What if a Term Became an Assertion? Peirce on Rudimentary Assertions

The aim of this paper is to analyze an apparent paradox that exists in the concept of the assertiveness of terms, an idea put forth by Peirce in the manuscript R 787, c. 1896. The scrutiny of this case sheds new light on Peirce's speculative grammar, especially on his account of subject and predicate. After briefly reviewing the current relevance of Peirce's thought for speech act theories, this paper investigates the role of rudimentary assertions in Peirce's thought, which lies at the crossroads of semiotics, logic and linguistics. In order to reach this goal, this paper (i) considers the place of assertions in Peirce's thought; (ii) analyzes the general conditions for assertion, especially its syntactical structure; (iii) redefines Peirce's original concepts of subject, predicate and copula, which differ from traditional logic and Indo-European grammars; and (iv) explores the structure of reasoning tacitly assumed in our linguistic habits, such that even a term might be understood as assertoric.