Abstract

Abstract:

In Buddhist epistemological works following Dharmakīrti, the distinction between conceptual and non-conceptual cognitions is both crucial and complex. This essay examines that distinction by inquiring into the Dharmakīrtian notion of "pseudo-perception" (pratyakṣābhāsa), that is, cognitive events that spuriously appear to be instances of perception but actually are not. A particular form of contour illusions, the Kanisza Triangle, will serve as a test case that clarifies not only the Dharmakīrtian notion of conceptuality, but also the ways in which the conceptual and non-conceptual interact.

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Additional Information

ISSN
1529-1898
Print ISSN
0031-8221
Pages
pp. 571-593
Launched on MUSE
2020-07-03
Open Access
No
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