This is a preprint
Abstract

Kumārila Bhaṭṭa is committed to svataḥ prāmāṇya, or the “intrinsic validity” principle, on which agents are entitled to take their cognitions as knowledge-events unless confronted by defeaters. I argue that, despite recent work arguing otherwise, this principle—as understood by an important Mīmāṃsā philosopher, Pārthasārathi Miśra—is not an instance of the KK principle, the idea that if one knows that p one thereby also knows that they know p, nor would Kumārila be committed to that principle on other grounds.

pdf

Additional Information

ISSN
1529-1898
Print ISSN
0031-8221
Launched on MUSE
2020-12-09
Open Access
No
Back To Top

This website uses cookies to ensure you get the best experience on our website. Without cookies your experience may not be seamless.