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Introduction: Three Shades of Brown

The Nazi Past and Postwar Careers in Germany and Austria

THOMAS SCHLEMMER AND SUSANNA SCHRAFSTETTER

A History of Blunders?

In the histories of West and East Germany and the Second Austrian Republic, the continuity of Nazi elites in politics, society, economy and culture constitutes a central analytical challenge. In the three states that emerged from the Greater German Reich, following a brief period of denazification, large numbers of former National Socialists were allowed to continue their professional careers, even though all three of these states seriously distanced themselves from the so-called Third Reich. The Cold War, the focus on economic reconstruction, the shortcomings of denazification, the need for qualified personnel, and the extent of popular support for National Socialism before the end of the Second World War all facilitated the widespread professional, social, and political reintegration of former Nazis.¹ This fifth volume of the *German Yearbook of Contemporary History* is devoted to the reintegration of the *Funktionselementen*—elites defined by their functions in various areas of society, such as politics, the civil service, military, the economy, culture, science, law, and religion—and the relaunch of their careers in postwar Germany and Austria.²

The processes of reintegration were negotiated differently in West Germany, East Germany, and Austria, as the three states that emerged from the Reich embarked on different paths into the postwar world. All three states struggled with issues of legitimacy while seeking broad popular support for new models of society as well as international respectability. To achieve these goals, West Germany cast itself as a bulwark against communism and a firm supporter of European integration. Economic success would boost the popularity of democracy.³ For its part, the reestablished Austrian republic was to remain neutral in the Cold War and had to redefine Austrian nationalism

and identity. Leaving behind both National Socialism and the polarization of the First Republic, the Second Republic's elites sought a political climate of consensus and cooperation that was facilitated by a widely appealing historical narrative of Austria as Hitler's first victim.⁴ East Germany's legitimacy was based on its identity as an anti-fascist state—having eradicated the capitalistic roots of fascism—and its appropriation of the pre-1945 anti-fascist resistance. All Germans in the East were invited to join the struggle against fascism, which was portrayed to be alive and well in the West.⁵

Denazification took different forms in the German Democratic Republic (GDR), the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), and Austria, but in all three states the occupying powers' interest in carrying through the process faltered quickly.⁶ Partly buying into the notion of Austria as the first victim of Hitler, the Allies showed little appetite for denazification in Austria. By 1946 they tasked the Austrians with the continuation of the process "and limited themselves to a supervisory role."⁷ By 1948 an amnesty for *Minderbelastete* (lesser offenders) meant that denazification was finished for 90 percent of former National Socialists, and by the early 1950s most of the small number of *Belastete* (offenders) were either pardoned, or they had served their short sentences.⁸

In the Western zones of Germany, the temporary exclusion of former *Funktionseiliten* from political and economic life through internment by "automatic arrest" or denazification was reversed in the *Spruchkammerverfahren* (proceedings of the denazification courts). Yet the denazification courts did not merely serve as *Mitläuferfabriken* ("factories" producing fellow travelers), as Lutz Niethammer has claimed. After all, they imposed substantial fines, they took former National Socialists out of circulation during the crucially important immediate postwar period, and they made the crimes of the Nazi regime public. These are important points to consider, even though, ultimately, the denazification courts "worked toward a swift rehabilitation of the great masses of the population"⁹ and allowed many major offenders to get off lightly. In the socialist zone of occupation, 1948 marked the dissolution of the denazification commission. While the purge of elites was more thorough under the Soviets, especially in certain fields such as law, the state bureaucracy, or education, nominal Nazis were needed to build socialism and were given an opportunity to do so.¹⁰

Yet what the process of denazification meant for Nazi *Funktionseiliten* was an unexpected—albeit ultimately temporary—end to their bourgeois lives and professional careers. This temporary shock generated not so much moral soul-searching as the development of multiple strategies to obfuscate, white-

wash, and justify one's past.¹¹ The ugly stains of Nazism on the fabric of democracy damaged the legitimacy of the Federal Republic domestically, and even more so internationally,¹² but they did not pose any threat to the stability of democratic institutions. The former elites were generously reintegrated into the Federal Republic but, in return, they had to commit themselves to the anti-totalitarian consensus on which the republic was based. Anyone violating that consensus had to expect sanctions. This pressure to play by the rules of parliamentary democracy steadily increased in the second half of the 1950s and led *Funktionseliten* of the Nazi state to display a "cowering opportunism" which was both "an expression of, and a precondition for, the political neutralization of this group."¹³

In all three successor states to Nazi Germany, political parties competed for the votes of former National Socialists. Even in the anti-fascist GDR, they were given a political home in the shape of the nationalist National Democratic Party (NDPD, *Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands*).¹⁴ One of the so-called *Blockparteien* that were represented in the *Volkskammer*, but locked into a position of continuous inferiority to the ruling Socialist Unity Party of Germany (SED, *Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands*), the NDPD was designed to appeal specifically to former soldiers and Nazi supporters and mobilize their support for the socialist state. In Austria, former Nazi Party members were found in all political parties, but those who (secretly or openly) were nostalgic about the Nazi past found their political home in the Federation of Independents (VdU, *Verband der Unabhängigen*) and later in the Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ, *Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs*).¹⁵ In West Germany the small Socialist Reich Party (SRP, *Sozialistische Reichspartei*) was banned in 1952. Appealing to a clientele as diverse as its ideas and regional organizations, the Free Democratic Party (FDP, *Freie Demokratische Partei*) represented the interests of former National Socialists. Under the slogan of *nationale Sammlung* ("national rallying"), FDP party officials in North Rhine-Westphalia voiced their opposition to denazification and called for an amnesty for all imprisoned German war criminals.¹⁶ By the early 1950s a network of former employees in Goebbels's Reich Ministry of Propaganda had subverted the FDP in the state of North Rhine-Westphalia and was about to take over the party organization.¹⁷

What were the limits to this reintegration of former National Socialists? The attempted takeover of the FDP by former National Socialists was forestalled in 1953 when the British arrested the ringleaders. While British action highlighted German inertia in 1953,¹⁸ the Allies intervened only this one time. If the re-employment of Hans Globke, *Ministerialrat* in Hitler's Ministry of

the Interior, co-author of a legal commentary to the Nuremberg Laws, but never a member of the Nazi Party, pushed the limits to integration in the Federal Republic, that of Franz von Papen, instrumental in putting Hitler in the saddle in 1933 and serving as the Führer's vice-chancellor, lay beyond those limits.¹⁹ While Chancellor Konrad Adenauer appointed Globke to be chief of staff in his chancellery, Papen's postwar political ambitions were thwarted in the Bonn Republic. The practice of where exactly the line was drawn depended on multiple factors and was by no means limited to the issue of earlier membership in the Nazi Party and other Nazi organizations. These factors played out differently in different countries, in different fields of employment, and at different points in time.²⁰ For example, in the West German Ministry of the Interior, the bar for employing Nazi-era civil servants was lowered under Minister Robert Lehr, who succeeded Gustav Heinemann in 1950.²¹ This example also shows that top officials in the Adenauer government held different views on who was considered to be reusable and who was not.²² This is how disgraceful careers "which never should have been allowed" and which, to this day, cast "a shadow on the beginnings of the Federal Republic" became possible.²³

In the 1950s, elites returned to their positions as civil servants in ministries, as generals in the armed forces, as journalists and pundits in the media, as managers in industry, as lawyers and judges in the courts, and as professors at the universities. However, a variety of factors led to a growing concern over the suitability for office of people who had been active in the Nazi period. In a political climate of increasing liberalization, debates about the limits to the reintegration of such persons intensified. These debates were also influenced by the GDR campaigns against former Nazis in the FRG and the publication of the *Braunbuch* ("Brown Book") in 1965—a who's who of former National Socialists in West Germany.²⁴ The Eichmann trial in 1961, which raised questions internationally about how Germans dealt with their Nazi past, was another factor, and so was the generational change of the 1960s. While the *Brown Book* was dismissed as cheap propaganda in the Cold War, the basic validity of the book's central point could hardly be negated.²⁵ In 1968 Beate Klarsfeld's famous slap in the face of Chancellor Kiesinger was controversial, but Germans did discuss whether a member of the Nazi Party from 1933 to 1945 was an appropriate choice for the office of chancellor of the Federal Republic.²⁶

By the time the Social-Liberal coalition government was formed in 1969, the limits of what was considered acceptable had come to be defined more narrowly. However, even under Chancellor Willy Brandt the practice of promoting highly incriminated individuals was not abandoned completely,²⁷ and many of those who had been reintegrated in the 1950s remained in their

positions. The generation of elites who started their professional careers in the 1930s did not retire until the 1970s. Also, many of these highly incriminated individuals had missed the change of the political and social climate: “Was damals Rechtens war [. . .], das kann heute nicht Unrecht sein” (“What was lawful then [. . .], cannot be unlawful today”)²⁸ is how in 1978 the *Ministerpräsident* of Baden-Württemberg, Hans Filbinger, justified a death sentence he had issued against a deserter in 1945 in his then function as a military judge. Revealing a remarkable lack of understanding of the moral wrongdoing on his part, Filbinger had to step down a few months later.²⁹ Those still in office in the 1970s were confronted with both a change in standards of what was considered acceptable and the beginning of scrutiny of their careers by historians.

History and Historiography

It is perhaps not surprising that historians have only recently started to analyze the question of continuity and discontinuity in Nazi careers in postwar Germany and Austria. While the beginnings reach back to the 1970s, most of the work was produced in the 2000s. Historical studies that were published early attracted the wrath of former Nazi *Funktionselementen* who were still alive or even professionally active. For example, when Hans-Jürgen Döscher published his critical study of the Foreign Office in 1987, he was fiercely criticized by (former) diplomats and older pundits.³⁰ After the end of the Cold War more documents became available beyond the former Iron Curtain, and more and more Nazi-era official documents and personal papers were opened for research by German archives. Other factors, however, still hampered historical analysis. In history, and in other fields, a younger generation of scholars proved unwilling to scrutinize the Nazi pasts of their revered academic mentors. The controversy over the role of political scientist Theodor Eschenburg during the Nazi period is indicative of these conflicts.³¹

Research into the *Belastungsgeschichte*³² (the history of the burden resulting from the legacy of Nazism and the Holocaust) of postwar Germany and Austria began with critical inquiry into the process of denazification. Works by Lutz Niethammer and Dieter Stiefel laid the foundation³³ and were followed by a large number of studies, often with a regional or comparative approach.³⁴ Following this focus on denazification, individuals and entire professions came under scrutiny by historians. Studies of the legal profession under Nazism and of doctors who had participated in the so-called Nazi euthanasia program were among the first, appearing in the 1980s.³⁵ These early works triggered

numerous case studies of individuals, networks, professions, and institutions, a trend that has continued,³⁶ with more recent research including, for example, soccer clubs and carnival societies.³⁷ In Austria, the Waldheim Affair of the late 1980s and early 1990s chipped some cracks in the founding myth of Austria as the first victim of Nazism.³⁸ In the wake of the scandal over President Kurt Waldheim's military record and his potential implication in war crimes, historians published pioneering work on Austria under National Socialism and also more broadly on the continuities between National Socialism and the Austrian Second Republic.³⁹ A large chunk of the latter focused on the rising star of the FPÖ, the party's controversial populist leader Jörg Haider.⁴⁰

Following the end of the Cold War, American class action lawsuits against companies that had employed slave labor and had benefited from "Aryanization" not only triggered belated payments of restitution to victims of Nazism, but also forced the German global players of industry to deal more openly with their companies' history under National Socialism. In fact, many CEOs hired individual or entire teams of historians to research and write the histories of their companies.⁴¹ This trend, which started in the 1990s, has produced numerous publications—among them histories of German banks, insurance companies, food producers, and automobile manufacturers, to name just a few.⁴² This careful scrutiny of the private sector preceded systematic investigation of state bureaucracies. Some studies of German ministries under Nazism began to appear in the 1970s but for a long time they remained limited to a handful of books.⁴³ It was only in 2003 that a major controversy within the German foreign ministry (*Auswärtiges Amt*) prompted Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer (Green Party) to announce the formation of an historians' commission to examine the role of his ministry during the Nazi years. Civil servants in the ministry had publicly criticized Fischer for his refusal to allow obituaries of diplomats who had been Nazi Party members to be published in the ministry's internal newsletter. As a consequence, Fischer commissioned comprehensive research on the history of the *Auswärtiges Amt* under Nazism.⁴⁴ Following the publication of the results in 2010,⁴⁵ other ministries followed suit, and most ministries have by now been subjected to detailed studies by historians.⁴⁶

While large-scale studies of individual ministries, companies, and institutions have generated important results, they have not been above criticism.⁴⁷ In some cases, the principals wanted to predetermine certain results. Typically, the studies were expected to appear quickly, the contracts went to a small number of influential academic chairholders in Germany.⁴⁸ One of the most glaring examples of the potentially problematic nature of commissioned re-

search was the appointment of an historical commission by Austria's FPÖ in 2018, in the wake of several scandals involving antisemitic Nazi songbooks circulating within the party and within rightwing student fraternities with close party connections.⁴⁹ The commission, consisting of handpicked individuals sympathetic to the FPÖ, presented a final report in December 2019, which was then scathingly condemned by professional historians.⁵⁰

Today, moral outrage over the levels of continuity across 1945 has contributed to a prolific application of the term "Nazi." But not all of those who willingly served the Nazi state in influential positions were active National Socialists or members of the NSDAP. Karl Hettlage, Albert Speer's right-hand man, who became state secretary in the Federal Ministry of Finance in 1959, may serve as an example. Hettlage had not been a member of the party.⁵¹ High-ranking *Wehrmacht* officers who participated in war crimes were not necessarily National Socialists. Moreover, among the party members there were true believers, opportunists, and nominal members. There were the *alte Kämpfer* (members of the old guard) who had joined the party before 1933, the ideologues whom Michael Wildt labeled the "uncompromising generation,"⁵² and anti-republican conservatives who often joined the party in 1933 or later. The percentage of former party members in the Federal Ministry of Finance in 1959 by itself, therefore, provides only limited insight into the nature of elite continuity. Hettlage, for example, would not be included in that number.⁵³ How many of them had been members of the SS or SA? When did they join the party? How many had worked in higher positions in the Reich Ministry of Finance? A close look at individual biographies is necessary to gain a nuanced picture of the depth, breadth, and nature of the continuity.

Multiple studies of companies and ministries notwithstanding, there still remain some important lacunae in the research on the continuity of Nazi *Funktionselementen* into the post-1945 societies.

While several studies have undertaken comparisons of East and West German ministries,⁵⁴ and others have focused on continuities between the *Wehrmacht* and the East German *Nationale Volksarmee*,⁵⁵ the GDR has not been scrutinized to the same extent as its West German counterpart. In the area of economics, Frank Bajohr and Johannes Hürter have pointed out that, below the level of multinational companies, little work has been done on German businesses and business leaders during the Nazi and postwar years.⁵⁶ And despite some existing studies of provincial (*Länder*) ministries in West Germany, more work is needed on continuities on the regional level.⁵⁷ With regard to Austria, to what extent did national ministries or government institutions such as the *Verfassungsschutz* employ former National Socialists?

These questions still demand answers. In 1998 the Austrian government tasked a commission to examine all forms of expropriation of property in Austria during the Nazi period, as well as the extent of compensation and restitution after 1945. The research produced almost fifty volumes of results, but this rigorous study was an exception for Austria, where the kind of *Auftragsforschung* (commissioned research) that has gone on in Germany has been lacking (as it has also been in Italy).⁵⁸ Austrian historians have begun to address personnel continuities in the major political parties, but much work remains to be done.⁵⁹ Given the current political context, Margit Reiter's study of the origins of the FPÖ published in 2019 serves as a model for where future research on the Austrian case should lead.⁶⁰

An additional gap in the relevant historiography is an assessment of how political, social, and regional milieus and mentalities allowed or hindered the reintegration of former elites. Which social networks facilitated reintegration and which networks opposed it?⁶¹ Individual case studies can shed light on specific milieus and mentalities, gauging the continuity of mentalities and the limits placed on the acceptance of implicated individuals.

These questions are tied to the fundamental question about the long-term success of democracy in Germany and Austria. Axel Schildt has posed the central question for the writing of West German history as a *Belastungsgeschichte*: “given the depressing material and moral burdens, how could a civilized and democratic polity emerge that today seemingly naturally fits in with normal international standards?”⁶² Answering this question requires an analysis of a multitude of individuals, networks, and institutions and mindsets.

The Nazi Past and Postwar Careers

This volume seeks to address some, but by no means all, of the lacunae described above by examining and contextualizing four individual biographies. It presents in English translation four articles that originally appeared in German in the *Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte*. In addition, it presents three commentaries, written specifically for this volume, that expand on the central themes, facilitate comparison, and consider the current political relevance of these issues. In our view it is particularly important to publish these works in English, as most of the recent works about the careers of Nazi functional elites in postwar Germany has appeared exclusively in German. With the exception of the study of the Foreign Office, research on German ministries has mostly been conducted without input from scholars outside of Germany. By contrast, much of the pioneering work in the field appeared originally in English, having

been produced by colleagues based in the United States, Britain, and Israel. Some of it has recently been (re)discovered.⁶³

At the heart of this volume are case studies of four individuals—Kurt Ziesel, Otto Brunner, Anton Reinhaller, and Max Frauendorfer—and three overarching, central themes. The first theme involves the different strategies pursued by highly incriminated individuals after the war for dealing with their checkered pasts. The second theme concerns the limits to postwar reintegration. The third theme relates to the impact on postwar Germany and Austria of the continuity of a certain set of ideas among *Funktionseliten*. These ideas consisted of a fusion of National Socialist, *völkisch*, nationalist, and conservative strands of ideology that slowed down the process of social liberalization, or what Ulrich Herbert has called the *Lernprozess* (learning process) of *Liberalisierung*.⁶⁴

The strategies of dealing with a checkered individual past were manifold in postwar Germany and Austria. Most commonly, people tried to obfuscate past positions and responsibilities, seeking to resume professional success quietly, without drawing too much attention to their pre-1945 careers.⁶⁵ Others sought the political limelight despite a high degree of *Belastung*, regardless of the risks and the scandalizing potential of such a move. Some members of this second group established themselves as “troublemakers” who diverted criticism by pointing the finger at Germans or Austrians belonging to the first group, those who covered up compromising pasts, in an effort to facilitate their own return to positions of influence.

One example of such a “troublemaker” was the author and journalist Kurt Ziesel, who had joined the Nazi Party in 1931. He had served as editor of the *Neues Wiener Tagblatt* and written for several Nazi papers, including the *Völkischer Beobachter*. Having moved to Germany after 1945, Ziesel faced problems while trying to regain a foothold in journalism. In response, he lambasted the adaptability and hypocrisy of liberal writers and pundits who had been supportive of the Nazi regime. In his contribution to this volume, Axel Schildt analyzes Ziesel’s strategy of systematically exposing embarrassing Nazi-era biographical details about editors of major newspapers and prominent writers. Ziesel used this strategy to claim that all those conservative writers and intellectuals who had remained true to their convictions were victimized by opportunists at the altar of a new, liberal *zeitgeist*. Schildt demonstrates that those who were attacked by Ziesel proved unable to defend themselves effectively. But, as Schildt shows, Ziesel’s case also illustrates the limits of reintegration, as Ziesel, despite receiving applause from the right wing of the Christian Democrats, was unable to resume his career as editor of a major

newspaper or magazine. The scandalizing potential of exposing the pre-1945 Nazi allegiances of postwar liberal elites has not abated, as the example of writer Günter Grass has demonstrated.⁶⁶

Commenting on Axel Schildt's case study of Ziesel, Mary Fulbrook argues that Ziesel and others who scandalized the Nazi pasts of prominent individuals, whether as a critique from the left or, more unusually, as in the case of Ziesel, from the right, overlooked the central question. Given the reintegration of former elites on such a massive scale, the key question was whether it made a difference for postwar German society. For example, what did the continuity in mentalities among German judges mean for the perpetrators of Nazi crimes and for their victims? While the Nazi-era careers of prominent individuals were discussed critically in an increasingly liberal public sphere, it was the continuity of ideas and mindsets that had real practical consequences for German society.

Hans-Henning Kortüm's article about the historian Otto Brunner contributes to our understanding of continuities in higher education and, more specifically, in the field of history.⁶⁷ A revered *Ordinarius* for medieval and early modern history and rector at the University of Hamburg in 1959/60, Brunner had been dismissed from his professorship at the University of Vienna in 1945 because of his close affinity for National Socialism. While Brunner had been considered unacceptable as a professor of history in postwar Vienna because of his Nazi past, his powerful professional mentor Hermann Aubin—also steeped in National Socialism—made Brunner's postwar career in Germany possible. Kortüm not only details the extent of Brunner's enthusiasm for Nazism, but also shows how Brunner's work remained deeply influenced by *völkisch*-nationalist thought after 1945. Brunner's depictions of medieval society were only contested in the 1980s, testifying to the longevity of interpretations of history based on Nazi ideology. Brunner thought of himself as belonging to the German *Volk* and gladly left behind the Second Austrian Republic. Both Brunner and Ziesel serve as examples of the migration of *Funktionseliten* from Austria to Germany, which was in part a strategy for obfuscating their pasts, and in part an expression of their ideological attachments to a Greater Germany.

Thomas Schlemmer's contribution examines the limits to reintegration in the realm of West German politics. Focusing on the case of Max Frauendorfer, who had headed the Labor Division (*Hauptabteilung Arbeit*) in the German administration of the General Government of Nazi-occupied Poland and held a high SS rank, Schlemmer shows that the bar to reintegration was higher in politics than in other fields. A member of the Bavarian Christian Social

Union (CSU, *Christlich-Soziale Union*), Max Frauendorfer was not content with quietly pursuing a successful career in the insurance industry. He also ran for political office. Hoping to be nominated as a CSU candidate for the Bavarian Landtag and the Bundestag, he presented his Nazi past as one of early disillusionment with Nazism. He remained silent about certain incriminating facts and played up contacts to members of the resistance. This strategy proved to be unsuccessful, not only because the press reported critically about the case, but also because some leading members of the CSU who had opposed Nazism felt uncomfortable with the degree of Frauendorfer's *Belastung* and the way in which he had misrepresented the facts. Schlemmer's contribution includes the minutes of the tumultuous discussions within the leadership of the CSU district in Munich about Frauendorfer's candidacy. Frauendorfer had powerful supporters, including Franz Josef Strauß, as well as uncompromising opponents such as Dr. Josef Müller and Dr. Erwin Hamm. The CSU leadership and the party's base comprised both supporters and opponents of Nazism. Frauendorfer was too tainted by National Socialism to be acceptable to the latter group, and media scrutiny of the case also caused the CSU leadership to discourage his candidacy.

By contrast, Margit Reiter shows that the FPÖ was formed as a reservoir for former National Socialists and did not recognize limits to reintegration. In the immediate postwar period, many Austrian National Socialists who remained true believers joined the VdU, a short-lived political party that collapsed from internal factionalism in 1956, a mere seven years after its formation. Reiter shows how Anton Reinthaller, a high-ranking National Socialist, managed to become a charismatic leadership figure among supporters of National Socialism, and in 1956 established the newly founded FPÖ as their political home. As *alter Kämpfer*, SS officer, and Nazi minister, Reinthaller commanded authority among Austrian National Socialists. Having sought a compromise between traditional conservatives and supporters of Hitler before 1938, he had a reputation as an integrative figure. Reiter highlights the significant contribution of Christian conservatives to the denazification of supposedly "moderate" National Socialists like Reinthaller. The formation of the FPÖ as a major political party also suited the Austrian People's Party (ÖVP, *Österreichische Volkspartei*). As a third force in Austrian politics, it could prove itself a valuable ally against the main rival, the Social Democratic Party of Austria (SPÖ, *Sozialdemokratische Partei Österreichs*).

In his commentary "The Limits of Integration," Gerald Steinacher expands the discussion to address many issues raised by Reiter's and Schlemmer's articles. As Steinacher shows, Frauendorfer's case was unusual. Many

individuals with a similarly high degree of *Belastung* shied away from the political limelight, instead pursuing highly successful careers in industry, where the level of public scrutiny was much lower. Steinacher also points out that, in the German case, the limits to integration were ultimately set by the Allies, whereas in Austria the Allies did not continue to monitor political developments. There were few limits to integration, with the exception of the necessity not to openly challenge the postwar political realities. The hard core of the Austrian National Socialists did not subscribe to the integrating narrative of Austria as Hitler's first victim but regarded the Second Austrian Republic, separated from Germany, as an historical abomination. These sentiments could only be expressed in a veiled manner. But within this community of like-minded individuals mindsets and mentalities were passed on to future generations. In the 1990s, the rise of Jörg Haider proved that Nazi ideas remained acceptable within the party. These long-term consequences are particularly important given more recent developments in Austria, such as the inclusion of the FPÖ in a coalition government in 2017.

The volume concludes with a contribution by Andreas Wirsching, who, drawing on the results of a study of the West German Ministry of the Interior, examines two types of mental continuities. The first was the core National Socialist ideology, as espoused by true believers in Nazism, which resulted in the persistence of antisemitism and racism after 1945. The second was rooted in the long-term continuity of antidemocratic and anti-pluralist conservative thinking that had had its roots in Imperial Germany, had then been amalgamated into National Socialist ideology, and which remained widespread in the postwar German state bureaucracy. What ultimately ensured the success of parliamentary democracy despite these continuities were numerous learning processes that the *Funktionseliten* of the Federal Republic, and society more broadly, underwent in the late 1950s and 1960s. This continued collective learning anchored democracy and pluralism more and more firmly in Germany.

This fifth German Yearbook of Contemporary History, dedicated to the careers of National Socialist *Funktionseliten*, highlights the different shades of brown that persisted in Germany and Austria after 1945. Behind a large number of scandalous careers lay diverse strategies of adaptation and the persistence of mentalities. The impact of these continuities on the Federal Republic, as well as the belated learning processes initiated by the Allies, help elucidate the multifaceted nature of German and Austrian *Belastungsgeschichte*. The comparison between Germany and Austria not only underscores the differing role of the Allies when it came to creating and upholding an anti-totalitarian

consensus in the two countries. It also shows the varying degrees to which networks and sociopolitical milieus made the reintegration of former elites as well as the transgenerational preservation of mentalities outside this consensus possible—a process that continues to this day.

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December 1, 2020

Notes

1. A brief overview is provided by Andreas Maislinger, "'Vergangenheitsbewältigung' in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, der DDR und Österreich: Psychologisch-pädagogische Maßnahmen im Vergleich," in *Deutschland-Archiv* 23, no. 8 (August 1990): 1358–67.

2. The term *Funktionseleiten* was originally coined by the sociologist Otto Stammer in the 1950s. Stammer wrote that the term "seeks to define the leading circles of society and state by their respective functions that they fulfill within the social and political interrelationship," Otto Stammer, "Elite und Elitenbildung," in Wilhelm Bernsdorf, ed., *Wörterbuch der Soziologie* (Stuttgart: Enke, 1969), 218. Ralf Dahrendorf defined the areas of state and society in which different *Funktionseleiten* operate. Ibid., 219. See also Ralf Dahrendorf, *Society and Democracy in Germany* (Garden City: Doubleday, 1969), 208–09.

3. For an insightful overview of German reconstruction, the "economic miracle," western integration, and the ways in which Germany dealt with the Nazi past in the 1950 (including

bibliographical references) see Ulrich Herbert, *Geschichte Deutschlands im 20. Jahrhundert* (Munich: C.H.Beck, 2014), 619–97.

4. See Margit Reiter, *Die Ehemaligen: Der Nationalsozialismus und die Anfänge der FPÖ* (Göttingen: Wallstein, 2019), 17–18.

5. See Herfried Münkler, “Antifaschismus und antifaschistischer Widerstand als politischer Gründungsmythos der DDR,” in *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte* 45 (October 1998): 16–29.

6. See Klaus-Dietmar Henke and Hans Woller, eds., *Politische Säuberung in Europa: Die Abrechnung mit Faschismus und Kollaboration nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg* (Munich: Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag, 1991).

7. Reiter, *Die Ehemaligen*, 18.

8. *Ibid.*, 21–22.

9. Lutz Niethammer, *Entnazifizierung in Bayern: Säuberung und Rehabilitierung unter amerikanischer Besatzung* (Frankfurt a. M.: S. Fischer, 1972), 623; new ed.: *Die Mitläuferfabrik: Die Entnazifizierung am Beispiel Bayerns* (Berlin: Dietz, 1982).

10. See Helga A. Welsh, “‘Antifaschistisch-demokratische Umwälzung’ und politische Säuberung in der sowjetischen Besatzungszone Deutschlands,” in Henke and Woller, eds., *Politische Säuberung*, 84–107, here 86, 97.

11. On this consequence, resulting in particular from postwar internment, see for example Ulrich Herbert, “NS-Eliten in der Bundesrepublik,” in Wilfried Loth and Bernd-A. Rusinek, eds. *Verwandlungspolitik: NS-Eliten in der westdeutschen Nachkriegsgesellschaft* (Frankfurt a. M.: Campus Verlag, 1998), 93–115, here 100–01; Christoph Strauß, “Zwischen Apathie und Selbstrechtfertigung: Die Internierung NS-belasteter Personen in Württemberg-Baden,” in Paul Hoser and Reinhard Baumann, eds., *Kriegsende und Neubeginn: Die Besatzungszeit im schwäbisch-alemannischen Raum* (Konstanz: UVK, 2003), 287–314, here 311–13.

12. See Ulrich Brochhagen, *Nach Nürnberg: Vergangenheitsbewältigung und Westintegration in der Ära Adenauer* (Hamburg: Junius, 1994).

13. Ulrich Herbert, “Als die Nazis wieder gesellschaftsfähig wurden: Vom raschen Wiederaufstieg der NS-Eliten und von der Frage: Wie konnte aus der Bundesrepublik dennoch eine stabile Demokratie werden?,” *Die Zeit*, January 10, 1997, 34.

14. For the foundation of the NDPD see Bernd Gottberg, “Die Gründung und die ersten Jahre der NDPD 1948–1954,” in Jürgen Frölich, ed., *‘Bürgerliche’ Parteien in der SBZ/DDR. Zur Geschichte von CDU, LDP(D), DBD und NDPD 1945 bis 1953* (Cologne: Verlag Wissenschaft und Politik, 1995), 73–87.

15. See Reiter, *Die Ehemaligen*, 12–13, and Margit Reiter’s contribution to this volume.

16. See Kristian Buchna, *Nationale Sammlung an Rhein und Ruhr: Friedrich Middelhaue und die nordrhein-westfälische FDP, 1945–1953* (Munich: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 2010).

17. See *ibid.*; Norbert Frei, *Adenauer’s Germany and the Nazi Past: The Politics of Amnesty and Integration*, trans. Joel Golb (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002), 277–302. The book was originally published as *Vergangenheitspolitik: Die Anfänge der Bundesrepublik und die NS-Vergangenheit* (Munich: C.H.Beck, 1996).

18. Frei, *Adenauer’s Germany*, 283–84.

19. For von Papen’s failed efforts to regain political influence, see for example Reiner

Möckelmann, *Franz von Papen. Hitlers ewiger Vasall* (Darmstadt: von Zabern, 2016), 411–13, 420.

20. On this point see for example Frank Bösch and Andreas Wirsching, “Einleitung,” in Frank Bösch and Andreas Wirsching, eds., *Hüter der Ordnung: Die Innenministerien in Bonn und Ost-Berlin nach dem Nationalsozialismus* (Göttingen: Wallstein, 2018), 13–26, here 20–21, and the contribution by Gerald Steinacher in this volume.

21. See Frank Bösch and Andreas Wirsching, “Die deutschen Innenministerien nach dem Nationalsozialismus: Eine Bilanz,” in *ibid.*, 729–49, here 736.

22. See *ibid.*

23. Peter Graf Kielmannsegg, *Lange Schatten: Vom Umgang der Deutschen mit der nationalsozialistischen Vergangenheit* (Berlin: Siedler, 1989), 24.

24. See *Braunbuch: Kriegs- und Naziverbrecher in der Bundesrepublik*, ed. by Nationalrat der Nationalen Front des Demokratischen Deutschland (Berlin/East: Staatsverlag der DDR, 1965). On the Braunbook and the GDR campaigns against implicated judges and other officials in West Germany see Annette Weinke, *Die Verfolgung von NS-Tätern im geteilten Deutschland. Vergangenheitsbewältigungen 1949–1969 oder: Eine Deutsch-Deutsche Beziehungsgeschichte im Kalten Krieg* (Paderborn: Schöningh, 2002), 76–108, 141–60; Michael Lemke, “Kampagnen gegen Bonn: Die Systemkrise der DDR und die West-Propaganda der SED, 1960–1963,” *Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte* 41, no. 2 (April 1993): 153–74; Manfred Görtemaker, “Die heile Welt der Rosenburg. Das Bundesministerium der Justiz und die NS-Vergangenheit,” in Stefan Creuzberger and Dominik Geppert, eds., *Die Ämter und ihre Vergangenheit. Ministerien und Behörden im geteilten Deutschland 1949–1972* (Paderborn: Schöningh, 2018), 47–70, here 62–68.

25. *Ibid.*, 65.

26. See Philipp Gassert, *Kurt Georg Kiesinger, 1904–1988: Kanzler zwischen den Zeiten* (Munich: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 2006), 480–92, 648–59. For a detailed overview of the changes in 1960s and 70s see Torben Fischer and Matthias N. Lorenz, eds., *Lexikon der “Vergangenheitsbewältigung” in Deutschland: Debatten- und Diskursgeschichte des Nationalsozialismus nach 1945* (Bielefeld: Transcript, 2007).

27. See Eckart Conze et al., *Das Amt und die Vergangenheit: Deutsche Diplomaten im Dritten Reich und in der Bundesrepublik* (Berlin: Blessing, 2010), 663–64; Susanna Schrafstetter, “A Nazi Diplomat Turned Apologist for Apartheid: Gustav Sonnenhol, *Vergangenheitsbewältigung* and West German Foreign Policy towards South Africa,” *German History* 28, no. 1 (March 2010): 44–66, here 59.

28. “Affäre Filbinger: ‘Was Rechtsens war ...,’” *Der Spiegel*, May 15, 1978.

29. See Wolfram Wette, ed., *Filbinger: Eine deutsche Karriere* (Springe: zu Klampen, 2006).

30. See Hans-Jürgen Döscher, *Das Auswärtige Amt im Dritten Reich: Diplomatie im Schatten der “Endlösung”* (Berlin: Siedler, 1987). On the attacks against Döscher, see Conze et al., *Amt*, 696–98.

31. See the contribution of Andreas Wirsching, footnote 7, in this volume.

32. The term *Belastungsgeschichte* was coined by Axel Schildt. See “Fünf Möglichkeiten,

die Geschichte der Bundesrepublik zu erzählen," *Blätter für deutsche und internationale Politik* 44, no. 10 (October 1999): 1234–44, reprinted in: Frank Bajohr et al. eds. *Mehr als eine Erzählung: Zeitgeschichtliche Perspektiven auf die Bundesrepublik* (Göttingen: Wallstein, 2016), 15–28.

33. See Dieter Stiefel, *Entnazifizierung in Österreich* (Vienna: Europa Verlag, 1981); Niethammer, *Mitläuferfabrik*.

34. See Sebastian Meissl, Klaus-Dieter Mulley, and Oliver Rathkolb, eds., *Verdrängte Schuld, verfehlte Sühne: Entnazifizierung in Österreich 1945–1955* (Munich: R. Oldenbourg, 1986); Klaus-Dietmar Henke, *Politische Säuberung unter französischer Besatzung: Die Entnazifizierung in Württemberg-Hohenzollern* (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1981); Clemens Vollnhals, ed., *Entnazifizierung: Politische Säuberung und Rehabilitierung in den vier Besatzungszonen 1945–1949* (Munich: Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag, 1991); Timothy R. Vogt, *Denazification in Soviet-Occupied Germany: Brandenburg, 1945–1948* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000); Benita Blessing, *The Antifascist Classroom: Denazification in Soviet-Occupied Germany, 1945–1949* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006); Thomas Schlemmer, "Ein gelungener Fehlschlag? Die Geschichte der Entnazifizierung nach 1945," in Martin Löhnig, ed., *Zwischenzeit: Rechtsgeschichte der Besatzungsjahre* (Regenstauf: Edition Rechtskultur, 2011), 9–33.

35. See Ingo Müller, *Furchtbare Juristen: Die unbewältigte Vergangenheit unserer Justiz* (Munich: Kindler, 1987); Ernst Klee, *Was sie taten—was sie wurden: Ärzte, Juristen und andere Beteiligte am Kranken- oder Judenmord* (Frankfurt a. M.: Fischer Taschenbuch, 1986).

36. See Frei, *Adenauer's Germany*; Ulrich Herbert, *Best: Biographische Studien über Radikalismus, Weltanschauung und Vernunft, 1903–1989* (Bonn: Dietz, 1996); Loth and Rusinek, eds., *Verwandlungspolitik*; Paul Erker and Toni Pierenkemper, eds., *Deutsche Unternehmer zwischen Kriegswirtschaft und Wiederaufbau: Studien zur Erfahrungsbildung von Industrie-Eliten* (Munich: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 1999); Philipp-Christian Wachs, *Der Fall Theodor Oberländer (1905–1998): Ein Lehrstück deutscher Geschichte* (Frankfurt a. M.: Campus Verlag, 2000); Norbert Frei, ed., *Karrieren im Zwielicht: Hitlers Eliten nach 1945* (Frankfurt a. M.: Campus Verlag, 2001); Steven P. Remy, *The Heidelberg Myth: The Nazification and Denazification of a German University* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002); Markus Roth, *Herrenmenschen: Die deutschen Kreishauptleute im besetzten Polen—Karrierewege, Herrschaftspraxis und Nachgeschichte* (Göttingen: Wallstein, 2009); Thomas W. Maulucci, Jr., *Adenauer's Foreign Office: West German Diplomacy in the Shadow of the Third Reich* (DeKalb, IL: Northern Illinois University Press, 2012); David Messenger and Katrin Pähler, eds., *A Nazi Past: Recasting German Identity in Postwar Europe* (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2015).

37. See Marcus Leifeld, *Der Kölner Karneval in der Zeit des Nationalsozialismus. Vom regionalen Volksfest zum Propagandainstrument der NS-Volksgemeinschaft* (Cologne: Emons, 2015); Stefan Goch, Norbert Silberbach, *Zwischen Blau und Weiß liegt Grau. Der FC Schalke 04 im Nationalsozialismus* (Essen: Klartext, 2005).

38. See Gerald Steinacher's contribution in this volume.

39. On the impulse provided by the Waldheim Affair see Cornelius Lehnguth, *Waldheim und die Folgen: Der parteipolitische Umgang mit dem Nationalsozialismus in Österreich* (Frankfurt a. M.: Campus Verlag, 2013), 13–15. For literature about the postwar continuities

see for example Anton Pelinka and Erika Weinzierl, eds., *Das große Tabu. Österreichs Umgang mit seiner Vergangenheit* (Vienna: Verlag der Österreichischen Staatsdruckerei, 1987); Oliver Rathkolb, *Führertreu und gottbegnadet: Künstlereliten im Dritten Reich* (Vienna: ÖBV, 1991); Gerhard Botz, ed., *Kontroversen um Österreichs Zeitgeschichte, verdrängte Vergangenheit, Österreich-Identität, Waldheim und die Historiker* (Frankfurt a. M.: Campus, 1994); Brigitte Bailer-Galanda and Wolfgang Neugebauer, . . . *ihrer Überzeugung treu geblieben: Rechtsextremisten, "Revisionisten" und Antisemiten in Österreich* (Vienna: Stiftung Dokumentationsarchiv des österreichischen Widerstandes, 1996); Hermann L. Gremliza, ed., *Braunbuch Österreich: Ein Nazi kommt selten allein* (Hamburg: KVV Konkret, 2000); Hellmut Butterweck, *Verurteilt und begnadigt. Österreich und seine NS-Straftäter* (Vienna: Czernin, 2003); Wolfgang Neugebauer and Peter Schwarz, *Der Wille zum aufrechten Gang: Offenlegung der Rolle des BSA bei der gesellschaftlichen Reintegration ehemaliger Nationalsozialisten* (Vienna: Czernin, 2005); Winfried R. Garscha and Franz Scharf, *Justiz in Oberdonau* (Linz: Oberösterreichisches Landesarchiv, 2007).

40. Brigitte Bailer-Galanda, *Ein deutsches Land. Die rechte Orientierung des Jörg Haider. Eine Dokumentation* (Vienna: Löcker, 1987); Brigitte Bailer-Galanda and Wolfgang Neugebauer, *Haider und die Freiheitlichen in Österreich* (Berlin: Elefanten-Press, 1997); Hans-Henning Scharsach, ed., *Haider. Österreich und die rechte Versuchung* (Reinbek: Rowohlt, 2000); Anton Pelinka, Hubert Sickinger and Karin Stögner, *Kreisky—Haider: Bruchlinien österreichischer Identitäten* (Vienna: Braumüller, 2008).

41. See Andreas Wirsching's contribution to this volume.

42. See Hans Mommsen and Wolfgang Gieger, *Das Volkswagenwerk und seine Arbeiter im Dritten Reich* (Düsseldorf: ECON, 1996); Harold James, *The Deutsche Bank and the Nazi Economic War against the Jews: The Expropriation of Jewish-Owned Property* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001); idem, *The Nazi Dictatorship and the Deutsche Bank* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004); Gerald D. Feldman, *Allianz and the German Insurance Business, 1933–1945* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001); *Die Dresdner Bank im Dritten Reich*, ed. Klaus-Dietmar Henke, 4 vols. (Munich: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 2006); Johannes Bähr et al., *Der Flick-Konzern im Dritten Reich* (Munich: Oldenbourg Wissenschaftsverlag, 2008); Jürgen Finger, Sven Keller and Andreas Wirsching, eds. *Dr. Oetker und der Nationalsozialismus. Geschichte eines Familienunternehmens, 1933–1945* (Munich: C.H.Beck, 2013).

43. See Christopher Browning, *The Final Solution and the German Foreign Office: A Study of Referat D III of Abt. Deutschland, 1940–43* (New York: Holmes & Meier, 1978); Lothar Gruchmann, *Justiz im Dritten Reich 1933–1940: Anpassung und Unterwerfung in der Ära Gürtner* (Munich: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 1988); Döscher, *Auswärtiges Amt im Dritten Reich*.

44. For details see Conze et al., *Amt*, 706–11.

45. See *ibid.*; Johannes Hürter, "Das Auswärtige Amt, die NS-Diktatur und der Holocaust: Kritische Bemerkungen zu einem Kommissionsbericht," in *Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte* 59, no. 2 (April 2011): 167–92.

46. See Christian Mentel and Niels Weise, *Die zentralen deutschen Behörden und der Nationalsozialismus: Stand und Perspektiven der Forschung* (Munich, 2016), <https://www>

.ifz-muenchen.de/fileadmin/user_upload/Neuigkeiten%202016/2016_02_13_ZZF_IfZ_PM_BKM-Studie_FINAL_Neu.pdf, accessed April 6, 2020.

47. See Frank Bajohr and Johannes Hürter, “Auftragsforschung ‘NS-Belastung’: Bemerkungen zu einer Konjunktur,” in Bajohr et al., eds., *Mehr als eine Erzählung*, 221–33.

48. See *ibid.*, 229–33.

49. These scandals became known under the name *Liederbuchaffäre* (songbook affair). In fact, there was more than one *Liederbuchaffäre*—a couple of remarkably similar scandals that happened in close succession. See <https://orf.at/stories/3142722/>, accessed March 16, 2020; “Neue Liederbuchaffäre: FPÖ sieht Schmutzkübelkampagne—Ein Liederbuch mit antisemitischen Texten einer steirischen Burschenschaft liegt bei einem Abgeordneten zu Hause,” *Der Standard*, October 31, 2019.

50. “Wissenschaftliche Stellungnahme zum FPÖ-‘Historikerbericht,’” <https://www.doew.at/neues/wissenschaftliche-stellungnahme-zum-fpoe-historikerbericht>, accessed March 16, 2020. See also the contributions of Margit Reiter and Gerald Steinacher in this volume.

51. See Susanna Schrafstetter, “Verfolgung und Wiedergutmachung. Karl M. Hettlage: Mitarbeiter von Albert Speer und Staatssekretär im Bundesfinanzministerium,” *Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte* 56, no. 3 (July 2008): 431–66, here 432.

52. See Michael Wildt, *Generation des Unbedingten: Das Führungskorps des Reichssicherheitshauptamtes* (Hamburg: Hamburger Ed., 2002), published in English as *An Uncompromising Generation: The Nazi Leadership of the Reich Security Main Office* (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 2009).

53. In 2009 the Federal Ministry of Finance appointed a historians’ commission to examine the history of the Reich Ministry of Finance between 1933 and 1945. An overview of the commission’s work and the publications that have appeared to date can be found here: <http://www.reichsfinanzministerium-geschichte.de/>, accessed February 16, 2020.

54. See Bösch and Wirsching, eds., *Hüter der Ordnung*; Frieder Günther, “Verfassung vergeht, Verwaltung besteht? Die vier deutschen Innenministerien 1919 bis 1970,” *Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte* 68, no. 2 (April 2020): 217–46; Creuzberger and Geppert, eds., *Ämter*.

55. See Peter Joachim Lapp, *Ulbrichts Helfer: Wehrmachtsoffiziere im Dienste der DDR* (Bonn: Bernard & Graefe, 2000); Henry Leide, *NS-Verbrecher und Staatssicherheit: Die geheime Vergangenheitspolitik der DDR* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2005); Daniel Niemetz, *Das feldgraue Erbe: Die Wehrmachteinflüsse im Militär der SBZ/DDR* (Berlin: Chr. Links, 2006); Creuzberger and Geppert, eds., *Ämter*.

56. See Bajohr and Hürter, “Auftragsforschung,” in Bajohr et al., eds., *Mehr als eine Erzählung*, 226.

57. See Frank Engehausen, Sylvia Paetschek, and Wolfram Pyta, eds., *Die badischen und württembergischen Landesministerien in der Zeit des Nationalsozialismus*, 2 vols. (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 2019); Bernhard Gotto, “Demokratische Kultur und NS-Vergangenheit in Bayern: Ein neues Forschungsprojekt des Instituts für Zeitgeschichte,” *Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte* 65, no. 2 (April 2017): 273–84.

58. For the Austrian Historians’ Commission and its publications see <https://hiko.univie.ac.at/>, accessed November 23, 2020.

59. Some work has been done on the SPÖ but there is so far only one preliminary study of the ÖVP. See Maria Mesner, ed., *Entnazifizierung zwischen politischem Anspruch, Parteienkonkurrenz und Kaltem Krieg: Das Beispiel der SPÖ* (Vienna: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 2005); Michael Wladika, *Zur Repräsentanz von Politikern und Mandataren mit NS-Vergangenheit in der Österreichischen Volkspartei 1945–1980: Eine gruppenbiographische Untersuchung* (Vienna, 2018), <http://www.vogelsanginstitut.at/at/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/forschungsbericht.pdf>, accessed April 7, 2020.

60. See Reiter, *Die Ehemaligen*.

61. See Klaus-Dietmar Henke, “Die Grenzen der politischen Säuberung in Deutschland nach 1945,” in Ludolf Herbst, ed., *Westdeutschland 1945–1955: Unterwerfung, Kontrolle, Integration* (Munich: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 1986), 127–33.

62. Schildt, “Fünf Möglichkeiten,” 1240.

63. Christopher Browning’s study *The Final Solution and the German Foreign Office: A Study of Referat D III of Abteilung Deutschland 1940–1943*, originally published by Holmes & Meier in 1978, appeared more than 30 years later in German translation as Christopher Browning, *Die “Endlösung” und das Auswärtige Amt: Das Referat D III der Abteilung Deutschland 1940–1943* (Darmstadt: WBG, 2010).

64. See Ulrich Herbert, “Liberalisierung als Lernprozess: Die Bundesrepublik in der deutschen Geschichte—eine Skizze,” in idem, ed., *Wandlungsprozesse in Westdeutschland: Belastung, Integration, Liberalisierung, 1945–1980* (Göttingen: Wallstein, 2002), 7–49.

65. On this point, Herbert, “NS-Eliten,” in Loth and Rusinek, eds., *Verwandlungspolitik*, 109.

66. See the contribution of Mary Fulbrook in this volume.

67. See Winfried Schulze and Otto Gerhard Oexle, eds., *Deutsche Historiker im Nationalsozialismus* (Frankfurt a. M.: Fischer Taschenbuch, 1999).