University of Hawai'i Press
  • Differing Views on Heaven's Role in Accounts of Undeserved Hardship in Early China

In this essay, Qiongda yi shi is compared with the "Youzuo" chapter of the Xunzi and Mengzi 6B15, and it is shown how its practical message is closer to that of the Mengzi rather than the Xunzi. The Mengzi also presents success as completely dependent upon external circumstances while the "Youzuo" regards even the harshest circumstances as surmountable through one's will and wisdom.

I. Introduction

There is [that which is controlled by] Heaven, and there is [that which is within the power of] man, and each has its separate lot. Once one has examined the division between Heaven and man, one will know how to act.1

Since the discovery of the Guodian 郭 店 manuscripts in 1993, the Qiongda yi shi 窮 達 以 時 (Time is the cause of adversity and success—hereafter QDYS) has gathered much attention, mainly thanks to this opening line, which practically invalidates the previously widely held belief that the division between Heaven and humanity was Xunzi's original idea.2 Consequently, much effort was spent on analyzing similarities and differences between the Xunzi and the QDYS, focusing on their concepts of Heaven.3 But perhaps because of the strong impression made by this first line, the striking difference in the philosophical message between the QDYS and its so-called parallel text in the "Youzuo" 宥 坐 (Warning vessel on the right) chapter of the Xunzi has not attracted enough attention. Scott Cook even stated that "all of these [parallel] texts profess the same fundamental philosophy," but this observation is far from accurate.4

In a nutshell, the QDYS speaks about prominent ministers of the past whose lives were troubled by hardships when they remained unrecognized. Its basic message is that the chances of encountering a ruler who would appreciate one's value depend completely on "time," and one has no control over this. Thus, one should focus on cultivating one's morality regardless of one's worldly success or failure. In the "Youzuo," however, it is suggested that even adverse circumstances can be beneficial for the virtuous as they provide a chance to advertise one's virtues and help build both prudence and ambition. Success, in this latter view, depends on one's will and wisdom more than on external conditions.

As I scrutinize the specific differences between these two texts, I will further compare them with Mengzi 6B15, which talks about virtually the same ministers in the QDYS but explains their sufferings as a kind of trial that Heaven has prepared for them. As far as I know, this passage has never been properly discussed along with the QDYS, but it serves as an interesting point of comparison for both the QDYS and the "Youzuo." Like the QDYS, [End Page 801] it argues that success and failure are completely beyond one's control, but, as in the "Youzuo," hardship is described as beneficial for enhancing one's virtues.

My analysis will further show that differences in accounts of undeserved hardship in Mengzi 6B15 and the "Youzuo" reflect different understandings of Heaven presented in the Mengzi and Xunzi, respectively. Mencius regards an anthropomorphic Heaven as responsible for an individual's success, but in the Xunzi, Heaven represents objective conditions that one can utilize for one's benefit. Heaven in the QDYS is between the two; it is not anthropomorphic, but people are still completely subject to its actions.

II. The QDYS and Its Parallels

Originally, the editors of the Guodian manuscripts identified four texts as parallels to the QDYS. They are in the "Youzuo" chapter of the Xunzi, the "Zai'e" 在厄 (In quandaries) chapter of the Kongzi jiayu 孔子家語 (Family sayings of Confucius), the seventh chapter of the Hanshi waizhuan 漢詩外傳(Outer commentary to the Odes by master Han), and the "Zayan" 雜 言(Miscellaneous talks) chapter of the Shuo yuan 說 苑 (Garden of stories). The basis of this identification is the analogy of an orchid that emits fragrance even in the deep forest where no one is present to appreciate its value. The analogy appears in all these texts, and an example is stated in the Xunzi as follows:5

Those angelicas and orchids that grow in deep forests do not stop being fragrant just because there is no one [around them].6

This analogy fits very well with the fundamental message of the QDYS, which is neatly summarized at the end of the manuscript itself:

Time is the cause of adversity and success. Remaining unchanged [in seasons of] darkness or light, noble men endeavors in returning to the self.7

In all of the four parallel texts, this message is corroborated with anecdotes of historically famous people who have suffered through hardship before they came to prominence. In the QDYS, this list consists of (1) King Shun 舜 (who served King Yao 堯), (2) Gao Yao 皋陶 (King Wuding 武丁), (3) Lü Wang 呂 望 (King Wu of Zhou 周 武 王), (4) Guan Yiwu 管 夷 吾 (Lord Huan of Qi 齊 桓 公), (5) Baili Xi 百 里 奚 (Lord Mu of Qin 秦 穆 公), (6) Sunshu Ao 孫叔敖 (King Zhuang of Chu 楚莊王), and (7) Wu Zixu 伍子胥 (King Helü of Wu 吳 王 闔 閭). This exact same list is shared in the Hanshi waizhuan and Shuo yuan. The version in the Xunzi, however, with the exception of Wu Zixu, carries a whole different set of historical figures.8 Confucius, the chief interlocutor in the story, tells his disciple Zilu 子 路 of cases of three ministers who met tragic deaths despite their virtues: [End Page 802]

Do you believe that wise people are necessarily hired? Did not Prince Bigan 比 干 get his heart cut out? Do you believe that loyal people are necessarily hired? Did not Guan Longfeng 關 龍 逢 get executed? Do you believe that advisors are necessarily hired? Did not Wu Zixu get dismembered outside the eastern gate of Gusu 姑蘇?9

Up to this point, the message of the "Youzuo" chapter stays largely in line with that of the QDYS. Despite the difference in specific examples, these ministers still represent the same category of virtuous people whose display of competence depends on uncontrollable circumstances. After all, all ministers need the support of a ruler to implement their ideas in government. In this sense, Ning Chen's reading of this narrative as a claim that "time determines man's political success and fate determines man's physical existence" is not completely implausible.10

However, after Confucius introduces the analogy of angelicas and orchids, he mentions the sufferings of three other historical figures who were not ministers but hegemons. Like the other ministers, they suffered through hardship in their early days, but according to Confucius, what made them prominent in the end was the change not necessarily in their circumstances but in their mind and will. Specifically, it was the ambition that they came to harbor during the times of their hardship that played the critical role in their ways to success:

In the old days, Prince Chong'er of Jin 晉 公 子 重 耳 harbored his ambition to become a hegemon in the state of Cao 曹; King Goujian of Yue 越王勾踐harbored his ambition at Mt. Kuaiji 會 稽; Xiaobai 小 白, Lord Huan of Qi, harbored his ambition in the state of Ju 莒. Thus, those who have never been in hiding do not think far into the future, and those who have not been put into exile do not aim for grand [achievements.] How do you know that I have not attained these under the falling leaves of mulberry trees?11

Interestingly, in his translation of the narrative, Chen chose to leave out this part, which could be an indication that he, too, did not see the cases of these hegemons entirely compatible with his interpretation.12 Contrary to Chen, John Makeham clearly reads a "political ambition" in the narrative.13 For Makeham, such a reading is even more justifiable because he relies on parallel texts of the "Youzuo" chapter, namely those in the "Shenren" 慎人(Being mindful of the human) chapter of the Lüshi chunqiu 呂氏春秋 (Annals of Lü Buwei) and in the "Rangwang" 讓 王 (Yielding kingship) chapter of the Zhuangzi 莊 子, which employ a different analogy.14

In fact, the analogy of angelicas and orchids does not fit very well with the cases of the hegemons because these images can only represent ministers who remain obscure until rulers come to appreciate their virtues. These flowers emit fragrance even if there is no one around to appreciate the scent, but their true virtue can only be recognized by others. By contrast, the hegemons are not people who waited for others to give them a chance [End Page 803] in this world. They overcame hardship with their own wisdom and will. (The fact that a large part of the success of Lord Huan of Qi is traditionally attributed to his minister Guan Yiwu bears no significance here, as the reason for Lord Huan's success is explicitly found in his ambition and not in his luck in finding a capable minister.) Thus, an analogy that emphasizes "appreciation" is not apt in their cases. If an analogy is to be used, it should be something that signifies overcoming of hardship through one's own power, like an evergreen that remains lush even in winter.

This analogy of evergreens, in fact, appears in the "Shenren" and "Rangwang":

After harsh cold has arrived, and frost and snow have fallen, I see how lush pines and cypresses are. In the old days, Lord Huan of Qi met [such harsh conditions] in the state of Ju; Lord Wen of Jin met them in the state of Cao; King Goujian met them at Mt. Kuaiji. It must be my luck that I met this plight between the states of Chen and Cai.15

Compared to how fragrant flowers passively wait to be rescued from their unfavorable (but not necessarily harmful) situations, the evergreens survive through the harsh winter by virtue of their innate strength. Their survival does not depend on changes in external circumstances. Thus, Confucius' message to Zilu here is almost the opposite of that success depends on uncontrollable external circumstances. In the remark that he comes to appreciate the lushness of pines and cypresses only after the harsh winter has arrived, Confucius reveals his thinking that even hard times can ultimately be beneficial for the virtuous because they provide a chance to advertise their virtues. If winter never arrives, no one may ever know that evergreens have such an ability to withstand cold weather. Thus, Confucius' comment is far from the claim in the QDYS that "With the right person, but without the right age, even though he be worthy he will be unable to act."16 The message that adverse circumstances can actually be beneficial is more vividly captured in other versions of the story of Confucius' plight between Chen and Cai, such as that in the Kongzi jiayu, where Confucius continues the conversation with his disciples Zigong 子 貢 and Yan Hui 顏 回 after he reproaches Zilu with the story of prince Bigan:

Zigong said: "Master's Way is extremely grand, so the world cannot accept you. How about retreating a little [from your ideal]?" The master said… "Now you are not cultivating the Way but seeking acceptance. Zigong, your aims are not grand, and you do not think far into the future." Zigong left. Yan Hui entered and asked the same question. Yan Hui said: "Master's Way is extremely grand, so the world cannot accept you. Even so, if you continue to practice it, and the world does not hire us, then it is a shame for the heads of states. What fault is with you, master? When one is not accepted [in this world], it reveals [the nobility] of a noble man."17 [End Page 804]

Yan Hui's final remark here, that Confucius' current plight can only reveal his nobility, is a straightforward statement of what Confucius implied in his appreciation of lush evergreens in winter. Hardship makes a true gentleman stand out among others, and thus manifests one's nobility. For a true gentleman, there can be no harm but only benefit in hardship.

Apart from providing a chance to advertise one's existing virtues, Confucius in the "Youzuo" chapter claims that hardship can even further one's virtues, as hardship makes one think far into the future and aim for grander achievements. And notice how Confucius' reproach to Zigong's shortsightedness in the Kongzi jiayu echoes these exact words from the "Youzuo." In this sense, Confucius' reproach is not simply about his disciple's present shortcomings but an indication that, with his willingness to evade hardship, he is far from building prudence and ambition even in the future. Hardship is not only beneficial but also required for one's ultimate success.

The QDYS stands in direct contrast to the "Youzuo" in this latter point as well. In the QDYS, as well as in its parallels in the Hanshi waizhuan and Shuo yuan, one's virtue is described as absolutely irrelevant to the sufferings they endured. In the QDYS there is the following:

That after beginning submerged in obscurity they would later have their names extolled was not due to any increase in their virtues. That [Wu] Zixu, after many earlier accomplishments, would end up getting executed was not due to any decline in his wisdom.18

The exact line saying "was not due to any increase in their virtues" (fei qi de jia 非其德加) is absent in two other parallels, but in both texts the comment on Wu Zixu ends as "That [Wu] Zixu, after many earlier accomplishments, would end up getting executed was not due to any increase or decline in his wisdom."19 This addition of the word "increase" indicates that the last comment could apply to all seven figures mentioned.

To summarize, the message of the "Youzuo" differs from that of the QDYS in that the former does not describe one's success as being dependent upon external circumstances. For those who can withstand trials, even detrimental circumstances can be beneficial because they build prudence and ambition and also advertise one's virtues to the world. On this difference, Mengzi 6B15 presents an interesting middle ground between the QDYS and the Xunzi. It describes success as completely beyond one's control yet still sees hardship as conducive to furthering one's virtues:

When Heaven is about to bestow a great duty upon someone, it first afflicts their mind and will, makes them toil with their bones and muscles, starves their flesh, impoverishes them, and obstructs their endeavors. By such means, it moves their hearts and controls their natural tendencies. Thus, it raises [their abilities] in areas where they were incompetent.20 [End Page 805]

In contrast to the claim in the QDYS "that after beginning submerged in obscurity they would later have their names extolled was not due to any increase in their virtues,"21 Mencius explains that the virtues of these ministers increased in their times of obscurity. In other words, just as in the stories of the Xunzi and Lüshi chunqiu, the Mengzi describes hardship as having been beneficial to the sufferers. Yet also like the QDYS, it sees one's success to be ultimately dependent upon the power that is beyond our reach. This by no means implies that Mengzi 6B15 and the QDYS share a common understanding of Heaven or the world, but it remains the same in both the QDYS and Mengzi 6B15 that worthies must wait for circumstances to change on their own before they can do anything.

Mengzi 6B15 retains another significant similarity with the QDYS in the list of the worthies mentioned. Mengzi 6B15 mentions six people, of whom five are shared with the QDYS: Shun, Gao Yao, Guan Yiwu, Baili Xi, and Sunshu Ao. The figures that are absent in the Mengzi but are present in the QDYS are Lü Wang and Wu Zixu. But instead of Lü Wang, Mengzi 6B15 has Jiao Ge 膠 鬲, who like Lü served King Wu of Zhou. And it should be remembered that Wu Zixu's case is different from the rest, and that his case does not quite fit with Mencius' message. Wu is mentioned along with others in the QDYS only because his fate suddenly changed for the worse through no fault of his own, and not that he remained unrecognized for a long time. In other words, the lists of worthies in Mengzi 6B15 and the QDYS are so close that they may be regarded as variant forms of an identical list, and at least one author of either text may have borrowed the list from another source to attach their own interpretation.

The idea that the author(s) of the QDYS or Mengzi 6B15 was merely borrowing an existing narrative, namely the inexplicable sufferings of eminent individuals in their early days, leads us to a hypothesis that this narrative was a well-known theme that solicited the attention of many intellectuals at the time. Of course, this theme may be seen as a part of the broader issue of "bad things happening to good people," surrounding which Franklin Perkins portrayed an entire landscape of early Chinese philosophy, but the focus is a little different.22 If the key examples in Perkins' books are people like Wu Zixu who met "bad ends" despite their virtue, texts like the QDYS, Mengzi 6B15, and the "Youzuo" chapter of the Xunzi focus on individuals who overcame hardship and ultimately attained success.23 The central issue of these texts has less to do with asking why such misfortune occurred to the virtuous but more with identifying that which is actually responsible for a person's ultimate success. Is it luck? Is it Heaven's will? Or is it the will and wisdom of the individual? The QDYS, Mengzi 6B15, and the "Youzuo" chapter of the Xunzi all present different solutions to this problem, and the role attributed to Heaven in each of these answers also varies among them. Heaven, which is presented as a willful being with power over the fates of individuals in the Mengzi, is relieved of all its [End Page 806] anthropomorphic qualities in the QDYS, and is equated with objective conditions that can be utilized for one's benefit in the Xunzi.

III. Differing Views on Heaven's Role in Explanations of Undeserved Hardship

The fact that the oldest surviving document arguing for a division between Heaven and humanity, along with a complete denial of Heaven's purpose- fulness, namely the QDYS, finds its support in the sufferings of virtuous people is hardly surprising. According to Ning Chen, the sense of conflict between one's virtue and appropriate rewards first became apparent in the Western Zhou period with the introduction of the idea of Heaven's mandate, which "clearly articulated that the morally worthy would be blessed by Heaven."24 Scholars like Perkins would disagree with Chen over whether this principle applied to individuals as well as sovereigns, but Perkins also acknowledges that accounts of Wu Zixu and other similarly unfortunate figures attracted more attention in the Eastern Zhou period against the background of such moral optimism, and before the introduction of the idea of Heaven's mandate that "bad things happening to good people poses no deep philosophical problem."25 In other words, Heaven from the beginning has been an inseparable part of the problem of undeserved hardship, and in one way or another the role of Heaven in the sufferings of worthy people had to be explained.

The defense of Heaven given in Mengzi 6B15 represents a deeply religious approach to this problem. The explanation that their sufferings were all a part of Heaven's grand scheme to prepare them for larger purposes preserves both the personality and morality of Heaven. Such a religious approach is largely consistent with the overall representation of Heaven in the Mengzi, which contains several passages describing Heaven as a willful being whose intention is difficult to comprehend yet holds great power over human beings. For instance, in the account of non-hereditary successions between Yao, Shun, and Yu 禹 in Mengzi 5A5, "Heaven is treated as an active and sentient entity, which, albeit not speaking directly with its appointees, intervenes in human affairs and determines who is appropriate to inherit the position of Son of Heaven."26 Another revealing example is Mengzi 2B13, in which Mencius explains the existence of a five-hundred-year dynastic cycle. But for the troubling fact that peace was already overdue by two hundred years by the time of Mencius, his only explanation is that "Heaven does not wish to bring peace to the world yet."27

There are scholars who would not agree with such a characterization of Heaven in the Mengzi. For example, Perkins argues:

In showing a natural causal connection between virtue and success, Mengzi aligns with the Mohists but without any role for heaven. Heaven is invoked [End Page 807] only when bad things happen.… What seems more likely is that Mengzi has come to equate heaven with fate, mìng. Heaven simply represents those forces or events in the world that are inexplicable and irresistible.28

Perkins may be right in pointing out that Mencius appeals to an anthropomorphic Heaven only when he is faced with situations that he cannot rationally understand, but this observation does not necessarily support his conclusion that Heaven in the Mengzi is "identified with the forces of the world."29 Indeed, even Perkins himself admits that a "direct view against an anthropomorphic view is difficult to find" in the Mengzi.30 In other words, even if some aspects of the Mengzi can be consistent with a more impersonal understanding of Heaven, Mencius himself never explicitly endorsed such a view. Just as Lee Yearley articulated, numerous passages in the Mengzi "clearly declare or imply that Heaven has attributes like acting, favoring, caring, or willing (e.g., 1B16, 5A6, even 5A5 under one reading). These passages invalidate any simple picture of Mencius's Heaven as a 'pattern' or 'structure' or 'machine.'"31

Interestingly, Perkins' description of the Mencian conception of Heaven as a representation of "forces or events in the world that are inexplicable and irresistible" fits much better in the QDYS than in the Mengzi. Only in the QDYS is there a complete removal of all references to the anthro- pomorphic nature of Heaven; instead, Heaven is precisely equated with the forces of the world, as Perkins said.

With the right person, but without the right age, even though he be worthy, he will be unable to act. If given the right age, however, what difficulties would there be?… Whether or not [all the aforementioned men] encountered [an appreciative lord] was [a matter controlled by] Heaven.… Time is the cause of adversity and success.32

Mencius could also have agreed with the claim that whether or not an individual meets an appreciative lord is a matter controlled by Heaven, if it was isolated from the rest of the manuscript. A remarkably similar claim is found in Mengzi 1B16, where Mencius blames Heaven for the failed attempt at a meeting with Lord Ping of Lu 魯平公:

Sometimes, one moves forward because [one's cause] is promoted [by Heaven], and one sometimes stops because [one's cause] is blocked. To move forward or to be blocked is not within the power of humans. That I did not meet the Lord of Lu is [due to] Heaven.33

Mencius' situation in this passage stands in parallel with those of other characters in the QDYS, waiting for a chance to meet a lord who will make use of his talent and virtue to rule the world, but whether or not such a meeting will occur is completely dependent on Heaven. The key difference between the two texts, however, is that Heaven in the QDYS is by no means a willful god. In the claim that a worthy person living in the right age will [End Page 808] have no difficulties, we read that what Mencius attributed to Heaven is more or less replaced by "the age" (shi 世), which represents the objective conditions of the time. And through the claim that time is the cause of adversity and success, Heaven is once again equated with time.34

But if Heaven is more or less equated with the objective conditions of the time, why does the QDYS make reference to Heaven at all? Does Heaven in the QDYS retain any further meaning that is not covered by concepts like "the age" or "time"? There is no evidence, at least within the QDYS, to support such a reading. Even if all references to Heaven were removed from the manuscript, the basic message does not change. We can still read it as an argument to focus on what can be controlled, namely one's virtue, as outside circumstances are beyond one's power. Never- theless, the reference to Heaven is necessary for the author(s) of the QDYS because, as discussed above, Heaven has been an inseparable part of the problem of undeserved hardship in early China. Unless one is planning to ignore completely all previous discussions surrounding this problem, one must phrase one's solution in such a way as to include Heaven, even when the answer practically excludes Heaven's role. The way the author(s) of the QDYS achieved this was by equating Heaven with what they regard as the ultimate cause, the objective conditions of the time. Thus, despite the difference in overall connotations of the word "Heaven," the QDYS still claims, as is the case in Mengzi 1B16, that Heaven is responsible for meetings between a worthy person and an appreciative lord.

The exact way the QDYS phrased this claim, that "Whether or not [all the aforementioned men] encountered [an appreciative lord] was [a matter controlled by] Heaven" (yu bu yu tian ye 遇不遇天也), deserves our further attention. Not only is this phrase similar to what is said in Mengzi 1B16 (albeit superficially), but it also appears in the "Youzuo" chapter of the Xunzi almost verbatim, only with the word "Heaven" replaced by the word "time" (yu bu yu shi ye 遇不遇時也). Obviously, such a close similarity has not gone unnoticed, and served as a ground for arguing that the two texts "must share a common source or sources."35 But what is just as important as their similarity is their difference. The context of the QDYS already makes it clear that "Heaven" is largely equivalent to "time," yet the fact that Heaven was explicitly replaced by time in the "Youzuo" suggests that its author(s) felt no need to make even a nominal reference to Heaven for their explanations of the problem of undeserved hardship. Indeed, in the narrative of the "Youzuo" chapter, Heaven's role is significantly reduced; not once does Confucius, the chief interlocutor in the story, use the word "Heaven."

Also noteworthy is the context in which this phrase appears. In the QDYS this phrase is an isolated claim about Heaven, but in the "Youzuo" it appears within a sequence of similar claims regarding various "forces in the world": [End Page 809]

A person's competence and incompetence depend on one's material composition cai 材; to act or not to act depends on the person ren 人; to encounter or not encounter [chances of success] depends on time shi 時; life and death depend on one's lifespan ming 命.

The structure of this passage suggests that time, which controls the chances of encountering opportunities, is only one factor among many things that contribute to our success in this world. And if we remember that the phrase regarding "time" is written with the word "Heaven" in the QDYS, this passage allows us to see the extent to which Heaven's role is reduced. Heaven, or objective conditions of time, is still regarded as a factor for our worldly success but only as one among many. There are also our inborn talents, our determination, and our allotted span of life.

Such a reduction of Heaven's role in explanations of undeserved hardship can only be understood in light of Xunzi's view of Heaven. Although it is often argued that the "Youzuo" chapter was not actually written, or even put together, by Xunzi himself, we can see that its fundamental idea is largely consistent with what is said in the more prominent chapters of the Xunzi, if we read it as arguing not that "time is the cause of adversity and success" but that we can benefit even from apparently adverse circumstances depending on our will and wisdom.36

What is at stake here is the attitude toward external circumstances. The former idea, well portrayed in the QDYS, puts a boundary on what is controllable and what is not. Some aspects of our lives, such as whether or not one can meet an appreciative lord, are completely beyond one's control no matter how virtuous or talented a person may be. And in this sense, despite the captivating assertion on the division between Heaven and humans, the basic attitude in the QDYS is not far removed from that in the Mengzi, in which willful Heaven is said to decide the uses of worthy people. Both texts tell us to keep our minds off the uncontrollable and focus on what can be controlled, namely our virtue.37 In the "Youzuo" chapter, however, one is advised to engage actively with what has long been regarded as the uncontrollable. What matters is how one responds to the seemingly uncontrollable objective conditions. Even if circumstances are adverse, it is ultimately up to oneself whether such conditions will lead to negative or positive results. Compare this view to what Xunzi says in the "Tianlun" 天 論 (Discussions on Heaven) chapter:

There is constancy in Heaven's actions. It is not preserved because of [the virtuous King] Yao, and it did not disappear because of [the wicked King] Jie 桀. When one responds to [the constancy] with order, there will be fortune; when one responds with disorder, there will be misfortune. When one's foundations are strong, and one is frugal in one's uses, Heaven cannot make one poor; when one stocks up provisions and acts in accordance with the seasons, Heaven cannot make one sick; when one cultivates the Way and is not of two [minds], Heaven cannot send calamities. Therefore, flood and [End Page 810] drought cannot cause starvation; cold and heat cannot cause sickness; omens and anomalies cannot cause misfortune.38

What Xunzi is denying here is the causal relationship between Heaven's actions, or the changes in external conditions, and individuals' well-being. One's misfortune is not a consequence of natural calamities or any other external factors but of one's inappropriate response to them; proper response can prevent misfortune. Is this not close to what Confucius tried to tell Zilu in the "Youzuo" chapter? In his accounts of the hegemons, their success was precisely due to their positive response to hardship. Xunzi in the "Tianlun" chapter may not necessarily agree with the idea that adverse conditions can somehow be even more beneficial than favorable ones, but the idea that success can be attained regardless of external conditions is unmistakably present in both texts.39

What may be relatively weak in the "Youzuo" chapter, however, is the idea of constancy. In the "Tianlun" chapter, Xunzi makes it clear that the way we can stay unharmed even in drought and flood is by relying on the constant patterns of Heaven. And those who disregard these patterns will never be able to flourish even in times of abundance:

For those who oppose the Way and act recklessly, Heaven cannot bring them fortune. Thus, they starve even before flood or drought has struck.40

Then by what means does Xunzi argue that we can rely on this constancy?—Through the rituals that the sages have left us. In the past, sages have observed the constant patterns of nature and left us a tool, that is, rituals, to help us navigate our path to prosperity.41 Thus, even if we ourselves do not precisely understand how this constancy is maintained, the rituals enable us to make use of the perpetual patterns of nature:

Those who cross the waters mark the depth [of the waters]. If the marks are unclear, [those who try to cross the waters later] may drown. Those who brought order to the people marked the Way [of nature]. If the marks are unclear, there will be chaos. Rituals are the marks. Without rituals, the world would be in a muddle. The world in a muddle means great chaos.42

Indeed, such a sophisticated understanding of rituals and constancy of Heaven is difficult to read from the "Youzuo." Nevertheless, the way "time" is reduced to merely a factor among many other causes of our success and how our own will and determination has been argued as equally important determinants allow us to see that the "Youzuo" chapter must presuppose a similar understanding of the roles of Heaven and human beings. Consider the following claim in the "Tianlun":

Heaven has [control] over time (shi 時); earth has [control] over material (cai 材); humans (ren 人) have [control] over order. This is the reason by which humans can participate [in the works of Heaven and earth].43 [End Page 811]

This passage may not exactly qualify as a parallel to what we saw above from the "Youzuo" chapter, but the shared terminology is unequivocal. One's lifespan (ming) has no counterpart here, but time (shi), material (cai), and humanity (ren) are all mentioned. The biggest and perhaps the only difference between the two texts is in the focus, where that of the "Youzuo" is on personal life, and that of the "Tianlun" is on order in the state. Nevertheless, the understanding regarding causes of success is unmistakably identical. Whether it is the success of an individual or that of a state, there is a role that humans must play in consideration to available resources (cai) and conditions of time (shi), and if properly managed, human beings are capable of bringing good results even when circumstances are unfavorable.

To summarize, the philosophical message of the "Youzuo" chapter is coherent with Xunzi's view of Heaven as seen in the "Tianlun" chapter, and it is fundamentally different from the message of the QDYS, despite the two texts being identified as parallels. The QDYS, on the other hand, retains many similarities with Mengzi 6B15, particularly in its practical solution to the problem of undeserved hardship, despite providing a very different view of Heaven.

IV. Conclusion

The discovery of the Guodian manuscripts in 1993 provided us with a chance to perceive aspects of the Chinese intellectual landscape of which the received tradition preserved only a partial picture.44 In particular, the significance of the QDYS was quickly noticed, as it contained a claim about the division between Heaven and humanity, something that was long regarded as Xunzi's original idea. Despite much scholarly attention, however, the striking difference in the fundamental message between the QDYS and its parallel in the "Youzuo" chapter of the Xunzi remained largely unnoticed, and the obvious similarity between the QDYS and Mengzi 6B15 was not discussed. But when the three texts, along with their parallels, are compared and analyzed side by side, we find varying accounts of undeserved hardship in early China, in which Heaven plays markedly different roles for a person's ultimate success in this world.

The QDYS differs from Mengzi 6B15 in that Heaven is not presented as an anthropomorphic deity; the QDYS argues that success and adversity for an individual depend on the objective conditions of the time, over which no one, or nothing, has control. By comparison, Mencius argues that willful Heaven brings hardship on worthies in order to prepare them for grander uses. Despite such a difference, the practical message for individuals is more or less identical: focus on cultivating your virtue instead of spending energy on pursuing uncontrollable worldly success. This message changes in the "Youzuo." The "Youzuo" chapter inherits the idea of the QDYS that whether or not we encounter opportunities of success depends on objective [End Page 812] conditions, but such conditions are considered to be only a factor in our ultimate success. Equally vital is one's attitude, how one responds to external conditions. If we respond right, we can even turn misfortune to fortune. This shows that in the "Youzuo" chapter there was a philosophical transition from merely passively focusing on the inner cultivation and disregarding what lies beyond one's control to an active engagement with the workings of what was previously thought to be an uncontrollable nature. I have shown that this change of view is closely associated with the understanding of Heaven defended in the "Tianlun" chapter of the Xunzi in which Xunzi maintained that human beings can bring order and prosperity to this world even in times of natural disaster if we respond properly to the constancy of Heaven.

Yunwoo Song

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Yuelu Academy, Hunan University

yunusong@yahoo.co.kr

Notes

1. Cook, The Bamboo Texts of Guodian, p. 453. Throughout this article I rely heavily on Scott Cook's version of the QDYS, which is a product of his thorough analysis of previous reconstructions of the manuscript. All translations of the QDYS given in this article are by Cook unless otherwise noted.

2. Ikeda Tomohisa once argued that the QDYS is later than the Xunzi (Ikeda Tomohisa 池 田 知 久, "Guodian Chujian 'Qiongda yi shi' yanjiu," pp. 140–151). But the archaeological evidence from the Guodian tomb makes this claim extremely unlikely (Asano Yūichi, "Kakuten Sokan 'Kyūtatsu i ji' no 'Ten jin no bun' ni tsuite," pp. 22–24). And even from the perspective of intellectual history, many have showed that the Xunzi cannot be earlier than the QDYS. See, e.g., Kondo Noriyuki, "Junshi no kyūtatsu-ron to 'Kyūtatsu i ji'." On the other hand, Liao Mingchun's argument that Confucius himself was the author of the text seems equally improbable (Liao Mingchun, "Jingmen Guodian Chujian yu xian-Qin ruxue," pp. 43–45).

5. In the actual bamboo manuscript, this part is damaged, so the words for angelica and orchid are illegible, but enough of the context survives, including the word "fragrance" (fang 芳), to make the reconstruction reliable. See Guodian Chumu zhujian, 28, p. 146 n. 15; Cook, The Bamboo Texts of Guodian, p. 462 n. 65.

8. Thus, Liao Mingchun's remark that "even though there is a little difference, [the lists of figures in two texts] match in general" is not an accurate observation (Liao Mingchun, "Jingmen Guodian Chujian yu xian-Qin ruxue," p. 44).

10. Chen, "The Problem of Theodicy in Ancient China," p. 66. Paul Goldin also supports this reading; see Goldin, After Confucius, p. 179 n. 84 (see note 36 below).

12. The only way we can read Confucius' message here to be in line with that of the QDYS is if we interpret this passage to mean that objectively harsh conditions automatically generate wisdom and ambition in the minds of the sufferers. Then the ultimate cause of their success would be the harsh circumstances, not their virtues. But this kind of interpretation would create more problems than solutions. First, it would mean that Confucius was plainly denying the more common view that harsh conditions are detrimental to success. Second, it could make Confucius a kind of determinist, as the argument would be that a person's will can be determined by external conditions. None of these positions is easy to defend.

13. Makeham, "Between Chen and Cai: Zhuangzi and the Analects," pp. 87–88. Unfortunately, the QDYS was not a part of his analysis probably because it does not frame its story within Confucius' plight between Chen and Cai, but had Makeham discussed the QDYS in this work he would certainly have noticed the difference in the philosophical idea.

14. The difference in the analogy is probably the reason that these texts were not mentioned by the original editors of the Guodian manuscripts. For an overview of all the materials that may be seen as parallels to the QDYS, see Cook, The Bamboo Texts of Guodian, pp. 431–439.

15. Chen Qiyou, ed., Lüshi chunqiu xin jiaoshi, p. 810. Cf. Knoblock and Riegel, The Annals of Lü Buwei, pp. 325–326. The "Rangwang" chapter also carries this analogy, but it leaves out the part explaining the cases of the three hegemons. See Guo Qingfan, ed., Zhuangzi jishi, pp. 981–983.

19. This sentence appears almost verbatim in all three texts with the exception of the character for "increase." In the QDYS the character is absent; in the Hanshi waizhuan it is written as cheng 盛; in the Shou yuan it is yi 益.

22. See esp. the first chapter, "Formations of the Problem of Evil" (pp. 10–44), in Perkins, Heaven and Earth Are Not Humane, to understand how Perkins situates the problem of "bad things happening to good people" as one of the central concerns of early Chinese philosophy.

23. See ibid., pp. 17–26.

25. Perkins, Heaven and Earth Are Not Humane, p. 28. As for whether or not the idea applied to individuals, Chen maintains that the idea of Heaven's mandate can indeed be "applied to account for an individual's fortune and misfortune" (Chen, "The Genesis of the Concept of Blind Fate in Ancient China," p. 153). But Perkins' view is more convincing. He writes, "the discussions of the rewards and punishments of heaven are limited to the actions of rulers. There is no general claim that good is always rewarded and bad always punished. In fact, that cannot be the view, because it was primarily the people—whether innocent or guilty—who suffered when the ruler was bad" (Perkins, ibid., p. 32).

30. Ibid., p. 117.

32. Cook, The Bamboo Texts of Guodian, pp. 453–464. The translation of qiong da yi shi in the last line is my own.

34. Pang Pu points out that the fact that Heaven in the QDYS is equal to concepts like "the age" is what differentiates its philosophy from that of the Xunzi, in which Heaven represents nature in general (Pang Pu, "Kong Meng zhi jian," p. 91).

36. This is despite Goldin (see Goldin, After Confucius, p. 179 n. 84). Goldin's reading of the "Youzuo" chapter is in agreement with that of Ning Chen in Chen, "The Problem of Theodicy in Ancient China," pp. 65–66 (see note 10 above). The view that the "Youzuo" was not written by Xunzi but is only a collection of pedagogically useful stories that circulated at the time of Xunzi or his disciples is seen even in the oldest surviving commentary to the Xunzi by Yang Liang 楊 倞 (fl. 818 C.E.) (Wang Xianqian, Xunzi jijie, p. 520). And for this reason some scholars are cautious about taking the chapter as an accurate representation of Xunzi's philosophy. E.g., see Kondo Noriyuki, "Junshi no kyūtatsu-ron to 'Kyūtatsu i ji'," p. 11.

41. For a more thorough explanation of this view, see Goldin, Confucianism, pp. 80–84.

43. Ibid., p. 308.

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