From the General Government to the Bundestag? The Christian-Social Union in Bavaria and the Case of Max Frauendorfer

Thomas Schlemmer, Dona Geyer

German Yearbook of Contemporary History, Volume 5, 2021, pp. 152-195 (Article)

Published by University of Nebraska Press

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1353/gych.2021.0000

For additional information about this article
https://muse.jhu.edu/article/804857

For content related to this article
https://muse.jhu.edu/related_content?type=article&id=804857
From the General Government to the Bundestag?
The Christian-Social Union in Bavaria and the Case of Max Frauendorfer

THOMAS SCHLEMMER
TRANSLATION BY DONA GEYER

The fact that innumerable National Socialists in elite positions were able to continue their careers after 1945 has been a source of widespread criticism for many decades. We nevertheless still lack a thorough understanding how this professional reintegration functioned, and the question of where the limits to this reintegration of former National Socialists were set remains underexamined. Exploring this question could help shed light on a central problem of German postwar history. How could democracy take root in a society strongly shaped by National Socialism? This issue is at the very heart of Thomas Schlemmer’s contribution, which aims to show that the democratic state’s readiness to integrate former Nazis reached its limit when members of the Nazi elite became politically ambitious and sought elective public office. When they crossed that line, the mechanism that had made their social and professional rehabilitation possible frequently lost its protective character. The case study of Dr. Max Frauendorfer and his political ambitions can serve as an example. Frauendorfer had had a questionable career in the Third Reich as the head of the Labor Division in the so-called Generalgouvernement and as Obersturmbannführer of the SS. Yet between 1957 and 1963 he repeatedly sought a seat in parliament as a representative of the Bavarian Christian Social Union (CSU, Christlich-Soziale Union). This case study shows how the confrontation with the Nazi past changed in Germany between the 1950s and 1960s and illustrates the motives among leading circles of the conservative CSU in either supporting or fundamentally rejecting support for colleagues with questionable political backgrounds.

A National Socialist Career

Max Frauendorfer was born in Munich on June 14, 1909.1 His father had made a name for himself as a lawyer, and another relative had been appointed minister and elevated to the nobility by Prince Regent Luitpold of Bavaria. At first Frauendorfer appeared to follow in his father’s footsteps. After receiving his Abitur (secondary-education certificate), he studied law, economics, and journalism in Munich, Berlin, and Erlangen. In October 1931 he passed the first state examination in law in Munich and fourteen months later earned his doc-
torate in law at the University of Erlangen. In addition to jurisprudence, however, Max Frauendorfer quickly became involved in another activity: politics. He joined the National Socialist German Workers' Party (NSDAP, Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei) (member number 85,562) on May 1, 1928, just a few weeks after completing his Abitur. At the same time he joined the Nationalsozialistischer Deutscher Studentenbund (National Socialist German Students' Association), and in October 1928 he became a member of the SS (number 1,281).²

An intelligent student and persuasive speaker, Frauendorfer displayed extraordinary commitment to the cause, so that it was not long before he came to the attention of party leaders. As early as 1929 he was serving on a voluntary basis as an aide in the Economic Policy Department of the NSDAP national leadership, the Reichsleitung. In November 1931 he moved to the Domestic Policy Department of the Reichsleitung to work as an aide for the ständischer Aufbau (corporatist organization). He also advanced within the ranks of the SS, and in March 1932 he was promoted to the rank of Untersturmführer. A year later, when Heinrich Himmler became a key figure in implementing Nazi tyranny in Bavaria as Munich’s police chief and commander of the Bavarian Political Police, it was Max Frauendorfer who stood at his side as his adjutant. The ambitious young activist was now promoted at a conspicuously rapid pace and given the rank of Obersturmbannführer in April 1935.

By this time Frauendorfer had already enjoyed a meteoric career. In May 1933, Robert Ley had appointed him head of the Office for Corporatist Organization of the German Labor Front (DAF, Deutsche Arbeitsfront), and shortly thereafter he also took over the corresponding office of the NSDAP. In May 1934 he became deputy head of the Office for Organizational Affairs of the DAF, to whose top management he also belonged. During this period, the party apparently pinned great hope on Frauendorfer. In September 1934 he was assigned responsibility for both the Reichsschulungsamt (Reich Office for Ideological Training) of the NSDAP and the DAF Office for Ideological Training, at first temporarily and then—upon his promotion to Hauptamtsleiter (main office head)—permanently, starting in November 1934. By the age of just twenty-five, Frauendorfer had already worked his way amazingly close to the center of Nazi power. Clearly, he was typical of the young lawyers increasingly found even in the upper echelon of the state, party, and security apparatus, young men who had been infected with völkisch and radical National Socialist ideas at universities in the 1920s.

Frauendorfer’s career in the Reichsleitung of the DAF and the NSDAP was, however, ill-fated. Although he was talented, confident, and well educated, he
was also too young, too inexperienced, and insufficiently aggressive to hold his own in his high-level positions when conflict arose, as was quickly evident when he became ensnared in the power struggle between Robert Ley, Alfred Rosenberg, and Rudolf Heß. As head of the offices responsible for corporatist organization at both the DAF and the NSDAP, Frauendorfer had responsibility for developing and propagandizing relevant concepts. The corporatist idea had played an important role in Nazi agitation from the start and had become a pillar of the Nazi ideology of a Volksgemeinschaft. Frauendorfer’s task was a tricky one, however, because there was no agreement on how a National Socialist body politic organized along corporatist lines should look. The lack of a consensus view quickly helped to push the corporatist idea into the background, and as a result the offices Frauendorfer headed lost their importance.

In his role as Reichsschulungsleiter (Reich Leader of Ideological Training), however, his task was to “school and instruct” the political leadership corps of the NSDAP. Moreover, he had to supervise the party’s numerous schools and take responsibility for the Schulungsbriefe (educational newsletters—a monthly periodical for political indoctrination) of the NSDAP and DAF.

As Reichsschulungsleiter, Frauendorfer served several masters, each of whom pursued his own interests. In organizational matters he was subordinate to the national head of the party organization, Robert Ley; in financial matters he had to answer to the Reich treasurer, Franz Xaver Schwarz; and in matters “regarding educational content” he reported to Alfred Rosenberg. Ley had actually planned to enlist Rosenberg as his ally in struggles with other major Nazi players. The alliance was short-lived, however, because he was not really willing to accept Rosenberg as a partner. Instead of an ally, Ley now had one more rival to contend with, and Frauendorfer’s predecessor, Otto Gohdes, experienced the repercussions of this rivalry. Ley fired Gohdes from his job as Reichsschulungsleiter on the grounds that Gohdes supposedly had allied himself “too closely [with] Party Comrade Rosenberg.” In his place Ley appointed Frauendorfer, but prohibited him from working with Rosenberg, Heß, or any other Reichsleiter. The new Reichsschulungsleiter complied with Ley’s instructions. For his part, Rosenberg simply waited at first to see how things would develop.

A letter from Rudolf Heß in March 1935 gave Rosenberg the chance to take the offensive. Deputy of the Führer Heß asked Rosenberg to undertake “systematic monitoring of the ideological education work” because of “various reports on the essentially favorable state of ideological schooling in the party, its organizations, and the affiliated organizations.” Rosenberg answered at once and used the opportunity to discredit Frauendorfer. At
first, his accusations had no negative repercussions for Frauendorfer, especially as Ley made no move to make more concessions to his rival than absolutely necessary. What eventually led to Frauendorfer’s downfall was that, at the end of 1935, Ley began to distrust him because he functioned “too independently.”

Apparently Reich Organization Leader Ley feared in-house competition, as one of his accusations against Frauendorfer was that the latter had overstepped his authority, despite repeated instructions, and had concerned himself not only with the schooling of NSDAP political leaders but also with the education work in other organs of the party. Therefore, Ley abruptly called off a “gathering of the Schulungsmänner [ideological instructors] in the organizations and associations of the party” that Frauendorfer had organized, prohibited the use of the terms Reichschulungsamt and Reichsschulungsleiter, and blocked Frauendorfer’s appointment as editor of the Schulungsbrie	e. In turn, Frauendorfer defended himself against Ley’s accusations and presented the matter to Heß. After all, he maintained, he had “brought together all the offices dealing with ideological training in all the organizations and affiliated associations of the party” on the basis of an order by the deputy of the Führer. The success of this effort, he said, was now in jeopardy.

However, before Frauendorfer could make any headway with Heß, Ley issued a written statement announcing an inquiry and ordered Frauendorfer to forgo “any type of independent decision-making” until further notice. Even though Ley had put little stock in Rosenberg’s complaints about Frauendorfer up to that point, he now used them as a weapon against his subordinate. Ley wrote that Rosenberg refused to work with Frauendorfer, viewed his staff as “unreliable and to some extent incapable,” and had informed him “officially and unmistakably” that he also considered Frauendorfer “ideologically unreliable.” Ley did at least conclude his letter on a more conciliatory note. He offered Frauendorfer his continued “personal comradery” and suggested that Frauendorfer either assume the directorship of one of the elite Nazi ideological training centers or travel abroad for study purposes on behalf of the DAF until the inquiry was concluded.

Frauendorfer was not deterred. He confronted Rosenberg with Ley’s accusations, at which point Rosenberg declared that he harbored “no doubts” about the “National Socialist reliability” of the de facto suspended Reichsschulungsleiter. In turn, Frauendorfer informed Rudolf Heß about the state of affairs and took the opportunity also to report incriminating internal information about Ley’s administration and his obstructionism regarding Rosenberg. Frauendorfer emphasized to Heß that he was not fighting to keep his job but that he found it “thoroughly unacceptable” to let himself be
“vilified [. . .] in the entire party” and “most gravely insulted.”12 Frauendorfer had no idea that Martin Bormann, Heß’s chief of staff, would forward his letter to Rosenberg and thereby hand Rosenberg such a lethal weapon in his fight against Ley. This step caused an irreconcilable breach between Frauendorfer and Ley: on January 2, 1936, Frauendorfer was ordered to “refrain from all activity involving the Office for Ideological Training” and was denied access to its premises.13

Less than two weeks later, however, Frauendorfer resumed his duties. We can assume that Ley did not voluntarily revoke his harsh suspension of Frauendorfer, but rather that Heß had pushed the Reichsleiter for Organizational Affairs to do so. Frauendorfer now sought a modus vivendi with Rosenberg to improve the difficult position in which he found himself, but Rosenberg was not interested. It is clear that Frauendorfer had lost all support and become isolated, and once Rosenberg and Ley turned against him, not even the intervention of Heß could save him in the long run. On May 15, 1936, Frauendorfer was forced to resign his position as head of the NSDAP Office for Ideological Training, and only two weeks later Ley terminated his employment at the DAF. By then, he had already lost his directorship of the Office for Corporatist Organization. Pointing out that the “party’s fundamental position” on this issue was established in the NSDAP’s party program, Heß decreed on February 18, 1936, that a separate office for corporatist organization had become “superfluous” and thus would be closed “with immediate effect.”14

For Reinhard Bollmus, who had the opportunity to interview Frauendorfer himself, the deeper cause of Frauendorfer’s conflict with Ley was that the Reichsschulungsleiter was alienated by the “SA spirit of the Sturmlokale” (the SA men’s usual tavern hangouts) and that he had not been a “‘real’ National Socialist.”15 Nevertheless, it should be noted that Frauendorfer was antidemocratic, anti-liberal, and anti-bolshevist. He celebrated the National Socialist revolution, revered Adolf Hitler and the Führer principle, and thought in racist and anti-Jewish categories, even though he does not seem to have been a fanatical antisemite.16 His removal from the NSDAP’s ideological training apparatus and the DAF executive staff was thus not due to his nonconformist attitude or even his criticism of the regime; rather, his dismissal resulted from one of the many power struggles within the leadership ranks of the Nazi state.

Frauendorfer did indeed fall far in 1936, but he did not crash, and his connection to the NSDAP continued to be close. Hans Frank brought him into the Reichsrechtsamt (Reich Legal Office) of the NSDAP, which meant that Frauendorfer, as the head of a main office of the party, could still retain
the title of Reichshauptamtsleiter. Frank may well have also had a hand in Frauendorfer's appointment as executive editor of the journal Deutsche Verwaltung, the official organ of the administrative lawyers in the National Socialist Association of German Legal Professionals. Until February 1938 Frauendorfer worked as a propagandist of the Third Reich, and then he resigned his office “out of consideration for his other official commitments.”17 In the spring of 1938 Frauendorfer was indeed fully occupied. In addition to his work at Deutsche Verwaltung, he had been working since 1937 as an administrator for organizational matters in the Reichswirtschaftskammer (Reich Chamber of Economics) and was studying for his second state examination in law. Once Frauendorfer had lost his top positions in the NSDAP and the DAF, he was eager to secure permission to take the second state examination as soon as possible.

Frauendorfer finished the preparatory service required for a legal career in January 1938 and passed the second state examination the following May. The newly minted lawyer then sought to become fully admitted as an attorney on an accelerated basis, and he used his connections to get the most favorable arrangement possible. Not for the first time in his career, his efforts were met with significant goodwill. Roland Freisler, the state secretary at the Reich Ministry of Justice, approved the proposal to exempt Frauendorfer from the officially required probationary period and to classify him immediately as a trainee lawyer. At his own request, Frauendorfer was assigned in February 1939 to the well-known Berlin lawyer Count von der Goltz. It is doubtful that Frauendorfer was truly content with the prospect of becoming a lawyer once he completed his training. After all, on October 1, 1938, he had already begun an internship with Dr. Däschner, the Reich Trustee of Labor (Reichstreuhänder der Arbeit) for Berlin and Brandenburg, where he worked primarily on wage policy issues.

A Wartime Comeback: Max Frauendorfer and the Labor Administration in the General Government

The German invasion of Poland and the quick victory of the Wehrmacht changed everything for Frauendorfer. Suddenly the young lawyer saw a chance for a new career, and he made the most of it. Frauendorfer belonged to what was effectively the advance command staff that began to organize and install an occupation regime immediately following Poland's defeat. On September 25, 1939, the German-occupied parts of Poland were placed under military administration, and just four days later Frauendorfer was in Poland and taking part in
the first meetings, held in Posen (Poznań). It may be that the traineeship and contacts to leading officials in the Reich Labor Ministry played a role in Frauendorfer’s assignment to Poland. However, it is more likely that Hans Frank put Frauendorfer on his staff. On October 26, 1939, Frank had begun serving as Governor General, directly subordinate to Hitler, and was the highest-ranking representative of the German Reich in occupied Poland. At first Frauendorfer acted as the right-hand man of State Secretary Johannes Krohn, who had been delegated to Poland by the Reich Labor Ministry to deal with labor and social matters in the occupation administration. However, personal and professional differences appear to have arisen quickly between Frank and Krohn, making the latter’s resignation only a matter of time. A successor was quickly found. As early as October 28, 1939, Frank wrote to Labor Minister Franz Seldte, suggesting that Frauendorfer be entrusted with running the Labor Department. Frank wrote that he would “gladly” support such an appointment; in fact, he would be “particularly” pleased to have one of his “old colleagues” working in the Office of the Governor-General and taking on the “portfolio of the Reich Labor Ministry.”

Two weeks later, Krohn left occupied Poland, and on November 18, 1939, Frauendorfer was appointed to head the Labor Department, which the following year became the Labor Division (Hauptabteilung Arbeit) in the administration of the General Government.

The Labor Division had special standing in Frank’s administration because of its role in realizing the aims of the Nazis’ Poland policy. Although the occupied territories also had military significance for Adolf Hitler as both a “forward glacis” and a deployment area, Poland was to serve primarily as the site of a “hard Volkstumskampf” (ethnic struggle) that would not permit “any legal restrictions”; under German administration, the Polish rump state was to be reduced to a reservoir of cheap labor. A key instrument for implementation of this program was the labor administration, which Frauendorfer began to build up at the end of 1939. The most important task of the Labor Division was to register, recruit, and deploy workers. Between June 1940 and June 1942 it was also responsible for assigning the Jewish population to work details. In addition, Frauendorfer’s Labor Division had a broad range of other responsibilities, among which were the administration of social insurance, the coordination of housing and settlement, and the provision of care for veterans of the vanquished Polish army.

The recruitment of laborers for the Reich began immediately in the fall of 1939. By the end of that year, nearly 40,000 Poles had been recruited. However, in light of the gigantic demands placed on the General Government for 1940, this figure appeared ridiculously small. According to the guidelines
set by Frank at the end of January 1940, the occupied Polish territories were to provide a work force of one million men and women, of whom 750,000 would work in German agriculture and 250,000 in industry. However, it quickly became evident that such demands were utopian. Voices could soon be heard demanding a tougher approach. Like Frank, Frauendorfer had rejected the idea of taking an overly hard line and focused more on recruitment of volunteers than on coercive police actions, although obviously people’s willingness to volunteer was decidedly related to the circumstances of occupation rule. Frauendorfer also criticized attacks against the Polish population, and stressed that recruitment efforts suffered both from such actions and from the fact that the Polish workers already in Germany had not yet received any money that they could send to their families back home. Among other things, he attributed the increasing failure of recruitment campaigns to effective Polish counterpropaganda, which he felt had caused particularly “the rural population to fall victim to an anxiety psychosis.” Here, the dilemma in which the labor administration found itself became apparent. In the words of historian Ulrich Herbert, “If you wanted foreign workers to perform at high levels, you could not deport them by force or treat them badly. But if you wanted to supply the large quota of workers needed, then coercive measures were unavoidable.”

In April 1940 the various options were discussed over and over again. Almost apologetically, Frank asked Frauendorfer on April 21 “whether there is any measure left that has not yet been seized upon” to convince the Poles to volunteer as labor recruits destined for Germany. When Frauendorfer answered no, a short debate ensued, after which the Governor General stated that the future path was now clear: “Where the Labor Division can no longer get the job done, the police must intervene.” Just two days later, Frauendorfer presented the rough outline of how he planned to proceed:

In each Kreishauptmannschaft [district administration], the wódsz, community leader and the mayor, under the supervision of the Kreishauptmann [district governor], are to call their community inhabitants together and determine how many people they can procure [...]. The propaganda has to be designed so that registration for agricultural labor service is presented as something inevitable, so that it is utterly pointless to try to evade this obligation. [...]. Once the community has been informed of this, then an order must stipulate a specific day on which laborers must be provided. Only if this approach fails should the police intervene. The Higher SS and Police Leader thinks it
will be enough to carry out in every district one exemplary episode of coercive implementation where recruitment appears difficult [. . . ]. Yet, even with such coercive measures, we need to ensure that it is possible to continue a dialogue with these people, not only because we have to work together with them here but also because they are, after all, destined to work in the Reich.

Frauendorfer’s circular decree of April 26, 1940, expanded on these ideas. All labor offices were assigned quotas adding up to 505,000 workers. The offices were to fill these quotas by subdividing and distributing them among the communities in their districts. Frauendorfer ordered his subordinate labor office directors to set short-term deadlines and to threaten police actions should the communities not fill their assigned quotas of laborers. Moreover, the Polish population was to be brought to heel by making promises that generated as much good publicity as possible and by cutting off benefit payments. According to Gerhard Eisenblätter, this approach established how labor registration would continue to be implemented “with some ups and downs until 1944.” “Depending on the availability of coercive means of police force and on the urgency of the Reich’s demands,” the Germans would rely “on police coercion or propaganda activity.”28 Between 1940 and 1942, nearly 925,000 men and women were recruited in Poland and sent by the General Government to work in agriculture or industrial plants in the Reich. Even though the number of Poles recruited lagged far behind the original expectations, Frauendorfer was responsible for a largely forcible transfer of people, one that “in its overall impact” represented what was “perhaps [the] most intensely felt and harshest measure of Germany’s policy for Poland” implemented in the General Government.29

Both Frank and the responsible authorities in the Reich were pleased with Frauendorfer’s work, and their satisfaction was soon demonstrated by the promotions he received. In May 1941 the Reich Labor Ministry proposed that Frauendorfer be named a Reich Trustee of Labor because he could “guarantee” to do the job responsibly and had long proven that he was prepared to defend “the National Socialist state wholeheartedly at all times.”30 Because the post of Reich Trustee of Labor was a political one, any considerations pertaining to the legal stipulations that governed civil service careers were irrelevant. Once it was clear that Martin Bormann, head of the NSDAP Party Chancellery, had no objections to the appointment, Frauendorfer was made a Reich Trustee of Labor on September 26, 1941. One year later, he climbed another rung of the
career ladder when he became the president of the Labor Division in late September 1942.

Frauendorfer did not have much time to relish the prospects of his new position. In the summer and fall of 1942, he found himself in serious trouble when he, a loyal acolyte of Frank, became involved in the confrontation between the Governor General and Heinrich Himmler and his satrap in Poland, Higher SS and Police Leader East Friedrich-Wilhelm Krüger.31 Because Frank’s position of power was greatly weakened in this conflict, Frauendorfer also became more vulnerable. In addition, the labor situation had worsened dramatically in the winter of 1941/42 as a result of the German invasion of the Soviet Union. Frauendorfer continually faced new demands to recruit laborers for the German war economy, and he had to undertake the thoroughly futile effort to meet, in equal measure, the needs of the Reich authorities, the Wehrmacht, and the industrial plants in the occupied Polish territories. Thus it was only logical that Jewish laborers became increasingly important in Frauendorfer’s strategy, and here he ran into conflict with the SS, which laid claim to complete control of all Judenpolitik (Jewish policy). Following Frank’s decree of October 26, 1939, Krüger was able to issue the corresponding regulations regarding the forced labor of the Jewish population in occupied Poland. However, the Jews were usually deployed as forced labor in a way that was “unregulated, arbitrary, and, above all, unpaid,”32 and Krüger’s offices apparently could not agree on a coherent concept or perform the necessary organizational preparatory work to ensure an effective deployment of labor. The situation was chaotic, and this inevitably alarmed the General Government authorities, as the Jewish communities that had to bear the cost of the labor deployment appeared to be overwhelmed, and the families of the Jews forced to work for the Germans threatened to become wholly impoverished. Should this development continue unhampered, it was feared that “one fine day, millions of Jews would then become a burden to the General Government.”33

In June 1940 Frauendorfer also underscored the necessity not to forget “that the Jews, as long as they are still here, have to be provided for in some way,” and thereby implied that his agency was demanding a greater voice in decisions about the deployment of Jewish laborers.34 On this point, the civil administration was indeed able to prevail against the SS. Following lengthy negotiations, Krüger approved an agreement in which responsibility for the deployment of Jewish laborers was transferred to the Labor Division. On July 5, 1940, Frauendorfer informed the subordinate offices about this
development. The “purpose of the labor deployment of Jews,” among whom were to be found “good skilled laborers and artisans, in contrast to the Jews in the Reich,” was “to help reduce the shortage of manpower in the General Government.” He then added in his circular memo that the Jews should be employed at first “on a free contractual basis” in order to achieve “the best possible exploitation of their labor” and to secure their means of subsistence. Forced labor without pay, he said, was to be used only for larger projects “in which a large number of forced laborers can be deployed, housed in barracks, and guarded.” In addition, Frauendorfer ordered that Jewish workers be paid 80 percent of the wages earned by Poles for the same work—after all, it was necessary to maintain their strength, secure the subsistence of the Jewish families, and prevent disease and epidemics. In pursuing such a course, Frauendorfer frequently encountered incomprehension and resistance. He would not have counted on the support of fanatic antisemites in any case, but others also protested “that the remuneration for Jews is set too high.” Odilo Globocnik, the SS and Police Leader for the Lublin district, even refused to transfer official responsibilities to the Labor Administration, which made it necessary for Krüger to intervene so that the agreements reached in Cracow (Kraków) would also be implemented in the Lublin district.

The labor administration had first compiled a special card index to gain a general idea of the number of Jewish laborers and their qualifications. All German agencies and businesses were instructed to report their “needs” to the labor offices, where the officials assigned to the Judeneinsatzstellen (Jewish deployment offices) reviewed these requests and then forwarded them to the local Jewish council, which was then responsible for providing certain individuals or an entire contingent of workers. In practice, things usually worked differently, and the labor offices were circumvented just as often as Frauendorfer’s remuneration guidelines were. For the labor administration, the year 1942 was overshadowed by a bitter conflict with the SS and police authorities. While Jewish laborers became increasingly vital to the Labor Division and its subordinate agencies in light of the general manpower shortage, the organized genocide of the Jews began in the General Government in March 1942 with the deportation of several tens of thousands from Lemberg (Lviv) and Lublin to the Belzec (Bełżec) death camp. The SS strove to deport as many Jews to the death camps as possible and wanted to let only a select number of Jewish laborers live. In this context, the struggle for authority over the use of Jewish labor thus became particularly important.

The labor administration played an ambivalent role in the implementation of the “Final Solution.” On the one hand, officials in the labor offices had an
important say in determining “who lived and who did not” because it was their job to judge Jews’ qualifications and fitness for work. By way of the so-called ABC classification system, they were also directly involved in the preparation and management of deportations. It was not unusual for representatives from the labor offices to take part in the on-site selection process.39 Dieter Pohl even found evidence indicating that the Labor Division “was involved in the overall planning of the ‘Final Solution’ in the General Government” because it conducted a census of all Jewish laborers in late April and early May 1942. On the other hand, among those working in the labor administration were also people who did not allow themselves to be influenced by the murderous atmosphere that was spreading throughout the General Government in 1942. As Bogdan Musial has shown, several officials at least attempted to hamper the Nazi death machinery, although it is difficult to say in individual cases “whether this behavior was due solely to the very real shortage of labor or also to moral scruples.”40

The president of the Labor Division certainly shouldered a special responsibility for the involvement, and in some cases the active participation, of his agencies in the murder of the Jewish population. It appears, however, that the exploitation and efficient mobilization of resources was a greater priority for Frauendorfer than the implementation of a Volksstum policy driven by racial ideology that stopped at nothing, not even the annihilation of entire ethnic and social groups. He had repeatedly protested against the poor treatment of Polish laborers because it was counterproductive in his eyes, and in February 1941 he had even raised the topic in a meeting with Himmler. He knew about the impending “Final Solution” by December 16, 1941, at the latest, when Frank explained to the circle of his most important colleagues that the problem of the Jews “had to be ended one way or another” and announced “interventions” that would “lead somehow to a successful annihilation.”41

Frauendorfer thought that this was the wrong path to take. On June 22, 1942, he pointed out in a meeting of main department heads that a “resettlement of the Jews” would “have far-reaching effects in all sectors of public life.” He argued that “in terms of manpower, the country has been nearly skimmed off,” and said that he was “right now absolutely dependent on the use of Jewish labor” because the Jewish laborers could “not be replaced owing to the shortage of skilled Polish workers.” He urged that the Jews “not be exempted from the measures carried out by the SS but merely remain available as a workforce for the duration of the war.”42

It cannot be determined with certainty whether Frauendorfer was motivated solely by the practical necessities of his job as head of the Labor Adminis-
tration or whether he harbored a few moral scruples. His call to spare Jewish workers only “for the duration of the war” supports the former interpretation. However, there are indications that Frauendorfer actually did have reservations about the increasingly radical measures taken by German institutions in occupied Poland and that he was not among those who condoned or even welcomed the organized mass murder. There is even evidence that he attempted to distance himself. In 1941, for example, he made the acquaintance of Ulrich von Hassell through one of his colleagues, Fritz Berthold. With increasing openness, Frauendorfer began to tell von Hassell about the atrocities occurring in the General Government. Ultimately he even informed this member of the resistance about the killing of the Jewish population with poisonous gas. In the summer of 1942 he also protected Adalbert Szepessy, one of his officials, who had prevented the deportation of Jews by issuing the necessary papers to save them and therefore had landed in the clutches of the state security apparatus.

In June 1942 Frauendorfer’s Labor Division was forced to turn over control of Jewish labor deployment once again to the SS and police authorities. On June 25, Frauendorfer informed the subordinate agencies of his office that the “labor deployment of Jews [may] be undertaken only after an agreement has been reached with the police leader responsible for that locality.” As Peter Longerich has argued, “with this move, the SS now also controlled the one sector that, up to that point, had still acted as the only effective barrier against the full-scale murder of the Jewish population.”

Frauendorfer emerged visibly battered from this turf war over responsibility for the labor deployment of the Jewish population. Not only his health but also his reputation had suffered. During the summer of 1942, it became increasingly evident that Frauendorfer would have to give up his post as head of the Labor Division. At the end of July, during a stay in a Munich clinic, he received written notification from Krüger ordering him in Himmler’s name to report for military duty, and a few weeks later Frank disavowed his former ally in a meeting attended by high-ranking leaders on securing labor for the Reich. As a result, Frauendorfer appears to have decided to exchange his office in Cracow for a barracks room. On October 2, 1942, Frauendorfer had a talk with Himmler about his further assignment and doubtless also about the quarrels of the previous months. The results of this meeting were indeed calculated to save Frauendorfer’s prestige, and by all appearances he succeeded in winning over the Reichsführer SS. It was agreed that he would resign from his post as head of the labor administration in the General Government following a transition period of several weeks, then go on longer sick leave, and subsequently report for duty to the Waffen SS. Himmler informed Krüger in
a letter that the Obersturmbannführer had “acted very properly” and therefore he asked Krüger in the coming weeks “to engage in particularly good and cordial conduct toward President Frauendorfer in the presence of everyone else.”

Two weeks later, little of this goodwill remained. A serious rift developed between Frauendorfer and Himmler, who felt that his former adjutant had betrayed him. This sense of betrayal emerged because Frauendorfer, who was still highly regarded in the labor administration, had been asked by Sauckel to become his personal commissioner in the Netherlands in charge of organizing the supply of labor for the German war economy. Frauendorfer did not seem opposed to the idea; to the contrary. However, Sauckel’s plan met with resistance—especially within the SS—and was eventually abandoned. When Frauendorfer learned that there were problems, he fired off a forceful telegram to Himmler, asking for his support; after all, his new position had already been officially announced, and he had to avoid “an unjustified and severe loss of prestige.” Himmler perceived this telegram as extraordinarily pretentious. Frauendorfer, trying to defend himself, informed Himmler that he was not taking this position to avoid military service, but by accepting the short-term special mission in the Netherlands he had sought instead to stifle the embarrassing rumors about his departure from Cracow. He appears to have been aware, however, that he had now become a persona non grata for Himmler.

Perhaps this was why Frauendorfer was seeking to be drafted into the Wehrmacht and not the Waffen SS after Frank had suspended him on December 1, 1942, and he had subsequently recuperated from a heart condition by February 1943. Perhaps, however, he had also learned that Krüger had denounced him to Himmler. Krüger was obviously set on making things thoroughly impossible for Frauendorfer by informing Himmler in late October 1942 that, in addition to his not insignificant salary as president of the Labor Division, Frauendorfer was earning income as the chairman of the board of a stock company. From October 1, 1940, to July 1, 1941, he had indeed acted as the director general of the Werke des Generalgouvernements (General Government Works), a pooling of companies once owned by the former Polish state that he had initiated himself. When he resigned from this position in the summer of 1941, he was promised a compensation of 27,000 Reichsmarks, a sum more than twice his yearly income. However, Frank had issued a decree back in October 1940 that prohibited those working for him from earning secondary incomes. Himmler sensed a case of corruption and initiated a disciplinary inquiry against Frauendorfer to determine whether he “still is worthy of belonging to the SS.” However, Frauendorfer had
commenced his military service in the Wehrmacht in February 1943, so by then he no longer fell under the jurisdiction of the SS, at least for the time being.

There is reason to believe that Frauendorfer had been distancing himself more and more from National Socialism since the end of 1942. His contact with Ulrich von Hassell intensified and enabled him to attend a meeting with Colonel General Johannes Blaskowitz in October 1943, at which von Hassell sought to find out how far the general would support the aims of the resistance movement. Frauendorfer’s connection with von Hassell did not have any negative repercussions for him, not even when von Hassell was arrested and executed. The investigation of Frauendorfer by the SS court also petered out once it became clear that he had been given special permission by Frank to pursue his activities as director general of the Works and had exercised this function at the expressed wish of the Governor General himself. Thus the court in charge of the investigation recommended to Himmler that he shelve the inquiry, and he did so in March 1945. By then, however, this rehabilitation by the SS was unimportant to Frauendorfer, as Nazi Germany was on the brink of collapse. On April 26, 1945, Frauendorfer was discharged from the Wehrmacht. Only a few days later, German troops surrendered unconditionally.

A Difficult New Start between Illegality and Denazification

Frauendorfer was thirty-five years old when the war ended, and his life, like that of countless other Germans, was in ruins. Moreover, he had good reason to fear that the occupation authorities would be interested in him. In this regard, his greatest fear was not internment in a detention camp but extradition to Poland, a fear that was far from unreasonable, as the Allies had turned over a number of Frauendorfer’s former colleagues to the Polish justice authorities. Because the leadership of the German administration in occupied Poland had been declared a criminal organization from the local administrator ranks of Kreishauptmann and Stadthauptmann (district and city governors) upward, Frauendorfer knew that he had to face extradition and a minimum sentence of three years.\(^52\)

To avoid being brought to justice, Frauendorfer disappeared into the realm of illegality, living under an assumed identity, at first in the Allgäu region. Eventually he returned to Munich, where—as he would later relate—he pursued private studies and had no income. His deprivation could not have been too great, however, as he claimed in 1950 that he still had assets of around 30,000 Deutschemarks.\(^53\) He used this time to arm himself for any eventuality. He contacted friends and acquaintances who he hoped would help him,
and he collected testimonies in his defense in Germany, Austria, and even the United States. By emphasizing the supposed threat of his deportation “to the East,” Frauendorfer even moved hesitant contemporaries to put pen to paper on his behalf.\textsuperscript{54} Apparently the risk he ran in abandoning his incognito was a calculated one, because he confided in Catholic clergymen as well as government representatives. The Bavarian State Chancellery became active on his behalf, and its head, Anton Pfeiffer, asked the relevant American authorities how matters stood in Frauendorfer’s case and whether an extradition would still be in the cards. Only after the Americans had given the all clear did Frauendorfer decide to come out of hiding. He revealed his true identity and a short time later underwent the denazification process, which was still obligatory at the time, even though there was little talk of political cleansing by then.

This procedure was burdensome, but Frauendorfer stood a good chance of coming out of it only minimally bruised. First of all, he benefited from the widely held view that the time had come to make a clean break with the crimes of the past regime—or, according to the German formulation, to draw a Schlussstrich. Second, he had a well-equipped arsenal of exonerating testimonies, among which were also statements from Ulrich von Hassell and his widow, Ilse von Hassell. The diplomat, who was executed in 1944, had made notes in his journal about his talks with Frauendorfer. These journals had been published in 1946, and his entries about Frauendorfer helped the latter clear his name. In fact, Frauendorfer could not have had a better advocate in the early 1950s, especially as von Hassell was no longer available to supply more details about his contacts with Frauendorfer. Third, one of the people on his side was the Social Democrat Camille Sachs, the man who headed the office responsible for denazification. From the start, Sachs intervened to an exceptional degree in the denazification process and declared “the matter” to be secret for “foreign policy reasons.”\textsuperscript{55}

Frauendorfer went about defending himself with extraordinary confidence. On the form he was required to fill out about his background, he claimed to belong to what was known in the denazification process as the category of exonerated persons. As in the years to come, he adopted an offensive stance, even when appearing before the Spruchkammer (denazification court), admitted only to what could already be proven, and did not shy away from lying, manipulating facts, and turning unflattering truths to his advantage through his one-sided interpretation. It almost goes without saying that he put particular emphasis on anything that could speak in his favor, and he stressed the usual clichés: he had been so young and had tried to prevent worse things from happening. He argued that von Hassell’s journals proved his resistance to the
regime as well as his Christian and humane disposition and his abhorrence of despotism and injustice. He defended his decision to go underground after the war as being “unavoidable” and argued that this decision had proven correct, considering “the fate of innumerable Germans who fell or were extradited into the hands of a hate-filled communist enemy.”

The prosecuting counsel was not swayed by these efforts and classified Frauendorfer as a major offender (Hauptschuldiger). Frauendorfer’s protest and his insistence that he had “not [been] a leading National Socialist” had little effect. On January 29, 1951, the Hauptkammer (main denazification court) in Munich ruled that he was indeed a Belasteter (offender) and imposed severe sanctions: whereas the fifty days of work on behalf of the public good may not have been difficult to contend with, the confiscation of 10 percent of his assets and the loss of all retirement and pension rights from public funds were considerably harder to swallow. The court also put an end to his professional legal career by ruling that he was permanently unfit to hold public office, including that of a notary and a lawyer. It also imposed other restrictions on his occupational activity, stripped him of his voting rights and his right to hold elected office, and prohibited him from engaging in any form of political activity.

Frauendorfer immediately appealed against the ruling and emphasized that he had “voluntarily and out of deepest conviction ‘denazified’ himself as long ago as 1934/35” and that he had done this “in the most forceful way,” as demonstrated by his activities “as a member of the [. . .] German resistance movement.” Camille Sachs emphatically supported this view and instructed the public prosecutor of the Munich appeals court in charge of Frauendorfer’s case to move for his denazification. Sachs argued that the information he had supplied to Ulrich von Hassell had constituted “objective resistance” and therefore Frauendorfer had to be cleared of the charges leveled against him, pursuant to the 1946 Law for Liberation from National Socialism and Militarism (Gesetz zur Befreiung von Nationalsozialismus und Militarismus). However, the appeals court was not prepared to go so far. It classified him officially as a Belasteter (offender) but made allowances for various circumstances and eventually came to the conclusion that Frauendorfer should be classified instead as a Minderbelasteter (minor offender). In 1951, however, sanctions could be leveled only against major offenders and offenders, and the appeals court therefore reversed the decision of the lower court and closed the proceedings. Not only did this revoke all the sanctions, but from this point on Frauendorfer could also maintain with a good conscience that the denazification proceedings against him had been closed.
Now he was free to build a new middle-class existence for himself. His application for permission to finish his training as a lawyer was granted. After he had successfully completed his internship, he applied for his license to practice law, which he received in 1953. It appears that he was not completely confident about his future, however, because in September 1951 he had requested the Bavarian State Ministry for Labor and Social Affairs to reinstate him as a civil servant under Article 131 of Germany’s Basic Law, also temporarily and even “disregarding all questions of rank.” It may have come as a surprise to Frauendorfer when his request was unequivocally denied. The ministry argued that his appointments and promotions between 1939 and 1942 contravened civil service regulations and could “have occurred” only because of his “close ties to National Socialism.” Therefore he could not make any valid claims based on the legal regulations pertaining to Article 131.

Once again Frauendorfer appealed, and once again he was successful. However, his appeal was granted on purely procedural, rather than substantive, grounds. His case was thus reopened, but at the end of July 1952 this no longer appeared to interest Frauendorfer much. By then he had gained a foothold in the business world, namely at the Allianz insurance company in Munich. During his legal training period there, he had learned the basics of the insurance business, and he quickly made a career for himself in the years that followed. He rose to a leading position at the company’s headquarters, acting as head of the department for corporations and associations, and finally becoming the executive director of the department responsible for industry.

The First Attempt: Party Tactics, Uncertainty, and Indignation

Frauendorfer probably could have enjoyed the fruits of his labor largely undisturbed had he not pursued his old passion for politics. On December 13, 1956, he joined the Christian Social Union (CSU, Christlich-Soziale Union in Bayern) but not without having conferred with important figures in the party beforehand. When asked about his Nazi past, he appears not to have laid his cards on the table; instead, he must have presented a sanitized version of his personal history. At first, no further questions were asked, not even when Frauendorfer sought higher office. In the summer of 1957 his name was found on the CSU candidate list for the coming federal elections; even though he was only a token candidate, he was still a candidate. His immediate success was due in no small measure to his position as a leading executive at Allianz, a company that had repeatedly supported the CSU with donations, which the party so urgently needed prior to important elections. Thus, the hope for
financial support may also explain why the delegate meeting for the Munich VII Stimmkreis (electoral ward) nominated Frauendorfer as a candidate for the Bavarian state elections in 1958, although he was a relatively unknown quantity.

The elections for a new Bavarian state parliament, the Landtag, were to be held on November 23 and were particularly important for the CSU, because in October 1957 it had just succeeded in bringing down a coalition government led by the Social Democrats. However, the election campaign did not bode well for the party, because it was overshadowed by scandals involving candidates whose political pasts were highly dubious at best. Frauendorfer was certainly the most prominent of these candidates who found themselves under massive scrutiny in the summer of 1958. The affair did not ignite in Munich, but in the rural areas of Lower Bavaria. The delegates of the Mainburg-Kelheim ward had nominated the hops farmer and cattle trader Peter Prücklmayer, even though he had been a member of the CSU for only three years and despite the delegates’ knowledge that he had served for several months as an SS Untergauproführer guarding the Mauthausen concentration camp. The delegates had quelled their concerns with the belief that there were witnesses who could attest to Prücklmayer’s impeccable behavior. At the end of August, the newsmagazine Der Spiegel and the newspaper Süddeutsche Zeitung (SZ) picked up the story, and their revelations turned the Prücklmayer candidacy into a national issue. However, those who came under heavy fire were not the local delegates who had nominated Prücklmayer but rather the party leaders who had failed to prevent the candidacy.

The leading CSU politicians were split over this issue. Some protested strongly against the “Nazi infiltration of the CSU,” while others expressed obvious discomfort, cautious rebuke, convoluted justifications, or apologetic statements. The public debate and the critical voices from the party’s own ranks forced the party’s executive board (Landesvorstand) to look into the matter on September 3, 1958. This small cadre attempted to find a way of addressing the issue that would enable the CSU to save face and at the same time to take the wind out of the sails of the attacks against the party. In the subsequent press release, the executive board expressed its conviction that no “personal accusations” could be leveled against Prücklmayer, but in light of “the particular difficulty of this candidacy” the delegates who had nominated him needed the opportunity “to rethink this nomination again.” Therefore, the board ordered that the election be repeated. This was all the executive board could do, at least officially, because legally the delegates in the ward were largely autonomous in their decision-making powers.

Nothing had yet been decided in the Prücklmayer case when the SZ and
Der Spiegel uncovered the next scandal. In the Traunstein ward, the candidate was a municipal official in Ruhpolding named Leonhard Schmucker. Between 1942 and 1945 Schmucker had acted as a contact for the Security Service (SD, Sicherheitsdienst) of the SS, and in 1942/43 he headed an SD field office in the Bavarian–Bohemian border region. Like Prücklmayer, Schmucker was a promising candidate who had been denazified after 1945 and could produce people who attested to his personal integrity.69

The persistent discussion about politically tainted candidates finally prompted the leaders of the Munich CSU to act. Those responsible, especially the district chairman, Josef Müller,70 had taken a long time to realize that the party was sitting on a ticking time bomb, but now they took decisive action to defuse it. On September 8, 1958, the district executive board (Bezirksvorstand) met in an extraordinary session.71 Only one issue was on the agenda: the candidacy of Max Frauendorfer for the Bavarian Landtag. He was given the opportunity to explain his past to the board members and to address the rumors that had been circulating for a while. In defending himself, Frauendorfer did what he had repeatedly done in the past: he pointed out his contacts with the resistance, presented himself as a victim, and either omitted or whitewashed certain incriminating facts. But Josef Müller came to this meeting well prepared, with the support of Erwin Hamm,72 a prominent CSU member in the Munich city government. Their probing questioning of Frauendorfer soon dismantled his fragile construct of fact and fiction to the point that no one on the board was willing to support him openly.

Whereas tactical concerns and the fear of public scandal were important reasons why Frauendorfer’s candidacy did not appear opportune, these were not the only factors. A number of important Munich CSU politicians found it unacceptable to pave the way to the Landtag for a man like Frauendorfer, both out of moral considerations and for reasons of political hygiene. After all, they themselves had fought against National Socialism or had been persecuted by the regime for various reasons. District chair Josef Müller had been arrested in 1943 for being a messenger for the military opposition and had barely survived his imprisonment in a concentration camp, as had his vice-chair Werner Müller;73 Franz Fackler, the chairman of the city council’s CSU caucus, had been sentenced by the infamous Volksgerichtshof (People’s Court) for being a member of a resistance group that supported restoration of the monarchy in Bavaria; Erwin Hamm had been forced to answer to a special court for comments critical of the regime in 1938. Most likely, the confrontation between a representative of the former Nazi elite and opponents or victims of the regime also helped escalate the discussion that took place among the district’s execu-
tive board members. Frauendorfer, however, showed no understanding of his situation. Even after all 27 board members had approved the motion requesting the party leadership to order a new election to pick a party candidate, he refused to resign his candidacy.

Frauendorfer was able to maintain his resistance only for a limited time. Like Prücklmayer and Schmucker, he eventually had to give up his candidacy. Public pressure had simply become too great and criticism within the party itself too loud. Disappointed and bitter, Frauendorfer finally realized that nothing more was to be gained. On September 12 he officially withdrew his candidacy and resigned from his party posts. The editorials in leading daily and weekly newspapers expressed relief over the resignations of Frauendorfer, Prücklmayer, and Schmucker, but they were not reticent about criticizing the CSU and its leaders; in their view, the CSU leadership had acted too reluctantly and hesitantly in handling these cases.74

As far as the press was concerned, this closed the book on Frauendorfer, at least temporarily. However, the CSU could not yet shelve the matter, because the accused demanded an inquiry into the charges against him. The executive board of the party took its time. A small commission was not set up until after the Bavarian elections. The men selected for the task of once again investigating Frauendorfer’s past were Hans Ehard, the current president of the Bavarian Landtag; Emil Muhler, a Catholic priest who had been imprisoned in the Dachau concentration camp during the Nazi regime; and Werner Müller. Once again, Frauendorfer presented his version of history and supported it with the exonerating documents that had once been useful to him at the denazification court. Without in-depth research into the case, there was little to challenge his defense, especially as the state of research and the availability of sources posed problems even for experts.

On May 2, 1959, Ehard presented the results of the commission to the party’s executive board. The commission’s report largely concurred with Frauendorfer’s depiction of his past, even though it was obvious that the commission attempted somewhat to distance itself from it. In the end, Ehard noted that “absolutely nothing [stood] in the way” of granting Frauendorfer his wish to be rehabilitated. Further, he would be allowed to be both a “member and officeholder” of the CSU, although it was “another question” whether it would be “smart to run for office.” The commission was also of the opinion that this rehabilitation by the party should not be announced publicly.75 But this was precisely what Frauendorfer was seeking. He wanted a formal written apology, and he wanted it announced in a press release. He even made specific suggestions about the wording of both the apology and the press release. Although
Hans Ehard felt this was not at all “possible and suitable,” after much back and forth Frauendorfer did indeed receive a written statement of rehabilitation, which thus gave him yet another exonerating document to add to his collection. This latest whitewash was particularly valuable because it was the indispensable prerequisite for his second attempt to launch a political career in the CSU.

The Second Attempt: Limits to Integration

Frauendorfer needed a year and a half before he started this renewed effort. Once again, elections were quickly approaching. His admission ticket, so to speak, was two recommendations by the Bayerische Staatsbürgerliche Vereinigung (Bavarian Civic Association), a nonprofit organization that raised funds for political parties through donations from the business community and was closely linked to the influential Landesverband der Bayerischen Industrie (State Association of Bavarian Industry). In June 1961 Otto Eberle, the chair of the Bayerische Staatsbürgerliche Vereinigung, suggested to CSU chair, Franz Josef Strauß, that Max Frauendorfer be “assigned” a “safe seat” on the party’s list of candidates for the national elections to the Bundestag. Shortly after that, he asked Strauß to ensure that Frauendorfer be given “a suitable job” in the leading bodies of the CSU. Strauß granted him these favors. After all, his party was in the middle of an election campaign and needed money. Membership dues were far from sufficient to finance such a campaign, and government funding of the parties had not yet developed beyond its relatively modest beginnings. In this situation, it was very valuable to have the goodwill of the business community, so Strauß did not hesitate to suggest to the CSU party committee (Landesausschuss) that Frauendorfer be elected to the position of deputy treasurer of the CSU. Strauß argued emphatically for this move:

Several of you will be familiar with the name Frauendorfer, several won’t. I do not intend to hide anything [. . . ]. During the last state elections, he was subject to a witch hunt by the press, in which accusations were leveled against him in connection with the period of the Third Reich. He was able to refute these accusations so that the honorary committee we established [. . . ] recommended a full formal apology to Mr. Frauendorfer, declared all accusations unjustified, and labeled him employable and unobjectionable in every way. When someone has been the victim of political error in the past, then the yardstick by which we judge conservative people should at least not be any stricter than
that which the SPD [*Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands* – Social Democratic Party of Germany] uses for the communists who fill its ranks in huge numbers. (Applause.) If someone who was a high official with the rank of department head in a ministry of the Third Reich resigns his post in protest against policy and goes to the front as a simple infantry soldier [. . . ], I have more respect for him than for someone who talked resistance but made sure that he kept his job. We do not have first-class and second-class party members. Either a person is usable or not.78

No objections were raised. Even Werner Müller, the chief treasurer of the CSU, said nothing when the party committee elected Frauendorfer as the man to be his deputy, a man whose candidacy for the Bavarian Landtag he had so adamantly opposed in the summer of 1958.

However, things did not go as smoothly for Frauendorfer when the CSU party committee began to compile the candidate list for the elections to the Bundestag.79 He was nominated for place sixteen, but the delegates chose another candidate over him. Not until the deputy party chair Rudolf Eberhard vigorously stood up for him did the delegates select Frauendorfer to fill place twenty on the list. This was hardly a safe place for a seat. Despite the sensational election results of 57.2 percent in 1957, the party had been able to secure a mandate in the Bundestag for only the first fourteen candidates on the list. So after the election on September 17, 1961, it was not surprising that Frauendorfer was not among the CSU candidates who won a Bundestag mandate by way of the party’s candidate list. Yet he could hope that, with time, he would make it to Bonn as a substitute. Sure enough, in December 1962 it looked as if that time had come. Prime Minister of Bavaria Alfons Goppel had appointed Hans Schütz and Gerhard Wacher, two CSU Bundestag representatives, as state secretaries. It was only a matter of a few weeks before the two men would clear out their desks in Bonn, and then Frauendorfer would have his chance.

If he really assumed that there would be no protest against him this time, then Frauendorfer had been deceiving himself. The reaction of the press was even louder than it had been in 1958. Once again, *Der Spiegel* started the ball rolling by reporting on Frauendorfer’s alleged services on behalf of the CSU finances and his impending move to the Bundestag.80 Well-known papers picked up the story, as did those from rural Bavaria, which reported repeatedly on the latest developments. The tenor of most of the articles and editorials was clear: the “line of what was politically acceptable” had been “crossed”;81 it was, in fact, “inexcusable”82 and “scandalous”83 that the ranks of the CSU lead-
ership had heaved Frauendorfer into the saddle and put him on the road to Bonn. Former functionaries and high officeholders of the Nazi regime had no place in public office, the press declared, regardless of whether they were guilty or not under criminal law. It was argued that such affairs cast doubt on the credibility of Germany’s democracy and discredited the image of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) abroad.

Such a reception in the press certainly did not please CSU officials, especially as it sparked demonstrations and student protests under the slogan “There’s no place for alte Kämpfer [members of the old guard] in the Bundestag.” But more disconcerting for the party leadership must have been the criticism growing louder within party ranks. Among those speaking out were Alois Hundhammer and Baron Karl Theodor von und zu Guttenberg, both of whom had been unequivocal opponents of National Socialism and were now among the best-known critics of their party chairman, Strauß, whose protégé Frauendorfer was considered to be. Despite all these critical voices, the CSU leadership stood by Frauendorfer at first. A party press release of January 17, 1963 emphasized that the accusations against Frauendorfer had already been scrutinized years before and found baseless. Should new suspicions arise, then a “relevant and proper review” would be undertaken by the party. However, the party’s deputy chair, Rudolf Eberhard, expressly rejected the idea that “a second denazification process [would be] carried out” in the Frauendorfer case.

In 1958 it had been CSU politicians like Alois Hundhammer and Josef Müller who had helped put an end to the affairs involving the candidates Prücklmayer, Schmucker, and Frauendorfer. But the CSU of 1963 was no longer the CSU of 1958. Men like Franz Josef Strauß, Friedrich Zimmermann, and Rudolf Eberhard focused first and foremost on achieving political success, no matter how twisted the road they traveled or how dubious the means they used. Strauß, in particular, was perceived as a danger to democracy by both politicians and the public on the left-liberal spectrum. The fact that he was now viewed as the one pulling the strings in the Frauendorfer case may explain the aggressiveness exhibited by some journalists in the early weeks of 1963.

Leading CSU party officials were not about to cave to any pressure to drop Frauendorfer. Hundhammer came to feel their entrenchment the most, particularly as Strauß had more than one score to settle with him. Hundhammer, the Bavarian minister for agriculture at the time, had stated in an interview in January 1963 that Frauendorfer had become “clearly too great a burden for the CSU and the entire FRG.” Not only should Frauendorfer be denied a seat in the Bundestag, he went on to say, but it would be wrong in general for former-
ly prominent National Socialists to hold higher public office again. Moreover, Hundhammer emphasized, he had tried to block Frauendorfer’s nomination in 1961. This statement alone provided sufficient reason for the CSU party leadership to disavow Hundhammer publicly and accuse him in a press release of lying. In fact, Hundhammer had said nothing when Frauendorfer’s name was placed on the candidate list, and he had even supported the suggestion to elect Frauendorfer as deputy treasurer.

It came as no surprise that Frauendorfer refused to even consider relinquishing his promised seat in the Bundestag. Then again, Gerhard Wacher had not yet resigned his seat, and the longer the matter dragged on, the more loudly the critics voiced their opposition. Nor were these critics assuaged by the announcement that the CSU planned to set up a commission to inquire into the accusations once again. But then came the moment when Hendrik van Dam, the secretary-general of the Central Council of Jews in Germany, spoke out against a seat for Frauendorfer, and trouble began to brew among the CSU members of the Bavarian Landtag. The CSU party leadership had to act, and Strauß took it upon himself to have the decisive talk with Frauendorfer. Soon thereafter, on February 1, 1963, Frauendorfer announced at a press conference that he had decided to forgo any claims to a seat in the Bundestag, even though he had nothing to reproach himself for.

It was obvious that Frauendorfer’s decision had not been prompted by any honest introspection on his part, and the CSU also presented a half-hearted stance on the matter. The Bavarian party leaders welcomed Frauendorfer’s decision as “a reasonable resolution in light of the current situation,” but at the same time they affirmed that Frauendorfer would keep his party office. Franz Josef Strauß was equally ambivalent. While stating that he himself had told Frauendorfer to forgo the seat, he simultaneously acknowledged that there was a “right to political error” and demanded that, “in accordance with principles of fairness, former National Socialists and communists be judged by the same standard” because communism had “brought no less disaster upon the world than National Socialism.” With Frauendorfer’s announcement, Strauß assumed that the matter had been “resolved in a way” that did not alienate “former party comrades who are members and voters of our party.”

As had been announced, a commission was formed by the executive board of the CSU to reexamine all the accusations against Frauendorfer. In doing so, the commission based its evaluation primarily on documentation that he himself had provided, and it concluded that it had found no grounds on which to criticize him. On the contrary, it adopted Frauendorfer’s version of his own biography almost completely and came to the remarkable conclusion,
announced in a press release, that he had “opposed National Socialism more boldly than many who today call themselves ‘enemies of the Third Reich.’”93 Thus, Frauendorfer was rehabilitated yet again, but even so, his career in the CSU was over. The negative publicity had cost him his executive post at Allianz, making him no longer of much use to the CSU. At the same time, it could not be ruled out that Frauendorfer might continue to throw a shadow over the party. For that reason, he was removed from the office of deputy treasurer before the end of 1963. However, for the top CSU leadership, the topic of the Nazi past was not over. In November 1963, at a meeting of the executive board, Friedrich Zimmermann asked, “How far may a former Nazi advance in a democratic party?” He was of the opinion that this question had to be settled once and for all.94 Such debates were irrelevant for Frauendorfer. His venture into politics was over before it had properly begun.

From that point onward, the course of Frauendorfer’s life was unspectacular. An official investigation of him was started rather accidentally in 1963, but it ceased once opinions had been obtained from the Central Office of the State Justice Administrations for the Investigation of National Socialist Crimes and from the Institute for Contemporary History in Munich. He was less fortunate in the suit he filed against the Bundesanstalt für Arbeitsvermittlung und Arbeitslosenversicherung (Federal Agency for Employment Services and Unemployment Insurance), as the federal employment agency responsible for employment and unemployment insurance was then called. His lawsuit to have his years as head of the Labor Division in the General Government counted toward his pension failed in two courts in 1964 and 1966, respectively. This was another indication of the limits to which German society was willing to integrate members of the Nazi elite, limits that had become increasingly strict since the late 1950s. After his unsuccessful fight for expanding his pension rights, the public heard no more from Frauendorfer, who lived a reclusive life in Tutzing in Upper Bavaria. On July 25, 1989, he died at the age of eighty.

Appendix

MINUTES

of the special executive board meeting of the Christian Social Union, Munich district chapter, on Monday, September 8, 1958, 7 p.m., in the room of the CSU parliamentary party in City Hall.

[... ]95

The chair of the party’s district chapter,96 in an official letter of the CSU district chapter dated September 3, 1958, called for a meeting of the extended
executive board on September 9, 1958. Those present at the meeting signed an attendance list. Shortly after the meeting was opened, the undersigned was requested by District Chapter Chair Dr. Josef Müller to prepare the minutes.97

City Councillor Franz Fackler opened the meeting and requested the report on the meeting of the CSU executive board. Werner Müller reported on this meeting, which resulted in instructions to repeat the candidate selection process in the Kelheim ward. Reference was made to the case of Schmucker, Traunstein. As Müller emphasized, he had argued strongly for new elections in Kelheim on grounds of the fundamental position of the CSU.

[City Councillor] Fackler indicated that similar accusations about the Munich CSU candidate Dr. Frauendorfer have been raised concerning his functions in the Third Reich. Dr. Hamm, he said, could elaborate on this.

[City Councillor] Dr. Hamm requested that Dr. Frauendorfer first be given the chance to disclose his functions before 1945. Only afterward would he, if necessary, expand on this, for it would embarrass him for the party's sake to level accusations personally.

Dr. Max Frauendorfer reported: The ideas of the papal social encyclicals had greatly appealed to him. When the NSDAP was still a small party, he believed that it was a place where he could put his ideas into practice. This is why he joined the NSDAP early and worked for it. He became the head of the office “für ständischen Aufbau.” On December 13, 1935, he resigned all his posts in the party (at age twenty-six) due to disapproval by Dr. [Robert] Ley. The process of terminating the posts lasted into the spring of 1936.

“After that I made an effort to work against the undesirable development occurring in the Third Reich.” He made many connections to circles in the resistance movement; in particular, the cooperation with Ambassador von Hassell was underscored by Dr. Frauendorfer. He maintained that he had never spoken about this activity, even though he had references from recognized members of the resistance movement, but “I have had to say these things because the relationship to the party before 1935 has been questioned.”

Of the six years of peace during the Third Reich, for four of them he was unable to find employment suitable to his legal training, “because neither the state nor the city would employ me, as I was a dismissed Nazi employee.” “I was one of those people belonging to the resistance who were fully aware of the danger involved.”

Dr. Frauendorfer concluded by saying that he would answer any further questions.

Dr. Josef Müller asked: “What were your functions in Poland?”
Fr.: “I was head of the state social administration; I did not hold any party office.”

In answer to repeated questioning: he was the head of the entire department, “labor minister,” that is, of the social administration, including the provision of food to plants and factories, first as an employee, then as a civil servant.

Interjected question by Dr. Hamm: “Which offices did you hold?”

Dr. Müller added: “in the General Government?” and quoted from the notes of Ambassador von Hassell:

... page 179 – Ebenhausen, Hassell talks about Dr. Frauendorfer’s Golden Party Badge

– ... page 209 – about Frauendorfer’s despair over what he had to witness in Poland... about Frauendorfer’s objection to the murder of agricultural workers, etc., that he raised with [Heinrich] Himmler. In another quote from the abovementioned source, reference is made to SS member Frauendorfer, who wanted, out of distress over what was occurring in Poland, to serve as a common soldier on the front line and, like [Hans] Frank, volunteered to serve in the Wehrmacht, something for which Frauendorfer was criticized by the SS...

Dr. Müller: “What were your responsibilities? Even in a high-level position you could have been a respectable person, but we are making a political decision here that is not concerned with passing judgment on an individual.” The quotes showed that Fr. was obviously a member of the SS in a high position, because there is no other way to explain the personal allegations expressed to Himmler. The aforementioned Golden Party Badge could indeed have served as protection for resistance activities.

Dr. Müller elaborated on the difference between hearing news (over banned radio), transmitting news to resistance circles, and [engaging in] active resistance efforts. Then Dr. M. reworded the question, roughly as follows: What functions [did you have] on the official side, how far [did you go] on the side of the resistance?

Answer from Dr. Frauendorfer: He became a NSDAP member at the age of eighteen, his membership number was under 100,000, [and] therefore [he received] a Golden Party Badge automatically.

Also [he] went to the SS at eighteen years of age (cavalry); in 1932 he announced his resignation, which was not accepted. At the time of his quarrel with Dr. Ley in 1935 (see above), he had the rank of Truppführer. From 1932 to 1945 he held no SS position, but the last “listed promotions” were to Sturmbannführer and Obersturmbannführer.
Objection by Dr. Müller: “How could you be promoted if you resigned from the SS?”

Dr. Fr.: In 1932 he officially resigned in order to prepare for the Dr. jur. [law doctorate] (letter was read aloud).

Interjected question by Werner Müller: “Did you pay dues?”

Dr. Fr.: Party dues until 1939 or 1940, “as far as the SS goes, I don’t know.”

Dr. Steinkohl: “How could you be promoted if you had resigned?”

Dr. Fr.: “I was not allowed to resign . . . therefore I was promoted on lists . . .” Szepessy, one of Frauendorfer’s head officials, landed in a concentration camp and Fr. got him released because together they had issued identification cards to Polish intellectuals, classifying them as skilled workers.

Fackler asked whether Frauendorfer’s position would have been comparable to the position of a son of Kolping who became known in the resistance . . .

Fr.: To be precise, he had been the director of the Landesarbeitsamt [state labor office] . . .

Dr. Müller: “Did that have anything to do with the deployment of labor?”

Fr.: That was a “small side job” next to many other responsibilities.

Then Fr. read aloud a statement by a Polish count, who had been an envoy in Berlin and after 1939 the head of the Polish relief organization (similar to [the] Red Cross), and who acknowledged in 1947 Frauendorfer’s helpfulness on behalf of the Polish people.

Fr. had given the impression that he had severed ties with everything in 1935. Then in answer to the interjected question[s] of Dr. Müller, concessions gradually emerged . . .
Dr. Hamm verbatim: “You have attempted to lie to the executive board of the party.”

Then Dr. Hamm read from photocopies of official documents that he had in his possession: in 1934, Reichsschulungsleiter of the NSDAP and the aforementioned responsibilities in Poland . . . “How can you say that you lost four years? You should spare the party the scandal.”

Dr. Fr. “I said expressly, no party offices.” (After 1935.)

Dr. Hamm: “We remember the Third Reich all too well for me to have to listen to such rubbish . . .”

Dr. Müller repeated that he had asked only because of the Hassell book, in which Frauendorfer did “not come off unfavorably.” “I have to say, it took a long time before we discovered that you held a ministerial-level position in Poland.”

Dr. Fr.: “I explained that I was head of the Labor Division in the General G[overnment].”

Dr. Müller: “If someone was of ministerial rank, he ultimately would have landed in the Prinz-Albrecht-Straße cellar [prison in Gestapo/SS headquarters].” Whoever served Hitler in such a high position would have had to give his life for being in the resistance . . .

Fr.: “You cannot reproach a person because, thanks to fortunate circumstances, he did not get killed.”

Dr. Müller stated that the CSU would get into big trouble if the facts recorded in the Nuremberg trial records were to become public.¹¹² (Concurring comments!)

Once again, Hamm read the section of the Nuremberg trial records on the forced labor issue.

Dr. Fr.: “I only said that as much as could happen by choice, did happen.”

Dr. Müller asked if it had to be read aloud again.

Dr. Fr.: “But, why?”

Fellow CSU member Engel asked how Fr., as a candidate, would explain to the public that he continued to be promoted until 1945 . . .

Dr. Fr.: From 1936 on, he had no longer held any party office and began work in Poland only after the war started and against the will of the party . . .

Once again the excerpt from the Nuremberg records is read aloud; it states that because of the lack of volunteers, Polish workers had to be made available by force.

Dr. M.: “This laid the foundation for the use of force.”

Dr. Fr.: “I had nothing to do with that.”

Dr. M.: “Good, we will let you believe what you want.” However, if a news-
paper published the excerpts just read, no one would understand a candidacy for public office of someone who helped to put these coercive measures into action and who denied being able to find further voluntary way[s]. No one would understand that, and for him, Dr. Müller, this would be taking things too far.

Fellow CSU member [Adolf] Lohrer advised careful consideration of the human aspect. The remarks by Dr. Hamm went too far. On the other hand, he himself had experienced some of the horrible events in Poland as a non-commissioned officer working in the outer office of the general responsible for transportation (or something like that). Therefore, he would have to say: “It’s nothing personal against you, but don’t do it. We cannot justify and defend this publicly; the party stands no chance because this cannot be defended.”

Lohrer requested Dr. Fr to “withdraw his candidacy.”

Fellow CSU member Glaser noted that numerous party members who had come into conflict with the NSDAP in the Reich had been sent to the East, where they were to prove themselves. Turning to Dr. Frauendorfer: “But regardless of how much good you may have done, if you were the director of such a Reich division, then it shows prudent tact not to campaign now for parliamentary government in Bavaria. You cannot convince anyone that you meant well. I cannot follow your reasoning when you say that your involvement ended on December 13, 1935, because you were Catholic and black [politically conservative]. You cannot make us believe that you did not serve the NSDAP after 1935 . . . How could it be that you were given this function if you didn’t want it; you must have rendered certain services . . .”

Fellow CSU member Schmidhuber, Peter: Was Dr. Müller aware of what Dr. Fr. was during the Third Reich? Dr. Fr. had said that, before starting his work in the CSU, he had described his career to Dr. Müller and Dr. Hundhammer.

Dr. Müller: “I knew that he had been in the General Government, and what you told me [then] corresponds roughly with what you said at the start (of this meeting).” After President Riedmayr called his attention to the Hassell book, he had posed such precise questions because he, Dr. M., realized he was not fully informed.

Dr. M. mentioned his earlier statement on the denazification law and asked Dr. Fr.: “Where were you immediately after 1945?”

Dr. Fr.: “After 1945 I was in Munich; at first I could not go by my own name, that was quite clear, of course . . .” He spoke with Father Rupert Mayer and Father Rösch, among others, and they expressed their hope that he would soon be able again “to play an active role himself.”
Fellow CSU member Stützle: He came to this meeting fully uninformed and had not even known that Dr. Hamm had some concern to raise regarding Dr. Fr. But he then ascertained that Dr. Fr.'s introductory statement gave the impression, intentionally or unintentionally, that he had been a young idealist who rejected Nazi ideology by 1935 at the latest and therefore found himself discredited and in dire straits professionally. If Dr. Fr. does not step down, the state executive board of the party will be forced to make a decision because, in light of Dr. Fr.'s responsibilities, the personal conduct of the candidate cannot be justified to the public. Even if Dr. Fr. is granted a clean bill of conduct, the propaganda efforts of the CSU would not be enough to defend this conduct against attacks leveled by the opposition's propaganda.

Fellow CSU member Lemmrich asked what position Dr. Fr. had taken when it was decided that the recruitment of Polish workers would continue to be possible only through coercive measures. Dr. Fr. referred to the letter of the aforementioned Polish count, who had confirmed his helpfulness on behalf of the Polish people.

Dr. M. interjected that Frank had also possessed a written statement from a Polish bishop to Rome and yet he was still hanged . . .

Fellow CSU member [Anton] Thanbichler pointed to the task that lay ahead: to conduct a successful election campaign for the party. It would not be acceptable to have a man run for office who had had such high-level responsibilities in the Third Reich. The man on the street could never be made to understand that.

The further course of the meeting was very heated.

Dr. Fr.: “I feel personally disappointed by the way Dr. Hamm has portrayed me here. I have not sought to conceal anything. . . .” Hamm’s behavior is “impertinent.” “I can assure you of one thing: I went four years without a position suitable to my training, and I landed in this job as a civil servant of the social administration only as a result of the war. I did not carry out any party functions after 1935/36. The other job was a government position, that is something else. By referring to the Polish statement, I have shown how I carried out my duties. I have gone through so much in ten years and will not let myself be portrayed now as some enthusiastic Nazi . . .”

(Objections from the participants that no one had portrayed him as an “enthusiastic Nazi,” but as a high-level Nazi officeholder.)

Dr. Fr. wanted to refer to a statement written by the widow of Ambassador von Hassell, but was interrupted by Dr. H. and, turning to Dr. Hamm, in essence said: I can understand that you are in a “personally difficult position” in the party . . . Dr. Hamm countered, asking what this had to do with him and
with the topic on the meeting’s agenda. Dr. Frauendorfer countered, saying that marriage to “FDP Landtag member Dr. Brücher” naturally creates difficulties in the CSU [...].

At this, Dr. H. rushed over to Frauendorfer and warned, “I’m going to belt you one, this is none of your business…” Remarks were made such as “You Reichsschulungsleiter, you filthy Nazi pig…” Interjections by the other meeting attendees caused Hamm to desist: This is not the way to handle things either.

Dr. Müller: “Frauendorfer, is there something you still want to say?”

He asked permission to read aloud the aforementioned statement by Hassell’s widow in which Fr. is confirmed as having transmitted valuable information to resistance groups. This was said to be an important contribution to the resistance made under full awareness of the risk.

Dr. Fr. stressed his role as a resistance fighter and argued that the annual ceremonies honoring the dead resistance fighters are worthless when the living resistance fighters are not being acknowledged...

Dr. M. protested against dragging the remembrance of resistance fighters into the hearing. He asked Dr. Fr.: “What would have happened to you had Hitler been victorious?”

Dr. Fr.: “I would have died that first year.”

Dr. M.: “Do you voluntarily relinquish your candidacy?”

Dr. Fr.: “I am profoundly convinced that I have no reason to relinquish it. If you believe that, then the Landesführung [state leadership] (interjection Dr. Müller: “There is no Führung in the CSU”), the state executive board of the CSU, as a more objective body, should decide” (interjection by Stützle, “outrageous”; protest from City Councillor Lutz against the accusation of a lack of objectivity).

Dr. M. pointed out that he had requested fellow CSU member Stützle to take notes. The minutes of the meeting can thus be submitted. He said he mentioned this because Dr. Fr. doubted the objectivity of the hearing.

Dr. Fr. left the parliamentary party chamber at 9:05 p.m. to give the expanded board the opportunity to come to a decision.

Dr. M. started the discussion by declaring that he had come here without really knowing what the outcome should be. Now he is “100 percent clear what the outcome should be.” He hopes that the board shares this opinion unanimously.

Stützle asks, because the objectivity had already been placed in doubt, whether any other people were present, besides Dr. Fr., who were not board members. Dr. Hamm then also left the room.

L. Huber said he was puzzled how it could happen that the relatively un-
known Dr. Fr. had even been allowed to run for office. “He was managed,” he said.

Pflüger: He had known him as chairman of local CSU Chapter 9.

Dr. M. disclosed that Der Spiegel had already announced it would be taking up the case of Dr. Fr. “I can only remedy this in the interests of the party.”

On the question how it came about that Fr. could even run, Dr. M. said: The director general of Allianz asked him to suggest Dr. Fr. for the elections to the Bundestag, because in the past he “had occasionally supported the CSU.” “I didn’t know him [Frauendorfer] then, he was somehow there for the first time, and I heard that he was supposed to be a man who, early on, was in the NSDAP as a young person . . .” This would not have been grounds to oppose him had no new incriminatory revelations surfaced. For the Bundestag elections, he [Müller] had rejected the suggestion made by the director general, referring instead to Hugo Geiger, a member of the Bundestag. The Allianz director had said that Dr. Fr. had been granted leave with a monthly salary of such and such for politics. “Then it was called to my attention by the JU [Junge Union, the youth organization of the CSU and CDU] that in Gauting he had founded a ‘humanistic society,’ the bylaws of which I didn’t like. So I did not go to the nomination meeting.” Dr. Fr. was said to have promised the campaign generous financial backing, and that is why Pflüger could nominate him, particularly as it was an electoral ward in which his chances were hopeless. In the meantime it has been called to his attention that Fr. wanted to procure the second votes of other electoral districts by financing campaigns . . . It was thought that Fr. would “bring in Nazi votes”; by then Fr. had set to work to procure second votes at the expense of others . . .

Dr. Müller continued: “What was decisive for me, informed about the positions by the Hassell book, was that he spoke of the encyclicals . . .” He was already familiar with that. Furthermore, Fr. tried to explain what an insignificant Nazi dignitary he had been—the rank of noncommissioned officer in the SS!—“And only when he is grilled is he suddenly—although he had quit the party—a lieutenant colonel in the SS and on Himmler’s staff; otherwise he could not level accusations against Himmler, and in occupied Poland he held a minister-level position.”

City Councillor Fackler said that he could suddenly vividly remember red posters, “Reichsamtsleiter Dr. Frauendorfer.” . . .

Peter Schmidhuber asked whether the delegate assembly itself could withdraw a candidacy.

Werner Müller answered that this had already been checked in the Prücklmayer case, and it was not possible. W. Müller said further that the Prücklmay-
er hearing was fundamentally different from the hearing with Frauendorfer. Prücklmayer had made all incriminating facts known at the candidate nomination meeting. No new accusations surfaced either before or during the hearing of the state executive board. “In the interest of and commissioned by the district committee, I took to the barricades to ensure that the Prücklmayer election would be repeated. I will take the same standpoint in the Schmucker case. We also have to take the same standpoint in this case with Frauendorfer. We have to request Mr. State Chairman\textsuperscript{132} to repeat the election based on the minutes of this hearing. I am convinced that the delegate assembly in the Munich VII ward will make other nominations after the withdrawal of this candidacy . . . As I have emphasized to the state executive board, what is at stake here is the fundamental principle of the CSU in Bavaria.”

Dr. M.: Before any new decision is taken in the Munich VII ward, the state executive board must first rescind the first election.

Dr. Steinkohl: States that he was an electoral delegate in the Munich VII ward. They had nominated Dr. Fr. at the urging of Pflüger for financial reasons. “We have Dr. Hamm to thank for avoiding this humiliation. He has been trying for weeks to bring this to light.”

Dr. M.: “Is anyone against us passing the resolution unanimously? If someone is of another opinion, he should say so now.”

No requests to speak.

Dr. M.: “Shall we vote?”

Dr. Besold:\textsuperscript{133} “It was, for example, deception to make us drag it out of him that he was promoted ‘automatically’ as a former SS member. Second, he said that he never got anything more through the party. Yet wasn’t this office in Poland strictly a party office?”

Dr. M.: “Frank was appointed by Hitler.” Frank had concerns about going over [into Poland]. Certainly Fr. was brought over [to Poland] by Frank as Reichsleiter. Back then, the aforementioned Max Dorn\textsuperscript{134} went to the Abwehr [German military intelligence] to avoid having to go to Poland. “Actually, everyone knew what was coming in Poland.” Dr. Besold maintained that whoever went to Poland had to have been reliable in the political party sense. Also, he noted, Dr. Hamm should not have “reacted” as he did.

On the motion of City Councillor Lutz, the vote was to be taken by secret ballot. Dr. Besold: “Isn’t it still possible to get him to withdraw voluntarily?”

Dr. M.: He [Müller] plans to inform him of the unanimous rejection of his candidacy by the board and then ask him again.

*The motion* read as follows:

“The Munich District Chapter requests the State Chairman of the CSU in
Bavaria to order that candidate selection be carried out again in the Munich VII ward.”

The twenty-seven persons present were eligible to vote. Twenty-seven yes votes were submitted.

Dr. Müller noted that he would be adding the following to the text of the resolution sent to the state chairman: “This motion was passed unanimously in a vote by secret ballot by twenty-seven eligible voters—with no abstentions.”

At 9:30 p.m. Dr. Fr. and Dr. Hamm were requested to enter the caucus room again.

Dr. Müller announced: “We have made the following decision: The district chapter requests the State Chairman of the CSU in Bavaria to order that the election to select candidates in the Munich VII ward be repeated.”

“Twenty-seven eligible voters cast their ballots secretly. All twenty-seven approved this resolution.” Addressing Dr. Fr.: “In light of this unanimous decision, may I ask you again whether you are willing to withdraw voluntarily from your candidacy in the VII ward? We are not going to resume the discussion because the decision now rests with another authority; I would appreciate a yes or no.”

Dr. Fr.: “I am forced to say no, because otherwise it would look as if there were something to accuse me of.” That was what motivated his answer. He would now have to have his activities on behalf of the resistance clarified in greater detail than before.

Minutes taken on September 9 and 10, 1958, based on the stenographic record of the meeting.

_Bundesarchiv Koblenz, NL 1397 Karl Theodor Freiherr von und zu Guttenberg, vol. 249, fols. 219–30._

Notes

1. This contribution is a considerably shortened version of my original publication “Grenzen der Integration: Die CSU und der Umgang mit der nationalsozialistischen Vergangenheit—der Fall Dr. Max Frauendorfer,” _Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte_ 48, no. 4 (October 2000): 675–742. The footnotes have been limited primarily to the source citation of quotations, although references have been added to several studies that have appeared since the original version was published in 2000.


5. IfZ-Archiv, MA 595, “Martin Bormann an Alfred Rosenberg vom 29.3.1935.”
15. Bollmus, Amt Rosenberg, 92.

17. BArchK, R 41/351, “Auszugsweise Abschrift aus Deutsche Verwaltung 15 (1938), S. 95,” “Notiz: Wechsel in der Hauptschriftleitung.” Frauendorfer would continue to work on the editorial staff.
19. In 1942, the administration of the General Government consisted of the Secretariat of State as General Governor Hans Frank’s office for coordination and control and of 12 divisions (Hauptabteilungen) which functioned as ministries. See the overview in Taschenbuch für Verwaltungsbeamte 1942, ed. by Dr. Wärnack (Berlin: Heymanns, 1942), 197–205; for an overview of the administrative structure of the Labor Division which consisted of eight departments, see ibid, 201.
135–40, 379, which also provides an overview of the structure of the Hauptabteilung Arbeit in ibid., 379.


25. _Diensttagebuch_, 149, entry dated March 7, 1940.


27. _Diensttagebuch_, 176–77, entry dated April 21, 1940; following quotation, ibid., 188–89, entry dated April 23, 1940.

28. Eisenblätter, _Grundlinien_, 329; the following information, ibid., table 3.


33. _Diensttagebuch_, 216, entry dated May 30, 1940 (SS Brigadeführer Bruno Streckenbach).

34. See ibid., 230–31, entry dated June 6/7, 1940 (quotation, 231).


37. See Dieter Pohl, _Nationalsozialistische Judenverfolgung in Ostgalizien 1941–

---

Schlemmer: General Government to the Bundestag?


39. See Pohl, Judenverfolgung, 136 (quotation), 184–85, 189, 287–88. In the ABC classification system, the Jewish population was divided into the groups skilled laborer (A), generally fit for work (B), and unfit for work (C). The following quotation, ibid., 287.

40. See Musial, Zivilverwaltung, 273–76 (quotation, 273).

41. Diensttagebuch, 457–58, entry dated December 16, 1941.

42. Ibid., 516, entry dated June 22, 1942.

43. See footnote 101.


46. Longerich, Politik der Vernichtung, 509.

47. IfZ-Archiv, MA 309, "Heinrich Himmler an Friedrich-Wilhelm Krüger vom 3.10.1942."

48. IfZ-Archiv, MA 309, "Max Frauendorfer an Heinrich Himmler vom 18.10.1942."

49. IfZ-Archiv, MA 309, "Heinrich Himmler an Max Frauendorfer vom 20.10.1942."


51. IfZ-Archiv, MA 309, "Heinrich Himmler an Obersturmbannführer Bender vom 3.12.1942."


53. IfZ-Archiv, Sp. 58, "Meldebogen Max Frauendorfers vom 7.11.1950."


56. IfZ-Archiv, Sp. 58, "Max Frauendorfer an die Hauptkammer München vom 27.1.1951."

57. IfZ-Archiv, Sp. 58, "Lebenslauf Max Frauendorfers vom 1.11.1950."

58. IfZ-Archiv, Sp. 58, "Max Frauendorfer an die Hauptkammer München vom 27.1.1951"; emphasis in the original.


60. IfZ-Archiv, Sp. 58, "Max Frauendorfer an die Berufungskammer München vom 10.2.1951."

63. BArchK, R 41/350, fol. 26, “Bayerisches Arbeitsministerium an Max Frauendorfer vom 15.1.1952.”
70. See footnote 96.
71. The text of this document is printed at the end of the current article.
72. See footnote 100.
73. See footnote 99.
75. ACSP, Vorstand/Präsidium 19590502, “Protokoll der Sitzung des geschäftsführenden Landesvorstands der CSU am 2.5.1959.”
77. IfZ-Archiv, ED 720/12, “Protokoll der Sitzung des Landesausschusses der CSU am 24.6.1961.”
78. Since 1953 voters have received two votes in federal elections. With the first, voters directly elect a federal district representative, and with the second they vote for a party. Party candidate lists are compiled in all of the federal states.
86. See footnote 117.
87. ACSP, Schiedsgericht, Ordner “Dr. Max Frauendorfer,” “Presseerklärung der CSU vom 17.1.1963.”

Schlemmer: General Government to the Bundestag?
92. ACSP, Schiedsgericht, Ordner “Dr. Max Frauendorfer,” “Franz Josef Strauß an Alois Hundhammer vom 1.2.1963.”
94. ACSP, Vorstand/Präsidium 19631130, “Protokoll der Sitzung des geschäftsführenden Landesvorstands der CSU am 30.11.1963.”
95. According to the distribution list (omitted here), copies were to be provided to Josef Müller, Werner Müller, Heinrich Pfüger, Erwin Hamm, and Max Frauendorfer. Misspellings and punctuation were discreetly corrected, obvious duplicate wording and superfluous quotation marks were deleted, and handwritten corrections were added. A copy of the minutes can also be found in ACSP, NL Müller F 49. The version of the minutes printed here includes numerous corrections and changes, as compared with the copy in NL Müller, but these have no significant effect on the content.
96. Dr. Josef Müller (1898–1979), Catholic, lawyer, as of 1939 served as an officer of the *Abwehr* (German military intelligence) and became a go-between for the military opposition at the secret negotiations with the British government in which the Vatican acted as the intermediary; incarcerated in various prisons and concentration camps, 1943–45; temporary and then first official chairman of the CSU, 1945–49; chairman of the CSU Munich district chapter, 1951–60; member of the Bavarian Landtag (MdL, CSU), 1946–62; Bavarian minister of justice, 1947–52.
97. The minutes were taken by Hans Stützle, but—in contrast to the copy in the NL Müller—they are unsigned.
98. Franz Fackler (1895–1963), Catholic, baker and advertising specialist; held in pretrial detention as a member of a pro-monarchy resistance group, 1939–44; sentenced by the *Volksgerichtshof* (People’s Court) to twenty-seven months’ imprisonment, 1944; served as city councillor (CSU) in Munich, 1946–63, and as chairman of the CSU caucus in the city council, 1949–63; vice-chair of the CSU Munich district chapter, 1949–63; vice-chair of the CSU Munich district chapter, 1949–59.
99. Werner Müller (1910–1996), Lutheran, authorized notary, imprisoned in a concentration camp, 1944/45; served first as vice-chair and then (1960–67) as chair of the CSU Munich district chapter; CSU treasurer, 1959–67; MdL (CSU), 1965–74.
100. Dr. Erwin Hamm (1909–2008), lawyer; after denunciation in 1938 appeared before a special court and was then excluded from service in the justice system; for a while one of the vice-chairs of the CSU Munich district chapter; city councillor (CSU) in Munich, 1948–56; administrator for the city of Munich, 1945–74; married Hildegard Hamm-Brücher in 1956.
101. Ulrich von Hassell (1881–1944), lawyer and diplomat; ambassador in Rome, 1932–38; arrested, 1944; sentenced to death by the People’s Court and executed.
102. In Josef Müller’s copy: “food, etc.” (*Lebensmitteln usw*).
103. On January 19, 1941, Ulrich von Hassell noted (*Tagebücher*, 22.4): “Berthold visited me and brought his friend [ . . . ] (with the Golden Party Badge). It was highly impressive how distressed he was about events in Poland and overall developments in general.”
105. Probably in the entry dated May 15, 1943 (Hassell, Tagebücher, 365). However, it is
not stated here that it was Hans Frank who also voluntarily joined the German army, but
Frauendorfer’s friend Friedrich Berthold.

106. Handwritten correction of German spelling in Josef Müller’s copy.

107. Dr. Hans Steinkohl (1925–2003), Catholic, consultant surgeon, last employed as
medical director of the Munich-Harlaching hospital; city councilor (CSU) in Munich,

108. In the original: “Schempessy (?)”.

109. This is a reference to the Catholic social service agency Kolpingwerk. It was founded
in the 19th Century by the Catholic priest Adolph Kolping.

110. Count Adam Ronikier (1881–1952), Polish architect and politician; president of
Rada Głównej Opiekuńcza (official German name: Polnischer Hauptausschuss; Central Wel-
fare Council), 1940–43; removed from office by the German occupation administration
and imprisoned for several months; immigrated to the United States after the war ended.

111. As it appears in Josef Müller’s copy.

112. On January 10, 1946, an excerpt from the official diary of Governor-General Frank
was read aloud. See Trial of the Major War Criminals before the International Military Tribu-
nal, vol. 5 (Nuremberg: 1947), 103. On this, see also p. 181 of this article.

113. In the original the word “voluntary” is marked or crossed out by hand; the sentence
makes sense only with the inclusion of this word.

114. In Josef Müller’s copy, the wording is in plural form: “voluntary ways.”

115. Ernst Glaser (1904–1990), Catholic, sales director; since 1946 member of the
CSU; district chairman of the Union der Vertriebenen (Federation of Expellees) in Munich,
1946–74.

116. Peter Schmidhuber (1931–2020), Catholic, economist and lawyer; city councilor
(CSU) in Munich, 1960–66; member of the Bundestag (MdB, CSU), 1965–69 and 1972–
78; MdL (CSU), 1978–87; Bavarian state minister for federal affairs, 1978–87; member of
the European Commission, 1987–94.

117. Dr. Dr. Alois Hundhammer (1900–1974), Catholic, economist and historian MdL
(Bavarian People’s Party, BVP—Bayerische Volkspartei), 1932/33; in Dachau concentration
camp, 1933; chairman of the CSU Upper Bavaria district chapter, 1946–70, except for a
short period in 1948; MdL (CSU), 1946–70; chairman of the CSU caucus in the Bavarian
Landtag, 1946–51; president of the Bavarian Landtag, 1951–54; Bavarian minister of culture,

118. Martin Riedmayr (1896–1989), police officer (ultimately a lieutenant colonel in the
Schutzpolizei, urban police); temporarily deployed in the Soviet Union, 1941; co-founder
and candidate (1950) of the Bayerische Heimat- und Königspartei in the elections to the Ba-
varian Landtag; president of the Bavarian State Office for the Protection of the Constitu-

119. Rupert Mayer, SJ (1876–1945), Catholic priest in Munich; repeatedly arrested for
his public criticism of National Socialism; died in November 1945 of health problems result-

120. In the minutes the name “Pater Schröder” appears here. However, the name is
crossed out and a handwritten note in the margin probably means “Rösch.” Augustin

Schlemmer: General Government to the Bundestag? 193
Rösch, Societas Jesu (1893–1961), Catholic priest; as of 1935 provincial superior of the Upper German Province of the Jesuits, member of the Kreisau Circle; arrested and severely mistreated during interrogations, 1945; director of Caritas in Bavaria, 1947–61.

121. Hans Stützle (1928–2003), Catholic, politician, appointed as social affairs secretary at the CSU state headquarters, 1953; executive secretary of the CSU faction in the Bavarian Landtag and editor of the CSU-Correspondenz; as of 1966 employed at the Bavarian Ministry of Labor; city councillor (CSU) in Munich, 1956–60 and 1963–79; chairman of the CSU caucus in the city council, 1963–70; head of the social services department of Munich, 1979–93.


123. In Josef Müller’s copy, handwritten inserts identify this as a verbatim quotation.

124. Ilse von Hassell (1885–1982), née von Tirpitz; married Ulrich von Hassell, 1911. Probably reference is being made to the sworn statement made by Ilse von Hassell on February 4, 1951, a notarized copy of which is in the denazification court file on Dr. Max Frauendorfer.


126. In Josef Müller’s copy, there is a handwritten insertion here of the words “somewhat later.”

127. Josef Lutz (1882–1965), Catholic, employee of the health insurance provider Allgemeine Ortskrankenkasse in Munich; city councillor (BVP) in Munich, 1925–33; arrested, 1933 and 1943; city councillor (CSU) in Munich, 1946–48 and 1949–65; chairman of the CSU employees’ groups in Munich.

128. Heinrich Pfüger (1908–1968), Catholic, white-collar worker; arrested as a member of a pro-monarchy resistance group, 1939, and sentenced to five years’ jail time in 1944 by the People’s Court; vice president of the Bavarian Restitution Office, 1949–52; as of 1955 administrative head of the CSU Munich district chapter; MdL (CSU), 1958–68.


130. Christian Democratic Union of Germany (Christlich Demokratische Union Deutschlands)

131. In the elections for the Bavarian parliament voters have two votes. With the first vote, a candidate for a voting district is elected, with the second vote, a candidate on a party’s constituency list is chosen; there is a constituency list for each of the seven administrative districts in Bavaria.


134. Max Dorn (1892–?), Catholic, lawyer, as of 1934 judge at the Munich I Regional Court (Landgericht).