



PROJECT MUSE®


---

“You Aren’t You, Are You?”: Transhumanism, the Person,  
and the Resurrection in *Black Mirror*’s “Be Right  
Back”

Paul Treschow

Logos: A Journal of Catholic Thought and Culture, Volume 24, Number  
1, Winter 2021, pp. 49-65 (Article)

Published by Logos: A Journal of Catholic Thought and Culture  
DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1353/log.2021.0004>



➔ For additional information about this article  
<https://muse.jhu.edu/article/777011>

PAUL TRESCHOW

# “You Aren’t You, Are You?”

---

## Transhumanism, the Person, and the Resurrection in *Black Mirror*’s “Be Right Back”

### *Introduction*

STRETCHING BACK TO ANCIENT MYTHS like the tale of Orpheus and Eurydice, the lover’s desire for a resurrected beloved has long been a theme explored in art and literature. Hans Urs von Balthasar suggests an intriguing relationship between this longing and the Christian vision of resurrection: “Eros contains a promise . . . which is always pointing beyond the sentiment that sighs ‘Abide a while, thou art so beautiful!’ and which, therefore, if it is not transposed onto the Christian level, must condemn itself to eternal melancholy and self-consumption. This total structure of beauty can be redeemed only if the risen Lover is met at the other side of death.”<sup>1</sup> Balthasar’s comments establish eros almost as a barometer of resurrection, finding fulfillment when “transposed” or “redeemed” by Christ’s Resurrection (“the risen Lover”) but disappointment everywhere else.

One modern variation on this theme comes from an episode of the series *Black Mirror* entitled “Be Right Back.”<sup>2</sup> The episode tells the story of Martha<sup>3</sup> (Hayley Atwell), whose deceased lover Ash (Domhnall Gleeson) is “resurrected” through a service that creates a version of him based on his digital footprint. Thus, the mode of resurrection

that “Be Right Back” reflects is of a transhumanist variety,<sup>4</sup> not too far removed from current speculation about “digital resurrection.”<sup>5</sup> In keeping with *Black Mirror*’s usual assessment of transhumanism,<sup>6</sup> the episode is hardly optimistic about the outcome of such a resurrection; Martha’s desire for a resurrected Ash could well be said to end in Balthasar’s “eternal melancholy and self-consumption.” In this article, I will consider the failed resurrection of the beloved in “Be Right Back” in conversation with Christian doctrine surrounding Christ’s resurrection. I will ultimately contend that the resurrected Ash is insufficient for Martha because he is not a “person,” intending with that term to evoke the Catholic personalist movement,<sup>7</sup> particularly as outlined by Jacques Maritain.<sup>8</sup> I will begin with an outline of Maritain’s personalism and then discuss the Enlightenment conception of the self that Charles Taylor has called “the ‘punctual’ self”<sup>9</sup> and its relation to transhumanism. These competing accounts of personhood will frame a discussion of “Be Right Back,” in which I will contend that the resurrected Ash is a hyperpunctual self and that his lack of personality makes true loving exchange between him and Martha impossible. Finally, I will draw on Augustine’s teaching on the Resurrection and the New Testament resurrection accounts themselves to consider how Christ’s Resurrection affirms the centrality of persons and love, fulfilling the desire for a resurrection of the beloved’s person that is implicit in the critiques of a nonpersonalist resurrection in “Be Right Back.”

### *I. Jacques Maritain’s Personalism: Depth and Wholeness*

According to David Schindler, Jr., the term *personalism* describes a number of twentieth-century movements with a shared emphasis on personhood as “a special kind of being” and “the ultimate value or reality to which all things are relative.”<sup>10</sup> Schindler maintains that these movements were motivated by concerns about the dehumanizing effects of “the mechanistic tendencies of modern science.”<sup>11</sup> He also notes that many Catholic personalist thinkers emphasize the

significance of personhood in trinitarian and Christological theology;<sup>12</sup> Balthasar maintains that “the term *person* . . . receives its special dignity in history when it is illuminated by the unique theological meaning.”<sup>13</sup> Thus questions about our relationship to technology and the divine are at the heart of personalism.

Maritain gives an account of personalism that is heavily influenced by Thomist philosophy.<sup>14</sup> He follows other personalist thinkers<sup>15</sup> in intimately associating the concept of person with love, suggesting that “the most apposite approach to the philosophical discovery of personality is the study of the relation between personality and love.”<sup>16</sup> In his following attempt to delineate personality through a phenomenological description of love, Maritain emphasizes two key aspects of the person: depth and wholeness. His description of the person’s depth is worth quoting at some length:

Love is not concerned with qualities. They are not the object of our love. We love the deepest, most substantial and hidden, the most existing reality of the beloved being. This is a metaphysical center deeper than all the qualities and essences which we can find and enumerate in the beloved . . . Love seeks out this center, not, to be sure, as separated from its qualities, but as one with them. . . . For love is not concerned with qualities or natures or essences but with persons.<sup>17</sup>

Maritain establishes personality as the deepest object of love. The qualities of the beloved are not entirely irrelevant (“Love seeks out this center, not . . . as separated from its qualities, but as one with them”) but do not constitute what one loves in the beloved. They are of secondary importance in comparison with the depths of the beloved’s “metaphysical center,” the personality.

The other aspect of the person that is essential for Maritain is wholeness. He insists that “the person . . . is a whole” and that “the concept of part is opposed to that of person.”<sup>18</sup> Wholeness requires that a person exist “in self-possession, holding itself in hand, master of itself.”<sup>19</sup> This follows from the fact that the person is “ordained

directly to God as his absolute ultimate end” in a way that “transcends every created common good.”<sup>20</sup> Thus the beloved cannot exist *for* the lover but remains a whole person whose existence is directed toward God. Yet this wholeness also makes love possible. The whole personality is “capable of . . . *giving itself*,” and “capable of receiving . . . another self as a gift,” allowing love to be “a dialogue in which souls really communicate.”<sup>21</sup> The initial act of self-possession allows one to “bestow oneself” upon the beloved and receive her self in return. This type of love is typified in the Holy Trinity, “three wholes who are the Whole.”<sup>22</sup>

Finally, we should note that Maritain’s personalism, while perhaps privileging the soul,<sup>23</sup> also preserves the importance of the body. Maritain rejects Cartesian dualism and maintains that “soul and matter are the two substantial co-principles of the same being.”<sup>24</sup> He goes so far as to say that “a soul separated from its body is not a person.”<sup>25</sup> His thought is consistent with the broader personalist claim that “my body is constitutive of the identity of my ‘I’.”<sup>26</sup>

## *II. The Punctual Self and Transhumanism*

In contrast to Maritain’s personalism, the punctual self is a conception of subjectivity identified by Charles Taylor that is inherited from the Enlightenment and particularly the work of John Locke. It is defined by the attempt “to take an instrumental stance to one’s given properties, desire, inclinations, tendencies, habits of thought and feeling, so that they can be *worked on*, doing away with some and strengthening others, until one meets the desired specifications.”<sup>27</sup> Taylor maintains that this stance has consequences for our conceptions of the self. The act of disengagement causes one to “identify oneself with the power to objectify and remake” and “distance oneself from all the particular features which are objects of potential change.”<sup>28</sup> This reduction of the self is the source of Taylor’s geometrical metaphor: “The real self is ‘extensionless’: it is nowhere but in this power to fix things as objects.”<sup>29</sup>

Here we can note important similarities and differences between the notion of the punctual self and Maritain's description of the person's depth. Both diminish the importance of qualities but for different reasons and with different consequences. Maritain does this in order to affirm the "metaphysical center" that lies beneath a person's qualities. Qualities are unimportant only relative to the person, the real object of love. The notion of the punctual self, on the other hand, casts qualities as arbitrary in establishing the subject's "power to objectify and remake." This process, as Taylor describes it, is defined by negation rather than affirmation; we are "*none* of [our particular features]," the self is "*nowhere* but in this power to fix things as objects."<sup>30</sup> When we get past a person's qualities, we do not discover a rich metaphysical center but the arbitrary fixed point of her consciousness.<sup>31</sup>

Taylor's discussion of Locke's understanding of embodiment hints at the connections between the punctual self and the transhumanist movement. The notion of the punctual self makes possible the idea of the "perfectly detachable consciousness."<sup>32</sup> If the self consists in the power to objectify and remake, which exists in consciousness, then the body is unessential to selfhood. Thus Locke engages in various thought-experiments about "the same consciousness inhabiting different bodies, or two consciousnesses sharing the same, or bodies exchanging consciousness."<sup>33</sup> These speculations foreshadow the transhumanist idea of "uploading," by which, according to Nick Bostrom, "the original mind, with memory and personality intact, [is] transferred to the computer where it would then exist as software; and it could either inhabit a robot body or live in a virtual reality."<sup>34</sup> This shared ambivalence about embodiment suggests a thread of continuity running between the Lockean punctual self and transhumanist thought.<sup>35</sup>

Yet a deeper continuity exists in a shared emphasis on the individual as something to be "worked on." The idea of improving on the human person is essential to transhumanism, as expressed in the Transhumanist Declaration's support for the use of "human modification and enhancement technologies."<sup>36</sup> We can see how this

commitment, often referred to as “morphological freedom,”<sup>37</sup> is worked out in Nick Bostrom’s “Letter from Utopia.”<sup>38</sup> Writing in the voice of a future transhuman, Bostrom urges the reader to embrace technological enhancement. In doing so, he situates both bodies and minds as raw material that can be improved. He not only encourages the reader to improve on the “deathtrap”<sup>39</sup> of the body but also to seek out “skills and instruments for the cultivation of your neuronal soil”<sup>40</sup> in order to enhance cognition and eradicate suffering. In dissociating from both body and mind in this way, Bostrom casts the self as nothing more than the power to change out component parts and features at will, continuing in the tradition of the punctual self.

### *III. “Be Right Back”—The Failure of the Punctual Lover*

#### PSEUDO-ASH AS THE HYPERPUNCTUAL SELF

In “Be Right Back,” the resurrected Ash (henceforth, Pseudo-Ash) represents an outworking of the logic of this punctual, transhumanist conception of the person. He is defined by the ability to objectify and adapt appearances, behaviors, and characteristics at will. His hyperpunctuality is exemplified by his initial unindividuated body that is, in Pseudo-Ash’s words, “blank till you activate it.”<sup>41</sup> He is a true *tabula rasa*, ready to take up or discard qualities to meet “desired specifications.”

Throughout his interactions with Martha, Pseudo-Ash objectifies and adapts various aspects of his person. He does this to his body when, prompted by Martha that “[Ash] had a mole there,”<sup>42</sup> Pseudo-Ash spontaneously grows one. He does the same with speech, adding “threw a jeb”<sup>43</sup> to his vocabulary after Martha tells him that it was phrase that she and Ash used. When Martha is later disturbed by his ability to gather information from online, he says, “I’ll only do it again if you ask.”<sup>44</sup> Yet his ambivalence towards all that he says and does is most poignantly demonstrated at the episode’s climax when Martha tells Pseudo-Ash to jump off a cliff edge. After a mild protest, he calmly accepts her wishes until Martha protests, “Ash would’ve

been scared . . . he would have been crying.”<sup>45</sup> When Pseudo-Ash’s demeanor shifts to match Martha’s description, we see that he is able to adopt and discard both calm acceptance and fear, neither corresponding to any deeper reality. He is nothing other than a point onto which appearances, behaviors, and characteristics can be attached at will.

Yet Pseudo-Ash is a fulfillment of the logic of the punctual self in a deeper sense than just in how he functions. To see this, we must clarify in what sense Pseudo-Ash purports to be a resurrected Ash. Pseudo-Ash is essentially an entity that can imitate Ash’s qualities. When Martha’s friend signs her up for the service that provides Pseudo-Ash, she acknowledges that “it’s not [him], but it helps.”<sup>46</sup> Pseudo-Ash therefore does not necessarily purport to be a resurrection of Ash in the sense of reviving Ash’s consciousness. But he does purport to be a resurrection of Ash *for Martha*. Thus, any clarity about Pseudo-Ash not really being Ash becomes confused in his relations with her. We see this in how he encourages Martha not to refer to Ash and himself as distinct persons. When Martha says “That’s just the sort of thing *he* would say,”<sup>47</sup> Pseudo-Ash responds, “that’s why *I* said it.”<sup>48</sup> When Martha uses the past tense to describe Ash, Pseudo-Ash objects, “You speak about me like I’m not here.”<sup>49</sup>

Pseudo-Ash represents the implicit claim that the beloved and an entity that perfectly imitates the beloved’s qualities are interchangeable from the perspective of the lover. And this claim rests on the anthropology of the punctual self. If beneath the beloved’s qualities is nothing more than “the power to objectify and remake,” then an entity with this power and the same qualities would be identical from the lover’s perspective. Pseudo-Ash is defined by this power and adopts Ash’s qualities. Thus, according to this logic, he represents a true resurrection of Ash with regard to Martha’s experience of him.

#### PSUEDO-ASH’S LACK OF PERSONALITY

One might suggest that Martha ultimately rejects Pseudo-Ash simply because he is a poor imitation of Ash. He lacks qualities that Ash had or basic human qualities, forgetting Martha’s sister or not

breathing as he sleeps, for example. Martha does react negatively when Pseudo-Ash fails to imitate Ash. By this logic, the problem is just a failure of technology; given technological improvement or more data, Pseudo-Ash could be a true resurrected Ash for Martha. But a fuller account of Martha's rejection can be found in Pseudo-Ash's lack of personality. We can see this by analyzing Pseudo-Ash's divergence from the two key aspects of the person in Maritain's account: depth and wholeness.

Martha's rejection of Pseudo-Ash is caused by the absence of Ash's deepest "metaphysical center" (the person). This is suggested through two scenes involving the appropriately titled Bee Gees song, "How Deep is Your Love."<sup>50</sup> Before Ash's death, Martha is surprised to learn that he likes the Bee Gees, objecting that "in ten years, you haven't played them once."<sup>51</sup> When Ash names "How Deep is Your Love" as his favorite of their songs, Martha protests, "It's not very you,"<sup>52</sup> obviously seeing Ash's affection for the song as uncharacteristic. Later, when Martha puts on "How Deep is Your Love" in the car with Pseudo-Ash, he smirks and calls it "cheesy."<sup>53</sup> Martha says nothing, but her disdainful look suggests that his reaction has confirmed his inadequacy.

These two scenes verify Maritain's observation that "love is not concerned with qualities . . . but with persons." Ash's affection for the Bee Gees is not just another quality that Pseudo-Ash fails to imitate; it represents the depths of Ash's person that could not be fully known to Martha even after years of relationship. Martha does not react negatively to Pseudo-Ash because Ash's affection for the song was a quality that she loved or even was accustomed to. Rather, it is an indicator that beneath however many Ash-like qualities he might possess, Pseudo-Ash is not Ash. This constitutes Martha's ultimate rejection of Pseudo-Ash: "You aren't you, are you? . . . You're just a few ripples of you."<sup>54</sup> Martha realizes that "you" was not an adjective to describe Ash's qualities ("it's not very you") but an address to his person. Beneath his qualities lies not just "the power to objectify and remake," but the true object of love.

The other reason for Martha's rejection of Pseudo-Ash is his lack of wholeness. Here the project of resurrecting the beloved not for his own sake but for the sake of the lover falls apart. Pseudo-Ash's hyperpunctuality is intended to please Martha, allowing him to imitate Ash according to her wishes. But a person who exists for another will never be whole enough to participate in love's dialogue of souls. We see the effect of this dynamic in Martha's reaction to Pseudo-Ash's complacency when told to sleep downstairs: "No . . . Ash would argue over that. He wouldn't just leave because I'd ordered him to."<sup>55</sup> Her subsequent anger at Pseudo-Ash's inability to act for himself shows her desire to engage with a whole person. She shoves him and tells him to fight back in an effort to provoke any meaningful response, telling him, "You're not enough of him! You're nothing!"<sup>56</sup> Her first comment entertains the possibility that the difference between Ash and Pseudo-Ash is merely quantitative, but the second suggests that this is not strong enough to describe Pseudo-Ash's inadequacy. He is not a dialogue partner but an embodied void, and her words echo into his vacuity.

"Be Right Back" refuses the idea that an assembly of the beloved's qualities combined with "the power to objectify and remake" could constitute the beloved's resurrection for the lover. In its portrayal of Martha's desire for the depths and wholeness of Ash's person, it affirms the centrality of the person in true loving exchange. Greg Singh maintains that Martha's final decision to keep Pseudo-Ash in the attic means that "this new Ash is worthy of protecting in his current form."<sup>57</sup> But this could be true only in the sense that the photos of the dead also stored in the attic, which Ash mentions earlier in the episode,<sup>58</sup> are worthy of protecting. Pseudo-Ash's placement there suggests that he is no more than an image, perhaps capturing some of Ash's qualities but not his person. He cannot represent Ash's resurrection any more than a photo could do so.

#### *IV. The Personal Resurrection of Christ*

The critiques of the nonpersonalist, transhumanist resurrection in “Be Right Back” lead into a consideration of the place of the person in Christ’s Resurrection. Christianity and transhumanism generally have a strange relationship, with their parallels only serving to highlight their differences. Both refuse to take death for granted as the ultimate destiny of humanity and envision a better mode of being that we will attain in the future. But the source of our escape from death and eventual beatitude obviously greatly differ, with transhumanism placing its hope in technology and Christianity looking to the Resurrection of Christ as the promise of new life. These visions of resurrection imply different understandings of what is and is not essential in the preservation of the human person. While transhumanist visions of resurrection (as we have seen) often prioritize conscious will as the essence of the person, the Resurrection of Christ affirms a vision of the person’s existence beyond death that is more in keeping with Maritain’s account of personhood, although involving transformation as well. Maritain maintains that “no personality is more magnificently asserted than that of Christ.”<sup>59</sup> In this final section, I will consider how Christ’s existence as a person is affirmed in his resurrection, endowing Christian hope with a promise of the person’s ultimate fulfillment in loving relationship with the Triune God.

#### THE BODY AS GUARANTOR OF THE PERSON

In one sermon, Augustine tells parishioners wondering about the nature of resurrection, “It’s enough for you to know that your flesh will rise in the same form as that in which the Lord appeared, in the form, of course, of a human being.”<sup>60</sup> Christ’s Resurrection as a human being and, we might add, as a person is crucial to the Christian doctrine of the Resurrection. Gerard O’Collins, building on Augustine’s understanding of the Resurrection, maintains that Christ’s Resurrection “brought no loss of personal identity.”<sup>61</sup> In seeking to

establish this continuity of identity, O'Collins breaks with the ambivalence towards the body that we noted as a feature of the Lockean punctual self and transhumanism. O'Collins understands bodily continuity to be the guarantor of personal identity: "To be and to be recognized as the same person, we must remain 'the same body'."<sup>62</sup> This understanding coincides with Maritain's claim that "a soul separated from its body is not a person."<sup>63</sup>

These claims lend new weight to Augustine's insistence that "our Lord rose again in the very same body in which he had been buried."<sup>64</sup> Christ's bodily continuity signifies the continuity of his identity and personhood. O'Collins emphasizes the importance of "embodied histories," noting that through embodied interaction we "make and suffer our history."<sup>65</sup> This connection is affirmed in the scars that remain on Christ's resurrected body, which Augustine suggests are there "in order to remove from people's hearts the wound of unbelief."<sup>66</sup> These markers of Christ's embodied history become evidence of the continuity of his identity and personhood. Thus, Thomas's verification of Christ's body gives him faith in the Resurrection of Christ's person, provoking his response, "My Lord and my God!"<sup>67</sup>

There is a marked contrast in Martha's response to Pseudo-Ash's "body." She notes that Pseudo-Ash looks like Ash "on a good day,"<sup>68</sup> owing to the fact that his appearance is based on flattering photographs. Thus, Pseudo-Ash's body omits parts of Ash's embodied history. While this might make him more attractive, it betrays the fact that Pseudo-Ash is not Ash. In a scene perhaps intended to evoke Christ and Thomas, Martha puts her hand up to Pseudo-Ash's when touching his body for the first time. But where Thomas finds evidence of Christ's embodied history, Martha experiences the unnatural smoothness of Pseudo-Ash's fingertips, verifying that "the really tiny details [of Pseudo-Ash's body] are visual."<sup>69</sup> His body bears the marks not of Ash's life but of his own artificiality. Martha's experience of Pseudo-Ash's body is perhaps reflected in her complaint that "there's no history to you."<sup>70</sup>

## CHRIST'S DEPTH, WHOLENESS, AND LOVE

Beyond the continuity of his body, the Resurrected Christ also exhibits the depth and wholeness of personality that Pseudo-Ash lacks. Christ's depth is evident in that his Resurrection is not constituted in imitation of the qualities that he had before his death. He maintains the metaphysical center, the personality that the lover seeks beneath the beloved's qualities. This allows people to receive him as resurrected and love him despite differences in his preresurrection and postresurrection modes of existence. This is evident when Christ appears to the disciples in a locked room.<sup>71</sup> Whatever quality allows him to do so, it does not seem to be one that he possessed in his preresurrection state. Yet despite this incongruity, the disciples are still "glad when they saw the Lord."<sup>72</sup> They receive back from the dead not an assembly of Christ's qualities but the person of Christ himself. His resurrection can involve transformation and yet still bring "no loss of personal identity" because of the continuity of his person.

Although Christ's resurrection appearances emphasize his availability to his followers ("I am with you always"),<sup>73</sup> they also make clear that he retains his wholeness. We see this in Christ's words to Mary Magdalene: "Do not cling to me, for I have not yet ascended to the Father; but go to my brothers and say to them, 'I am ascending to my Father and your Father, to my God and your God.'"<sup>74</sup> These words make clear that Christ's Resurrection has not occurred merely for the sake of reunion with those who love him. His desire to ascend to the Father emphasizes that, like all persons, he is "ordained directly to God as his absolute ultimate end" in a way that "transcends every created common good." The fact that he is able to realize his ascension is thus the ultimate example of a personality existing "eminently, in self-possession, holding itself in hand, master of itself." This act of self-possession makes him supremely capable of bestowing himself and receiving the gift of other selves in love.<sup>75</sup>

Christ's risen existence and ascension promise the fulfillment of love and personality. O'Collins maintains that Christ's glorified

body enables him to relate to “the Father, human beings, and the whole cosmos in a manner that has shed the constraints of his earthly existence.”<sup>76</sup> We can therefore imagine resurrection “maximizing our capacity to relate and communicate,”<sup>77</sup> thus fulfilling the desire of the lover. Commenting on Christ’s Ascension to heaven, Augustine urges parishioners, “What has first taken place in him we too should be hoping for at the end.”<sup>78</sup> Thus Christ’s Resurrection and Ascension promises fulfillment of what Maritain describes as the person’s ultimate end: “participation in the very life of God so that, in the end, [she] might know and love Him as He knows and loves Himself.”<sup>79</sup>

### *Conclusion*

This article has attempted to establish that *Black Mirror*’s “Be Right Back” and the doctrine of Christ’s Resurrection share a concern for the centrality of the person and love between persons in resurrection. Whether the source of this concern in “Be Right Back” is the influence of Christian doctrine or a persistent human longing that Christian doctrine addresses is an intriguing but perhaps unanswerable question. Nevertheless, the concerns that the episode expresses pose a challenge to the anthropology that undergirds much transhumanist thought. These concerns suggest that resurrection projects that seek to reduce the person to a mere fixed point of consciousness or the experience of the beloved to a mere assembly of qualities will not pass the test of the lover. “Be Right Back” takes us no further than this critique, perhaps provoking the “melancholy and self-consumption” that Balthasar describes. Yet the episode’s conclusion may also be a fertile site from which longing for the beloved can reemerge in the form of desire for the person of Christ as “the risen Lover.”

## Notes

1. Hans Urs von Balthasar, *The Glory of The Lord: A Theological Aesthetics. Vol. 1: Seeing the Form*, trans. Erasmo Leiva-Merikakis (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1982), 321.
2. *Black Mirror*, season 2, episode 1, "Be Right Back," directed by Owen Harris, written by Charlie Brooker, featuring Hayley Atwell and Domhnall Gleeson, aired February 11, 2013, <https://www.netflix.com/watch/70264888?tctx=2%2C%2C%2C%2C>.
3. She significantly shares a name with Martha, sister of Lazarus, to whom Christ says, "I am the Resurrection and the life" (John 11:25).
4. For one account of the distinction between transhumanism and posthumanism, see Francesca Ferrando, "Posthumanism, Transhumanism, Antihumanism, Metahumanism, and New Materialism Differences and Relations," *Existenz* 8, no. 2 (2013): 26–32, [https://www.researchgate.net/publication/304333989\\_Posthumanism\\_Transhumanism\\_Antihumanism\\_Metahumanism\\_and\\_New\\_Materialisms\\_Differences\\_and\\_Relations](https://www.researchgate.net/publication/304333989_Posthumanism_Transhumanism_Antihumanism_Metahumanism_and_New_Materialisms_Differences_and_Relations). This article will use the term "transhumanism," following Ferrando's understanding that this denotes more of a specific focus on technological possibility.
5. See David Cox, "Will 'digital resurrections' let us bring back the dead?," *NBC News*, April 16, 2018, <https://www.nbcnews.com/mach/science/will-digital-resurrections-let-us-bring-back-dead-ncna865806>.
6. Grzegorz Maziarczyk notes that "*Black Mirror* tends to underscore the dark, dystopian side of a possible posthuman future." See Grzegorz Maziarczyk, "Transhumanist Dreams and/as Posthuman Nightmares in *Black Mirror*," *Roczniki Humanistyczne* 66, no. 11S (2018), 128, 10.18290/rh.2018.66.11S-10.
7. For an introduction to this movement, see David Schindler Jr., "Catholic Personalism up to John Paul II," in *The Oxford Handbook of Catholic Theology*, ed. Lewis Ayres and Medi Ann Volpe (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199566273.013.48.
8. See in particular Jacques Maritain, "The Person and the Common Good," trans. John J. Fitzgerald, *The Review of the Politics* 8, no. 4 (1946): 419–55, <http://www.sfu.ca/classics/pdf/person.pdf>.
9. Charles Taylor, *Sources of the Self* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 160.
10. David Schindler Jr., "Catholic Personalism," 739.
11. *Ibid.*, 739–40.
12. *Ibid.*, 740.
13. Hans Urs von Balthasar, "On the Concept of Person," *Communio* 13, no. 1 (1986): 19, <https://www.communio-icr.com/files/balthasar13-1.pdf>.
14. For the Thomistic metaphysics underlying Maritain's account of the person, see Jacques Maritain, *The Degrees of Knowledge*, trans. Bernard Wall and Margot R. Adamson (Glasgow: Glasgow University Press, 1937), 284–86.
15. David Schindler Jr., "Catholic Personalism," 748.
16. Jacques Maritain, "The Person," 431.

17. Ibid., 431–32.
18. Ibid., 440. This claim rests on Maritain's distinction between individual and person (see *ibid.*, 428–35). An *individual* can be a part of society, but a *person* is always whole.
19. Ibid., 432.
20. Ibid., 421.
21. Ibid., 432 and 433 respectively.
22. Ibid.
23. Matter (the body) is linked to individuality, which is dependent on personality (linked to the soul) for its goodness. See *ibid.*, 434.
24. Ibid., 430.
25. Jacques Maritain, *Degrees of Knowledge*, 285.
26. David Schindler Jr., "Catholic Personalism," 9.
27. Charles Taylor, *Sources*, 159.
28. Ibid., 171.
29. Ibid., 172.
30. Ibid., 171 and 172 respectively. Emphasis added.
31. The indebtedness of this conception of the self to the theological movements of nominalism and voluntarism is worthy of note. See *ibid.*, 161, 171.
32. Ibid., 172.
33. Ibid.
34. Nick Bostrom, "A History of Transhumanist Thought," in *Academic Writing Across the Disciplines*, ed. Michael Rectenwald & Lisa Carl, (New York: Pearson Longman, 2011), 11–12, <https://www.nickbostrom.com/papers/history.pdf>.
35. Though not unanimously, most transhumanists regard the body as unessential. See Max More, "The Philosophy of Transhumanism," in *The Transhumanist Reader: Classical and Contemporary Essays on the Science, Technology, and Philosophy of the Human Future*, ed. Max More and Natasha Vita-More (Hoboken: Wiley-Blackwell, 2013), 7, 10.1002/9781118555927.ch1.
36. Doug Baily et al., "Transhumanist Declaration," *Humanity Plus*, <https://humanityplus.org/philosophy/transhumanist-declaration/>.
37. Nick Bostrom, "In Defense of Posthuman Dignity," *Bioethics* 19, no. 3 (2005): 203, <https://www.nickbostrom.com/ethics/dignity.html>.
38. Nick Bostrom, "Letter from Utopia," *Studies in Ethics, Law, and Technology* 2, no. 1 (2008): 1–7, <https://www.nickbostrom.com/utopia.html>.
39. Ibid., 3.
40. Ibid., 5.
41. Charlie Brooker, "Be Right Back," 26:06.
42. Ibid., 22:55.
43. Ibid., 19:54, 24:01.
44. Ibid., 21:34.
45. Ibid., 45:32.

46. Ibid., 12:51.
47. Ibid., 18:42. Emphasis added.
48. Ibid., 18:46. Emphasis added.
49. Ibid., 20:32.
50. Bee Gees, "How Deep is Your Love," recorded 1977, track 1 on *Saturday Night Fever*, RSO, vinyl LP.
51. Charlie Brooker, "Be Right Back," 1:59.
52. Ibid., 2:11.
53. Ibid., 43:58.
54. Ibid., 45:10.
55. Ibid., 40:46.
56. Ibid., 41:16.
57. Greg Singh, "Recognition and the image of mastery as themes in Black Mirror (Channel 4, 2011–present): an eco-Jungian approach to 'always-on' culture," *International Journal of Jungian Studies* 6, no. 2 (2014): 131, <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/19409052.2014.905968>.
58. Charlie Brooker, "Be Right Back," 4:26.
59. Jacques Maritain, "The Person," 428.
60. Augustine, "Sermon 362," in *The Works of St. Augustine: A Translation for the Twenty-First Century. Part III – Sermons. Volume Ten: Sermons 341–400*, ed. John E. Rotelle, trans. Edmund Hill (Hyde Park: New City Press, 1995), 263.
61. Gerard O'Collins, *Saint Augustine on the Resurrection of Christ: Teaching, Rhetoric, and Reception* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), 83, 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198799542.001.0001.
62. Ibid., 84.
63. The centrality of the body of course becomes complicated when thinking about the general resurrection; how will our bodies be returned to us? A discussion of this issue is beyond the scope of this article. For one helpful consideration, see Bruno Niederbacher, "The Same Body Again? Thomas Aquinas on the Numerical Identity of the Resurrected Body," in *Personal Identity and Resurrection*, ed. Georg Gasser (Surrey: Ashgate, 2010), 145–60.
64. Augustine, "Sermon 362," 247.
65. Gerard O'Collins, *Saint Augustine*, 85.
66. Augustine, "Sermon 375C," in *The Works of St. Augustine*, 340.
67. John 20:28
68. Charlie Brooker, "Be Right Back," 30:57.
69. Ibid., 31:36.
70. Ibid., 45:15.
71. John 20:19 *ESV*.
72. John 20:20.
73. Matthew 28:20.

74. John 20:17.
75. Besides the obvious significance of Christ “bestowing” his flesh in the Eucharist, there is perhaps a connection here with the importance of Christ’s ascension for his sending of the Spirit (John 16:7).
76. Gerard O’Collins, *Saint Augustine*, 83.
77. Ibid.
78. Augustine, “Sermon 395,” 432.
79. Jacques Maritain, “The Person,” 433.

Statement of Ownership, Management, and Circulation. 1. Title of publication: *Logos: A Journal of Catholic Thought and Culture*. 2. Publication no.: ISSN: 1091-6687. 3. Date of filing: 10/01/2020. 4. Frequency of issue: Quarterly. 5. No. of issues published annually: 4. 6. Annual subscription price: \$50 US or \$86. 7. Complete mailing address of known office of publication (street, city, county, state, and ZIP+4): Logos, University of St. Thomas, 2115 Summit Ave., Mail #55-S, St. Paul, MN 55105-1096. 8. Complete mailing address of the headquarters of general business offices of the publisher (not printer): same as above. 9. Full names and complete mailing addresses of publisher, editor, and managing editor. Publisher: same as above. Editor: David Deavel, University of St. Thomas, St. Paul, MN 55105. Managing Editor: Elizabeth Kelly, University of St. Thomas, St. Paul, MN 55105. 10. Owner (If owned by a corporation, its name and address must be stated and also immediately thereafter the names and addresses of stockholders owning or holding 1 percent or more of total amount of stock. If not owned by a corporation, the names and addresses of the individual owners must be given. If owned by a partnership or other unincorporated firm, its name and address, as well as that of each individual must be given. If the publication is published by a non-profit organization, its name and address must be stated.) Full name: University of St. Thomas. Complete mailing address: Center for Catholic Studies, 2115 Summit Ave., Mail #55-S, St. Paul, MN 55105-1096. 11. Known bondholders, mortgagees, and other security holders owning or holding 1 percent or more of total amount of bonds, mortgages or other securities (if there are none, so state): None. 12. Tax Status (For completion by nonprofit organizations authorized to mail at nonprofit rates) The purpose, function and nonprofit status of this organization and the exempt status for federal income tax purposes: Has not changed during preceding 12 months. 13. Publication title: *Logos: A Journal of Catholic Thought and Culture*. 14. Issue date for circulation data below: Summer 2020 (Vol. 23:3). 15. Extent and Nature of Circulation. Average No. Copies Each Issue During Preceding 12 Months: a. Total Number of Copies (Net press run): 446. b. Legitimate Paid and/or Requested Distribution: (1) Outside County Paid/Requested Mail Subscriptions stated on PS Form 3541: 259. (2) In-County Paid/Requested Mail Subscriptions stated on PS Form 3541: 0. (3) Sales Through Dealers and Carriers, Street Vendors, Counter Sales, and Other Paid or Requested Distribution Outside USPS®: 87. (4) Requested Copies Distributed by Other Mail Classes Through the USPS: 26. c. Total Paid and/or Requested Circulation: 372. d. Nonrequested Distribution: (1) Outside County Nonrequested Copies Stated on PS Form 3541: 0. (2) In-County Nonrequested Copies Stated on PS Form 3541: 0. (3) Nonrequested Copies Distributed Through the USPS by Other Classes of Mail: 0. (4) Nonrequested Copies Distributed Outside the Mail: 0. e. Total Nonrequested Distribution: 0. f. Total Distribution (sum of 15c and e): 372. g. Copies not Distributed: 74. h. Total (sum of 15f and g): 446. i. Percent Paid and/or Requested Circulation: 100 percent. No. Copies of Single Issue Published Nearest to Filing Date: a. Total Numbers of Copies (Net press run): 446. b. Legitimate Paid and/or Requested Distribution: (1) Outside County Paid/Requested Mail Subscriptions stated on PS Form 3541: 246. (2) In-County Paid/Requested Mail Subscriptions stated on PS Form 3541: 0. (3) Sales Through Dealers and Carriers, Street Vendors, Counter Sales, and Other Paid or Requested Distribution Outside USPS®: 101. (4) Requested Copies Distributed by Other Mail Classes Through the USPS: 46. c. Total Paid and/or Requested Circulation: 393. d. Nonrequested Distribution: (1) Outside County Nonrequested Copies Stated on PS Form 3541: 0. (2) In-County Nonrequested Copies Stated on PS Form 3541: 0. (3) Nonrequested Copies Distributed Through the USPS by Other Classes of Mail: 0. (4) Nonrequested Copies Distributed Outside the Mail: 0. e. Total Nonrequested Distribution: 0. f. Total Distribution (sum of 15c and e): 393. g. Copies not Distributed: 53. h. Total (sum of 15f and g): 446. i. Percent Paid and/or Requested Circulation: 100 percent. 16. Electronic Copy Circulation. Average No. Copies Each Issue During Previous 12 Months: a. Requested and Paid Electronic Copies: 15. b. Total Requested and Paid Print Copies + Requested/Paid Electronic Copies: 387. c. Total Requested Copy Distribution + Requested/Paid Electronic Copies: 387. d. Percent Paid and/or Requested Circulation: 100 percent. No. Copies of Single Issue Published Nearest to Filing Date: a. Requested and Paid Electronic Copies: 14. b. Total Requested and Paid Print Copies + Requested/Paid Electronic Copies: 407. c. Total Requested Copy Distribution + Requested/Paid Electronic Copies: 407. d. Percent Paid and/or Requested Circulation: 100 percent. 17. Publication of Statement of Ownership for a Requester Publication is required and will be printed in the Winter 2021, Volume 24:1 issue of this publication. 18. I certify that all information furnished on this form is true and complete. I understand that anyone who furnishes false or misleading information on this form or who omits material or information requested on the form may be subject to criminal sanctions (including fines and imprisonment) and/or civil sanctions (including civil penalties): Elizabeth M. Kelly, Managing Editor, October 1, 2020.