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From Crisis Management to Realignment of Forces: The Diplomatic "Geometry" of the 1969–1978 Sino-Soviet Border Talks
- Journal of Cold War Studies
- The MIT Press
- Volume 24, Number 1, Winter 2022
- pp. 116-154
- Article
- Additional Information
Abstract:
In 1969, after a series of large-scale border clashes, the People's Republic of China (PRC) and the Soviet Union finally decided to enter negotiations to prevent a wider military confrontation. The de-escalation process that ensued gave Soviet and Chinese leaders two options: either to compromise and reach a settlement or to go back to a strategy of delay. This article shows that the choice between the two options depended on whether either state believed it could improve its relative position in a better political environment or could gain certain political advantage by immediately settling the dispute. Ultimately, both sides chose to return to a strategy of delay. The Chinese decision was influenced by the strategic configuration of U.S. "triangular" diplomacy and the hope that it would enhance the PRC's relative position. For Soviet officials, the outcome stemmed from a lack of trust in their Chinese counterparts.