Hegemony and the Variety of Democratic Institutions: Executive-Legislative Relations and U.S. Foreign Economic Policy Change

This article examines how domestic institutional change within the United States affects changes in its foreign economic policy. The focus is on formal rather than informal institutions, specifically executive-legislative relations. The rise of the United States to hegemonic leadership coincided with a shift from a Congress-centered to an executive-centered structure. To explain the shift, the article examines the literature on the role of institutional factors in policy outcomes regarding the international political economy. A comparative analysis follows of the domestic sources of U.S. responses to global duties, along with a comparison of the British and American cases. The article concludes that in Britain the Westminster model of party politics played the role that executive politics played in the United States. This confirms the wisdom that two-party system and united government are more conducive to strong and independent government action than are multipartyism and divided government.