The Ottoman Empire and the Sea

Journal of the Ottoman and Turkish Studies Association 1:1-2 (2014): 207-228 Svat Soucek Review Essay: The Ottoman Empire and the Sea Panzac, Daniel. La marine ottomane: De l’apogée à la chute de l’Empire (1572–1923). Paris: CNRS Éditeurs, 2008. 537 pp. ISBN 9782271067999. Idris Bostan, Adriyatik’te korsanlık: Osmanlılar, Uskoklar, Venedikliler, 1575–1620. Istanbul: Timaş Yayınları, 2009. 252 pp. ISBN: 9789752639980. The author, Daniel Panzac,1 begins the first book under review with the following statement: “Coming after the Corsaires barbaresques and the Caravane maritime, this work too covers the same theme: the Ottoman Empire and the sea.”2 He then adds that “more ambitious than the two former works, it intends to follow over a very long period—three and a half centuries—an important Ottoman institution, namely the navy (marine militaire).” There is an implied paradox, almost a contradiction, here: for the book tells the story of an important institution in a chronic state of weakness that followed the gigantic rebuilding of the navy’s strength after the battle of Lepanto, a weakness interlaced by spasmodic and only partly successful efforts at reconstruction and modernization until the demise of the empire itself. This long period presents a contrast to the preceding one, which marks the Ottoman navy’s rise since Mehmet the Conqueror and then its glorious dominance during the reign of Suleyman the Magnificent. Panzac defines the principal reason for limiting his book to the later period: “To begin this history from the origins themselves of the navy…would have presented a challenge exceeding the capabilities of a single historian, besides the fact that the rise of the Ottoman Empire, especially the reign of Suleyman the Magnificent, has already been treated by many studies.” The author could have added that he is the best qualified scholar for the period in question. Two somewhat separate themes emerge as dominant in this book:3 the navy’s organization and structure, a maze of political, technical, logistical, administrative,  Svat Soucek, having served many institutions in different capacities, is a retired librarian at Princeton University, Princeton, NJ. 1 It is with great sadness that this reviewer notes the passing away of Daniel Panzac on 7 December 2012. He was a good friend and colleague, and he will be missed. 2 Daniel Panzac, Les corsaires barbaresques, la fin d’une épopée, 1800–1820 (Paris: CNRS Editions, 1999) and its English edition, Barbary Corsairs: the End of a Legend, 1800–1820 (Leiden: Brill, 2005); idem, La caravane maritime: Marins européens et marchands ottomans en Méditerranée, 1680–1830 (Paris: CNRS Editions, 2004). 3 The titles of its eleven chapters: 1. Reconstitution of the Fleet after Lepanto (1571–1574). 2– 3. From the Reconquest of Tunis to the Attack on Crete (1574–1645). 4. The Mastery of the Svat Soucek 208 financial and social components; and its functioning, dominated by two kinds of activity: war waged by full-fledged fleets, called here “guerre d’escadre,” and forays of corsairs, the “guerre de course.” The detailed table of contents on pp. 529– 37 helps the reader acquire an idea of what to expect: a thorough treatment of the navy’s structure, dwarfing the story of its activities. Thus in chapter 1, “Reconstitution of the Fleet after Lepanto,” thirty-one of thirty-nine pages are devoted to the rebuilding in its various aspects (the titles of the subsections are: The role of the grand vizier; The role of the kapudan pasha; The ships: the hulls of the vessels, the equipment: oars, ropes and sails, metallurgical products; The men: the sailors, the rowers, the soldiers on board; Reactions of those affected: those made responsible and state employees, those mobilized), and only eight pages to action at sea (A campaign of adaptation, 1572. The reconquest of Tunis). The rapid reconstruction of the sultan’s fleet after Lepanto occupies an almost legendary place in Ottoman historiography, but Panzac’s account is the most detailed and lucid one. Also significant is his corrective conclusion on p. 53, however. While the reconquest of Tunis is routinely brought up as proof of Lepanto’s insignificance and Ottoman Empire’s unimpaired naval...