Abstract

Abstract:

This essay evaluates the philosophical merits of the Pratyabhijñā Śaiva critique of Dharmakīrti's stance that the judgment of sameness that constitutes a concept formed via exclusion (apoha) does not require ultimate grounding, and presents these Śaivas' account of the relationship between time, reality, and concepts. These Śaivas argue that time is the expression, as the subject/object pairs that define conventional worlds, of the non-dual differentiation inherent in ultimate reality—and use Dharmakīrti's own apoha theory to explain how this works.

pdf

Additional Information

ISSN
1529-1898
Print ISSN
0031-8221
Pages
pp. 594-614
Launched on MUSE
2020-07-03
Open Access
No
Back To Top

This website uses cookies to ensure you get the best experience on our website. Without cookies your experience may not be seamless.