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The Rise of Right-Wing Populism in Brazil
- International Union Rights
- International Centre for Trade Union Rights
- Volume 26, Issue 3, 2019
- pp. 20-22
- 10.1353/iur.2019.a838211
- Article
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In June 2013, under the administration of President Dilma Rousseff, students took to the streets in São Paulo. Within weeks the demonstrations took on unexpected proportions, involving thousands of people of diverse origin (low-income service workers, the unemployed, young people), which often developed into violent street conflicts. Students initially demanded free public transportation, but as the demonstrations spread to other major urban centres, the protesters’ demands grew. The fact that the State of São Paulo police violently repressed one of the first demonstrations contributed to the escalation; images of the clashes were published across the world. Both government and opposition hedged their bets that the mood on the streets would eventually cool off, as it in fact did the following year. At this point, in 2014, the Federal Public Prosecutor’s Office initiated an investigation into fraudulent corruption involving Petrobras – a majority state-owned company for exploration, refining and distribution of oil and gas. The ‘LavaJato ’ (car wash) investigations exposed illegal forms of financing of a wide range of political parties (not only those that supported the PT administration). By May 2019, judicial police operations totalled 61, with more than one hundred imprisoned, including executives of state-owned companies, parliamentarians and executives of large private companies. The whole political-ideological universe was shaken. The same year witnessed an electoral campaign for the Presidency of the Republic and National Congress and a sharp slowdown in the economy, the beginning of the deepest recession of the last seventy years. The President began the campaign for reelection in a tone of polarisation that has continued until today. Rousseff was re-elected, in the second round, (with 51,64 percent of the votes). Less than 30 days after the outcome, the President announced a drastic fiscal adjustment and a second term for the neoliberal Economy Minister. With drastic fiscal adjustment, rising unemployment and inflation, government approval ratings declined rapidly. Street demonstrations returned, to protest corruption and fiscal adjustment. Demonstrations against corruption increasingly acquired a moralising tone, demonising political activity and flirting with the agenda of the military right-wing. Demonstrations of explicit nostalgia for the era of the Civil-Military Dictatorship began to appear. At this point, the Generals of the reserve began to publicly defend the rupture with the Federal Constitution in 1964 and its repetition if necessary. Legal institutions remained silent on veiled threats to the democratic constitutional order. In May 2016, following political and legal proceedings in the Federal Senate, a vote was taken to remove Rousseff from office. Vice President Michel Temer was inaugurated as President. His government implemented a conservative economic and political agenda; fiscal adjustment was more drastic; more tax concessions were for businesses; labour inspection services virtually paralyzed; and the state oil company’s monopoly was broken. In August 2016, the National Congress approves the Rousseff’s definitive impeachment and the axis of governability changed with the formation of a centre-right parliamentary majority, which then began to promote conservative liberal political and economic reforms. From 2013 to 2016 unemployment rose from 6.4 to 12.6 percent. Major state-owned enterprises such as public banks and oil exploration were privatised. In 2017, despite the efforts of business leaders and key media organisations the Temer government could not dissociate itself from the ethical crisis that had plagued Brazil’s institutions. Temer experienced a drastic fall in popularity. Brazil’s trade union context Since 1934, the State has provided an institutional framework for solving individual and collective conflicts, which became the Labour Court in 1943. Funding collected by the federal agency – until the recent Labour Reform – was a day of salary per year for each worker; unions also made compulsory contributions until a few years after the promulgation of the new federal Constitution (1988). Armed with public funding, providers of various legal assistance services bureaucratised themselves from the outset, in addition to providing a wide legal support service for workers, promoting a judicialisation of individual conflicts unprecedented in other union models. This scenario has been changing slowly since the adoption of the new constitutional text and the emergence of militant trade unionism and, originally, an opponent of the trade union structure, the Central Única dos...