Abstract

Abstract:

I examine how Heather Douglas' account of values in science applies to the assessment of actual cases of scientific practice. I focus on the case of applied toxicologists' acceptance of molecular evidence-gathering methods and evidential sources. I demonstrate that a set of social and institutional processes plays a philosophically significant role in changing toxicologists' inductive risk judgments about different kinds of evidence. I suggest that Douglas' inductive risk framework can be integrated with a suitable account of evidence, such as Helen Longino's contextual empiricism, to address the role of social context in the cases like the one examined here. I introduce such an integrated account and show how Longino's contextual empiricism and inductive risk framework fruitfully complement each other in analyzing the novel aspects of the toxicology case.

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Additional Information

ISSN
1530-9274
Print ISSN
1063-6145
Pages
pp. 737-763
Launched on MUSE
2020-12-18
Open Access
No
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