The Fluctuating Roles of the Military in Egypt

76 Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies Vol. XXXIX, No.1 Fall 2015 The Fluctuating Roles of the Military in Egypt Ann M. Lesch* Authoritarianism can be defined as a political order “in which power is highly centralized, pluralism is suspect and where the regime seeks to exercise a monopoly over all legitimate political activity.”1 Although often launched by a military coup, such regimes are not monolithic. The military and security apparatuses not only repress autonomous public action but also vie for power. The authoritarian ruler maintains control by manipulating and balancing those powerful apparatuses, so that he is not captured by them. He shares their antipathy to allowing autonomous actors to emerge, seeking instead to create subservient political structures that will bolster his authority, not challenge his rule. Six of Egypt’s eight presidents since 1953 have been military officers. The two civilians ruled for a mere two years: Mohamed Morsi (r. 2012-2013) and Adly Mansour (r. 2013-2014). Engineering professor Morsi—a senior figure in the Muslim Brotherhood—was elected in Egypt’s only democratic presidential contest, whereas Chief Justice Mansour was selected by Defense Minister Abdel Fattah El-Sisi with the support of the popular movement that demanded Morsi’s removal. Gamal Abdel Nasser(r. 1954-1970) and Anwar Sadat (r. 1970-1981) were lieutenant colonels when they overthrew the monarchy in July 1952, whereas Mohamed Naguib (r. 1952-1954), Hosni Mubarak (r. 1981-2011), Mohamed Hussein Tantawi (r. 2011-2012) and ElSisi (r. 2014+) were already generals when they became president. The roles of the military have fluctuated significantly: at times directly in charge, sometimes challenging the presidency and at other times sidelined, secondary to the security sector and even the economic elite. This essay *Ann / is a Professor Emeritus, The American University in Cairo, Former Professor of Political Science, Villanova University 1 Roger Owen, State, Power and Politics in the Making of the Modern Middle East (London: Routledge, 1992), 38. 77 examines those fluctuations and their implications for El-Sisi’s rule, including the implications of his warning (that he did not heed) that military intervention “would risk dragging the country backwards” for at least thirty years.”2 Nasser: The Challenge from the Military Power Center The Free Officers seized power in July 1952 in the context of an unpopular monarchy, divided civilian political forces, the discrediting of the armed forces by their defeat in Palestine, spiraling labor strikes, rural unrest, and widespread anger at the continuing British presence, anger that climaxed with the burning of Cairo, six months earlier. The young officers were furious at the corrupt rulers who sent them into battle with defective weapons and resented being used as a gendarmerie to quell popular dissent. Mounting the coup in complete secrecy, they swiftly removed King Farouk and purged the officer corps. Nasser led the Free Officers, served as vice-chair of the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC), and consolidated his power as minister of interior. Although initially claiming that they did not want to rule directly, the officers discarded civilian cabinets and arrested nominal head General Naguib when he sought to return the army to the barracks. The RCC crushed autonomous actors: They broke up labor strikes, purged universities , and arrested royalists, Wafdist, Muslim Brothers and Communists, labeling them all “enemies of the people” and subjecting them to kangaroo trials by special “people’s tribunals.”3 Another wave of arrest in 1965-66 resulted in the death of additional Brotherhood and Communist activists. Military officers held the strategic positions—president, vice president, prime minister, defense, interior, intelligence, military production and local government—and served as deputy ministers in order to oversee their civilian bosses. As president since 1956, Nasser appointed governors and mayors, who were largely drawn from the military and security apparatuses. Hostile to competitive politics, the RCC set up an umbrella organization—also dominated by former officers—to rally the public under the slogan “Unity, Liberty, Work.” Officers replaced Wafdist and royalists in the bureaucracy, ran public agencies, and gained lucrative positions as 2 El-Sisi on May 11, 2013, quoted by Bassam Sabry, “Who Only Democracy Can Save Egypt,” al-Monitor, May 19, 2013, http://www...