Abstract

Abstract:

Following the 1967 Arab-Israeli war, the United States took a relatively passive approach to Middle East peacemaking. The passivity shown by the administration of President Lyndon Johnson stemmed primarily from its belief that the Arab states had failed to make reasonable proposals for an agreement and from the White House’s awareness that pressuring Israel would likely have significant domestic political consequences. Thus, even though it felt the need to press Israel to withdraw to prewar boundaries as part of a settlement, the administration made little effort to achieve an agreement on that basis.

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Additional Information

ISSN
1940-3461
Print ISSN
0026-3141
Pages
pp. 202-219
Launched on MUSE
2020-08-22
Open Access
No
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