Algeria's Reform without Revolution: The Same Old Game

Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies Vol. XXXVIII, No.3 Spring 2015 Algeria’s Reform without Revolution: The Same Old Game Mohamed A. El-Khawas* Since Algeria’s independence from France in 1962, its National Liberation Front (FLN) has dominated the political process and army generals have been the final arbitrator of power within the state over the past fifty years. Together, they have manipulated the electoral process to ensure the regime’s survival. They have handpicked presidential candidates and made sure that the FLN won all electoral contests. A shortlived experiment with democracy began in 1989 but was aborted two years later after the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) was the big winner in the legislative elections, receiving over three million votes, about twice as much as the FLN.1 Islamic Salvation Front leaders promised to purge the military and bureaucracy once they took office. This electoral defeat of the ruling party shocked the military, which mounted a coup in January 1992 to prevent the FIS from coming to power. Their intervention halted the democratic process and marked a return to authoritarianism. Violent suppression of protestors and the arbitrary arrest of FIS leaders led to the outbreak of rioting and several people were killed or wounded. The following month, the government announced a state of emergency. Press freedom was curtailed, a dozen newspapers were closed down, and some journalists were detained without trial.2 The FIS was banned, its assets were seized, members were rounded up. In July, its top leaders, 55 *Mohamed A. El-Khawas, Ph.D., is a professor of Political Science at the University of the District of Columbia, Washington, DC. His recent books are Case Studies of Conflict in Africa (2013) and Democracy, Diamonds and Oil Politics in Today’s Africa (2006). 1 John L. Esposito, Islamic Threat: Myth or Reality (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 183-84; William B. Quandt, Between Ballots and Bullets, Algeria’s Transition from Authoritarianism(Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1998), 59; 2 Human Rights Watch, Human Rights in Algeria Since the Halt of the Electoral Process (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1992), 7. 56 Abassi Madani and Ali Belhadji, were sentenced to twelve years imprisonment by a military court. The government’s failure to seek a political solution set the stage for continuing confrontation with increasingly militant Islamist groups. As John L. Esposito pointed out, “Having driven FIS leaders into exile or underground, the Algerian military had set into motion a cycle of violence and counterviolence.”3 The military’s decision to use force to wipe out Islamists radicalized the FIS, which had been non-violent for three years. Moderate members turned into militants. The Islamic Salvation Army (AIS) was founded as the military wing of the FIS. As fighting intensified, other Islamist groups waged their own guerrilla campaigns, attacking security personnel and government officials. In March 1993, the Armed Islamic Group (GIA) was formed and joined the fight against the government. Its core members were Algerian veterans of the Afghanistan war, the most militant Islamists. Its fighters targeted Europeans working in Algeria whose governments had close economic ties with Algiers. The GIA also unleashed a reign of terror on civilians, killing judges, journalists, feminists, intellectuals, and writers who, in their judgment, were supporting the government or writing or speaking against Islam.4 A decade of protracted civil war claimed more than 150,000 lives.5 Since the 1992 coup, the generals have dominated Algeria’s political scene and have tightly managed the nomination process. They have not allowed strong candidates to run against their own candidate for the office of the president. They have used the Constitutional Court to disqualify real challengers on the pretext that they did not have enough endorsements from elected representatives. Instead they have encouraged small parties to nominate candidates who had no chance to win because they do not have large constituencies. Since 1999, Abdelaziz Bouteflika, backed by the military, has served as the country’s president. During his first term, he ended the devastating civil war of the 1990s and made peace with the Islamic Salvation Army (FIS3 John L. Esposito, Unholy War: Terror in the Name of Islam (New...