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  • Obstinate Heroism: The Confederate Surrenders after Appomattox by Steven J. Ramold
  • Christopher Lyle McIlwain Sr.
Obstinate Heroism: The Confederate Surrenders after Appomattox. By Steven J. Ramold. Denton: University of North Texas Press, 2020. 504 pp. $34.95. ISBN 978-1-5744-1791-3.

There have been far too many Civil War books written about events that occurred in the Eastern Theater, that is, the states along the eastern seaboard of the United States. More specifically, far too much ink has been spilled and too many trees have given their all to tell the story of wartime Virginia. The historiographical slant has been so pronounced that most Americans outside academia identify Appomattox, Virginia, as the place where the Confederacy finally surrendered and the war ended.

This is not to suggest that what happened at Appomattox in 1865 was unimportant to Confederate capitulation. On the contrary, as author Steven Ramold makes clear, the surrender there was the first tangible domino to fall leading to the end of conventional warfare. Not only did it remove the most vaunted Confederate army and military commander from the war, but it eliminated whatever was left [End Page 187] of widespread public confidence that the war could be won, which triggered another surge in desertion. Professor Ramold's carefully researched book thoroughly chronicles each of the other surrenders that followed over the next several weeks. Indeed, for those seeking data about these important events, which spanned a geographic area from North Carolina to Texas, and a period of time from April to May 26, 1865, Ramold's book is a must-read.

Of interest will be Ramold's description of how each surrender occurred. With one major exception, related to the Union promise to "parole" the Confederates, they were all a little different. Regardless of rank, the federal government would not prosecute members of the Confederate military for treason, but instead would allow them to return to their homes unmolested. This was certainly not a term that was universally supported by the northern populace, and after the hundreds of thousands of casualties and millions of dollars of treasure lost, this is not surprising. But it was critical to the surrender process. Few Confederates would have voluntarily surrendered if they knew their fate was to be hanged. They would instead choose to fight, potentially to the death. Fear of this outcome and the potential for a protracted, bloody, and expensive guerrilla war even if conventional warfare ended was the driving force behind the Union high command's decision to offer paroles.

But as events would demonstrate, a topic not broached between the two sides was of equal importance. There is little doubt that if Confederate soldiers had known that not only would slavery end, but the freed slaves would be given the right to vote, they would have taken their chances on the battlefield. At the time of the surrender at Appomattox, the chances of these outcomes were exceedingly slim. President Lincoln had not yet been assassinated and neither he nor most northerners supported imposing Black suffrage on the South. Although not immediately, the ferocious reaction to that assassination ultimately changed everything. It did not, however, change the surrender terms offered and accepted by the other Confederate commanders. [End Page 188]

For those interested in the surrender of forces in Alabama, Ramold provides an excellent presentation. At the time, Alabama was one of several geographic areas (Mississippi and East Louisiana being the others) in a military district under the command of Confederate General Richard Taylor, whose headquarters were at Meridian, Mississippi. Although he had been a relative by marriage to Confederate President Jefferson Davis (his sister was Davis's first wife), Taylor was not someone who wished to fight in the last ditch and die a hero. Taylor had told Davis as early as October 1864 of his belief that a peace accord should be negotiated before it was too late. By early 1865, it was too late. A large portion of his forces had earlier been sent east to try to stop General William T. Sherman's move into the Carolinas, leaving Taylor with insufficient men to defend against the many Union onslaughts that began...

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