Suffering and Mindfulness: A Neo-Darwinian Perspective

1. Introduction

Cultivating a form of awareness of embodied experience unmediated by discursive conceptualizations is a theme common to many Buddhist meditative practices, as well as contemporary, mindfulness-based psychotherapeutic interventions. In fact, in some Buddhist traditions, seeing through conventional, discursive conceptualizations to their ultimate emptiness is the key to escaping suffering (Nāgārjuna, MMK 25:24; Garfield 2015). This feature of Buddhist approaches to well-being distinguishes it from most if not all European philosophical and psychotherapeutic traditions. For example, discursive conceptualization is essential to Platonic and Aristotelian theories of human well-being (Annas 2011). In addition, it seems at odds with a contemporary, scientific, neo-Darwinian understanding of the human mind. In many versions of the neo-Darwinian picture of the mind, discursive conceptualizations are, ultimately, products of cognitive mechanisms selected in evolution because they generate accurate representations of the world and our place in it (Millikan 1984; Barkow et al. 1992; Pinker 1997). How else could cognitive mechanisms be adaptive? If this is true, then one should not expect practices aimed at neutralizing such discursive conceptualizations to yield mental well-being: how can not employing conceptualizations selected in evolution for their accuracy be adaptive? This seems analogous to not relying on evolved components of the body for physical health, for example, like trying to circulate the blood effectively without help from the heart.

I think this apparent puzzle is illusory. In the following pages, I argue that a proper understanding of the evolutionary roots of our discursive conceptualizations, and especially our discursive self-conceptualizations, is consistent with the Buddhist-inspired hypothesis that easing suffering requires a kind of liberation from them. Moreover, it can actually explain the therapeutic value of mindfulness, understood at least partly as a way of cultivating awareness of embodied experience unmediated by discursive conceptualizations. In section 1, I explain and defend a neo-Darwinian theory of the functions of our discursive self-conceptualizations, according to which they are selected not for accuracy but for their efficacy as coordination devices. The basic idea is that the mechanisms generating our discursive self-conceptualizations were selected to shape us into good coordination partners on cooperative projects, relative to our ambient social circumstances. In section 2, I look more closely at the proximate, neurally implemented means by which discursive self-conceptualizations succeed in shaping us in these ways. I argue that these mechanisms typically rely on negative affect, like aversion and other fearlike responses, to shape us to conform to our discursive self-conceptualizations. If this is true, then discursive self-conceptualizations are likely to cause a lot of psychological trauma. It is no surprise, therefore, that practices aimed at cultivating a kind of awareness unmediated by discursive conceptualizations, like Buddhist-inspired mindfulness-based therapies, can help ease a very human-specific form of suffering. In section 3, I apply this neo-Darwinian perspective to two related controversies about mindfulness: (1) whether it should indeed aim at a form of experience that is independent of discursive conceptualization, and (2) how to conceive of the liberation from suffering of which mindfulness is supposed to be a necessary component.

2. Darwinian Functions of Discursive Self-Conceptualization

The human talent at social coordination is well known. More than any other mammal, humans can coordinate on large-scale cooperative projects. There are a number of components to this talent that appear unique to our species. For example, we often coordinate on cooperative projects with people of whom we have very little personal knowledge, and coordination often involves very large numbers of individuals in extended periods of interaction.

It is notoriously difficult to explain the evolution of this notable, distinguishing feature of human sociality. There are two puzzling components of human coordination on cooperative projects: (1) cooperative motivations and (2) coordinative skill. It is difficult to explain the prevalence of cooperative motivations in human populations since these seem susceptible to undermining by free riders. Free riders should thrive in populations initially dominated by cooperatively motivated individuals, since they can reap the benefits of cooperation without paying the costs. Thus...