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  • Till Populism Do Us PartA Review of Sheila Smith's Japan Rearmed
  • Quentin Levin (bio)
Sheila Smith. Japan Rearmed: The Politics of Military Power. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2019. 304 pages. Hardcover $29.95.

In Japan Rearmed, Sheila Smith of the Council on Foreign Relations offers a comprehensive and historically rooted analysis of Japan's evolving approach to military power. Despite Japan's historical, cultural, and constitutional restraints on military power, Smith illustrates how the following two trends are inching Japan toward developing an offensive strike capability: Japan faces new regional threats while, in Smith's view, the credibility of American security guarantees is weakening. Smith's central argument is that Japan may be on the cusp of a decision to develop an offensive strike capability. Although Japan has not yet resolved to develop such a capability, Smith argues that military power has already become an instrument of Japanese national power and there are plausible scenarios in which Japan could make this decision to rearm. While Smith offers a comprehensive overview of this policy area, her predictions about the circumstances in which Japan may develop an offensive force are not groundbreaking. Moreover, she underestimates the feasibility of such a move and the enduring credibility of America's commitment to Japanese security.

Japan Disarmed

Smith prefaces her analysis by explaining the historical and legal reasons why Japan's military is currently prohibited from utilizing offensive force first. Article 9 of Japan's Constitution forever renounced the use of force as a method for resolving international disputes.1 American occupation officials believed that a constitution could reduce the possibility that Japan could again threaten international security through two institutional reforms. First, Japan's leaders would be democratically selected by its own people, who would be less likely to sanction wars like the one that had just caused them so much suffering.2 Second, this elected government would be legally prohibited from rearming. Over time, however, these provisions have been interpreted to permit Japan to maintain armed forces for the purpose of self-defense.3

The Cold War shifted American goals in the region and ignited debate within Japan over what scope of self-defense armaments the constitution permits. In short, the Cold War meant that American policymakers were more concerned with containing encroaching communism in Southeast Asia, and they urged Japan to arm for its own defense.4 But because Japan did not perceive the Soviet Union to be a direct threat, policymakers instead allocated their limited resources to other policy priorities.5 During this period, Japan did gradually increase its defensive military and intelligence capabilities, but its military advancement was limited by its [End Page 220] "hesitancy in identifying threat[s]."6 Therefore, even as the United States, ironically, pushed for Japan to rearm, Japan did not develop an offensive strike capability.

In the post–Cold War era, Japan gradually expanded its defensive military outlook as part of a policy of deterrence and contributing to international security. Japan has participated in the American-led war on terror, peacekeeping, and anti-piracy missions. In Smith's view, Japanese policymakers support these missions to leverage Japan's military as an instrument of state power while embedding the military within the constraining framework of international coalitions.7

Regional Threats and American Credibility

At the same time, Japan has invested in new defensive military capabilities to counter two increasing, direct regional threats. North Korea's nuclear missile program and China's claims over the Senkaku Islands both present the risk that miscalculation could spark war.8 In Smith's view, Japanese policymaking focuses on defending against such direct threats. Japan has invested in its missile defense system to defend against North Korean nuclear weapons, and Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has advocated for a constitutional reinterpretation to codify Japan's Self-Defense Force.9

However, Smith suggests, neither of these is a fundamental shift in Japan's military posture. Both simply affirm and expand Japan's existing policy of possessing defensive capacity to deter attacks on its islands as Japan continues to rely on United States military power for any potential offensive action. Therefore, Smith argues that the emergence of these direct threats on...

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