Lincoln, Seward, and US Foreign Relations in the Civil War Era by Joseph A. Fry (review)

On April 14, 1865, the list of those John Wilkes Booth and his fellow conspirators aimed to assassinate included the president, his vice president, and the secretary of state. By targeting the latter, the factionalists conferred on Seward a cardinal cabinet status. This recognized preeminence at the expense of other ministers, such as Edward M. Stanton, who had also contributed to the victory, raised questions about Seward’s relationship with the president. To what extent had Lincoln, a novice on foreign issues when he came to power, listened to his secretary of state to develop foreign policy? Observers debated this point early on. For example, at the time of his former colleague’s death, former secretary of the navy Gideon Welles was publishing a book, titled Lincoln and Seward, in which he was already reassessing the president’s role in the conduct of affairs outside the national theater.

However, in the next century, historians’ study priorities, mostly confined to the national context, made it rare to identify the instigator of diplomatic choices. Some of Seward’s biographies had been written, but it was at the approach of the 150th anniversary of the beginning of the conflict that more works were devoted to diplomatic issues. These books generated a renewed interest in the federal government’s foreign affairs director. At the same time, the debate over the reality of Seward’s relationship with Lincoln resurfaced. In Lincoln, Seward and US Foreign Relations in the Civil War Era, Joseph Fry dissects the relationship between Seward and Lincoln. Far from repeating the conclusions of some of Seward’s hagiographers, who made him the key man in the American foreign policy, Fry depicts a very balanced relationship, enriched by the Lincoln and Seward’s willingness to serve above all the cause of the Union in peril. He recalls the different backgrounds and careers of the two men. Their paths were to converge in 1860 when they became rivals at the Republican National Convention that led to Lincoln’s selection.

Fry demonstrates that despite this recent rivalry, their differing temperaments and ideas, the Civil War would push them to reconcile their animosity and establish, as he puts it, a true partnership. More than that, this symbiosis would give rise to a real friendship. This association was not, however, self-evident at the outset. The facts are well known. While seven states had seceded, Seward believed that the problem could be solved by starting a war with the United Kingdom and France. His aim was to divert the rebels’ attention and provoke a national upsurge to renew the federal link. Lincoln, however, relied on law and the constitution to bring the insurgent states back into the Union fold. In the end, the latter carried the final decision by recklessly commanding to resupply Fort Sumter and to focus on one war at a time. Fry considered this a key moment because in agreeing with Lincoln’s decision Seward was irrevocably choosing to work with him to defeat secession.

The author highlights how the two statesmen would benefit from their sometimes conflicting views. Thus, during the Trent Affair, the secretary of state abandoned his previous bellicose posture. He advised Lincoln not to outbid and to recognize that the English had international law on their side. Conversely, though at first reluctant to proclaim the emancipation of slaves in the States of Confederation, he agreed with the president’s view that the cause of the Union should henceforth be linked to that of abolition. Lincoln killed two birds with one stone. Being hostile to slavery, the British could no longer consider recognizing Confederation.

Through these examples, Fry expresses a balanced point of view. He does not deny the diplomatic qualities of Seward, who, like Monroe, Hay, or Lansing, other great secretaries of state, had to face a war while being the bearer of a global project...