Did Peirce Misrepresent Descartes? Reinvestigating and Defending Peirce’s Case
- Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society: A Quarterly Journal in American Philosophy
- Indiana University Press
- Volume 56, Number 1, Winter 2020
- pp. 1-18
- View Citation
- Additional Information
While Peirce’s case for rejecting Descartes’ approach to philosophical inquiry tends to be familiar, there is the need to return to it, especially considering that some critics claim that he misread Descartes’ method of doubt. My aim in this article is to show that, after closely reinvestigating Peirce’s case, it becomes clear that his reasons for rejecting Descartes’ approach are stronger than critics generally take them to be. And after I spell out these reasons, I will show why we can defend Peirce’s case and how we can resolve the longstanding controversy over whether Peirce misrepresented Descartes.