Dietrich von Hildebrand's Concept of Value

Introduction

Arguably, Dietrich von Hildebrand's most important and original contribution, not just to a general value theory but to philosophy as such, is his discovery of the three "categories of importance"—that is, three viewpoints under which the importance of an object moves our emotions or will. Although the basic philosophical insight on which this discovery hinges can be traced back to an early stage of his thinking,¹ the most comprehensive account of the three "categories of importance" is presented in his mature work on moral philosophy—namely, in his Christian Ethics.²

The distinction between the three "categories of importance" has been rightly labeled "a kind of cornerstone of the entire philosophy of von Hildebrand."³ The argument for this contention can be put forward in a rather straightforward manner: Hildebrand's thought is based on his theory of (material) values, the backbone of which is his account of value as the important in itself. This account can only be properly understood on the basis of his distinction between "the important in itself" and the "the merely subjectively satisfying"—that is, the distinction made in the context of his analysis of the three types of importance.

The overall aim of this article is to present a critical evaluation of Hildebrand's account of value. In its first part, I will explain this account following the simple logic just stated by first explaining and commenting on the distinction between the three "categories of importance."⁴ In the second part of the article, I will critically examine the question of the philosophical originality and merit of Hildebrand's account of value. I will do so by arguing against his claim that value, in the sense of the important in itself, is not in the center of "traditional ethics."

1. The Three "Categories of Importance"

Hildebrand starts his investigation of the fundamental types of importance with a seemingly trivial observation: whereas some events, states of affairs, objects, and so forth are given in our experience as (more or less) important, others are given to us as almost or entirely neutral. For example, I experience the fact that the water in Lake Baikal is deep and cold as neutral. This fact is not able to stir my emotion or move my will in any way.

Against the background of countless facts, events, or objects that I experience as neutral, there also stand out equally numerous facts, events, or objects that I experience as, in some sense, important. The interesting philosophical question Hildebrand raises is whether the experienced importance of such facts, events, objects, and so forth is homogenous or heterogeneous—that is, whether there is, ultimately, only one type of importance or whether there is more than one such basic type. The implication of this question is that for there to be more than one type of importance, the types must be mutually irreducible and fundamentally different in the sense that will be explained here.

Having already distinguished two such basic types of importance in his dissertation, in Christian Ethics, Hildebrand adds a third. In his eyes, the discovery of the three types of importance is a crucial contribution to philosophia perennis. By deliberately using the term "categories of importance," Hildebrand suggests that, in its philosophical importance, his discovery is on the same footing with that of Aristotle.⁵

Such an ambition certainly whets the reader's appetite. So what, after all, are these three "categories"? According to Hildebrand, the distinction between them hinges on our intellect's ability to draw a sharp line between the importance we ascribe to an object in virtue of its ability to satisfy our cravings or needs and to fulfill our tendencies or desires on the one hand and the importance an object has in virtue of its intrinsic worth on the other. In his dissertation, Hildebrand elucidates this distinction by starting with the following two examples: the importance a greedy man ascribes to a financial speculation that is likely to significantly enlarge his wealth and the importance that a human life has to someone who rushes to help his...