Abstract

Abstract:

This article, invited for presentation to the North American Nietzsche Society at the 2020 Pacific Division Meeting of the American Philosophical Association, is a commentary on Mark Alfano's 2019 monograph, Nietzsche's Moral Psychology. I commend Alfano's productive, innovative use of digital humanities methods as well as his more traditional textual interpretation. But I raise some doubts about Alfano's proposed criterion of "external integration" for a drive to qualify as a Nietzschean virtue: the claim that if a drive systematically and reliably meets with condemnation from an agent's community, it cannot be a virtue. I suggest that the criterion be amended either so that it is disapproval from the agent's true community, which for a solitary moral innovator may be an imagined community of past and future peers, that disqualifies a drive from virtue status; or so that community disapproval is disqualifying only if the agent internalizes it.

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Additional Information

ISSN
1538-4594
Print ISSN
0968-8005
Pages
pp. 250-255
Launched on MUSE
2020-11-23
Open Access
No
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