The Origins of American Strategic Bombing Theory by Craig Morris (review)

A valuable contribution to a crowded field, Craig Morris’s ably researched and well-written book builds on the work of major scholars, notably Tami Davis Biddle, Mark Clodfelter, Stephen McFarland, and John Buckley, to argue that American strategic bombing doctrine stemmed from an interaction among airpower theory, aircraft technology, organizational dynamics, and political forces. Morris, assistant professor of history at the U.S. Air Force Academy, emphasizes external factors rather than the Air Corps and focuses on the 1926 Air Corps Act as the turning point for strategic bombing. He suggests that the concept of strategic bombing was poorly developed, not least due to the lack of a defensive national security policy, combined with funding and technological issues.

Deliberately embracing the complexity of reality and subverting the standard teleology, Morris argues that the late 1930s was not a period of triumph for strategic bombing. The army was more interested in developing its conventional components. Thus, the General Staff under Malin Craig, the army’s Chief of Staff from 1935 to 1939, was opposed to the B-17, as was the navy. Two aircraft companies had developed gigantic long-range bombers: Boeing, with the XB-15, an aircraft designed in 1934 and first flown in 1937; and Douglas, with the XBLR (Experimental Bomber Long Range)-2, renumbered the Douglas B-19, contracted in 1938 and first flown in 1941, was named the “Hemisphere Defender,” as part of the air force’s XBLR program. The specifications for the XB-15 were for an aircraft capable of carrying 2,000 pounds (910 kilograms) at 200 mph (320 kmh) over a distance of 5,000 miles (8,000 kilometers). The aircraft used an autopilot and de-icing equipment. Its speed, however, when loaded with 2,000 pounds, was only 145 mph, which was too slow for a combat mission, and the project was abandoned.

Success came with the B-17, the Flying Fortress, the first effective all-metal, four-engine monoplane bomber, seen as an expression of American power. “Airpower you could put your hands on,” according to General Henry Arnold, the B-17 had an initial range of 2,600 miles and a top speed of 250 mph. The General Staff, however, preferred a less expensive medium bomber, better able to provide ground support. The B-17 was presented as extending America’s coastal perimeter by being able to attack an incoming fleet well out to sea, in other words a form of mobile coastal fortress, not a strategic bomber. Despite its relatively small bomb load and unsuitability for night attacks, the B-17 was nevertheless forced into that role in the forthcoming world war.

It was the onset of German militarism from 1938 that helped lead to a focus on aircraft, with President Roosevelt playing a key role. He was supported in this from 1939 by his Army Chief of Staff George Marshall, who established that year the Army Air Forces. This new organization proved more adroit at command and planning than in the previous more inchoate situation. In turn, the Air Corps analysts, exaggerating the effectiveness of the German Luftwaffe, put failure in 1940 down to a lack of strategic bombers, thus underplaying the role of the British integrated air-defense system. In July 1941, Air War Plans Division No. 1 appeared to offer a comprehensive plan for defeating Germany by means of air power. The right opponent had helped push forward both the doctrine and the crucial support.

This is an interesting book, although the author offers very little indeed on the challenge from Japan, against which B-17s were deployed to Clark Field in the Philippines in 1941.