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  • Maritime Ryukyu, 1050–1650 by Gregory Smits
  • Harriet Zurndorfer
Maritime Ryukyu, 1050–1650 by Gregory Smits. Honolulu: University of Hawaiʻi Press, 2019. Pp. xiii + 303. $68.00 cloth, $28.00 paper.

The map on the cover of this fascinating book indicates the centrality of Ryukyu 琉球 in the maritime network extending from coastal Korea to the Japanese islands of Tsushima 対馬 and Iki 壱岐, along the western shore of Kyushu, and southward toward Taiwan and China’s littoral. Smits’s aim is to write a history of early Ryukyu outside the dominant framework of Confucian ideology. Much of this kingdom’s development from the late fourteenth century is tied to its role as a trading intermediary between Ming China and Southeast Asian dominions, as recorded in Lidai baoan 歴代宝案 (J. Rekidai hōan; [End Page 561] Precious documents of successive generations).1 Smits sees a need to reconsider the idea that situates Ryukyu as purely a tributary of China. His book goes beyond standard histories of diplomatic relations.

Smits’s approach is interdisciplinary, making use of archaeology and anthropology as well as literary study of the Omoro sōshi おもろさうし, a collection of Ryukyuan songs.2 He offers an alternative narrative of Ryukyu history that begins with the formation of power centers throughout the islands and examines their close connections with coastal regions of western Japan and Korea. Smits charts the chronology of his study between 1050, when these power centers known as gusuku 城 (wall-framed stone fortifications, or castles) first developed, and 1650, the year that Shō Shōken 向象賢 (1617–1675) published Chūzan seikan 中山世鑑 (Reflections on Chūzan [中山]), Ryukyu’s first official history. Chūzan seikan, written in Japanese, is based on oral testimonies and some transcribed accounts by Japanese and Korean visitors, as well as a number of Chinese records.

Maritime Ryukyu is divided into four parts, with each part consisting of three to five chapters. In part 1, “Ryukyu’s Network, 1050–1470,” Smits examines the geographical dimensions of the Ryukyu islands within the East Asian network of sea-lanes. Smits explains the distinctions among islands in what he calls the Northern Tier (including Kikai 喜界, Amami-Ōshima 奄美大島, and Tokushima 徳島, which are the nearest to Kyushu), the southern Okinawa 沖縄 islands, and the Sakishima 先島 islands, which are the closest to Taiwan. Smits argues that, until the thirteenth century, wealth and advanced technology were concentrated on the Northern Tier islands. But with the appearance of Chinese ceramics and Southeast Asian fragrant wines in Okinawa, a southward shift in material wealth began to take hold. During the fourteenth century, power centers developed in Okinawa while the locale’s main town Naha 那覇 became a prosperous international port. [End Page 562]

This fourteenth-century southward shift is significant for several reasons. First, Okinawa surpassed the Northern Tier islands as Ryukyu’s main center of gravity. This shift diverted maritime traffic from the Hakata 博多 (present-day Fukuoka)–Ningbo 寧波 route to the Takase 高瀬 (in southern Kyushu)–Fujian 褔建 route beginning in the 1340s. This change was due in part to the intensification of coastal depredations caused by Koryŏ-based wakō 倭寇 (armed raiders), whom Smits clearly analyzes as both a menace and a source of help in the delivery of goods and services within the region. Second, with Naha being the major intersection within the East China Sea network, both legitimate merchants and wakō (who engaged in trading Korean captives there) could be repatriated for compensation.

The third significance of the southward shift relates to the well-known tribute trade that the Ryukyu kingdom began in 1372 with Ming China. Anxious to facilitate security along the Chinese coast, Ming China banned all private overseas trade (under the haijin 海禁 [Ch., maritime ban] policy) from 1371. Although the first Ming emperor, Hongwu 洪武 (r. 1368–1398), was aware that wakō were active on the Ryukyu islands, he decided nevertheless to incorporate the kingdom into a legitimate conduit for trade goods that it could nominally supervise. Turning to Ryukyu made sense after negotiations with the volatile Japanese Prince Kaneyoshi 懐良親王 (1329–1383), the official ruler of the Southern Court of Japan, to control the same marauders had failed.

In order to facilitate Ryukyu’s entrance into the tributary system, the Ming government initially...

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