Discussion on Strategic Guiding Policies of the Guomindang and the Communist Party and Their Mutual Relations During the War of Resistance Against Japan

Jiscussion on Strategic Guiding Policies of the Guomindang and the Communist Party and Their Mutual Relations During the War of Resistance Against Japan by Fei Zheng and Li Zuo-min Translated by Tien-wei Wu The war· of resistance against Japan was a war of total national liberation commonly undertaken by all anti-Japanese classes and social groups on the basis of cooperation between the Guomindang (GMD) and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). War as the fundamental content and central theme of the eight year history bestowed on the GMD-CCP collabo-ration a heavy mi 1i tary coloration. The result was divergence and unity with respect to the strategic guidance of the two parties as well as restraint and coordination in a series of comp icated relations. From a macrocosmic approach, this paper aims at investigating these fundamental relations. I. The early stage of the war of resistance: coordination of military strategies between the two parties and development of stabilized spheres ln two battlefields. The North China Incident augered Japan •s all-out aggression. With the national crisis festering, the GMD and CCP were promptly faced with the immediate task of preparation for the war of resistance against .Japan, a situation which meantime provided the two parties with the initial contact for rapprochement. Following the Lugouqiao Incident ·and the formation of the united front, the two parties again joined hands, thereby entering the period of mutually coordinated war strategy for the national resistance against Japan. From July 11 to August 12, 1937, the supreme command at NanJ 1ng convened thir·ty-three meetJngs to discuss policies of war against Japan and also held the supreme national defense conference, which resolved to adopt the protracted war strategy against Japan. For unifying ideology and coordinating military operations between the two sides, Zhou En-lai, Zhu Ue, and Ye Jian-ying made a special trip to Nanjing, and at a meeting on August 11, published their important opinJons on the national military deployment and the strategic and tactical principles in accordance with the strategic lh inking of a protracted war. L11 This marked the initial consul tation on military strategy between the two parties, which came closer to unanimity ln thejr understanding of the strategic question. How ever, the actual situation was far more complicated than was 56 manifested, particularly over many broad issues crucial to war with Japan, concerning which the two sides were often diametrically opposed . First, whether to fight an all-out war of resistance or to negotiate and fight simultaneously? The fire of war that fast spread from Lugouqiao originated in Japan's camouflaged "non-expansion policy." The Nanjing government was determined to adopt the same non-expansion attitude; in its direct negotiation with Japan, it had sought the possibility of international mediation. During tJte time of the Nanj ing supreme national defense conference, Chiahg Kai-shek unequivocally expressed that "if the Great Wall can be taken as the demarcation line, south of which Japan will not be allowed to encroach upon any resources," [ 2] he was ready to accept such peace. The Japanese front line troops, driven by their unexpected success in fighting and their insatiable ambition, repeated! y ignored the "restricted line" formulated by their own command organ, as they continued to push into China. Consequently the Japanese cabinet was obliged to give up the "non-expansion policy" on August 17, thus carrying the fierce war to the vast areas of North and East China. Faced with the pressing war, the Nanj ing government set out to organize a large-scale resistance on the one hand and, on the other, sti 11 tried to bring about a cease-fire through the intervention of the League of Nations and the Nine-Powers Pact, as well as the mediation of Trautmann, a cease-fire which would be realized under the minimum condition of returning to the status quo prior to the Lugouqiao and August 13 incidents. After the fall of Nanj ing, Japan's overture for peace was unacceptable to Chianging in spite of his sharply skidding bargaining power. If the National government were forced to surrender, "it woutd be toppled by the tide of criticism from the...