Abstract

abstract:

In this paper, I investigate Aristotle’s claim in Nicomachean Ethics III.1 about situations that “overstrain human nature.” By setting out and answering several interpretative questions about such situations, I offer a comprehensive interpretation of this passage. I argue that in (at least some of) these cases, the agent voluntarily does something wrong, even though there is a right action available. Furthermore, I argue that Aristotle would think it is possible for a rare agent to perform the right action in (at least some of) these cases, overcoming the limitations of human nature by identifying with the divine part of the soul.

pdf

Additional Information

ISSN
1538-4586
Print ISSN
0022-5053
Pages
pp. 45-67
Launched on MUSE
2021-01-16
Open Access
No
Back To Top

This website uses cookies to ensure you get the best experience on our website. Without cookies your experience may not be seamless.