China's Asia: Triangular Dynamics Since the Cold War by Lowell Dittmer (review)

In a conference on the situation of the Korean Peninsula held at Chengdu, People's Republic of China (PRC) in 2014, participated in only by Chinese and South Korean scholars, a Chinese scholar blatantly asked why the Seoul government did not start to sever its linkages with Washington and come closer to China, as the South Korean economy is increasingly integrated with China's. The increasing (or even over) self-confidence of Chinese officials or analysts regarding the rise of China has aroused worries among Asian states. While all wish to benefit from the dynamic Chinese market, they all seek closer security guarantees from the US, so as to counter-balance the rising regional hegemon. The relationship between Asian states and China engages inevitably the only "balancer" or "stabilizer" in this region, a role which used to be played by the only global power, the US.

The latest monograph of Professor Lowell Dittmer on the intriguing triangular relationship among China, US and the rest of Asia (ROA) in the post-Cold War period is a brilliant attempt in analyzing how the Asian powers, from rich and advanced ones like Japan, to poor and developing ones like Laos and Cambodia, react to the rapidly changing security environment that all have to encounter due to the diminishing capabilities gap between Beijing and Washington. Dittmer uses his triangular framework of China, US and ROA to study how the US plays a part in the management of the uneasy bilateral relationship between China and ROA. The book is lucid and well-written, meticulous and rich in the analysis, with the triangular framework shedding new flight on and deepening our understanding of China and Asia.

Dittmer's analytical framework is original and thoughtful. There are four types of triangular relations. The first is Unit-veto, with all three bilateral relations negative. The second is Marriage, with two actors in positive relationship and both having negative relations with the third actor. The third is Romantic, with a "pivot" power that has better relations with each of the two "wings" than the wings have between themselves. The fourth is Ménage à Trois, which means positive relations among all three. What is noteworthy from Dittmer's study is that though the US enjoys the "pivot" position in various Romantic triangles, as well as benefitting from the Marriage with ROA which are US allies, the challenge imposed by the so-called "revisionist power" China has become so substantial to Washington that some ROA, especially the poorer states, may bandwagon with China.

As noticed by Dittmer, smaller powers have been warned by Beijing not to take sides. But as we noted in the beginning of this review, Chinese analysts did already openly ask Korea to side with the PRC and distance from the US. Though most Asian states, the book argues, avoid a clear choice and try to maneuver between the two, these third powers are at risk and facing uncertainties in mapping their foreign and security policies. This is because due to its economic prowess, China will become the natural pivot, and even US allies like Australia have to face a dilemma in choosing between the US and China. Dittmer refers to an Australian defense scholar, Hugh White who stresses that his country should convince the US to compromise and form a "concert" with China, which means that China's core interests should be respected. Then the ROA may enjoy better relationship with both China and the US than the latter two with each other. However, Dittmer eloquently contends that though Australia wants to balance between China and the US, and to play the role of pivot, it lacks sufficient resources to do so. If both sides want Australia to take sides, it is forced to choose.

The author is right in pointing out the rationale for the anxiety of Asian states: "China's ambitions are dynamic and may grow in correlation with its power...