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Introduction: Matterphorical

Daniela Gandorfer and Zulaikha Ayub

Thought is relational, non-representational, and collaborative. To deny this, whether intentionally or not, is a proprietary act—one of capture, appropriation, and seizure. To begin our introduction with a decisive emphasis on the relational and collaborative nature (understood also in the sense of “physical world”) of thought speaks to both the image of (representational) thought deeply ingrained in Western philosophy, as such challenged by *matterphorics*, and the way in which *matterphorical* came into being.

Foremost, *matterphorics* is an ethics of thought, or, more precisely, it is an *aesth-ethics* of thought.¹ It calls for an ethics of both sense-making and sensing in the making. Indeed, *aesth-ethics* takes seriously that sense-making requires attentiveness to the ongoing intra-action of modes of sensing and the being of the sensible (i.e. that which is sensible but not recognizable).² Thinking, far from being restricted to human and humanist thought, (un)matters and (un)makes-sense. As such it is both an onto-epistemological and ethical concern. Thus, *matterphorics* is committed less to a theoretical program than to a heightened attentiveness to the violence(s) already inherent in representational modes of thought and sense-making. For these modes rest on the assumption that thought exists (if accepted as existing) in the separate, human, sometimes perhaps divine, realm of consciousness, untouched by physical forces, molecular bonds, and other matter(s) of real alliances, and is yet capable of determining who and what matters. It is precisely these determinations of meaning—performed from a presumed outside, and at the exclusion of not only matter, but also other possible meanings coming to *matter*—that are acts of capture and appropriation. What brings about these kinds of violence(s) are, for example, the adamant adherence to *universality* and its accompanying claim according to which political and legal relationality capable of attending to *singularities* still remains unthinkable; and also the privileging of *generalization* and *consensus* over *particularities* and *dissent*. For the former confidently allows the rushed sacrifice of the differences that matter to those (human and non-human existences) who never quite matter enough to counter their own becoming negligible. A similar violence accompanies *comparison* as a mode of binary and oppositional meaning production. And even modes of thought often

praised for holding inventive and creative potential, such as *analogy* and *metaphor*, carry out particular forms of violence(s) by leveling out that which is not sufficiently adaptable or applicable to the contexts in question and by refusing to acknowledge that the demand for high degrees of similarity for every application is also an act of onto-epistemological exclusion for which no legal, often not even ethical, accountability is required.

What, for example, justifies the still prevalent understanding of law as an exclusively human-created structure or system that hovers over a physical and embodied reality in order to (allegedly) guarantee law's objectivity (and even creativity)? Feminist science studies have demonstrated that this concept of objectivity is objectivizing but not objective, and legal materialists have pointed to the flawed "cult of immateriality" and anthropocentrism inherent in Western legal thought.³ And why are concepts, words, and ideas assumed to reside in a vacuum, which, as a concept denoting emptiness or nothingness, has itself already been scientifically disproved?⁴ Who or what has ever encountered – that is, sensed and made sense of – a concept, or even a word, that was not an entanglement of matter, history, forces, political and legal structures, chemical reactions, and physical intra-actions?⁵ Each time these encounters were claimed to have taken place, were they not claims to power over the (yet) unthinkable and unknown by means of representational thought (which certainly is related yet not to be equated with abstract forms of expression)? Isn't *terra nullius* as one of the most important legal concepts in justifying colonization *matterphorically* (rather than just literally) a tool of both representational thought (erasing who and what matters in an attempt to install a different regime of mattering) and "taking (a) place"? And has not the sheer unbreakable and highly protected bond between language and thought – the fact that, as Alfred North Whitehead writes, "language dictates our unconscious presupposition of thought" and is falsely understood as the "essence of thought"⁶ – justified the unmatteing of millions and millions of human and non-human lives? The history of legal personhood (subjectivity), which is, as such, a history of exclusion and inclusion of human and non-human beings governed by the far from neutral prerequisite of rationality, self-consciousness, and the faculty of reason, all signaled by the capacity for Indo-European human language(s), serves as an example *par excellence*.⁷

And what about the many times it has been exposed that Cartesianism and representationalism bring (and have brought) forth concepts and theories that continue to exclude what strays too far from the thinking subject and its all-encompassing yet non-extensive thoughts? In addition to the resistance to Cartesian thought, which has preceded (i.e. Plato) and followed (i.e. Kant) from Descartes, various materialist feminist, indigenious, post-colonial, posthumanist, and

queer theories, and even attempts from within more classical strands of the Western canon (such as process philosophies or philosophies of immanence), have exposed the injustices the massive Cartesian unmat-
 tering created (and still creates) for various human and non-human
 modes of existence. And yet, despite the critique uttered, the mani-
 festos written, the cases analysed, the numbers presented, the gene-
 alogies and etymologies traced, the diagrams drawn, and despite the
 climate changing, fires raging, coasts floating, populations starving,
 pandemics spreading, nuclei fusing and splitting from good and ill
 will, the very *mode* of thinking (what Gilles Deleuze calls moralistic
image of thought⁸) continues to claim its independence from matter,
 announce judgements, and issue sovereign decisions on who or what
 matters. What lies outside that logic (and *logos*) cannot breathe.

Irigaray expresses precisely this paradox when she asks: "But does
 thought need an other air than the living do? More ethereal?"⁹ As do
 Deleuze and Guattari when asking what "thought's relationship with
 the earth" is.¹⁰ Approaching these questions means inquiring thought
matterphorically. How to investigate the particular gas exchange drawn
 out by Irigaray – these processes by which ideas, words, laws, repre-
 sentations use up all the air(s) without being held accountable for those
 thoughts, bodies, lives, existences left to suffocate? And what about all
 other matter(s) that thought encounters and that are encountered by
 thought?¹¹ What would it mean to meet the universe halfway,¹² to slide
 between language and materiality,¹³ to sound the limits of life,¹⁴ to not
 limit life's 'speech' to communication but to attend to it in its "terres-
 trial vibrancy,"¹⁵ to acknowledge that "earth matters to thought,"¹⁶ that
 concepts matter-forth,¹⁷ that some concepts are lethal,¹⁸ and that "with
 our planetary decline comes a weakening of the concepts we depend
 upon to think about it"?¹⁹ And what would it take to understand what
 it *means* to be born "property," to carry "the undying pain of thinking
 things" and of being "burned by history,"²⁰ and what it *means* to hold
 fast to the dead body, and thereby also the name and memory, of a
 woman on a refugee boat, about to slip into the water, in an attempt to
 defy "the arithmetic of disposability and disappearance of the slave-
 ship's hold?"²¹

These questions, if attended to *matterphorically*, are not rhetorical,
 their meanings not metaphorical. These are not questions that produce
 subjects (and objects) for representational modes of thought to capture,
 appropriate, extract, circulate, exchange, and dispose of. In fact, they
 do not obey the logic of representationalism or Cartesian dualism, but
 rather expose the importance of investigating the inextricability of
 thought and matter for a *matterphorical* ethics of thinking. For it is the
 task of such an ethics to attend to the constantly shifting, often incom-
 mensurate, and always incomparable (in)justices of (un)mat-
 tering.

There is, however, yet another reason for why we opened the introduction with this specific clarification, stating that thinking is not the faculty of the genius or an endeavor attributed to the present of thought and thinker, but a collaborative practice of sense-making, stretching over various periods of time and simultaneously cutting across different temporalities and scales. Not only does this special issue include various conversations and co-written pieces, emphasizing the collaborative work and engagement that brings about concepts (i.e. turbulence²²), clarifications, and new relationalities, *matterphorical*, as attribute and title of this special issue, was an invitation to thinkers whose work has accompanied and guided us in thinking about an ethics of doing theory that does not assume the superiority of sign systems that are accepted to preside over academic meaning production. That is not to say that this issue's aim is to ban language, or numbers, or images, as this would mean mistaking an expression for representation, and even further, reducing the operation of representation to what is assumed to be its product. Rather, the invitation and its acceptance by the contributors of this special issue testify to a commitment to attend to material expression(s)—be it a particular word, text, sound, border, wave, electron, plant, YouTube advertisement, movie, or be it the tides, turbulence, skittles, split second decisions, combustions—in its specific entanglement and with attention to how meaning comes to *matter*.²³ In other words, the invitation asked scholars to experiment with the *matterphorality* of meaning production and sense-making. The fact that the contributors work in various different fields and disciplines allows for a nuanced understanding of the multiple limits, challenges, and resistances *matterphorics* might encounter.

Some of the contributors to this special issue were already part of the *Reading Matters* project, which resulted in a workshop at UC Berkeley in fall 2018,²⁴ and a conference at Princeton University in winter 2018.²⁵ *Reading Matters* evolved from within a field of various events and phenomena distinct to that time—the circulation of concepts such post-truth, fake-facts, the further popularisation of anti-science sentiment and mistrust in higher education, the acceleration of affect production and mobilization via social media platforms under the banner of free-speech, and the intensification of racism and fascisms under (and by) the Trump administration. It aimed to think about the political and ethical potential of a generative mode of reading, understood as sensing and making-sense of both matter and what matters. In addition to the contributors to this special issue, Jane Bennett, Judith Butler, Eduardo Cadava, Angela Creager, Jack Halberstram, Donna Haraway, Sanford Kwinter, and Gayle Salamon have been part of the *Reading Matters* project, presenting and sharing

their thoughts and work in Berkeley and Princeton. However, each of the contributors to this special issue decided to write a new contribution that speaks to what might be understood as *matterphorical* in their respective fields of academic engagement. The legal thinkers Peter Goodrich and Andreas Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos, as well as the architectural theorist Eyal Weizman, have already been part of an earlier and related project, *Synesthesia of Law*, which was co-organized by Daniela Gandorfer and Nofar Sheffi and not only concerned with challenging representationalism but also with articulating alternative modes of sensing law.²⁶ Importantly, the work of Suzanne Guerlac, Elizabeth Povinelli, and Philip Steinberg has for years accompanied us, and significantly formed the *matterphorical* project, while the work of Elizabeth R. Johnson and Jessi Lehman has become an important and invaluable source for us to think-with.

It is nothing less than the generosity of the contributors, their openness to think collaboratively about what matters and might matter differently, and their willingness to devote time and energy into collaborative thought in times deeply unsettling and uncertain, that makes this issue special and, indeed, meaningful. It is beyond our capacity to express the deep appreciation and gratitude we hold towards each and every thinker who has contributed to this issue, and who has, each in their own way, exemplified for us what it means to think ethically in and through politically challenging and dangerous times (with the prospect of danger so unequally distributed).

As already thought-with quite a crowd, *matterphorical*, in this special issue, is thought-with us (and more than just us²⁷), the contributors, as well as the thinkers, human and non-human, with which they are thinking-with. This matters as it emphasizes that thinking is collaborative, traverses temporalities, media, and spatialities, and also that thinking *matterphorically* is less subjected to a requirement of consensus, let alone driven by loyalty to schools of thought, than it is to the commitment of addressing injustice(s) inherent in our very modes of thinking and sense-making.

Matterphorical, as specific consideration of the potential and limits of *matterphorics* in different fields, disciplines, and regions, is a collaborative project (as is *matterphorics*), appreciative of difference(s) and critical of representative tools guiding sense-making and knowledge production. As such, thinking about *matterphorical* modes of analysis has informed *and* has been informed by an ongoing endeavor to resist and challenge the violence(s) of representationalism in its many forms. This collaborative project is not a matter of invention or ownership, but seeks to matter non-propriotorially. Each contribution demonstrates this from within a specific discipline and in regard to a specific region, concept, problem.

In “Political Desirings: Yearnings for Mattering (,) Differently,” quantum physicist and feminist philosopher Karen Barad thinks diffractively with Daniela Gandorfer through Barad’s *agential realist* account of how and why theory matters. In doing so, the piece focuses on Barad’s agential realist reworking of various core concepts of Western thought (including “concept” itself, theory, ontology, politics, individual, justice, desire) and raises *matterphorical* concerns about thought and expression. Precisely because matter, Barad argues, is already political “all the way down,” they call for not only a critical, diffractive engagement with both the sciences and political-social theories, but also an *ethico-ontoepistemology*.

“Earth-Bound Sound: Oscillations of Hearing, Ocean, and Air,” by the sound artist and theorist Raviv Ganchrow, is itself an interplay of oscillations and vibrations, not only counter-narrating the history of listening, but also that of narrative methodologies bound to linearity and conclusivity. Sounding, he argues, is an integral tendency of terrestrial sound and “not an inscriptive functional afterthought.” Listening to *earth-bound sound*, then, is a practice of terrestrial *meaning production*.

The legal scholar Peter Goodrich argues in “Transhumusians: On the Jurisography of the Corpus Iuris” that law, too, “lies beneath, slow changing, the pre-nomos of the earth, transhumusian in its roots, in origin a sound or vibration emitted to the ear.” For Goodrich, legal thought matterphorically and synesthetically comes from the middle, the navel, bellowed, written, and imagined by bodies in their materiality thereby exposing the earth, the humus, in the human. This, he shows, has been suggested and *ontographically expressed* before by the body - or bodies - of (Judge, Miss, jurisographer) Schreber.

In “Livingness, Information, and the Really Real” the literary scholar Suzanne Guerlac suggests a shift from the concept of life, which increasingly becomes privatized, capitalized, synthetically altered, and technologically formed, to that of *livingness*. Precisely because inventing concepts ought not to fall prey to rebranding efforts, but requires an engagement with old concepts and the preparation of “a ground from which new ones might meaningfully emerge and put down roots,” Guerlac works through the sediments of livingness by providing readings of Henri Bergson, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, and Gilbert Simondon.

The anthropologist of science and technology Stefan Helmreich, in conversation with Daniela Gandorfer and Zulaikha Ayub, attends closely to an ethics of doing theory as inextricable from “life.” Indeed, Helmreich states that “[t]heory is about whose lives matter and how.” The contribution “Doing Theory: Life, Ethics, and Force” thinks closely through precisely that relationality, touching upon alleged dualisms such as epistemology and ontology, representation and materiality, as

well as on phenomena such as Covid-19, contemporary U.S. fascism, and racialized violence(s), which un-matter both life and modes of theory that refuse those unmatterings.

In the co-authored contribution “Turbulent Waters in Three Parts,” geographers Jessica Lehman, Philip Steinberg, and Elizabeth R. Johnson reshape *turbulence* as *matterphorical* concept from three perspectives, focusing on the complex relationship between metaphor and materiality in regard to oceanic worlds. Through thorough, cross-scalar, and cross-disciplinary matterphorical considerations of turbulence in its relation to marine historical knowledge production, the governance and epistemic cultures of ocean life, and the lines and laws of the ocean, this contribution shows how turbulence, if thought collaboratively and in its material and discursive performativity, “produce[s] different possibilities for how we think from, with, and in relation to the sea.”

With “Nietzsche, Revelation, and the Materiality of Metaphor,” the political and literary theorist James Martel traces Friedrich Nietzsche’s particular use of metaphor in *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* which, Martel argues, “collapses into its own materiality” and becomes “matterphorical in the process.” In order to make that argument, which for Martel bears political potential, he reworks Nietzsche’s concept of *revelation*, understanding it not in an ‘archist’ sense, but attending to its potential to both defy the notion of an unbridgeable gap between language and materiality and guide an anarchist politics.

In her contribution “Improbably Intimacy: Otobong Nkanga’s Grafts and Aggregates,” the German literature scholar Katrin Pahl provides not only a careful reading of the artwork and performances of the Nigerian-born visual artist Otobong Nkanga, but draws out *matterphorical* relations of and with vibrant matter, *material and emotional bonds*, in an attempt to show alternative modes and material practices of making kin. Pahl argues that these forms of kinship, in this case with minerals, plants, and humans, go beyond anthropocentrism, “enable less hierarchical modes of co-existing, and offer an opportunity to decolonize our metaphors.”

“Performing Metaphors” is a creative, performed, and performative contribution by the legal scholar and poet Andreas Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos, which consists of “[t]hree performances, three folded theoretical contexts, three slidings, three matterphors” that, folded into and out of each other, demonstrate the need to not succumb to a prioritization of language over the material and to attend to “suffering bodies behind vacuous metaphorical concepts.” As such it aims to emphasize the ethical and political potential of the *matterphorical* as a continuous sliding across matter and materiality which itself slides across scales.

“Mattering-Forth : Thinking with Karrabing,” is a co-written and co-thought contribution by the anthropologist and philosopher Elizabeth Povinelli, Daniela Gandorfer, and Zulaikha Ayub, working with various media and intertwining Karrabing—a concept, grass-root group, indigenous Film Collective, tidal phenomenon, and, most importantly, mode of existence—with a *matterphorical case study* on the 2020 wildfires in California, U.S. In doing so, this contribution offers notions of theory, concept(ing), and sense-making that not only *matterforth* but *come-from*, both being requirements of an ethics of doing theory.

In a different sense, this plays an important role also in “Race, Migration, and Security at the Euro-African Border” by the literature and film scholar Debarati Sanyal. Looking at Melilla and Ceuta as borderscapes—attending closely to the interplay of technology, surveillance regimes, *bordercutting*, and the mobilization of representations—Sanyal shows that “migrants and refugees are metaphorized and matterphorized by borders, expropriated of their body and image, bereft of a right to move, indeed, to exist,” but also “shape and carve forms of becoming and belonging” as they “matterphorize alternate imaginaries as they metaphorize their own lived conditions.” The latter Sanyal demonstrates by attending to testimonies in *The Messengers* and *Those Who Jump*, two documentary responses to Europe’s outer frontiers that, she argues, “summon us to witness the exiled as existences that persist, analyze, remember, embody and materialize new becomings and life worlds.”

In “Skittles as Matterphor,” the critical legal scholar Patricia J. Williams explores “the matterphor of living history from the inside out” in the context of contemporary American politics, carried by racism which, she shows, governs a particular form of meaning (un)production. Williams carefully works through Donald Trump’s racist affective regime, his continuously acted upon pleasure for ‘order’ and punishment, and the desire to break and stand above the law, and thereby demonstrates that the racist gaze (from images, to twitter posts, surveillance techniques, reckless eyeballing, screen testing, finger pointing, targeting, and hunting), deeply ingrained in U.S. law, police and societal practices, history, and affect, contributes to an unmatteing of black, and other forms of non-white and non-male, lives.

“Epilogue: Theory, Momentarily,” a conversation between the architectural theorist Eyal Weizman and Daniela Gandorfer, focuses on the temporality of theory and concept in relation to perception and the unfolding of material reality. Theory, Weizman argues, “inhabits a gap between sensing and sense making,” and can be understood as “a set of speculations of how to ethically and politically understand what we experi-

ence – in order to shape from this sensorial experience – a world view.” This, however, requires a mode of investigating events and concepts that universities are currently neither teaching nor attending, too. Weizman explains the durational (legal) concept of the *split second* in order to demonstrate the political and ethical importance and challenges of such a mode. In the final part of the conversation the focus lies on possible tools to challenge and resist fascism, and the complicity of critical theories.

It is with deep respect and great excitement that we wish to express, once again, our sincere thanks to this special issue’s contributors for their time and generosity in working and thinking with us and each other. We are honored and humbled by their trust and generosity. Finally, and fully aware (or, so we think) of the unavoidable awkwardness the phrasing itself evokes, we also wish to thank each other. We are feminists (or, so we think), after all (and everything).

Notes

1. On matterphorics, matterphorical case studies, and aesth-ethics in regard to an ethics of thought see: Daniela Gandorfer, *Matterphorics: On the Laws of Theory* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, forthcoming) and the Logische Phantasie Lab: <https://lo-ph.agency>.
2. Or, put differently, *aesth-ethics* speaks to the fact that the being of the sensible and practices of sense-making and sensing are not only entangled, but onto-epistemological practices. The concept of the “being of the sensible” (i.e., difference in intensity) is borrowed from Deleuze. In *Difference and Repetition*, he remarks that “[i]t is strange that aesthetics (as the science of the sensible) could be founded on what can be represented in the sensible.” The object of encounter, he further argues, is less an object than a *sign* that “gives rise to sensibility with regard to a given sense;” in other words, it is “not a sensible being but the being of the sensible.” See Gilles Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition* (1968), trans. Paul Patton (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), 266, 56–57, 139–140.

Although *aesth-ethics* differs from Deleuze’s understanding of aesthetics, we think *aesth-ethics* in part also with his claim according to which aesthetics is not necessarily tied to representation and recognition. It is in this sense that we understand aesth-ethics as attentiveness to modes of sensing and making sense, not of a given object, but *with* that which is neither recognizable to, nor thinkable for, our modes of sense-making and yet continuously un(matters) sense and meanings.

The concepts “intra-action” as well as “onto-epistemology” are borrowed from Karen Barad. See Karen Barad, *Meeting the Universe Halfway: Quantum Physics and the Entanglement of Matter and Meaning* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2007).

3. See, for instance, Sandra Harding, “‘Strong Objectivity’ and Socially Situated Knowledge,” in *Whose Science? Whose Knowledge?* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991): 138–163; Donna Haraway, “Situated Knowledges: The Science

Question in Feminism and the Privilege of Partial Perspective," *Feminist Studies* 14, no. 3 (Autumn 1988): 575–599; Karen Barad, "Invertebrate Visions: Diffractions of the Brittlestar," in *The Multispecies Salon*, ed. Eben Kirksey (Durham: Duke University Press, 2014): 221–241; Cormac Cullinan, *Wild Law : A Manifesto for Earth Justice* (Cape Town: Siber Ink, 2002); David Delaney, "Afterword: Lively Ever After: Beyond the Cult of Immateriality," in *Animals, Biopolitics, Law : Lively Legalities*, ed. Irus Braverman (New York, NY: Routledge, 2016); Daniela Gandorfer, "Breathing Law. Real Imaginings of What it Might Mean to Matter Differently," in *The Cabinet of Imaginary Laws*, edited by Peter Goodrich and Thanos Zartaloudis. Discourses of Law (London: Routledge, forthcoming 2021). Important contributions to the materiality of law have been made by, among others, Irus Braverman, Margaret Davies, Peter Goodrich, Anne Grear, Hyo Yoon Kang, Sara Kendall, Andreas Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos, and Alain Pottage.

4. See, for example, Karen Barad, *What Is the Measure of Nothingness? Infinity, Virtuality, Justice/ Was Ist Das Maß Des Nichts? Unendlichkeit, Virtualität, Gerechtigkeit*. 100 Notes – 100 Thoughts, Documenta (13). Hatje Cantz, 2012; Frank Close. 2009. *Nothing a very short introduction*. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009); John D. Barrow, *The book of nothing: vacuums, voids, and the latest ideas about the origins of the universe*. (New York: Vintage Books, 2002).
5. To pick a random starting point from an inexhaustible pool of possibilities: Are ink, paper, stone, papyrus, wood, sand, or even LCD screens devoid of matter?
6. Alfred North Whitehead, *Modes of Thought* (1938) (New York: Free Press, 1968), 35 and 66.
7. See for example: Anna Grear, "Deconstructing Anthropos: A Critical Legal Reflection on Anthropocentric Law and Anthropocene Humanity," *Law and Critique* 26, no. 3 (2015): 225–49; Ngaire Naffine, "Legal Personality and the Natural World: On the Persistence of the Human Measure of Value," *Journal of Human Rights and the Environment* 3 (June 2012): 68–83; Roberto Esposito, *Persons and Things: From the Body's Point of View* (Cambridge: Polity, 2015); Christopher D. Stone, "Should Trees Have Standing?: Toward Legal Rights for Natural Objects," *Southern California Law Review* 45, no. 2 (1972): 450–501.
8. Gilles Deleuze, "The Image of Thought," in *Difference and Repetition* (1968), trans. Paul Patton (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994): 129–167.
9. Luce Irigaray, *The Forgetting of Air in Martin Heidegger*, trans. Mary Beth Mader (London: Athlone, 1999), 6.
10. Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, *What Is Philosophy?* (1991), trans. Janis Tomlinson and Graham Burchell III (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), 69.
11. Although the etymology of "encounter" also suggests a confrontation, a meeting of the other, we understand it (perhaps even more literally) as the coming together of "in" (the Latin *in*) and "against" (the Latin *contra*), thereby drawing on a different typology already inherent in the term.
12. As raised by Karen Barad. See Karen Barad and Daniela Gandorfer, "Political Desirings: Yearnings for Mattering (,) Differently" in this issue.

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13. See Andreas Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos, "Performing Metaphors" in this issue.
14. As suggested by Stefan Helmreich. See Stefan Helmreich in Conversation with Daniela Gandorfer and Zulaikha Ayub, "Doing Theory: Life, Ethics, and Force" in this issue.
15. See Raviv Ganchrow, "Earth-bound Sound : Oscillations of Hearing, Ocean and Air" in this issue.
16. See Peter Goodrich, "Transhumusians: On The Jurisography Of The Corpus Iuris" in this issue.
17. See Elizabeth Povinelli, Daniela Gandorfer and Zulaikha Ayub, "Mattering-Forth: Thinking With Karrabing" in this issue.
18. See Eyal Weizman and Daniela Gandorfer, "Epilogue: Theory, Momentarily" in this issue.
19. See Suzanne Guerlac, "Livingness, Information, And The Really Real" in this issue.
20. See Patricia J. Williams, "Skittles as Matterphor" in this issue.
21. See Debarati Sanyal, "Race, Migration, and Security at the Euro-African Border" in this issue.
22. See Jessica Lehman, Philip Steinberg, & Elizabeth R. Johnson, "Turbulent Waters In Three Parts" in this issue.
23. One of the initial framings of this special issue with which we have provided the contributors (in addition to conversations and email exchanges), reads as follows: "Whereas the concept 'metaphor' is the trope of meaning transfer and substitution by means of analogy, *matterphor* denotes the articulation of meaning in relation to matter, understood not as fixed entity, but as constantly shifting (*-phoric*) and thereby establishing entanglements and relationalities. This changes not only how we conceive of the relation between meaning and matter, and consequently of knowledge production, but also presents a different way of *doing theory*. The question of how matter and meaning relate, which is at the core of the project, can neither be answered once and for all, nor treated simply as a theoretical exercise, detached from its many embodied and situated actualizations. In other words, rather than being concerned with a theoretical question about the adequacy of rhetorical tropes and visual representations, this special issue is concerned with the political, aesthetic, legal, social, technological, and environmental entanglements that not only shape, but are epistemologically and ontologically constitutive of, the very processes of knowledge and meaning production." See: <https://readingmatters.princeton.edu/matterphorical>.
24. Photographs, course reader, and participants of the event at University of California, Berkeley can be viewed at <https://readingmatters.princeton.edu/workshop-review>.
25. Photographs, participants, and lecture videos of the event at Princeton University can be viewed at <https://readingmatters.princeton.edu/conference-overview>. In regard to both events, we also want to thank our co-organizer Mari Jarris and the discussants, our colleagues, Jonathan C.

Aguirre, Katie Brown, Caroline Durlacher, RL Goldberg, Sheila Lin, Lou Silhol-Macher, Emily O'Rourke, and Simone Stirner.

26. Other speakers included: Christian Biet, Yishai Blank, Eduardo Cadava, Emanuele Coccia, Allen Feldman, Bernard Harcourt, Bradley McCallum, Kendall Thomas, Julie Saada, Mangalika de Silva, Ann Stoler, Mariana Valverde, Jesus Velasco, Patricia Williams, Mikhail Xifaras, and Carey Young. Discussants included Anton Bunia, Nicholas Croggon, Amélie Férey, Sarah-Jane Koulen, Valentina Luketa, and Lindsay Ofrias. See: <https://synesthesia.princeton.edu>.
27. In spring 2020, during the time we received drafts of the *Matterphorical* contributions, the *Logische Phantasie Lab*, a research agency actively challenging injustices resulting from political, legal, economic, social, physical, and environmental entanglements by means of *matterphorical case studies*, were founded. A LoPh research seminar, led by Daniela Gandorfer and Zulaikha Ayub, various conversations, as well as the case studies conducted by LoPh Lab researchers, too, have shaped the field of *matterphorics*. Special thanks here to: Jonathan C. Aguirre, Shazia'Ayn Babul, Christian Bischoff, Tiffany Critchlow, Mabel Felix, Ariane Fong, Curt Gambetta, Raviv Ganchrow, Lindsay Ofrias, Janette Lu, Heidi Kim, Rafi Lehmann, Ananya Malhotra, Nadin Mukhtar, Layla Varkey, and Lisa-Marie Weidl. See: <https://lo-ph.agency>.