Abstract

abstract:

This paper focuses on a neglected portion of Plato's Gorgias from 506c to 513d during Socrates's discussion with Callicles. I claim that Callicles adopts the view that virtue lies in self-preservation in this part of the dialogue. Such a position allows him to assert the value of rhetoric in civic life by appealing not to the goodness of acting unjustly with impunity, but to the badness of suffering unjustly without remedy. On this view, the benefits of the life of rhetoric depend on the idea that virtue consists in the power to protect oneself from the predations of others. I argue that by challenging this understanding of virtue as self-preservation, Socrates both deprives Callicles of any remaining justification for the rhetorical life in the Gorgias and, at the same time, makes room for his own defense of the life of philosophy.

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Additional Information

ISSN
1538-4586
Print ISSN
0022-5053
Pages
pp. 349-369
Launched on MUSE
2021-07-22
Open Access
No
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