Toward a Normative Theory of Political Development With Special Reference to the Republic of China in Taiwan

TOWARD A NORMATIVE THEORY OF POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA IN TAIWAN by Thomas A. Metzger Below is a list of questions that, in a slightly different form, I distributed in May 1983 to a discussion group organized in Taipei by Chung-kuo shih-pao. Some of the flavor of that discussion can be found in a debate about Taiwan's political development that this paper printed in its issues of March 13, 21, 28, April 16, 21, 24, 26, May 20, 21, 22, 23, and June 5 and 6. Chin Heng-wei was the editor responsible for organizing all these exchanges, in the course of which my position was criticized as too "conservative" by, among others, Professor Chang Chung-tung of National Taiwan University, Liao Jen-i, a young intellectual, and someone writing under the pen name of K'ang Ch'in. This debate gratifyingly illustrates how liberal views highly critical of the Government can now be expressed not only in small magazines but also in a newspaper with a circulation of about 1 million. Yet it struck me then, as it did when preparing in early 1983 for the Association of Asian Studies' panel on "Sinological Shadows," that there is a discrepancy between our need as political actors to evaluate governments in a moral way and the academic discussion of political development. Influenced by Max Weber's search for a social science free of value judgments and by the need to keep clear the distinction between •is" and "ought," the academic discussion of political development is often restricted to factual inquiries, while moral judgment is left in the realm of tacit assumptions, some conflicting theories none thought out. ad hoc exchanges of opinion, and of which has been too carefully There are several schools of thought that present a normative theory of political development -- one explaining how governments should develop, not just how they have in fact developed -- by intertwining this theory with a factual count of historical evolution. This approach is common in contemporary Chinese circles, whether of the right or the left, since there it has been furthered not only by the influence of Spencer, Marx, and Hegel but also by that of scientism and Confucianism; and it has been intertwined with much important scholarship. Evident also in the U.S., however, this approach often blurs together the questions of "is• and "ought• and is based on assumptions about which historical movement is in accord with universal •morality" or "reason.• The human rights approach is another common way of evaluating governments morally. Yet this approach is seldom based on consideration of all relevant questions (see below). Moreover, it typically rests on the assumption that total, immediate democratization is feasible in all societies, and that therefore prosecuting anyone for breaking laws that limit 23 political dissent is a violation of universal human rights. Some scholars combine Marxism and the human rights approach to offer a high evaluation of "Leninist revolutions" violating human rights on a massive scale and a low evaluation of •counter-revolutionary• governments violating human rights on a lesser scale. To avoid being charged with the use of a double standard, however, such scholars should show how Leninist revolutions meet the standards of normative political development, while "counter-revolutionary" governments do not. Other scholars, especially in Taiwan, evaluate governments by combining human rights theory with modernization theory. This combination , however, again blurs together "isu and "oughta questions, while social scientists focusing on the purely factual aspects of modernization, such as urbanization rates, end up not addressing moral issues that in fact are central to poiitical development. The academic discussion of normative political dev~lopment thus seems to be in a state of some disarray. As a result, we find it hard to minimize bias by pinpointing disagreements and maximizing the discussion of normative problems that can in fact be abstracted from the turmoil of political passion. Leo Strauss long ago criticized the social sciences by warning that factual political studies should not be divorced from the central, normative question of classical political philosophy, the question of the nature of the ~ood society. Today we can perhaps heed his warning by...