The Cabinet: George Washington and the Creation of an American Institution by Lindsay M. Chervinsky (review)

Remarkably, for an institution we take for granted and that has loomed large down to the present, there has been no recent historical treatment of the presidential cabinet. But Lindsay M. Chervinsky's book does so much more than fill a surprising gap in the literature. Her work examines both process and power in the new government, shows how the first cabinet "developed organically" (5) in response to foreign and domestic threats and to assaults on presidential authority, and documents the cabinet's emerging centrality in the George Washington administration.

The Constitution provided little clear guidance about a cabinet. While the framers recognized that the president needed advice and expertise, they rejected the idea of a privy council, deeming it too redolent of monarchy. They considered the idea of a cabinet of advisors but then rejected that idea without saying so, and provided no alternative. Chervinsky's book thus offers an excellent case-study companion to Jonathan Gienapp's recent account of the indeterminacy and lack of fixed meaning in the textual Constitution; understanding emerged only through the experimental practices and debates in the new national government in the 1790s.¹ Washington himself, unsure how to proceed yet determined to hew closely to what little guidance the Constitution specified, tried several methods of gathering advice: visiting the Senate in person to advise and consent on foreign affairs, consulting with the Supreme Court (chiefly John Jay), and considering filling a prime minister role with a member of Congress (potentially either James Madison in the House or John Adams as President of the Senate).

But none of these possibilities proved satisfactory so Washington finally turned toward familiar practices. During the Revolution he consulted his top officers in councils of war before making major strategic and operational decisions. Washington soon realized that some of his war-time practices could serve him well during his presidency in defining his relations with the cabinet. Before meetings he submitted questions to his generals and asked for written replies. This focused the councils and ensured that all, not just the most dominant officers, were heard. Washington then considered the advice in private before making a decision. These practices collected an array of views, built consensus, and provided Washington with political cover on controversial decisions. Having worked well for him in war, such methods provided a natural example for his presidential interactions with department secretaries. Thus, Washington's "presidential leadership cannot be understood without first analyzing his military experience" (16). But the conversion took time. The first cabinet meeting was not held until November 26, 1791, and this body met only a few more times that year and the next before gathering fifty-one times in 1793.

Chervinsky lays out all the central themes of her book in an exemplary introduction. Fundamentally, the cabinet helped Washington reinforce the power of the executive and of presidential prerogative as they "claimed authority over both diplomatic and domestic issues, and rejected challenges from the states and Congress" (7) that sought to limit their power. She also provides some vivid imagery of the physical spaces in which cabinet meetings occurred—in Washington's second-floor private study, which measured just fifteen feet by twenty-one feet. She notes understatedly that this was "not a particularly large room for five large adult men" (197), and that such sustained physical proximity could only have "exacerbated the existing tensions between Hamilton and Jefferson by confining them together in a small space" (219).

Washington also played favorites, and the degree to which he shared or withheld information from the individual secretaries revealed his levels of faith in them. He trusted Hamilton implicitly, eventually cooled on Jefferson, and completely lost confidence in Randolph, breaking off all ties. Cabinet secretaries excluded from Washington's private study lost out since "access to Washington and the...