How to Lose a War through Small Defeats: The Case of Turkey's Democratic Backsliding

The tradition of the oppressed teaches us that the "state of emergency" in which we live is not the exception but the rule. We must attain to a conception of history that accords with this insight. Then we will clearly see that it is our task to bring about a real state of emergency, and this will improve our position in the struggle against fascism. One reason fascism has a chance is that, in the name of progress, its opponents treat it as a historical norm.

—Benjamin [1940] 2003, 392

INTRODUCTION

The permanent state of emergency, which Walter Benjamin conceptualizes as an act and stance that will liberate the oppressed once perpetuated, is determined and administered by those who hold power. The oppressed themselves are unable to establish a permanent state of emergency as a means of their own liberation, and numerous examples from around the world illustrate the impasses created by nearpermanent states of emergency imposed and manipulated by those in power. In the relevant literature, Turkey has become an iconic case study, referred to alongside Poland and Hungary (the troublesome members of the EU) and several Latin American countries (including Brazil, Venezuela, Bolivia, and Colombia). But the dominant terminology seems to have slightly diverged from that initially envisaged by Benjamin and centered on "populism."¹ Still, Benjamin's views about the continuity of fascism highlight a present threat that has become more pronounced in the past 20 years, the period that has undermined liberal democratic constitutionalism's main achievements and institutions that originated during the second half of the twentieth century. Hence, liberal constitutionalism is today in an existential crisis and risks becoming a mere footnote in history.

This article specifically examines Turkey, a country that has never been able to emerge as a fully functioning constitutional democracy since its foundation in 1923. While not providing a class-centric explanation of Turkey's democratic backsliding in the last 20 years, it takes into account the achievements of the class-sensitive welfare state while situating the concept of "authoritarian populism" within the current crisis of liberal constitutionalism, for this seems to have replaced the concept of fascism employed by Benjamin in his project of accurately grasping history. The struggle for rights and freedoms is not yet sufficiently dynamic for a coercion-free world—a state of affairs that may be problematized as an element of democratic backsliding. By doing so, we avoid focusing solely on contractions in civil and political rights, and thereby avoid overlooking some of the steps that threaten liberal constitutionalism and cause its visible decline.

For a constitutional lawyer, then, what is the point of examining a country emblematic of constitutional populism and systematizing its relevant norms and facts? The German author Juli Zeh makes a distinction between the directions and aims of two related terms, "why" (warum) and "what for" (wozu). The "why" question approaches the past to find the reasons, background, and incitements, and seeks to deliberate the coherencies, while the "what for" question looks at the future, is speedy and demanding, and is economic in nature (Zeh 2016, 106). Any study that seeks to explain Turkey's current political and legal conundrums must ask both questions, because the backsliding of democratic institutions and the rule of law neither came about through abrupt ruptures nor has reached its ultimate stage. As Pierre Rosanvallon points out (2019, 37; 2020, 228), democracy is not static but rather is a dynamic process that keeps on writing its own history (see also Varol 2018, 339). So, for a different tomorrow, it is crucial that we holistically look at the small defeats and disruptions of the past that have led us to the present day, and that we understand them as causally related events. The political power that has singlehandedly ruled Turkey for almost 20 years has always placed its emphasis on "the battles," while the opposition parties unnecessarily occupied with "the war" have neglected smaller fronts. This divergence in emphasis and political priorities constitutes the main reason the opposition in Turkey currently suffers...