Abstract

abstract:

Many see narrative as important for life in terms of its persuasive value, including through the process of identification. This article examines narrative and argument with particular attention to how desire and self-image warp processes of narrative judgment and appropriation. In seeking a way to transcend only accepting narratives or storied accounts of important events that confirm what we want to believe, this article proposes the idea of narrative skepticism as a limiting disposition to our reactions to narratives we are poised to accept and those accepted by our partisan opponents. Narrative skepticism, if employed in a positive and pluralistic fashion, can follow through on the ideals posited by thinkers such as John Dewey that involve deeply democratic and unified communities of diverse but respectful partisans.

pdf

Additional Information

ISSN
1527-9383
Print ISSN
0891-625X
Pages
pp. 349-370
Launched on MUSE
2021-11-30
Open Access
No
Back To Top

This website uses cookies to ensure you get the best experience on our website. Without cookies your experience may not be seamless.