Johns Hopkins University Press
Abstract

The flawed 2020 Tanzanian elections are typically blamed on an authoritarian turn instigated by the late President John Magufuli (1959–2021). This articles argues that focusing excessively on Magufuli obscures the authoritarian foundations of CCM rule: The strategies used to maintain political control under his tenure have deep roots, and have not taken CCM off a democratizing path it was never on in the first place. This conclusion underlines the risks of viewing leaders through rose-tinted glasses: Charismatic individuals can claim the reformer's mantle, but giving them too much credence before structural reforms are implemented sells democracy short and increases the risk of authoritarian relapse.

Nobody was surprised that the late President John Magufuli and his ruling party won Tanzania's 2020 general election. Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM)—then the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU)—has been in power since independence in 1961, and has never come close to losing power nationally. What did surprise many foreign commentators and academics was the size of the victory, the strategies used to bring it about, and the continued closing of political space even after the votes were tallied. Despite CCM officially winning 84 percent of the presidential vote and 97 percent of legislative seats, a number of senior opposition-party members were arrested after the vote. Following a decade of putative democratization, the events of 2020 laid bare the crude authoritarian logic of the ruling party, and highlighted how ready, willing, and able it is to resort to coercion.

Some blamed this authoritarian turn on President Magufuli himself, who died unexpectedly five months after the election.1 Yet his tenure did not take CCM off a democratizing path that it was never on in the first place, and it is unlikely that a different figure at the head of this party and government would have given Tanzania a free and fair election. Focusing on Magufuli obscures the authoritarian foundations of CCM rule. While academic analysis has tended to explain the ruling party's durability on the basis of its relative coherence, its clientelism, the resonance of its nation-building message, and the unifying legacy of first president Julius Nyerere, CCM rule has always had coercive characteristics. It is this, and not only the government's policies and rhetoric, that explains how CCM has bucked the trend of dominant parties losing power following prolonged economic decline. [End Page 77]

By placing CCM's guaranteed-landslide methods in historical context, we can see the continued relevance of three interconnected authoritarian control mechanisms. First, the government manipulates the rule of law to harass and detain opponents. Nyerere did this—whatever his reputation as an enlightened leader, he was fond of jailing critics and rivals—and Magufuli followed in his footsteps.

Second, CCM uses tight control of media and information to conflate loyalty to the party with being a good citizen. This too is nothing new. Tanzania has never had a fully free and open media sphere. The intensification of media suppression and nationalism under Magufuli represents a continuation of the ruling party's playbook rather than a dramatic change.

Over the last sixty years, these two strategies have been consistently complemented by a third: the diversion of state resources to sustain the ruling party, build patron-client networks, and deny resources to potential rivals. While many accounts trace this to the 1980s and 1990s, the use of state funds for partisan purposes began much earlier, with the fusion of the ruling party and the state apparatus under Nyerere.

What was distinctive about Magufuli's rule was thus not the ruling party's authoritarian capacity, but rather its growing recognition that opposition parties might defeat it at the polls, and the president's ability to dominate intraparty affairs as no one has done for a generation. It was Magufuli's reassertion of central authority—not his rhetorical glorification of the past—that represents his primary return to the Nyerere era. By the time he retired in 1985, after almost a quarter-century in the highest office, Nyerere stood atop a ruling party whose factions had been tamed or eliminated. Then economic and political liberalization gave rise to wealthy financiers backing different sections of CCM. This created rival power centers with the potential to constrain presidential authority, and so limited the centralization of power.2

In order to overcome that constraint, Magufuli spent his first term carrying out a presidential clawback of patronage and revenue, thereby cutting off potential rivals. To keep disgruntled CCM members from defecting, the leadership targeted their likely landing places—opposition parties—for heightened repression. Bolstered by these measures, Magufuli pushed the country back toward the one-party state. Following his death as a result of "heart complications," which many believe were exacerbated by covid-193—the disease Magufuli notoriously downplayed—the key question is what will happen to CCM and Tanzania in the absence of the "Bulldozer's" dominant presence. [End Page 78]

On March 19, Magufuli was succeeded by his vice-president, Samia Suluhu Hassan, according to the constitution. As Tanzania's first female president, Hassan has already made history, but those hoping that the country will take a swift democratic turn may be disappointed. Hassan may struggle to assert the same dominance over the party that Magufuli did, and this would lead to a return to the rampant factionalism that has historically constrained the power of the executive. But this would only return CCM to the days of President Jakaya Kikwete (2005–2015), when the widespread perception that Tanzania was more democratic overlooked the fundamental reality that the ruling party's grip on power was underpinned by the same set of authoritarian strategies it has deployed since independence. Given CCM's longstanding characteristics, Tanzania is unlikely to reset to a democratizing path even now that Magufuli has departed the scene.

How to Control an Election

After taking office in 2015, Magufuli has deployed physical violence, censorship, and harassment to close off political space for opposition and civil society groups. As the Africa Center for Strategic Studies notes, "violence has become deeply embedded in CCM's current calculus of control."4 A particularly chilling instance of political violence was the September 2017 attempt on the life of Tundu Lissu, the leader of Chadema, the main opposition party. Shot multiple times by assailants who have never been caught, he spent years undergoing surgeries and rehabilitation in Belgium. Intimidation and persecution of the opposition continued after the election, as the regime feared protests against the implausible results.

To choke information flows, the government shut down multiple news outlets between the start of 2020 and the election ten months later. Legal changes gave such terms as "news-related content" and "online forum" definitions which were "so vague that their application is potentially boundless in scope."5 Anyone conveying information online was required to pay a large fee, while a new law gave the state power to oversee and even suspend civil society groups. The message was received: When Lissu returned in July 2020, the print and broadcast media almost completely ignored his arrival.

Irregularities and antidemocratic practices continued in the run-up to the 2020 elections. In January 2019, as local elections loomed, the National Assembly passed the Political Parties Act, which gave the government "sweeping powers to de-register parties and provide for up to a year in jail for anyone engaging in unauthorized civic education—for example, a voter registration drive."6 Angered by candidate disqualifications, the opposition boycotted, and CCM cemented its control at the subnational level. [End Page 79]

As the CCM stranglehold tightened, 2020 saw the disqualification of hundreds of opposition legislative and local-government candidates, in some cases with the clear aim of giving the CCM candidate a better chance of winning.7 The government also successfully pressured mobile-phone carriers to block messages containing the words "Tundu Lissu." Opposition poll watchers were unable to obtain credentials, while pandemic-related restrictions on gatherings and campaign activities were unfairly enforced to benefit CCM.8

During the voting itself, oppositionists charge, CCM stuffed ballot boxes and obstructed opposition poll watchers.9 Such claims are by nature hard to substantiate, but evidence collected by Tanzania Election Watch10 and the remarkable discrepancy between the 2015 and 2020 results—Chadema's share of the presidential vote plummeted from 40 to 13 percent—suggest considerable fraud.

CCM Rule: Historical Foundations

Much of the media greeted the official election results with surprise. Had not Tanzania been on a democratizing arc? Magufuli's idiosyncratic leadership must have wrenched it off track. This reaction was based on a misunderstanding. The authoritarian methods used to produce the lopsided 2020 results were in fact familiar CCM tactics. Repression, censorship, indoctrination, and the misuse of state resources for partisan ends have changed in terms of their exact mix over the years, but they have always been the methods that CCM presidents deploy to retain control. Taken together, they have long provided CCM leaders with both the carrot and the stick, as well as the ability to win—or perhaps more accurately "secure"—hearts and minds.

The disturbing side of the Nyerere legacy

Tanzania has never had anything but CCM presidents, and the first of these was Julius Nyerere (1922–99). An anticolonial activist and intellectual who became chief minister of then–British Tanganyika in 1960, he would stay at the top for the next twenty-five years, becoming first prime minister and then president of independent Tanzania. Known as Mwalimu (the teacher), Nyerere is often credited with cementing political stability and giving Tanzanians a coherent national identity that has spared the country much ethnic conflict. His more troubling side is usually overlooked. In truth, Nyerere consistently used repression to maintain political control.

In 1965, Nyerere introduced a single-party system, inspiring many other leaders on the continent to follow suit. This system empowered him as president by both outlawing political opposition and making it easier to manage the ruling party. The lack of an opposition left dissatisfied ruling-party factions nowhere to defect and so made them easier to keep in line. [End Page 80]

The barrage of authoritarian laws that Nyerere used to cow dissent is the basis for the "lawfare" that Magufuli had been waging against his critics. Anyone held to be a threat to state security could be detained at presidential discretion; many a Nyerere rival or foe wound up being held for a long time without trial.11 By 1977, Amnesty International estimated that there were up to two-thousand such detainees in Tanzania—more than in apartheid South Africa, and the equivalent of eight people in every hundred thousand.12 President Magufuli's decision to arrest hundreds of opposition leaders following the 2020 elections was thus not an unprecedented authoritarian endeavor.

By the time Nyerere retired in 1985, hundreds of his critics had left for exile, generating what James Brennan describes as a genre of prison diaries and bitter criticism featuring titles such as I Was Nyerere's Prisoner and, later, The Dark Side of Nyerere's Legacy.13 It was not only Nyerere's political opponents who faced authoritarian tactics. His decision to move citizens to larger, more centralized villages in support of his vision of "African socialism" was originally conceived as voluntary but was enforced with extreme violence. When people proved reluctant to uproot their families, beatings and even house burnings were used to make them relocate.14

Michael Jennings recounts how NGOs and international donors looked the other way: "In Tanzania, on hearing reports of babies left in huts set alight by soldiers, of violence used against villagers, property destroyed in attempts to force people to move, and so on, such events were put down to the actions of a few 'over-zealous' officials."15

Securing hearts and minds

Nyerere gained credit by voluntarily leaving office in 1985, becoming one of the first African leaders to do so. Yet he left behind a legacy of censorship and ideological indoctrination that has cast a long shadow—and that helps to explain why his regime's worst abuses have been largely covered up. The Newspaper Act of 1976 and associated laws allowed the president to ban publications—domestic and imported alike—on vague grounds of jeopardizing peace and order. When a newly elected Magufuli shut down critical newspapers in 2015, more than a dozen years into the multiparty era, the Media Services Act (the Newspaper Act's successor) was his tool. Thus, many years after the transition to multipartism, "post-independence nationalism and ideology inform the contemporary media regulatory environment and conceptions of freedom of expression."16

Beyond this, CCM pursued one of the most concerted efforts to push an official state ideology that Africa has ever seen. The content of education became increasingly political and invasive. Thus a 1969 grade-school curriculum that focused on "educating children about the African view of life and its advantages" evolved into a 1978 version that aimed "to build and develop children's minds to recognize and carry on the [End Page 81] politics of Ujamaa and development; to know and carry out the Arusha Declaration."17

Although the impact this had on popular attitudes is hard to assess, it appears that political indoctrination, systematic censorship, and state propaganda played important roles in legitimizing CCM rule. As early as 1967, a survey found that Tanzanian secondary-school students saw "teaching students to be good citizens" as the most important function of school. Tanzanian secondary-school students, moreover, were more likely than their Kenyan counterparts (75 versus 64 percent) to agree that the "best" citizen should "obey."18

One of the most systematic attempts to track and evaluate civic and political education from 1967 to 1994 concluded that over time teachers "internalized the authoritarian values concerning the outcomes of teaching and learning of Civics (e.g. unconditional obedience/loyalty to authority)."19 This helps to explain why, despite CCM's consistent failure to foster economic growth and development, there was relatively limited mass pressure for political liberalization. Instead, Tanzania experienced a "top-down democratization,"20 as Nyerere pushed ruling-party elites to hold multiparty elections in the belief that this would enable the country to better access the international aid that it so desperately needed.

Playing patronage politics

In addition to developing a cohesive national identity, the ruling party has also proved adept at mobilizing supporters and using state resources to win elections. Many accounts of African politics suggest that the widespread diversion of state funds into patronage and campaign funding came fairly late in Tanzania due to Nyerere's moral values, but it is misleading to suggest that corruption has been a feature only of the two decades since the ruska ("all is allowed") Ali Hassan Mwinyi administration. Rather, corruption also has deep roots. Yonatan Morse recounts how a senior CCM official explained to him that under the one-party state, CCM cadres were involved in dishing out patronage, buying votes, and intimidating political foes.21

In line with this, William Freund wrote in 1981 of how "black market operations and corruption at all levels have become very rife and, in their wake, a general cynicism has developed about the gap between official rhetoric and practice." Heavy state involvement in the economy, including attempts to deal with shortages by decreeing that only certain shops could sell necessities, led to what Freund called "a spiral of corruption and more intense hoarding."22 This corruption was not always explicitly political, but it enabled those close to the ruling party to get wealthier, and hence sustained a stable support base for the government even when its economic policies failed.

By seizing such enrichment opportunities, lawmakers and other leaders [End Page 82] could fund their own local-patronage networks, which in turn built support for the system: Even if the larger economy was failing, individuals and communities with access to patronage used it to sustain backing for CCM. The shift to multiparty politics three decades ago did not end this. Instead, as Alexander Makulilo has shown, the top-down nature of the democratization process enabled the ruling party to "determine the transition pace [and] design the rules of the game, as well as to own and benefit out of it."23

The abuse of state power for partisan ends has enabled the ruling party to discipline and mobilize millions of citizens in both rural and urban areas, underpinning CCM's political control from the 1960s onwards. The government does not repress and censor in constant measure, however. Instead, under Magufuli as under Nyerere, it knew how to let up and bear down. When it does the latter, no space is left for political opposition.

Multipartism and Democratic Backsliding

Given that CCM has always been authoritarian, why did democratic backsliding become so acute under Magufuli? Perhaps the most important factor was the extent of the electoral threat. Unwilling as it is to lose power, CCM nonetheless grasps the value of at least appearing to respect democratic norms and values. When it senses little threat, it can ease up. In the 1990s, CCM won elections on the mainland with ease (the offshore-island region of Zanzibar was and is a different story), so civil society groups and opposition parties were allowed to operate with relative freedom. This changed in 2010, when CCM's vote-share drop alarmed the regime. In a nutshell, more support for Chadema meant more repression.

A second factor is rivalry among CCM factions, especially over patronage. Nyerere concentrated patronage and political control in the president's hands, but the economic and political liberalization that followed his exit sparked the rise of a new business elite and wealthy financiers.24 They began pairing up with rival CCM factions, splitting the party and giving its leaders fresh headaches.25 Magufuli's success, in turn, at bringing CCM back into line under the presidency increased the scope for abuses of power.

External political competition

Since multipartism's return, the electoral threat to CCM has grown. In the early 1990s, the party was internally split but electorally dominant. Its lighter hand created fresh opportunities for the opposition. In 2010, CCM won 63 percent of the presidential and 78 percent of the parliamentary vote. Those figures were down from 80 and 89 percent, respectively, just five years before. Opposition leaders, it seemed, had found in Chadema a vehicle that could turn popular frustration with corruption and the poor economy into votes. [End Page 83]

It was against this background that CCM began moving against civil society. New laws appeared with key clauses left so vague they could be used to limit the freedoms of the press, expression, and access to information. Significantly for our argument that CCM's authoritarian inclinations predate Magufuli, fresh planks in Tanzania's authoritarian legal edifice were nailed into place before he became president.26

It is also worth noting that CCM has long known it cannot win free and fair elections in Zanzibar, and so has been more violent there than on the mainland. The semi-autonomous island region is important both for the tourism revenue it brings in, and for its exports. It is also culturally distinct, with a mostly Muslim population that has long distrusted the mainland establishment. This has made for impressive levels of opposition mobilization, countered by the ruling party's striking determination to do anything—intimidate, repress, cancel whole elections, or manufacture unlikely results—to keep control. One can view Magufuli's presidency as an exercise in treating mainland Tanzania the same way CCM has long treated Zanzibar: No one familiar with CCM's behavior in Zanzibar should be surprised by the repressive zeal and authoritarian resolve that the party has shown on the mainland.

Internal political competition

While external competition has driven repressive strategies, internal political competition has tended to act as a brake on the personal ambitions of CCM leaders. In Tanzania, ruling-party factions are based not on ethnicity or region, but on personal ties and networks that may go back as far as school days. There are generational cleavages too, as young CCM up-and-comers expect senior leaders to take a turn at the helm and then step aside. This expectation creates pressure to respect term limits.

As noted above, post-Nyerere economic liberalization yielded what President Benjamin Mkapa (1995–2005) lamented as the "privatization" of the ruling party, with rich backers funding factions and those factions then using power to make backers even richer. There was no dominant faction; instead, it was more like a free-for-all that presidents had a hard time containing. Partly as a result, a series of major scandals hurt Tanzania's reputation with international donors and foreign investors.27

Once in power, Magufuli made regaining control of CCM his top goal; his major policies and reforms must be seen in this light. The president's anticorruption drive has cut off rival CCM factions from their respective funding sources and made internal dissent more difficult. Positioning [End Page 84] himself as a corruption foe has moreover allowed him to deflect criticism while cultivating support both at home and abroad.

The intensity of Magufuli's changes, and the number of people whom they disadvantaged, encouraged him to adopt an increasingly authoritarian approach. As Dan Paget has argued:

Magufuli's war on corruption makes CCM's authoritarian turn doubly necessary. By constricting political space, the party sends a clear signal that it intends to win at any cost. In doing so, it depreciates the benefits of defection to the opposition.28

Financial coercion to stop private business interests from paying rival CCM factions has therefore gone hand-in-hand with party purges and physical intimidation, including abductions. In 2017, he had the party charter amended to make general meetings less frequent and to shrink the membership of key committees. In this way, Magufuli's war on corruption and quest for internal control cannot be divorced from the abuses and manipulation that characterized the 2020 election.

Magufuli's faux-populist stylings,29 his personalization of power, and his downgrading of intraparty organs that might act as forces for restraint do not mean, however, that all formal institutions were compromised or that all informal norms were undermined. Most significantly, there is still a strong expectation that term limits will be respected, and that the presidency will rotate between Christians and Muslims. Indeed, despite speculation that rival factions within CCM might seek to prevent the constitutional succession of Vice-President Hassan to the presidency, the transition was—publicly at least—smooth. Moreover, if President Hassan cannot reproduce Magufuli's dominance over CCM, the factionalism that constrained previous presidents is likely to resurface—once again placing greater constraints on what the executive can achieve. Yet even if Hassan does not dominate the political scene as Magufuli did, it is important to remember that she has risen to power through a political party that has coercion and repression built into its DNA. The new president carries that legacy with her, and will face considerable pressure not to relinquish CCM's grip on power.

The Lessons of 2020

The recent intensification of authoritarian practices in Tanzania underlines the risks of engaging with new democracies while wearing rose-tinted glasses. The CCM regime has long penetrated and regulated Tanzanian society. Magufuli has been presented as a uniquely authoritarian force, but he was enabled by this system and the realities of one-party rule. Tanzania's reputation as a "success story" of gradual democratization rests on a selective view of the country's politics and an overlooking of the threat inherent in one-party dominance. [End Page 85]

The hegemonic rule of a single party, even if it talks a liberal-democratic game, is likely to be grounded on authoritarian structures that can be activated at any time. Tanzania is not a case of a ruling party that turned authoritarian over the last five years. Rather, that party has always been authoritarian, but did not always need to use the full weight of its powers. Development partners, commentators, and academics who have identified with this party—whether because of its initial socialist leanings or its recent anticorruption drive—have overlooked this harsh reality to a remarkable extent, especially given the consistent election-related violence that the CCM regime has inflicted on the people of Zanzibar.

Developments in Tanzania also remind us that anticorruption efforts should not be taken as signs of broader democratization. Magufuli's drive against corruption also tightened his grip on his party, while this drive's success both presupposed and necessitated the creation of a more authoritarian political landscape. Supporting anticorruption efforts that take place in such a compromising manner can do as much harm as good.

Under Magufuli, the prospects for democratization and good governance looked bleak. Civil society could not mobilize, elections were neither free nor fair, the media were hamstrung, advocates of democracy and accountability such as Aidan Eyakuze (head of the NGO Twaweza) had their passports seized, and opposition leaders including Tundu Lissu had gone into exile. The succession of Samia Hassan to the presidency has naturally raised hopes that the ruling party will now reverse some of Magufuli's most controversial policies, most notably the failure to follow scientific advice on combating covid-19 and the repression of opposition parties.30 But while President Hassan is a very different personality from her predecessor—known to be less rambunctious and more likely to lead through persuasion than through domination—there are good reasons to be cautious about the prospects for democratization.

For one thing, some commentators have suggested that Hassan lacks a strong base within the party,31 having only become a member of parliament in 2010, and so will be a hostage to those who rose to prominence under Magufuli. Significantly, this group currently dominates the intelligence and security services that played a central role in designing and implementing repressive strategies under Magufuli. Although the constitution is clear that the vice-president succeeds the president upon his death, there was widespread speculation that the government delayed the announcement in order to buy time for party elites to agree on how to manage the transition.32 If so, the big question is what deals Hassan may have struck behind the scenes to ensure that other factions and rival leaders fell into line behind her. These could have included, for example, promises to maintain some of Magufuli's policies, to maintain the prominent political role of the Tanzania Intelligence and Security [End Page 86] Service (TISS), and to appoint influential faction leaders as her vice-president and ministers, constraining her authority.

It is also possible, of course, that in time President Hassan will break free of these constraints, following in the footsteps of the many leaders who were initially perceived to be weak but who subsequently used the authority of the presidency to expand their power. President Daniel arap Moi of Kenya, for example, was seen to be a weak leader with limited capacities when he succeeded Jomo Kenyatta in 1978—but ruled the country until 2002, becoming one of the world's longest-serving leaders.33 Yet even if President Hassan is able to step out of Magufuli's shadow we are likely to see as much continuity as change.

Our review of the way that CCM has retained power over the last sixty years demonstrates that Magufuli's leadership was not an aberration; instead, it was rooted in the very same strategies the ruling party has deployed since independence. "Reverting to type" would therefore mean not a return to free and fair elections, but the same highly constrained "competitive authoritarian"34 political landscape in which opposition parties have always been competing with one hand tied behind their back. To divert from this norm would require not only considerable strategic nous and creativity on Hassan's part, but also great bravery and fortitude.

Tanzania was able to gain its unmerited reputation as a "democratic success story" in part because international actors were unwilling to deal with CCM as it was, rather than as they wanted it to be. As in other cases of stunted or stalled democratization (Rwanda and Uganda come to mind), superficial reforms were hailed as landmarks of democratic progress while coercive state structures and clientelism continued to sustain the ruling party's grip on power.35 In Ethiopia, Prime Minister Abiy was initially lauded as a progressive reformer, but has quickly fallen back on repression to maintain control.36

Charismatic individuals can claim the reformer's mantle, but giving them too much credence before serious structural reforms have taken place both sells democracy short and increases the risk of authoritarian relapse when political opposition begins to rise.

Nic Cheeseman

Nic Cheeseman is professor of democracy and international development at the University of Birmingham.

Hilary Matfess

Hilary Matfess is a doctoral candidate in political science at Yale University and a 2020–21 Peace Scholar Fellow at the U.S. Institute of Peace.

Alitalali Amani

Alitalali Amani is a student of political science writing under a pen name.

NOTES

The authors thank Dan Paget and Michaela Collord for their thoughtful comments on this paper.

1. "Tanzania: Recent Governance Trends and 2020 Elections in Brief," Congressional Research Service, 26 October 2020; Nicodemus Minde, "How Magufuli Has Steered Tanzania down the Road of an Authoritarian One-Party State," The Conversation, 15 November 2020; Peter Beaumont, "Tanzania President Magufuli Condemned for Authoritarian Regime," Guardian, 29 October 2019.

2. Michaela Collord, "The Political Economy of Institutions in Africa: Comparing Authoritarian Parties and Parliaments in Tanzania and Uganda" (doctoral diss., University of Oxford, 2019).

3. "John Magufuli: Tanzania's President Dies Aged 61 After Covid Rumours," BBC News, 18 March 2021, www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-56437852.

4. "Once a Beacon of Hope, Tanzanians Now Resist Growing Authoritarianism," Africa Center for Strategic Studies, 8 September 2020.

5. Edrine Wanyama, "Tanzania Entrenches Digital Rights Repression Amidst Covid-19 Denialism and a Looming Election," CIPESA, 19 August 2020.

6. Fumbuka Ng'wanakilala, "Tanzania MPs Grant Government Sweeping Powers over Political Parties," Reuters, 30 January 2019.

7. Michaela Collord and Dan Paget, "Tanzania Elections: Opposition Report Widespread Nomination Interference," African Arguments, 26 August 2020.

8. Abdi Latif Dahir, "As Tanzania Votes, Many See Democracy Itself on the Ballot," New York Times, 28 October 2020.

9. "Tanzania Votes but 'Widespread Irregularities' Are Claimed," Associated Press, 28 October 2020.

10. Tanzania Election Watch sent regular emails documenting widespread electoral abuses. For more see https://tanzaniaelectionswatch.org.

11. "Tanzania Urged to Free Zanzibaris," Amnesty International Newsletter 3 (August 1973), 3, www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/204000/nws210081973en.pdf.

12. Xan Smiley, "How Smugglers Ended Nyerere's Dream," Guardian, 10 August 1980.

13. James R. Brennan, "Julius Rex: Nyerere Through the Eyes of His Critics, 1953–2013," Journal of Eastern African Studies 8, issue 3 (2014): 459–77; Ali Muhsin Barwani, I Was Nyerere's Prisoner (Southsea: Zanzibar Organisation, 1975); Ludovick S. Mwijage, The Dark Side of Nyerere's Legacy (London: Adelphi Press, 1994).

14. Leander Schneider, "Freedom and Unfreedom in Rural Development: Julius Nyerere, Ujamaa Vijijini, and Villagization," Canadian Journal of African Studies 38, no. 2 (2004): 344–92.

15. Michael Jennings, "'Almost an Oxfam in Itself': Oxfam, Ujamaa and Development in Tanzania," African Affairs 101 (October 2002): 513.

16. Ryan Powell, "Unfinished Business: Tanzania's Media Capture Challenge," in Anya Schiffrin, ed., In the Service of Power: Media Capture and the Threat to Democracy (Washington, D.C.: National Endowment for Democracy, 2017): 88; see also Martin Sturmer, The Media History of Tanzania (Ndanda, Tanzania: Ndanda Mission Press, 1998).

17. Robert McCormick, "Political Education as Moral Education in Tanzania," Journal of Moral Education 9, no. 3 (1980): 166–77. "Ujamaa," a Swahili word often translated as "familyhood," was the term that Nyerere chose to encapsulate his concept of African socialism. The Arusha Declaration (1967) was the ruling party's codification of this ideology.

18. David Koff and George von der Muhll, "Political Socialisation in Kenya and Tanzania—A Comparative Analysis," Journal of Modern African Studies 5 (May 1967): 24.

19. Willy L.M. Komba, "Changing Politics and Political Culture in Tanzania: The Impact on Political Education and Civics Curricula, 1967–1994" (doctoral diss., University of London, 1996), 2.

20. Göran Hydén, "Top-Down Democratization in Tanzania," Journal of Democracy 10 (October 1999): 142–55.

21. As quoted in Yonatan L. Morse, "Electoral Authoritarianism and Weak States in Africa: The Role of Parties versus Presidents in Tanzania and Cameroon," International Political Science Review 39 (January 2018): 114–29.

22. W.M. Freund, "Class Conflict, Political Economy and the Struggle for Socialism in Tanzania," African Affairs 80 (October 1981): 488, 499.

23. Alexander Boniface Makulilo, "Unleveled Playfield and Democracy in Tanzania," Journal of Politics and Law 5, no. 2 (2012): 96.

24. Tim Kelsall, "Shop Windows and Smoke-Filled Rooms: Governance and the Repoliticisation of Tanzania," Journal of Modern African Studies 40 (December 2002): 597–619.

25. Collord, "The Political Economy of Institutions in Africa."

26. Dan Paget, "Tanzania: Shrinking Space and Opposition Protest," Journal of Democracy 28 (July 2017): 153–67.

27. Hazel S. Gray, "The Political Economy of Grand Corruption in Tanzania," African Affairs 114 (July 2015): 382–403.

28. Dan Paget, "The End of Gradual Democratization in Tanzania," unpubl. ms., 2017.

29. Dan Paget, "Mistaken for Populism: Magufuli, Ambiguity and Elitist Plebeianism in Tanzania," Journal of Political Ideologies, published online 4 August 2020, www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13569317.2020.1796345.

30. "Samia Suluhu Hassan Sworn In as Tanzania's First Female President," France 24, 19 March 2021, https://www.france24.com/en/africa/20210319-samia-suluhu-hassan-sworn-in-as-tanzania-s-first-female-president.

31. "Interview: President Magufuli's Death, His Successor, and the Future of Tanzanian Politics," Democracy in Africa, 18 March 2021, http://democracyinafrica.org/interview-president-magufulis-death-his-successor-and-the-future-of-tanzanian-politics.

32. Nic Cheeseman, "The Great Magufuli Mystery: What a Missing President Tells Us About Politics in Tanzania," The Africa Report, 17 March 2021, www.theafricareport.com/72664/the-great-magufuli-mystery-what-a-missing-president-tells-us-about-african-politics.

33. Gabrielle Lynch, "Moi: the Making of an African 'Big-Man,'" Journal of Eastern African Studies 2 (March 2008): 18–43.

34. Steven Levitsky and Lucan A. Way, "Elections Without Democracy: The Rise of Competitive Authoritarianism," Journal of Democracy 13 (April 2002): 51–65.

35. Anna Reuss and Kristof Titeca, "When Revolutionaries Grow Old: The Museveni Babies and the Slow Death of the Liberation," Third World Quarterly 38, no. 10 (2017): 2347–66; Andrea Purdeková, "'Even If I Am Not Here, There Are So Many Eyes': Surveillance and State Reach in Rwanda," Journal of Modern African Studies 49 (September 2011): 475–97.

36. "Internet Disrupted in Ethiopia as Conflict Breaks Out in Tigray Region," Netblocks, 4 November 2020; Dawit Endeshaw, "Mass Arrests in Ethiopia Raise Spectre of Repressive Past," Reuters, 13 August 2020.

Additional Information

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1086-3214
Print ISSN
1045-5736
Pages
77-89
Launched on MUSE
2021-04-13
Open Access
No
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