The article gives a novel argument to show that there is sense of "exists" suitable for posing a substantive issue between presentists and eternalists. It then seeks to invigorate a neglected variety of presentism. There are seven doctrines, widely accepted even among presentists, that create problems for presentism. The doctrines are that only existents can belong to sets, be referred to, be quantified over, have properties, bear relations, be constituents of propositions, and serve as truth-makers. Without distinguishing existence and being, presentists can comfortably reject all seven doctrines. Doing so would dispose of the majority of presentism's problems. Further, it would enable presentists to reduce A-judgments to B-judgments, thereby insulating presentism from doubts about the intelligibility of A-theories. For reasons indicated very briefly, it might also make presentism less difficult to reconcile with special relativity, though the point is not pursued here.