Protesting in Russia in the 2010s: Rising Risks, Rising Costs

Since the nation-wide protests of 2011–2012, the Russian state apparatus has invested considerable resources into the prevention, control, and suppression of all forms of public disobedience. An analysis of both domestic and international examples of protest movements reveals that the Russian legislature (Duma) has systemically limited the legal framework governing freedom of assembly. At the same time, the Russian state has used targeted repression and multilayer campaigns against protest leaders and their organizations to disrupt, discourage, and dissolve organized entities capable of institutionalizing protest movements and coordinating anti-government campaigns. While the state has concentrated its efforts on suppressing overt political groups and leaders, (and rather successfully preventing them from gaining political momentum), it remains less efficient when it comes to non-politicized protests that address local issues of bad governance. Protests that have only a local, case-based agenda, do not seek federal support, and do not reach out to nation-wide protest leaders are capable of achieving success and convincing state officials to reconsider their decisions, either through compromise or by reverting selected state policies. Despite nationwide efforts by the state to discourage dissatisfied citizens from protesting, public manifestations of discontent are on the rise. Coordinated protest movements with high-profile leaders and organizational infrastructure are giving way to leaderless protests coordinated via multiple rallying centers relying on instant messengers and case-based support of local communities.