Abstract

ABSTRACT:

It is often held that people have a moral right to believe and say whatever they want. For instance, one might claim that they have a right to believe racist things as long as they keep those thoughts to themselves. Or, one might claim that they have a right to pursue any scholarly question they want as long as they do so with a civil tone. This paper rejects those claims and argues that no one has such unlimited moral rights. Part 1 explores the value of the freedoms of thought and expression. Part 2 argues against the unlimited moral right to free expression, focusing in particular on the special obligations and moral constraints that obtain for academics. Part 3 argues against the unlimited moral right to free thought.

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Additional Information

ISSN
1086-3249
Print ISSN
1054-6863
Pages
pp. 133-152
Launched on MUSE
2021-06-09
Open Access
No
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