Dynasties and Democracy: The Inherited Incumbency Advantage in Japan by Daniel M. Smith (review)

Daniel Smith's Dynasties and Democracy: The Inherited Incumbency Advantage in Japan offers a detailed examination of the frequently overlooked phenomenon of legacy politicians in democracies. Using the case study of Japan along with plentiful comparative data, the book helps us understand the puzzle of why citizens in democracies sometimes favor relatives of known politicians over newcomers. Smith argues that depending on the electoral system, legacy politicians enjoy an inherited incumbency advantage over their nonlegacy counterparts in all three stages of a typical political career—parties select them to be candidates at higher rates, voters elect and reelect them at higher rates, and they are promoted to cabinet posts at higher rates.

Based on a kind of "natural experiment" made possible by Japan's 1994 electoral reform as well as a large original data set (134,803 observations for members of parliament across twelve countries from 1788 to 2016) that puts Japan's experience into comparative context, Smith is able to tease apart a variety of demographic, institutional, and political factors that alter the likelihood that legacy politicians will be favored by any given party in any given democratic political system. He also goes a step further by examining the effectiveness of dynastic political leaders in terms of descriptive (do they resemble their constituents) and substantive (do they represent the interests of their constituents) representation.

Many of the findings are not surprising, although it is illuminating to have them documented through such rigorous data analysis. For example, a politician who takes over a district upon the death of a relative has a significant electoral advantage over others, and politicians whose relatives have been prime minister or have held prestigious cabinet posts are significantly more likely than others to be asked to serve in similarly powerful positions.

Other findings may surprise readers and potentially require us to rethink the benefits of political dynasties. For example, legacy politicians are more likely to start their political careers earlier than their nonlegacy counterparts, and women have a much better chance at winning if they have family political connections. Thus, contrary to the stereotype of legacy politicians as perpetuating an "old boys' network," political dynasties are in fact helping to diversify parliaments by lending support to younger candidates and women.

Smith builds his argument in a logical and comprehensive fashion. The first chapter offers readers an overview of the phenomenon of legacy politicians in democracies and the theoretical work on the subject. The second chapter places Japan in comparative context. Drawing on his original data set, Smith not only illustrates changes over time in the proportion of legacy politicians in national legislatures but also compares that proportion in each of the major parties across twelve democracies. Inside Japan, his detailed analysis highlights the differing shares of legacy politicians among political candidates versus elected members of parliament, the variation in legacy politicians across prefectures, the kinds of family relationships that generate the most legacy politicians, and demographic and occupational differences between legacy and nonlegacy politicians.

The third chapter introduces Smith's theory of dynastic candidate selection, going on to articulate the relevant factors, generate a number of hypotheses based on those factors, and then test some of those hypotheses using the democratic dynasties data set. In brief, the theory posits three categories of factors that affect the "incumbency advantage" enjoyed by legacy candidates: supply-side factors (how many candidates there are and their quality), demand-side factors (whether parties will nominate legacy candidates and voters elect them), and system-related factors (whether the electoral system is candidate centered or party centered). Scholars of electoral politics will love this chapter, which gets into the nitty-gritty of how minor shifts in candidate demographics and electoral systems can change the propensity for legacy candidates. For example, incumbents who serve in office longer will be more likely to generate legacy candidates who follow them (p. 78, hypothesis no. 1; graphs of comparative data...