Updating Neoclassical Realism: A New Angle on Global Power Projection

From the vantage point of the international relations discipline, James Reilly's Orchestration: China's Economic Statecraft Across Asia and Europe and Kathryn Stoner's Russia Resurrected: Its Power and Purpose in a New Global Order are important books that contribute to the field both empirically and theoretically. Each book makes a unique contribution to its field of focus. Taken together, however, their respective contributions are magnified as they send an overarching message that challenges our assessments of global politics as well as the structure of the contemporary international system.

Empirically, the books explore global power projection by China and Russia and successfully debunk some deeply entrenched myths surrounding the assessments of the two countries' impact on the global order. Specifically, Reilly's analysis reveals that China does not—and is not likely to, as some might worry—"rule the world" any time soon. Economic diplomacy is naturally the main aspect of China's rise, and yet Beijing has not been fully successful in turning its economic strengths into tangible strategic results. Beijing's strategy of economic statecraft through expanding trade, aid, investment, and infrastructure projects in target countries largely leaves Chinese leaders unable to realize their political goals. Moreover, China's economic statecraft often exacerbates anxieties and distrust across the four different regions covered in the book: Western Europe, Central and Eastern Europe, North Korea, and Myanmar. For example, Beijing's major goals of securing market economy status, ending Europe's arms embargo, dissuading Pyongyang from pursuing nuclear weapons, and fostering a friendly image in Myanmar remain unachieved, despite decades-long efforts in the economic realm. Not only does China's deepening economic presence fail to wrest significant policy concessions, especially from the leaders of wealthy, stable democracies, but in fact it appears damaging for Beijing's diplomatic objectives (Reilly, p. 169). And since Beijing is unlikely to veer from its current, not spectacularly effective approach to economic statecraft, its capacity to project power overseas will remain limited and one-dimensional, not showing any strong signs of impending global political dominance by China.

While Reilly, by showing the limits of China's global power projection, adds a sobering note to what at times appear inflated assessments of China's global geopolitical clout, Stoner presents a compelling wake-up call to those who might be dismissing Russia as an insignificant regional actor in decline. Russia Resurrected introduces an innovative multidimensional understanding of power that goes beyond the traditional means of "men, military, and money" (Stoner, p. 27) and includes geographic domain and policy scope and weight associated with a country's external behavior as important metrics. Examining Russia's power in this way, Stoner demonstrates that, contrary to popular assessments, Russia is "good enough" not only to meddle in the affairs of its immediate geopolitical environment but also to dramatically alter the global balance of power (Stoner, p. 4). According to Stoner, Russia has not been declining since the end of the Cold War; rather, the country has been resurrecting itself while showing resilience to exogenous shocks, and using its power (hard, soft, and sharp) instrumentally to secure important economic and geopolitical benefits necessary for sustaining Vladimir Putin's autocratic political regime. Though domestic challenges are significant, Russia appears capable of challenging the global dominance of the still most powerful country—the United States.

Thus, the empirical message generated by the two books is critical for our understanding of global politics and the trends of global power transition. Paraphrasing Stoner, who argues that Russia is "neither as weak as we think, nor as strong as its leadership would like it to be viewed" (Stoner, p. 28), one way to summarize the critical takeaway from the two books together is: while Russia is not as weak as we think, China is not as powerful or influential as it looks. This finding has critical real-world implications, especially for the United States, which is finding it increasingly difficult to navigate the consolidating China-Russia alignment while still believing that Moscow, due to weakness, cannot well-manage closer strategic cooperation with Beijing.¹

The theoretical contributions of...