Play a Little!: Aristotle on Eutrapelia

This paper analyzes Aristotle’s account of eutrapelia in the Nicomachean Ethics ¹ and has two main goals. The first is to offer an alternative to the standard reading of this virtue, according to which eutrapelia is a good sense of humor or deals with the proper use of humor. The second is to make the case that this excellence serves a number of social purposes, which indirectly promote civic friendship and its offspring, political justice.

The standard interpretation of eutrapelia is advocated by William Fortenbaugh, ² whose translation of the term as “wittiness” is also customary.³ Fortenbaugh writes that eutrapelia is a “readiness to enjoy a good joke, even when the joke is directed toward [oneself] . . . and . . . the ability to make a good joke”⁴—with particular emphasis on “jeering abuse (skōmma and its cognates)”⁵—provided that the banter is appropriate rather than crude and demeaning.⁶

Howard Curzer’s interpretation can be considered a variant of the standard reading of eutrapelia because it assumes that this virtue deals with the activity of joking and being humorous.⁷ Specifically, Curzer restricts the domain of eutrapelia to certain kinds of jokes, namely, “put-downs and barbs,” ⁸ that ridicule, belittle, or otherwise offend their target. Then, he makes the case that the excellence of the eutrapelos consists not in humor production or appreciation but rather in the ability to assess whether a given joke will pain its target(s) or audience.⁹ As he puts it, eutrapeloi are “hatefulness experts: they can specify which jokes are hateful in which situations” ¹⁰ and choose to make, and tolerate, only inoffensive put-downs. In short, Curzer understands eutrapelia as the ability to police the moral boundaries of a narrow domain of humor. Accordingly, he proposes that the two vicious types associated with this virtue, namely, buffoons (bōmolochoi) and rustics (agroikoi), err only with respect to demeaning jokes, but are otherwise perfectly capable of engaging in, and appreciating, (nonhateful) humor.¹¹

I argue, by contrast, that eutrapelia cannot be reduced either to humor production and appreciation or to sensitivity to the hurtfulness of jokes. These two traits are only components of the virtue, which is to be understood, more broadly, as gracious playfulness. This is an amiable disposition concerned not only with jokes but with all forms of lighthearted social interactions. The eutrapelos excels at tactful social play and is well versed in all kinds of unserious exchanges. I further make the case that an important component of playfulness is a healthy enjoyment of the pleasures of rest and play, and correspondingly, that buffoons and rustics have a problematic relation to such pleasures and misunderstand the role that they ought to play in a well-lived life.

Turning to the importance of eutrapelia for the political community, John Lombardini argues that this excellence has two main civic functions.¹² First, he claims that, as a form of “educated hubris,”¹³ eutrapelia playfully targets others’ as well as one’s own faults. As such, it plays a role “in mediating potential social/political conflicts”¹⁴ with “friends, enemies and strangers”¹⁵ in an agreeable and nondisruptive manner. Lombardini’s view that eutrapelia serves an explicitly political function, however, runs counter to Aristotle’s position. ¹⁶ The philosopher does not think that playful or humorous modes of interaction are appropriate or helpful when conducting the serious business of managing the city. Rather, he sharply distinguishes the parts of life that are serious from those devoted to relaxation¹⁷ and squarely places eutrapelia in the latter’s sphere.¹⁸ Moreover, Aristotle is fully aware of his countrymen’s keen sensitivity to real or perceived offensive remarks and would likely regard the suggestion to mix criticisms and laughter as a possible threat to agreeable social relations.¹⁹ I propose that, rather than affecting political relations directly, eutrapelia promotes civic friendship indirectly by improving social interactions in times of rest and lightheartedness. Lombardini himself identifies one of the ways in which the virtue contributes to attaining this result. The second civic function of this excellence, he...