Pascal's Wager and Its Many Misinterpretations

Introduction

Blaise Pascal (1623–1662), a French mathematician, is today one of the best-known French religious figures of the seventeenth century, and yet the most unlikely. He had little religious influence in his day and published little either theological or philosophical work.¹ He is most famous for his posthumous book Pensées (Thoughts), which consists of a number of ideas Pascal wrote in a notebook. He initially intended these theological fragments to be the foundation for an apologetic work countering the religious skepticism of his day. There is no real continuity or order to them, nor do they evidence a great deal of theological coherence. In the end, he considered it something of a failed project. Eight years after his death, his nephew Étienne Périer published his Pensées, originally intending to disseminate it among family members and friends. Today, it is widely considered a counter to the atheists of his day, particularly his famous Wager, a loose piece of paper Pascal added to the notebook.² Actually, atheism was not yet much of a real problem in Europe. Michael Buckley observes of the seventeenth-century situation: "Atheism was seen not so much as a state of Europe nor as an atmosphere within it, but as a vector, whose initial stages were identified not with the new science but with the disintegration of a common religious confession sustained by a teaching church."³ It would be another century before bona fide atheism became anywhere near fashionable in Paris with such figures as Denis Diderot and Paul d'Holbach, both of whom challenged the need for God as a first cause.⁴ Still, some intellectuals were already seeing the trend beginning, and Pascal was among them.⁵

Pascal's Wager

Pascal's famous Wager (fragment 680) is what makes his Pensées particularly notable, and it has been subject to a great deal of scrutiny among philosophers, particularly those atheistic. Since fragment 680 is lengthy, the following represents the main thrust that has been critics' principal focus:

If there is a God, he is infinitely beyond our comprehension, since, having neither parts nor limits, he bears no relation to ourselves. We are therefore incapable of knowing either what he is, or if he is. … Let us therefore examine the point, and say: God is, or is not. But towards which side will we lean? Reason cannot decide anything. There is an infinite chaos separating us. At the far end of this infinite distance a game is being played and the coin will come up heads or tails. How will you wager? Reason cannot make you choose one way or the other, reason cannot make you defend either of the two choices… [Here his imagined atheist argues]: "The right thing is not to wager at all." [Pascal replies]: Yes, but you have to wager. … You have two things to lose: the truth and the good, and two things to stake: your reason and will, your knowledge and beatitude; and your nature has two things to avoid: error and wretchedness. Your reason is not hurt more by choosing one rather than the other, since you do have to make the choice. … Let us assess the two cases: if you win, you win everything, if you lose, you lose nothing. Wager that he exists then, without hesitating. [Pascal then describes something of early game theory and how just one chance of winning an infinity of rewards is worth innumerable potential loses. The losses cannot compete against the possible reward. Every gambler takes a certain risk for an uncertain gain; nevertheless he certainly risks the finite uncertainty in order to win a finite gain, without sinning against reason. … But the uncertainty of winning is proportional to the certainty of the risk, according to the chances of winning or losing. And hence, if there are as many chances on one side as on the other, the odds are even, and then the certainty of what you risk is equal to the uncertainty of winning. It is very far from being infinitely distant from it. So...