Abstract

Abstract:

While Peirce’s case for rejecting Descartes’ approach to philosophical inquiry tends to be familiar, there is the need to return to it, especially considering that some critics claim that he misread Descartes’ method of doubt. My aim in this article is to show that, after closely reinvestigating Peirce’s case, it becomes clear that his reasons for rejecting Descartes’ approach are stronger than critics generally take them to be. And after I spell out these reasons, I will show why we can defend Peirce’s case and how we can resolve the longstanding controversy over whether Peirce misrepresented Descartes.

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Additional Information

ISSN
1558-9587
Print ISSN
0009-1774
Pages
pp. 1-18
Launched on MUSE
2020-07-04
Open Access
No
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