Abstract

abstract:

In this paper, I argue against rationalist readings of Aristotle's epistemology, according to which our scientific understanding is justified on the basis of certain demonstrative first principles that are themselves justified only by some brute form of rational intuition. I then investigate the relationship between our intuition of principles and the broadly perceptual knowledge from which it derives. I argue that, for Aristotle, perceptual knowledge helps justify our intuition of principles, and also serves as an authority against which these principles and their consequences must be assessed. I end by considering how we should understand the justificatory role played by perception, and sketching the nuanced, empirically-minded sort of foundationalism I take Aristotle to endorse.

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Additional Information

ISSN
1538-4586
Print ISSN
0022-5053
Pages
pp. 1-27
Launched on MUSE
2020-01-17
Open Access
No
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