Feminist Relational Theory: The Significance of Oppression and Structures of Power: A Commentary on "Nondomination and the Limits of Relational Autonomy" by Danielle M. Wenner

Danielle Wenner has crafted novel arguments in defense of republican accounts of freedom. I learned a lot from her discussion of how Philip Pettit's neorepublican account of freedom as nondomination does a better job than standard accounts of freedom as noninterference of explaining how power over an agent can restrict their freedom to act autonomously. The real crux of Wenner's argument, however, is that freedom as nondomination can do this work in a way that those who defend an account of relational autonomy cannot. I will start with Wenner's defense of freedom as nondomination and of what it can do as the background for assessing her critique of relational autonomy. The upshot of my comments will be that Wenner fails to recognize feminist accounts of relational autonomy that do not fall prey to the charges she levels against relational autonomy theorists more generally.

Wenner uses Pettit to argue that accounts of freedom as noninterference cannot explain how freedom can be limited when someone interferes with an agent's autonomy by making it costlier or difficult to choose an original preferred option. When limitations are put in place through the arbitrary will of someone with power over an agent, then no matter what options may be open to that agent in the broader context, the agent's choices are restricted by the dominator who restricts available choices and thereby has control over the agent's autonomy. Wenner argues that these kinds of cases need to be identified and explained because most would not want to say that this agent chose freely or acted autonomously.

On the one hand, and against freedom as noninterference, Wenner argues that, "meaningful freedom … requires that the power to interfere arbitrarily be removed. In this sense, conceptions of freedom as noninterference are too narrow in what they construe as invasions" (39). On the other hand, she argues that freedom as noninterference is also too broad because it "portrays any interference with an individual's choices as freedom-limiting" (39). Her account of freedom as nondomination sets limits to interference by specifying that "others not have a power of uncontrolled interference with your choices" (39). The removal of options, in and of themselves, may not limit autonomy. In other words, one needs to be able to have control over the nature of the interference that shapes options and choices. The spouse fearful of her husband's anger does not have that control.

Wenner then uses examples of state control that can be justified because they can be said to increase freedom for all: "democratically-imposed legal restrictions are, on this view, controlled by those upon whom they are imposed. The rule of law, although it does restrict the options available to those under its domain, is thus not a threat to freedom but a prerequisite to living freely without fear of unchecked arbitrary aggression from others" (39). People in countries that uphold the rule of law can control the range of options and make choices within the limits of what the law allows (I will circle back to a discussion of the rule of law later). Thus far, Wenner's defense of Pettit's account of freedom as nondomination would seem to allow a way to determine how agents in positions of power-over can shape the extent of an agent's freedom in ways that has these agents make choices or adapt their preferences to fit those of the dominant and powerful.

The final piece in Wenner's defense of freedom as nondomination is to acknowledge that one of the strengths of relational accounts of autonomy is its ability to describe and analyze how domination and power-over can emerge from institutions, structures, and norms that shape the range of possible options and choices for those who are oppressed. While Wenner admits that this analysis hasn't figured fully into accounts of freedom as nondomination, she uses the distinction between internal (the agent's personal freedom) and external (features of institutional structures...