The Theory and Practice of the Wise and Virtuous Man: Reflections on Adam Smith's Response to Hume's Deathbed Wish

T h e T h e o r y a n d P ra c tic e o f th e W ise a n d V ir tu o u s M a n :zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFED R e fle c tio n s o n A d a m S m ith 's R e sp o n se to H u m e 's D e a th b e d W ish T . D . C A M P B E L L A N D I A N R O S S ZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA In the sixth edition (1790) of the TSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA T h e o r y o f M o r a l S e n t im e n t s1 Adam Smith added a new part (VI). There he included lengthy and elegant de­ scriptions of the conduct of the perfectly wise and virtuous man which serve to indicate the direction of his normative ethics in the latter years of his life.2 According to this "practical system of Morality," as he described it (Let­ ter 287), virtue is a combination "of perfect prudence, of strict justice, and of proper benevolence" (TMS Vl.iii.l). Smith goes into some detail in de­ picting each of these elements of virtue in turn and seeks to bring them to­ gether through the use of his concept of the "impartial spectator."3 In his exposition of this system of morality, two important and related issues are left obscure. The first is the circumstances in which benevolence ought to override prudence, and the second the role which consequentialist rea­ soning should play in the individuals determination of his duty. While the prime evidence relating to these questions must be his published work, some light may be shed on them by an examination of biographical mate­ rial. We shall therefore examine Smith's response to a deathbed wish ex­ pressed by David Hume to the effect that Smith should see to the post65 66 / CAMPBELL AND ROSS humous publication of Hume's TSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA D ia lo g u e s co n ce r n in g N a t u r a l R e lig io n . Although, as we shall see, it is doubtful whether Smith followed his own precepts in this matter, the arguments which he presents to justify his re­ fusal to take on this task give us an example of his considered response to a practical manifestation of the issues which he left unsettled in his picture of the wise and virtuous man. Since it is concerned with "perfect" virtue relatively little of Part VI is taken up with justice which is, for Smith, a purely "negative virtue," that "only hinders us from hurting our neighbour" (TMS II.ii.1.9). The virtu­ ous man adheres strictly to the rules of justice and thus avoids inflicting injury on others by his positive actions. Injustice can never, therefore, be justified by an appeal to prudence or benevolence (TMS VI.11.intro.2). But for all its importance justice is a relatively straightforward and lim­ ited part of virtue. Moral perfection has more to do with the development of the two positive components of virtue, prudence and benevolence. Our problem arises from the fact that while Smith cannot and does not exclude the possibility of conflict between these two elements of virtue, he does not tell us how such conflicts are to be resolved, nor does he define with precision the proper range of our "good offices." Smith does, however, provide a framework within which these two components of positive virtue can be brought together, for his ultimate normative principle is utilitarian in that he believes that each of the vir­ tues contributes to happiness and that the moral system as a whole maxi­ mizes happiness. This, however, can only take us as far as what might be called "contemplative utilitarianism," for while Smith uses the principle of utility to vindicate the moral sentiments he analyses and describes, he does not think that the individual should attempt to apply the utilitarian principle for himself. Smith offers an approving description of the man of "sublime contemplation" who...