The Senses and the History of Philosophy ed. by Brian Glenney and José Filipe Silva (review)

This edited volume of newly commissioned papers aims to further understanding of the philosophy of perception and its history. It seeks a broad historical coverage, to include works outside the Western tradition and figures only newly prominent within the Western tradition (e.g. Margaret Cavendish). Its principal theme is the problem of perceptual error, which it asserts has been understudied, at least in antiquity and the middle ages, as has, allegedly, the history of theories of perception more generally. The individual chapters are typically of high quality and add to the extant literature. The focus, as is usual, is on visual perception, but blindness and touch come forward in three chapters on Molyneux's problem (two historical, one contemporary), and there is a chapter on olfaction.

The book partially delivers on its aim of cultural diversity. The first part addresses "non-Western perspectives." These turn out to be Chinese and Buddhist (in the Indian tradition), and it would have been more informative to use those names rather than defining the part by what it is not. The collection might have extended its treatment of non-Western traditions and theories had it chosen to include a chapter on Islamic theorists, including Ibn-Sina and Ibn al-Haytham, who are now given brief treatment in the chapter on medieval theories of perceptual error, which treats them in the narrative of optics (perspectiva) in the Latin West. More generally, the optical tradition, also including Ptolemy (second century, Alexandria, Egypt), and subsequently Roger Bacon, John Pecham, and Witelo, and extending to Kepler, might usefully have received greater attention, as this tradition provided a framework for thinking about both veridical and nonveridical perception into the early modern period. In this way, the chapter on mirror images in medieval theories might have been augmented or complemented.

In the section on early modern theories, the "African" (5) philosopher Anton Amo is introduced and his interesting claim examined that only the body, not the mind, is involved in perception. Amo was taken from his home in what is now Ghana as a toddler and raised in the principality of Brunswick-Wolfenbüttel. He was thus culturally and intellectually German. Not a single work on African philosophical thought is mentioned in interpreting Amo's work, which retains its interest in discussion of early modern European philosophy. The chapter is found in a part that covers Locke, Berkeley, Reid, and Cavendish, leaving Descartes (who wrote a Dioptrics) to be covered incidentally, through his influence (in this case, primarily on Amo and Cavendish). Plato and Aristotle are also present only through their influence.

The editors' claim (2) that previous work in this area has focused almost exclusively on veridical perception rather than error is not plausible. Illusion has long been a prominent topic in the history of theories of perception, not only in the early modern period and after (e.g. with the argument from illusion), but also in ancient and medieval philosophy, as attention to the work of David Hamlyn (Sensation and Perception: A History of the Philosophy of Perception [London: Routledge, 1961]), and various articles by Myles Burnyeat and Richard Sorabji, would show. None of these authors are mentioned in the book's essays or introductions—which of course does not take away from the fact that several of the chapters offer new reflections on perceptual error.

While there is indeed much more work to be done on the history of the philosophy of perception, as the editors say (2), the book provides little guidance to the extant literature. Various topical articles and books are referenced in the chapters of the six parts of the volume (on Chinese and Buddhist theories; ancient Greek; medieval; early modern; post-Kantian; and contemporary), but the editors missed an opportunity to notice prominent works that are not otherwise mentioned or are buried in footnotes. This would...