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Reviewed by:
  • Brothers in Arms: American Independence and the Men of France and Spain Who Saved It by Larrie D. Ferreiro
  • Benjamin G. Scharff
Larrie D. Ferreiro. Brothers in Arms: American Independence and the Men of France and Spain Who Saved It. New York: Vintage Books, 2016. Illustrations, maps, notes, bibliography, index. Paper, $18.00.

The Declaration of Independence remains an American touchstone. Every child learns how fifty-six brave souls inked their names to the document on July 4, 1776. According to Larrie D. Ferreiro, few fully understand why [End Page 266] those fifty-six took such a step on that most momentous of days. Rather than calling Americans to arms, Ferreiro convincingly suggests, the document instead targeted French and Spanish policymakers in an attempt to nudge them into active support of the Revolution. While most scholars of the Revolution recognize the pivotal role played by American allies during the independence campaign, Ferreiro suggests that the very origins of the nation—formulated during the drafting and signing of the Declaration— resulted from international political realities and, if true, entirely rewrites the narrative of American exceptionalism. Larrie D. Ferreiro’s Brothers in Arms: American Independence and the Men of France and Spain Who Saved It is a reminder that American independence did not result from American force of arms alone. Instead, it reminds readers that Americans are deeply indebted to France and Spain and suggests that America’s most seminal document—the Declaration of Independence—might not have even existed had the young United States not sought out the support of the more established powers of non-British Europe.

Ferreiro’s interpretation of the Declaration of Independence is that of a call for help from France and Spain rather than a call to rally Americans or a noble explanation to Great Britain. He explains how Dutch and Corsican rebels had recently declared and won their independence in the years preceding America’s attempt and had done so without such a declaration. Considering the broad intellectualism involved in American leadership, he argues that leadership was well educated in these events. Instead of inventing a declaration, as most Americans would like to believe our founders did, Ferreiro instead suggests that American leadership was well versed in the manipulation of audiences and drafted the Declaration specifically to manipulate French, and to a lesser extent, Spanish leaders into supporting the revolt against the British control of the thirteen colonies. By making such an argument, the author powerfully combats a trope too often embraced by amateur historians—that of the self-sufficiency of America during its formative years. By undermining this ubiquitous myth, the author successfully combats American exceptionalism by reminding us that we would not have won the war without the French and Spanish and, quite probably, may not have even written our founding document had it not been for the need to recruit these outsiders.

He likewise questions the American assertion that the most monumental event of the late eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century Europe—the French Revolution and subsequent Napoleonic Wars—was not, as Americans [End Page 267] like to assert, due to French debt resulting from its support of the American Revolution. Rather, Ferreiro conclusively demonstrates that, while France was in quite a financial quandary, its support of America was reasoned and sound and did not subject the nation’s monarchy to undue financial stress beyond that which it was already subjected to.

Beyond these important reminders, Ferreiro’s Brothers at Arms is replete with a multitude of interesting material. Prior to the Revolution, for example, French and Spanish diplomats embarked on a strategy referred to as Revanche (or, in English, vengeance) preparing the allied nations to attack Great Britain at the opportune time after its unparalleled victories during the Seven Years’ War. Few Americans, this author suspects, understand the extent to which France and Spain were already prepared to attack Britain when the American Revolution provided a convenient excuse. The author convincingly demonstrates, for example, how French arms flowing into the United States made victory at Saratoga possible. The text likewise describes the depth, and complexity, of the Atlantic World by exploring the details of French and Spanish support for...

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