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Frankfurt and Beyond: Hierarchical Readings of Anselm’s Analysis of Moral Choice with a New Test Case for his Concept of Freedom

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The paper addresses criticism of Frankfurtian interpretations of Anselm’s account of moral choice and defends a modified hierarchical model of the will which introduces, based on Anselm’s theo-anthropology and Augustinian “beatitudinism,” a third-order desire for happiness with God. In light of this, the issue of evil appears to result from a cognitive deficiency and not only from failure to order one’s desires properly. The paper finally proposes, against the backdrop of universalism, a different test case for Anselm’s concept of free will (i.e., not Satan’s fall but the freedom humans may have on judgment day) and asks whether this choice might allow creatures to exercise freedom without the need for alternate possibilities. The paper thus aims to disentangle moral and theological-eschatological explanations of Anselm’s definition of freedom.

INTRODUCTION

Scholars like S. Tyvoll, K. Rogers and others have suggested “Frankfurtian” readings of Anselm’s account of moral choice. They argue that Anselm—similar to 20th-century philosopher H. Frankfurt—thinks of a hierarchical relationship between the desires rational creatures are endowed with (i.e., the desires for benefit and justice), rather than seeing them as conflicting same-order desires. Rogers, in particular, has received a lot of criticism for her reading of Anselm.¹

1. She claims that Anselm “prefigures” Frankfurt (AoF, 10). I shall use the following abbreviations for books by Rogers: AoF = *Anselm on Freedom*, FaS = *Freedom and Self-Creation*. Latin quotations are from F.S. Schmitt’s standard edition of Anselm’s *Opera Omnia* (Edinburgh: Nelson & Sons, 1940–61); unless otherwise indicated, translations are mine or adapted from T. Williams’ edition of

Some critics (e.g. Williams, Visser) take issue with Rogers' "anachronistic" method of connecting "the work of a long-dead philosopher to philosophy in the present," something she openly admits (AoF, 1). Such reservations may be justified from a purely philological and historical perspective, but philosophy in its purest form is impossible without showing the relevance of ancient thought. Moreover, while textual interpretation should always strive for accuracy, it can still have philosophical value so long as it is guided by the *eros* to explore perennial questions, opens up new lines of thought, and produces philosophical insight, even if it at times strays from the author's original intent. As we shall see, this is not the case with Rogers, who provides sufficient textual evidence to support many of her claims.

Some critics focus on the debate between libertarianism and compatibilism and question the suitability of Satan's choice as an example that could be transferred to free choice in general (e.g., Ekenberg 2016a). But Anselm emphasizes the intrinsic connection of his three dialogues *De veritate* (DV), *De libertate arbitrii* (DLA), and *De casu diaboli* (DCD) and requests that they be "written together as a unit." The primary (negative) "test case" for his understanding of freedom, which he explains in DLA, is Satan's fall.² Rogers acknowledges that the focus on Satan may seem odd but highlights three analytic reasons Anselm has in presenting him as an "idealized example" (FaS, 217): Anselm is "interested only in morally significant choice and [is] deeply concerned to get to the bare metaphysics of free will. He . . . wants to examine a pure instance of choice, and he wants to put the central and most difficult puzzle in the starkest of terms: how could a being made perfectly good, with . . . no evil in the world to tempt him, possibly choose against the will of God" (AoF, 7).

Nonetheless, there remain certain difficulties in Rogers' account, and I shall address some of them in this paper. My main goal, however, is to clarify and defend a hierarchical reading of Anselm. I will do so by modifying Rogers' model of moral choice and suggest that we

Anselm's *Basic Writings* (Indianapolis: Hackett, 2007). I am most grateful for editorial advice from A. Traylor.

2. Rogers 2005, 267, also points to the similarities between DCD and *De concordia* (DC). Taking into account the multiple meanings of the Latin noun *casus*, we can say that Anselm certainly means the devil's *fall* (*casus*¹) when he discusses "de casu diaboli" but this *fall* nevertheless serves as an exemplary *case* (*casus*²) to illustrate free choice: the case of Satan or Satan's fall. The German word "Fall" preserves this double meaning.

introduce a third-order desire, namely the *desire for (true) Happiness* (part 1). This third-order desire takes into account Anselm's theanthropology and the fact that his view of the human being is influenced by what I call "Augustinian beatitudinism." In this context, I will have to contend with Rogers' claim that Anselm should be seen as an "Aristotelian" rather than a "Kantian" thinker: "Anselm has almost always been taken to espouse a sort of proto-Kantianism: the virtuous person is the one who chooses duty over the opposing options of self-interest and natural inclination" (AoF, 10). This claim is meant to support the hierarchical interpretation, but it seems to me that it is rooted in a misreading of Kant.

Following this, I turn to the question of evil and the failure to order one's desires toward benefit, justice, and Happiness properly (which, according to Anselm, is the cause of evil-doing) and offer some critical reflections on Anselm's and Rogers' account of moral choice. I will suggest that evil is at bottom a cognitive issue. This then prompts me to apply the definition of freedom Anselm develops in DLA 3 to a different test case than Satan's fall, namely, to the freedom humans supposedly have on "judgment day" (part 2). I thus move beyond the scope of Anselm's own theology and use his concept of freedom within the context of *universalism*. I hope that this move may at the same time illustrate the theo-logic of this doctrine and emphasize the lasting relevance of Anselm's innovative reflections on freedom.

My discussion revolves around the cluster of issues having to do with the relationship between freedom and free choice, libertarianism and compatibilism, and moral and eschatological choice. It cannot be emphasized enough that all of Anselm's moral analyses are developed against the backdrop of his theology and eschatology. For him, moral choice is always about salvation and rarely about moral responsibility alone. The theological context, however, gives rise to certain problems. Anselm's definition of freedom is not primarily a moral but a theological concept which runs the risk of being reduced again to the moral choices finite creatures are expected to make against the backdrop of the idea of merit-based salvation. My proposal attempts to regain the high ground of his original definition and focus on a moment in which the kind of freedom Anselm has in mind may truly inform the free choice of creatures as well.

PART I: N-ORDER VOLITIONS AND THEO-ANTHROPOLOGY

1.1 *Some Preliminary Notes*

It is generally agreed that Anselm “inherits two notions of freedom,” of *libertas* and of *liberum arbitrium*, and combines them into one so that his single definition can stand for “such diverse realities as the freedom of self-perfection and the freedom of self-determination” (Kane, 305³), or freedom as a kind of virtue (self-perfection brings human excellence) and free choice. The “single definition” Kane refers to is Anselm’s famous *potestas servandem rectitudinem voluntatis propter ipsam rectitudinem* (DLA 3), “the ability to preserve rectitude of the will for the sake of rectitude itself” (hereafter *PSR*²). Still, we need to explore with greater depth and precision what is being compressed into this single definition, that is to say, certain notions of freedom and free choice.

Although influenced by Augustine, Anselm rejects Augustine’s concept of free will, i.e. “the ability to sin or not to sin.” Anselm’s reasons are theological: God and the good angels do not have that kind of freedom (DLA 1). Anselm therefore claims that the definition of freedom as such does not entail a “principle of alternate possibilities” (hereafter PAP). He does, however, say (most notably in DCD) that created rational natures need to have “open options” or real “*a se* choices” (Rogers) in order to prove and exercise their *PSR*². Rogers deserves credit then for showing that Anselm is not inconsistent (it seems, after all, that he is taking back his “distinctive definition” when it comes to created natures⁴) but presenting a proper application and explication of his definition and its entailments—one, moreover, in line with the more general idea that freedom is tested through free choice. Rogers spells this out repeatedly, but the idea is older. Kane, for instance, had stated that, “the form that freedom takes under the conditions of human existence is the ability either to sin or not to sin,” so that “self-determination in a creature . . . is only possible if there are alternatives from which he can choose” (301f.).

3. Kane refers to M. Adler’s distinction between three kinds of freedom: freedom of self-realization, of self-perfection, and of self-determination.

4. M. Barnwell’s criticism is driven by similar concerns regarding what he calls Anselm’s “distinctive definition” of freedom and Anselm’s alleged “conflation of freedom of choice with self-determination” in terms of PAP (cf. his paper published in this issue).

It is noteworthy that Anselm doesn't simply consider alternative objects of one's desires or possibly opposing actions directed at those objects. Instead, he focuses on the subject (i.e., the agent's will and its motivating factors). This approach does indeed "prefigure" Frankfurt's analysis of the will but it is really in line with *any* motivational account of human acting. Anselm sees rational creatures endowed with two different desires which can, but do not have to, come into conflict: *the desire for benefit* (hereafter *DB*) and *the desire for justice* (hereafter *DJ*). Rogers holds that potential conflicts don't arise on the same order of desires (as in what she calls the "Kantian" reading of Anselm). They are not opposing desires but desires that, on principal at least, are complementary, belonging, that is, to different orders of the will. She thus suggests a "hierarchical" or "Frankfurtian model" to account for Anselm's view of moral choice and the will.

Anselm does not, of course, use Frankfurt's terminology, but his language clearly entails a hierarchical understanding of the will. Note, though, that the *PSR*²-definition *itself* also uses hierarchical language (if *x* is done *for the sake* of *y*, this implies that *y* is higher or more valuable than *x*), but this does not involve a hierarchical understanding of the relationship between *DB* and *DJ*; it simply indicates a hierarchy of goods and ends, a notion that can also be found in Aristotle (*Nicomachean Ethics* [NE] I 1.2). There is, however, plenty of other textual evidence for Rogers' interpretation, which she has presented by "unpacking this definition" (Rogers 2005, 251) and emphasizing its connection with the test case of free choice Anselm presents in *DCD*.⁵

My analysis will focus on passages from *DCD* (and, to a lesser extent, *DC*) but it will also draw on Anselm's discussion of freedom in *DLA* (mainly chapters 3 and 8). Note that the proposal for a hierarchical interpretation does not rely on a phrase from *DLA* 5 ("for everyone who wills wills his own willing") which has previously been used in this context, e.g. by Saarinen who calls it "Anselm's principle" (46). Goebel 2006 convincingly shows that this is merely an "emphatic, more elegant way to say that anyone who wills something just wills what he wills, and nothing else" (102). An actual choice is always a willful choice and only "improperly said to be done against the will" (*DLA* 5). But Goebel goes so far as to argue that Anselm thinks it is in general meaningless to postulate a second-order will (100), and he

5. Most notably in Rogers 2005. It does in fact appear as if some of the important details presented in that paper are missing, merely asserted (cf. Visser, 411f.) or taken for granted in *AoF* and *FaS*.

may have incorporated his criticism of Saarinen's reading of DLA 5 into his critique of FaS. It seems to me that this full-fledged rejection isn't entirely warranted; for Rogers' argument is mainly built around DCD and the two desires whose relationship Anselm discusses in that work. It is not merely about "a desire to will" (Goebel 2017, 127) and goes beyond the bare distinction between "Wunsch" and "Wille."⁶

What I have called the *desire for benefit* above (following Rogers, Tyvold and others) is really Anselm's first notion of "happiness." Unfortunately, Anselm's terminology is not always consistent, a fact which may cause some irritation. In particular, it is not immediately clear that "benefit" and "happiness" are coextensive. Tyvold, for instance, speaks of desires that are "beneficial, useful, or conducive to happiness," using these attributes interchangeably (157).⁷ It is, in fact, Anselm himself who uses benefit (*commodus/commoditas*) and happiness (*beatitudo*) interchangeably. He explains in DCD 12: "By happiness I don't mean happiness in accordance with justice but the happiness that everyone wills, even the unjust. After all, everyone wills his well-being," and then goes on to distinguish between "two goods and two evils that are contrary to them," one is justice (i.e. moral goodness), the contrary being evil injustice, and the other one "can be called the advantageous" or "beneficial" (literally what "brings *commoditates*"), the opposite being "the disadvantageous" (cf. DC 3,11–12). However, even the "happiness with justice" Anselm mentions in DCD 12 does not, in itself, denote the theo-anthropological notion of happiness as final human fulfillment which I will focus on later in this paper. Rather, it simply means "justly sought benefit." So the English word "desire for benefit" seems to be an appropriate translation for what Anselm describes as the will that seeks "both" *commodum* and *beatitudinem*, and I will reserve, as much as possible, the word "happiness" for the other notion of *beatitudo* that, I believe, we find in Anselm's writings as well.

1.2 Anselm and Hierarchical Accounts of the Will: An Overview

1. Although some critics hold that a Frankfurian reading of Anselm's analysis of the will overcomplicates things, Rogers' view that,

6. This is what Goebel 2006, 109 focusses on ("desire" as just "wanting something" on the one hand, and "will" or "desire" that becomes an intention on the other hand). We shall see that this distinction plays a role in Frankfurt's analysis of the will.

7. Cf. AoF, 26: "a benefit is something which is desirable because it is the sort of thing which can produce happiness."

on the contrary, Anselm succeeds in presenting an acute analysis without the need for a “very complex process of desire formation” remains convincing (FaS, 261). It nevertheless seems necessary to point out and clarify certain issues and suggest some modifications to Rogers’ account and, if her interpretation is correct, Anselm’s account of moral choice as well. I shall first look at Rogers’ account and compare it with Tyvoll’s proposal on how to read Anselm’s two desires in DCD and DC.

Actions spring from the will but are, as such, no part of it and should therefore not be included in a model that describes the hierarchical structure of the will. The will itself first contains first-order desires which are “desires to perform an action” (Tyvoll, 156) or “desires to do or not to do one thing or another” (Frankfurt 1971, 83).⁸ A person can have “numerous first-order desires at the same time” while she can only have one first-order *volition* at any given time, for this is defined as an “effective first-order desire, one that moves a person all the way to action” (Tyvoll, 156; Frankfurt 1971, 8). The introduction of second-order desires takes into account that we develop attitudes towards our desires; they are desires for a desire. But there is a difference between someone who “wants simply to have a certain desire or when he wants a certain desire to be his will” (Frankfurt 1971, 86). Note that contrary to Tyvoll’s use of the term, Frankfurt reserves “volition” for the second order of desires (i.e. for those second-order desires that are effective and make a first-order desire effective or not). Effective first-order desires are simply called a person’s “will” in the sense of providing “the motive in what [someone] actually does” (85) or tries to do.

In Anselm’s view, the will yields volitions “through” inclinations (Tyvoll, 158). “Will” (*voluntas*) is here seen as instrument of the will. For Anselm says, we use the word in three different ways: as “faculty by which we will something (*instrumentum volendi*), inclination of that faculty, or desire, (*affectio instrumenti*) which moves it to will something . . . and the actual use of the will” (Rogers 2005, 252; cf. DC 3,11–13, DLA 7). In DC 3,11f., Anselm speaks of *aptitudines* which, he says, can also be called *affectiones*. These are the *voluntas rectitudinis/iustitiae*, or *affectio ad [volendum] rectitudinem* and the *voluntas ad volendum commodum*, or *affectio commodi*. They are inclinations or “occurrent desires” in the sense of “intention, volition or action-guiding plan” (FaS,

8. Interestingly, Frankfurt’s proposal has led to a shift of analytic attention from first- to second-order desires; this can be seen in Holton’s definition of first-order desires as desires “for anything other than a desire.”

78). Tyvoll argues that they are “neither first-order desires nor first-order volitions” for “they are clearly not desires for specific actions” (158). He concludes that they are “desires of the second order” but with “different directions” (159). Rogers, however, sees a hierarchical relationship between these two so that one qualifies the other.

It is in the very analysis of this relationship that Rogers finds evidence of Anselm’s hierarchical account of the will. Moral and immoral choices may be occasioned by objects (which may include acts, since the desire for *x* is the desire to do or get *x*, or do those acts that will lead to *x*) so that free choice is, on the surface, an object choice but it really is a value-judgment, which consists in the proper (or improper) ordering of desires, which incurs praise or blame and thus grounds moral responsibility.⁹ Anselm sees justice as superior to benefit and so *DB* needs to be “aligned” with *DJ* (AoF, 66ff.).

2. Generally speaking, it is not at all clear that this is the only conceivable relationship between benefit and justice since benefit is a relational concept requiring a genitive object (“whose benefit?”) and one could think of different objects. For instance, justice itself could be the object, so that a choice is good when it is done “for the benefit of justice.” Anselm, however, is clearly thinking of the agent’s benefit, so that seeking one’s benefit constitutes an integrative principle of all acting.

This view perhaps “prefigures” the motivational analyses of modern psychologists who focus on human self-interest (from Nietzsche to Maslow to advocates of “selfish genes”), but it really is nothing else than the old idea that human acting is *also* motivated by the “principle of pleasure and pain”; for all creatures seek advantage and try to avoid disadvantage. This is often called “hedonism,” but the philosophical term rarely has anything to do with the vulgar hedonism it has come to be associated with in the popular understanding. Even the so-called hedonistic schools of philosophy which put pleasure (or happiness) at the center of their teachings (e.g. Aristippus, Epicurus) do not intend by this any form of egotistical selfishness or bodily pleasures but rather see it as an integrative principle springing from the experience of true self-knowledge (cf. Göbel 2002, 238–292). And a

9. “Object choice” simply describes the choice of an object and specific way of acting; I am not referring to the psychoanalytic term. NB: The fact that Anselm traces object choices back to the proper or improper ordering of desires within the acting person is very much in line with a long philosophical tradition but differs from an idea that has gained popularity in the modern world; according to Anselm, subjects are evil, not the objects they use to do evil things.

modern hedonist like J.S. Mill has to defend, in Chapter 2 of *Utilitarianism*, the principles of utility and happiness precisely by pointing out their integrative character. Mill emphasizes, for instance, that utility and happiness are identical, that pleasure is happiness, that it starts with the mere absence of pain, and that hedonism allows for different kinds and qualities of pleasures. Even more traditional approaches to anthropology and ethics turn out to be more integrative than one may first imagine, and philosophers like Aristotle,¹⁰ Augustine or Kant (to name just a few) consider “pleasure-seeking” as natural and valuable (although they dismiss some of its forms as unfitting and self-degrading for humans). Anselm shares the view that *DB* is “inseparable” from the human being (DC 3,12), for “for no one wills anything unless he thinks it is in some way beneficial for himself” (DCD 12). He even says that “by [*DB*] the will moves itself to other desires,” since “no one . . . wills something, unless he first (*prius*) has a natural desire to avoid what is not beneficial or have what is beneficial” (ibid.).

3. This last quote may be seen as further supporting Tyvold’s reading which distinguishes between desires for certain actions (first order) and a second-order *DB*. Anselm’s use of *prius* seems to suggest a *relationship* (a priority-relationship)—not, as Rogers holds, identity—between desires for particular actions and *DB*. If Tyvold’s view is sufficiently convincing and if at the same time Rogers is right in emphasizing the hierarchical relationship *between DB and DJ*, we might be forced into introducing a third order of desires at this point. This would call for a more complex structure of moral choices, since desires for certain actions (first order) would need to be aligned (in some morally relevant situations) with both *DB* (second order; this alignment would guarantee freedom in Frankfurt’s sense) and *DJ* (third order; this alignment would guarantee justice and freedom in Anselm’s sense).

However, Anselm’s reference to the “prior” *DB* in DCD 12 is clearly different from Frankfurt’s description of second-order desires: it is not a desire to have a certain desire¹¹; it is not “formed” (Frankfurt 1971, 83) in response to a first-order desire or a conflict of desires on the first order. Rather, it “precedes” any and all desires, and no “aligning” is needed with *this* higher-order desire for benefit. On the con-

10. This includes not only what he says on pleasure in NE II 3 (as opposed to NE I 5) but also his pre-moral definition of “the good” simply as “what everything seeks” (NE I 1).

11. Note that the reference to specific desires is still constitutive on the meta-level Frankfurt introduces.

trary, Anselm clearly holds that *all* desires *are* desires for benefit. Rogers' model therefore suggests that desires for specific actions, since they are all desires (*plural*) for benefit, can be subsumed under the concept of a "desire (*singular*) for benefit" (more precisely, they are all motivated by the underlying *DB*). At least for now, this allows us to preserve a two-order structure of the will and its desires. It is precisely the fact that created natures seek benefit in *all* their actions but justice only through *some* (only some desires for certain actions *also* fulfill *DJ*) that prompts Rogers' hierarchical understanding of the relationship between the two desires which in my view is the most convincing reading of the above quotes from DCD 12 and DC 3.

4. If *DB* is the integrative principle of all acting, justice could also, one might say, become *subordinate* to benefit. In other words, one may seek or do justice for one's personal benefit alone (e.g., to gain social status, one's peers' esteem or some other reward, or to avoid punishment by the law or from God in the afterlife). However, Anselm's view of the relationship between the two desires is quite clear: benefit is subordinate to justice. Anselm is concerned with just benefits or "justly sought benefits" and condemns any good deed done for wrong reasons as immoral (an analysis, by the way, that is fully in line with both Aristotle and Kant, insofar as they are both "virtue ethicists"). Goebel points out that "willing something and willing it for a certain reason [because one ought to will it] is all there is" to the supposed hierarchy of desires (2017, 127); Anselm's reference to *DJ* thus serves as nothing more but an adverbial qualifier. This claim resonates with Anselm's words in DCD 14: the creature is "not able to be happy unless he wills to be and wills it justly." But Anselm uses hierarchical language in prominent passages of his account of moral choice precisely because it allows him to capture more clearly (1) the value judgment underlying the adverbial qualification of the *way* in which one acts on one's *DB* and thus (2) the relationship between the two desires. *DJ* "limits excesses" of *DB* (DCD 14) and expresses a fundamental orientation of the human being towards justice.

Some of the skepticism towards hierarchical readings of Anselm stems from the fact that there are important differences between Anselm and Frankfurt, especially regarding value judgments and moral choices properly speaking.¹² But Rogers never claims that their views

12. This expression refers to Anselm's distinction between proper and improper word uses (cf. DLA 5, DCD 1 et al.). More below.

are in every respect identical. Rather, she has merely observed that Anselm, too, seems to distinguish between different *orders* of desires and that this distinction is by no means trivial when it comes to analyzing the operations of the will and furthermore is consistent with the way some contemporary philosophers speak on the matter.

5. A few words on the issue of moral judgment in Frankfurt and Anselm. Needless to say, Frankfurt incorporates judgment into his analysis of those desires for specific actions that Rogers subsumes under the concept of *DB*. The evaluative dimension is in fact the characteristic feature of Frankfurt's definition of freedom and personhood and prompts his hierarchical analysis of the will; "reflective self-evaluation" on a higher level is key for him (Frankfurt 1971, 83). This requires some degree of self-distance: "one must be able to step back from one's immediate desires, assess them, and identify with some over others" (89; cf. Rogers 2005, 250).

Now, Frankfurt and Tyvoll mainly discuss judgment and evaluation at a level "below" justice and morality properly speaking. They look at desires for specific actions and *DB*. I earlier said that there doesn't seem to be any "aligning" involved at this level, but this claim needs to be further qualified. Tyvoll's application of Frankfurt's theory to Anselm seems misguided in its focus on the relationship between desires for specific actions and *DB* (for all desires are desires for benefit); yet, when conflicts between desires for specific actions arise, it is the reference to or, rather, formation of a second-order desire (wanting to have a particular first-order desire) which decides the conflict, if, that is, the second-order desire is to be effective.

A decision may be made on account of the fact that desires are judged to be *more or less* beneficial (i.e. promise more benefit when turned into volitions and then actions) or based on judgments about false and proper benefit. Frankfurt and Tyvoll offer examples of addicts, which suggest that agents can, or cannot, choose long-term health over a momentary pleasure and short-term satisfaction (the desire to smoke may or may not be rendered ineffective by the second-order desire that one would rather desire not to smoke). Or it may simply be the case that a person prefers (i.e. desires more), in a given situation, benefit b over benefit a (e.g., "writing over reading": Tyvoll 156; cf. DC 3,11). Frankfurt's point is that "a person has freedom of will (i.e. their effective desires are free) in so far as they can control their desires" (Holton, 1; cf. Frankfurt 1971, 90) since it is the "peculiar characteristic of humans . . . to form . . . second-order desires" (Frankfurt 1971, 82). More precisely, Frankfurt sees it as "essential to being a person" (and

not just a “wanton” who doesn’t “care about his will”) to have second-order *volitions*, rather than just “having second-order desires generally” (86), for the important feature of reflective self-evaluation, personhood and freedom is to be “concerned with the desirability of desires themselves” (87). It is, to be clear, a matter of free *will*, not just of free *action*. It is not significant “whether he is in a position to translate his first-order desires into action. That is the question of whether he is free to do as he pleases. . . Freedom of the will means that a person is free to want what he wants to want . . . or to have the will he wants. . . . It is in securing the conformity of his will to his second-order volitions . . . that a person exercises freedom of the will” (90). Frankfurt 1969 thus defines freedom simply as the harmony between first- and second-order desires and holds that this does not necessarily require a PAP. This looks very much like another surprising similarity between Frankfurt and Anselm, since Anselm rejects the Augustinian notion that a PAP (the ability to sin or not to sin) is essential to his definition of freedom (*PSR*²). Rogers, however, rejects this aspect of Frankfurt’s account based on her “unpacking” of Anselm’s definition and application to the case of creatures which, she insists, need open options as essential ingredients of true, libertarian freedom.

We will come back to this claim. It may suffice at this point to remind critics that the language of higher orders can simply be read as a new way to highlight the old philosophical idea that humans are self-reflective beings; their capacity to reason gives them their very dignity. Frankfurt and Anselm, as well as most other thinkers in the classical tradition of philosophical anthropology (including Aristotle, Augustine, and Kant) “suggest that we have a great deal of control over which desire we will entertain and allow to influence us” (FaS, 89).¹³

1.3 Anselm’s Theo-Teleological Value System and the Structure of the Will

1. Above, I briefly considered a hierarchical model that combines Tyvoll’s and Rogers’ readings of Anselm and that would require us to introduce a third order of desires, so the question may arise if there could be any further higher-order desires, indeed, any indeterminate number of a potentially infinite series of orders (hence my reference to

13. This idea may have come under scrutiny in certain branches of modern philosophy and contemporary science but that is not where the criticism of hierarchical models of the will and Anselm’s doctrine of the two desires generally comes from. For a choice of highly “Kantian” and Augustinian insights into the mechanics of moral choice, see DV 12, DLA 5, DCV 4, DC 3,13.

“n-order volitions” in the title of part 1). Although we have so far been able to preserve a dual structure, I will argue that there is another order of desires that we need to consider in Anselm. Nevertheless, there is a clear answer to the more general question at which point the series of orders will come to an end. Frankfurt himself has seen the problem of an infinite regress, and some critics argue that he merely suggests a pragmatic, arbitrary and unconvincing reason for stopping at the second order (cf. Holton, 2; Watson, 107; Goebel 2006, 100). Even Frankfurt himself initially says that “there is no theoretical limit to the length of the series of desires of higher and higher orders; nothing except common sense and, perhaps, a saving fatigue” prevents a person from stopping at a certain point (1971, 91). But is this really true in the end?

According to Frankfurt, “there are certain desires that we identify with and . . . free will consists in getting our desires in line with these” (Holton, 2), and “when a person identifies himself *decisively* with one of his first-order desires, this commitment ‘resounds’ throughout the potentially endless array of higher orders” (Frankfurt 1971, 91). It is, therefore, not at all arbitrary to stop at the second order *if it is the order of* those desires that we identify with, or if a solved conflict at the second order allows us to identify with a specific first-order desire. Note that second-order desires may also be in conflict, so what really matters is how they are turned into *volitions*, and thus, in turn, see to it that the corresponding first-order desire becomes effectively one’s will. The choice which first-order desire a person wants to identify with is made at a higher level (second order). And if no second-order desire becomes effective (unresolved second-order conflict), a person turns into a “paralyzed, helpless bystander to the forces that move him” (91).¹⁴ While a “wanton addict may have no identify apart from his first-order desires,” even the “unwilling addict identifies himself . . . through the formation of a second-order volition, with one rather than with the other of his conflicting first-order desires” (88).¹⁵

2. It seems to me that the emphasis Frankfurt places on self-identification is, generally speaking, very much in line with Anselm’s focus on freedom as a kind of virtuous “self-perfection” (Kane) and self-choice or

14. Similarly, if an “individual obsessively refuses to identify himself with any of his desires” and thus never “terminates such a series of acts,” his behavior “leads towards the destruction of a person” (91).

15. It may happen that he remains addicted due to external forces but he can at least gain some kind of inner freedom.

“self-creation” (Rogers¹⁶), and that this aspect may be overlooked by critics of a Frankfurian interpretation. It remains, however, true that Frankfurt’s motivational analysis of the will cannot fully account for the reasons *why* a person “decisively identifies” with a certain desire. This requires both an additional *faculty of judgment* (i.e., a faculty which is external to the will as such and allows us to “choose what we judge most desirable”: AoF, 37) and also *standards* by which the decision is made to prefer desire a over desire b through turning second-order desire a’ into second-order volition a” (making the desire effective), so that a person chooses to do a rather than b. Such a faculty of judgment, which also has access to external or internal standards for its choices, might be human reason or even emotions and natural sentiments.¹⁷

While Frankfurt’s analysis certainly implies evaluation and judgment, it doesn’t seem to refer to any particular value framework which would provide ultimate standards for someone’s choice to identify with a certain desire and judge it as more beneficial or better than others. This has led Frankfurt’s critics to ask if there is “anything special about higher order desires? Might they be trivial, or flippant (Consider my desire that I have cool desires). Why should we think of freedom as consisting in their efficacy?” (Holton, 2).

In fact, the standard examples of smokers or addicts aren’t really cases of moral choices properly speaking, or “morally significant freedom” in Anselm’s sense (Rogers 2005, 250; Williams/Visser, 9); for they are not matters of *justice, sin, and salvation* (cf. DLA 6, DC 1,6 et al.). Anselm uses the very example of preserving one’s health in DC 3,11 but solely as an example of benefit-seeking *without justice*. It is not immoral but morally irrelevant (amoral) in the proper sense of moral choices.¹⁸ Rogers notices that “a major difference between Frankfurt’s

16. Rogers introduces the term in her earlier work (e.g. AoF, 12) but gives it even more prominence in FaS.

17. Frankfurt 1971, 92 considers this without coming to a conclusion. On the role of reason, cf. Watson (see below).

18. This assertion seems to conflict with an idea that goes back to Aristotle and becomes prominent in later scholastic philosophy (doctrine of natural law), namely that self-preservation *is* a moral issue (a right and a duty), unless one argues that “benefit” constitutes its own category of morality. This is possible since the happiness all beings seek is, for Anselm, a “moral” goal, but it does not yet cover the specific notion of happiness *and* morality that Anselm focusses on in his discussion of the relationship between *DB* and *DJ*. In this specific sense, his example in DC 3,11 does not fall under Rogers’ more general observation that, on principle, “flourishing in the Aristotelian sense is part of [Anselm’s] moral landscape” and that he doesn’t distinguish between moral and prudent choices. Rogers thus sees

analysis and Anselm's [lies in the fact that] Frankfurt explicitly states that the second-order desires, though necessary for personhood and free will, need not have any moral content" (2005, 259).

Rogers points out that Anselm avoids and solves the issue of a potential regress: "For Anselm, there is no threat of an infinite regress of orders of desire. God's will is the absolute standard of value and once one has chosen to select one's first-order desires against that standard, there is no higher value to appeal to" (*ibid.*, 262). I would emphasize more clearly, though, that it is not Anselm's mere reference to God that puts an end to the order of desires but the fact that his value system has an absolute, external foundation (i.e., a natural order of things the agent knows, accepts, and even has a natural desire for).

3. The kind of criticism of Frankfurt that highlights the undistinctive character of second-order desires and, therefore, finds them superfluous or arbitrary cannot apply to Rogers' account of Anselm. Anselm, too, thinks of different orders of desires, but he clearly transcends the scope of Frankfurt's analysis which includes cases of reduced moral choice. Anselm is only interested in man's responsibility for full-fledged moral choices, and the introduction of a second-order desire (i.e., *DJ*) allows him to describe moral choice as hierarchical. A higher-order desire (or volition, since it is here assumed that it becomes effective) allows rational natures to make a moral judgement and apply their value system to the choice for a specific action and, in the case of a conflict, to the choice between desires for specific actions.

Goebel (2006, 101) invokes Leibniz' skepticism regarding a supposed "ability (or will) to will" and argues that a "reflective will" is meaningless. But the claim seems problematic if it implies that conflicts between desires are trivial. Doesn't Rogers capture a very common human experience when she describes a "torn condition" without which, she thinks, true freedom is impossible? Isn't she right in calling this a "decidedly conscious experience" (FaS, 91)? We are, in effect, torn between "open options" which result from our own, conflicting desires. Anselm clearly makes this point in DCD. Humans face the existential difficulty of dealing with the fact that they seem "condemned to freedom" (J.-P. Sartre) and hence to making responsible choices. Second-order desires allow us to be more than "bystanders to the forces that move us." We have already seen that, in Frankfurt's

eating (gluttony) and health as moral issues and only something like "debating chocolate and pistachio" as a morally neutral choice (FaS, 118).

view, these second-order desires are still action-specific (i.e., they are desires for certain first-order desires which are desires for certain actions) and thus give reason and motivation for one's choice of acting. Furthermore, it is implied that this choice is made by certain standards (whether internal or external). It could therefore be argued that Rogers may simplify the role of second-order desires by *subsuming*, again, moral choices properly speaking (regarding conflicts between benefit and justice) under the (single) second-order "desire for justice" (this encompasses all conceivable second-order desires that first-order desires be effective *for just reasons*). Rogers nevertheless offers an accurate and illuminating account of moral choice and of Anselm's view of the two desires.

If we bear in mind this role of second-order desires, we could actually say that Anselm's claim that *DB* is *prius* to everything else (DCD 12) holds for *all* higher-order desires¹⁹: they are, as value standards which exist inside and outside the acting person, ontologically "prior" to other desires and choices, even though we may refer to them only "after" we experience a conflict of desires. The distinction between "priority in nature" and "priority in time" is typically Anselmian (cf. DV 2). So, if Anselm had used the language of numbered orders, he might have called desires for specific actions second-order desires and the higher-order desires by which we evaluate or motivate lower-order desires, or make them effective, first-order desires. Watson makes a similar observation in his critique of Frankfurt: "evaluations are prior and of the first order" (109). More precisely, second-order desires may be *formed* when a conflict arises, but a closer look at Anselm helps us understand that they are *informed* by something already present within the agent and, possibly, beyond his [not my] subjective value system.

4. Note, however, that Anselm's reference to *God* is not simply a theological claim that puts an end to any philosophical discussion; rather it is an integral part of his analysis of moral choice which, for Anselm, is always a *theologically informed* moral choice. This is most obvious in DLA 8 which takes us back to Anselm's understanding of freedom as *PSR*². This definition, of course, also serves as the foundation for Anselm's discussion of Satan's fall and for the doctrine of the two desires he introduces to address this test case in DCD. An analysis

19. This is true if *DB* is, as Tyvoll holds, a higher-order desire or just the underlying principle in all first-order desires.

of DLA 8 provides even further support for the hierarchical reading of Anselm's structure of the will.

It is well known that Anselm's theory of truth and his concept of freedom are closely related. Anselm has a "double correspondence theory" of propositional truth (cf. DV 2). Statements are true when they correspond to reality or facts (this part is in line with the classic definition of truth as *adaequatio intellectus et rei*) but, more importantly, "when they correspond to the purpose of making statements" (Williams/Visser, 2). One determines the other, but the latter is essential; for truth and truthfulness are rooted in the *teleological* nature of things. And Anselm has a sort of double correspondence theory not only of truth but also of freedom because morality is rooted in ontology. *Rectitudo* (which is how truth is defined in DV 2) constitutes the crucial connection: everything, including human actions, is oriented towards the natural order of things. A being has *rectitudo* when it is as "it ought to be," "does what it received the power to do," and thus accomplishes its goal, "in keeping with the purpose for which it was made" (DV 2). While non-rational creatures like animals fulfill their purpose naturally and instinctively (cf. DV 12, DLA 2), humans (and angels) are meant to fulfill it through their particular nature (i.e., reason and free accordance with the purpose of things). Anselm's philosophy is teleological ("Aristotelian") in its emphasis on the being's orientation towards the natural order of things, which may take the form of ontological "correctness" or moral "uprightness" (both are common English translations of *rectitudo*²⁰). More precisely, Anselm's philosophy is *theo-teleological* since, as a theist and Christian believer in creation, he sees the natural order as God-given.

It is in the analysis of free will in DLA 8 (not in DLA 5, if Goebel's critique of Saarinen is correct) that Anselm first uses hierarchical language in a manner that reads almost like Frankfurt's "ability to want what one wants to want" (1971, 90). Recall that Anselm's "distinctive definition" of freedom does not in itself indicate an indeterminateness or "ambivalence with regard to good and evil" (Verweyen, 39) that is situated in the conflict zone of same-order or different-order desires but the *capacity for justice* or goodness, namely, the "capacity for preserving rectitude of the will for the sake of rectitude itself" (*PSR*²:

20. Rogers elaborates on the meaning of *rectitudo* (2005, 251; AoF, 23f.64f.) and takes issue with common English translations which focus on the moral meaning of the word. Her point, however, has long been made, e.g. in seminal studies by Enders (1999) and Goebel (2001).

DLA 3; cf. DCD 7), so that one wants to will what one ought to will (“for which one was given a will”: DV 4) or wills “what God wills the will to will” (DLA 8; cf. DCD 4, DC 1,6). This language is almost identical with Frankfurt’s, except that Frankfurt says “one” where Anselm uses the word “God.” To be sure, Frankfurt singles out the human decision-making process and desires, just as does Anselm, but with Anselm we also find a reference to God’s will. However, in DCD God’s will gets translated into an innate desire rational creatures possess (i.e., *DJ*) thus shifting the consideration away from a purely theological one into that of a metaphysics of morals. Indeed, we can interpret the reference to God’s will in DLA 8 as a reference to the higher-order desire that allows rational creatures to make truly moral value-judgments. Anselm refers to an evaluative dimension in the decision-making process *and* identifies its transcendent source. Since, for Anselm, this is God, freedom is understood in terms of self-perfection or self-fulfillment in accordance with the natural order of things, which is to say the order God intended for things.

Anselm is not merely suggesting a direct and simplified version of divine commandment theory. Rather, rational creatures have internal, natural access to, and take ownership of, divine law. Anselm’s doctrine of the two desires which he believes God has implanted in rational minds demonstrates this. God’s will is ingrained in human nature. But Anselm’s analysis in DLA is also directed at the acting subject, so that the reference to God is indirect and has a cognitive (and motivating) function in the agent’s choice-making process. Knowledge of what “God wills the will to will” (= what I ought to do) resides within the mind, namely, on that self-reflective higher level which Anselm in DCD calls *DJ*, so it really means that I am free (and just) when I can will what I want to will *because* I have brought lower-order desires in line with *DJ*, which is conformity with the natural order and, thus, with God’s will. “Willing for sake of rectitude is the same as willing what God wills the will to will” (DLA 8). It has become part of my value system.

Note that such a view of ethics, as much as it relies on theology in Anselm’s case, may not need God to ground morality and responsibility. An innate faculty, *DJ* and the natural access to the moral law it provides, as well as a faculty of judgment and application, may suffice. Such a view would be in line with later Scholastic teachings on natural law (in particular Thomas on the various types of law) but also with Kant’s philosophy. In fact, this idea goes back to St. Paul’s belief in a natural law and to the Stoic principle of a “natural order” which was adopted into Christian theology (as “divine order”) and features prominently in Anselm’s atonement theory (cf. Göbel 2015, 36–42).

5. So, Rogers' observation that Anselm's reference to God puts an end to any indeterminate, potentially infinite series of orders of the will is not just true because of the theological dimension Anselm introduces, but rather because God happens to be the absolute, external foundation of Anselm's internal value system. The hierarchy of desires comes to an end when the evaluative dimension of human decision-making finds values which serve as ultimate standards for the agent's judgments. They may have a theological foundation or merely human sources, or, as in Anselm, a combination of both.

In principle, however, Frankfurt's problem of a possibly infinite regress of higher orders doesn't need a return to *Anselm* to be solved, as Rogers seems to imply (2005, 250). In fact, a similar solution (although without reference to a theo-teleological foundation of value judgments) has long been reached within the tradition of Frankfurt's disciples and critics. Watson, for instance, has contrasted "mere wanting" with judging something as good (97.99.105). He also emphasizes the role of reason in making value judgments. Reason is not just a "faculty of determining what is true and what is false" but a real "source of motivation" and "original spring of action" (98f.) since "values provide reasons for action" (97). For Watson, "what one most wants" is not just, as in Frankfurt's analysis, someone's "strongest desire" but "what one most values" (100). Values are an essential part of a person's "motivational system" (97).²¹ This (old) insight doesn't need to abandon Frankfurt's hierarchical schema, though. Lewis thus *identifies* what we value with our second-order desires (115f.). If Anselm "prefigures" any of this, it is the combined or amended view of a Frankfurt-style hierarchical account of freedom, something that also accounts for the value-dimension of proper moral choice.

Critics of Frankfurtian interpretations of Anselm may have a point in maintaining that the idea of higher-order desires is meaningless if it remains within the sphere of a "superficial human wanting" (e.g. Goebel 2006), but this is precisely where Anselm's hierarchical model (as Rogers presents it) differs from and transcends the scope of Frankfurt's analysis. Watson states that "second-order desires are themselves simply desires" (108). Anselm's *DJ* on the other hand (although he

21. This remains true even if there are people "who express themselves independently of [their] valuational judgments" (Watson, 110). Examples include compulsive behavior, weakness of will (acting against one's better judgment) but also self-deception and problems in the identification of one's values, to which the moral framework of a theist like Anselm may not be prone (although this likely depends on the believer's commitment to his religion's rules).

calls it “desire” or “will”) refers to a “valuation system” (105) which goes beyond mere desiring. Even more, its goal, justice, is not part of a subjective value system alone but has objective existence and a transcendent source in God who is the standard of all being and of all normativity. Emphasis on these differences between Anselm and Frankfurt may help reconcile Rogers with some of her critics. Talk of desire may underscore the subjective, human side of morality, but Anselm never loses sight of its objective foundation. In the just person, who is good and free, “what one wills the will to will” (because it is just) *is* “what God wills the will to will.”

6. As much as I find the hierarchical account helpful and compatible with Anselm’s approach, it is not clear to me how different this really is from Kant and “Kantian readings” of Anselm. Conflicts still arise, although they may arise “across orders” rather than on the same order of desires. But even that doesn’t seem entirely true. There are still desires for specific actions that are mutually exclusive if the agent does his “duty” (in both Kant’s and Anselm’s sense) and aligns his *DB* with the *DJ*.

Rogers certainly acknowledges these conflicts; they are in fact essential in her emphasis on genuinely open options of acting without which created natures cannot prove their freedom: “We are not seriously torn in morally interesting ways unless we see mutually exclusive ‘goods’ to pursue” (FaS, 159; cf. AoF, 86.100). It even seems that she falls back on the language of same-order conflicts when she talks about “competing desires” and “two categories of good” (FaS, 92). But this is not the case. What seems like unclear language results from the very intricate way in which Anselm conceives moral choice. There is (1) no conflict *per se* between the two desires, but there are conflicts between options of choice. Yet, the “torn condition” does not (2) simply arise from something purely objective (i.e., from a conflict between options which merely present themselves externally to the acting person). Rather, the torn condition arises *within* the subject (the acting person’s will) as a result of the desires humans are endowed with. This leads to a conflict between *two ways to seek benefit*: mere benefit and just (justly sought) benefit (when *DJ* qualifies *DB*). It is precisely the hierarchical schema that explains the difference and allows us to see that conflicts between same-order desires for specific actions really constitute cross-order conflicts between the (mere) *DB* and the (additional) *DJ*. In fact, there are enough passages in Rogers’s works where she adds similar qualifiers. For example: “The torn condition arises when the agent desires justice on the one hand and, on the other, some conflicting ‘mere’ benefit which is inappropriate. But the desire for justice is a second-order desire about

how to regulate our first-order desires. We are always motivated by what we believe will be of some benefit for us” (FaS, 118).

Rogers is right in pointing out that, on principle, *DB* and *DJ* are not opposed to one another (AoF, 72, cf. DCD 14, DC 3,14). But some desires for specific actions are. In other words, some desires for benefit cannot be aligned with justice or *DJ*; for benefit needs to be sought in a way that is compatible with justice and the higher principles of morality. This, however, is not really different from Kant’s view of moral autonomy which is also grounded in what we could call a “hierarchical” anthropology (this may be most obvious in *Religion within the Bounds of Reason Alone*²²). Rogers insists that *commoditas* is better translated with “benefit” than “advantage” to avoid the Kantian connotation of immoral selfishness (2005, 254); she claims that Kant “pits duty against self-interest and natural inclination” (AoF, 72) and that Kantian readings of Anselm fail to see the non-exclusive relationship between justice and benefit.

But Kant’s account of moral choice, duty, and virtue is more intricate than this kind of dualism. He acknowledges that one source of human acting is sensibility, which he sees as a predisposition to the good that humans possess insofar as they are animals. He does call its principle “self-love,” but this is not in itself evil. The “propensity” to evil is not a “natural property” precisely because “it can be imputed to the man, and consequently must consist in maxims of the elective will.” Sensibility and self-love are natural, therefore not immoral but simply amoral. However, they can lead to evil if they are not controlled by reason, that is, if a person ignores his inherent access to the moral law, if, that is, “he reverses the moral order of the springs” of human acting. Evil does not result from “the distinction of the springs that he adopts into his maxim” but from a false “subordination” which makes “self-love and its inclinations the condition of obedience to the moral law,” whereas morality and the natural order demand the exact opposite.²³ Evil results if self-love (as a sort of *DB*) is not aligned with practical reason and the moral law or “justice.”²⁴ A closer look at Kant’s

22. Quotes in the following paragraph are from Section Three of Part One (Abbott translation).

23. Kant is even skeptical of the so-called Golden Rule because it may be followed out of self-interest (*Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals*, A 69; cf. Augustine, *De libero arbitrio* I 3).

24. Goodness for Kant is certainly a matter of reason and judgment (not of desires or feelings), but Anselm too thinks of moral judgment. Both agree that freedom “is only real as a capacity for the moral good” (Verweyen, 39). Even hap-

hierarchical analysis of evil suggests that, despite Rogers' concerns, Anselm does indeed seem to prefigure not only Frankfurt but Kant as well, and that he may at the same time stand in an older tradition which goes back to Aristotle and others simply because they all share some fundamental insights into human decision-making.²⁵

One might argue that, for Anselm, seeking benefit is not just amoral but has genuine moral value. This, however, doesn't seem to be totally accurate. *DB* is an integrative principle of all acting and, as such, falls into the realm of what we might call today motivation analysis. It is only *DJ* (added to *DB*) that allows us to make morally significant choices and thus enter the realm of proper morality. *DB* is certainly part of the *rectitudo* of things (animals have rectitude), but it is not sufficient to ascribe praise, blame, justice, or to ground freedom and responsibility.²⁶

Kant acknowledges that self-love is a legitimate determining factor of the human will (although in itself amoral and only of moral concern if it conflicts with the moral law). Anselm's view that humans always seek benefit is similar, and he clearly sees that "mere benefit" *can* imply the kind of selfishness Kantian readings deem immoral. Conflict situations mark the difference and may turn an amoral desire into evil. At the heart of their moral analyses, both Anselm and Kant focus on a form of justice (moral goodness) that doesn't just result from desire but is freely chosen for its own sake.

Nevertheless, what Anselm calls *DB* will also motivate those actions that spring from *DJ* or, rather, actions springing from *DB* aligned with *DJ*. In other words, all choices retain their orientation towards benefit if this is indeed the underlying motive of all willing. Up to this point, *DB* may in fact have a wider extension, but it still remains of a lower order than *DJ* since, according to Anselm, the former needs to be aligned with the latter if one wants to act justly and freely; the reverse is never the case. The "will for justice does not aim

pinness is a key term in Kant's moral philosophy (the happiness of others is one of those ends that are at the same time duties: *Metaphysics of Morals: Doctrine of Virtue*, A 5).

25. The fact that Rogers "pits" *Kant against Aristotle* may actually be the problem; a revision of Kant may be in order. My proposed reconsideration of Kant's "virtue ethics" and a comparison between Anselm, Kant, and Aristotle deserves a more detailed discussion than can be offered here. I plan to return to it in a separate paper.

26. Anselm even insists that a hypothetical creature which might *only* have *DJ* could not be called free or responsible for his choices either (DCD 14). He wouldn't be immoral but his actions wouldn't have any moral value.

at some object opposite to benefit. It operates at a higher level curtail- ing the excesses of the first-order desires for benefits” (FaS, 257).

It now seems to me, though, that actions springing from *DJ* (in addition to *DB*) provide some *other kind* of benefit (or happiness) which may not just fall under the benefit/happiness Anselm explicitly considers in his discussion of the two desires in DCD. We may, there- fore, based on other passages in Anselm’s work, need to think of a third-order desire to complement his model of the will and fully cap- ture the meaning of this other conception of happiness.

1.4 Human Fulfillment and Theo-Anthropology: A Third Desire and Other Kind of Happiness?

1. Anselm’s double correspondence morality entails respect for the natural order in one’s moral choices and, thus, the agent’s realization of his purpose and place within that order. Ethics is grounded in anthropology; the nature of the human being is part of God’s creation and of his plan for the world. Morality provides happiness since it is completion of the human nature and gives the satisfaction of having achieved self-knowledge and self-realization. What I have called Anselm’s (theo-)teleology above informs his view of the human being and thus extends to his ethics as well. In short, Anselm’s analysis of morally right choices is grounded in his (*theo-*) *teleological anthropology*.

This is an idea that we have come to associate with a virtue ethics account of character development and personhood. Human flourish- ing is found in the fulfillment of our higher faculties. The end consists in the proper exercise of one’s rational and moral abilities (Aristotle’s *telos*-nature context of *energeia* and *entelecheia*). Rogers repeatedly elaborates on the similarities between Anselm and Aristotle (e.g. FaS, 33.38.77.118). On this account, the virtuous person will at the same time be a happy person because happiness is “activity of the soul in accordance with virtue” (NE I 7). At first glance, it may seem that hap- piness, as human fulfillment, trumps justice, but that is not actually the case. The Aristotelian notion of happiness is in fact in line with Anselm’s hierarchical account which allows us to introduce the quali- fier “true” or “proper” to preserve the subordination of benefit to jus- tice Anselm upholds in DCD, and this is achieved precisely through the agent’s value judgment which brings *DB* in line with *DJ*. This achieved justice then results in “true” benefit which can genuinely be called “happiness” (*beatitudo*). Rogers sees this, too: “Your over-arch- ing life goal—the aim of your self-creation—is to flourish as a human agent” (FaS, 73). This is similar to Aristotle’s virtue ethics in its

emphasis on character-formation. Anselm shares the “view that your choices produce your character” (29.87).

Anselm defines his ethics of the good life anthropologically, informed, just like Aristotle, by an understanding of the purpose or proper function of the human being. Anselm’s distinctive definition of freedom as *PSR*² aims at conformity between acting and being. Anselm thus “argues that as a property of a rational will freedom cannot be thought of abstractly but must be considered in relation to the view of man and purpose of the being who is said to possess it” (Kane, 300).

There is, however, an additional aspect to Anselm’s ethics. For what is the function or purpose of the human being according to Anselm? It is twofold and thus transcends the Aristotelian (and any non-theological) account in that it extends from the realm of anthropology and ethics into the realm of theology.

(a) Man is, Anselm says, a “rational creature” (*Monologion* [= M] 68, cf. *Cur Deus homo* [= CDH] II 1). In line with a longstanding philosophical tradition, Anselm emphasizes the rational nature of the human being. This has relevance for his metaphysics of morals: the theo-teleology of being, which turns into a theo-teleology of acting when the rational agent does what God wills him to do, is not only something God or the natural order of things *demand*, but God or the natural order of things have made it such that humans desire justice and understand this demand by means of what is most distinctive of man, namely, reason (practical reason). So, for humans the natural order of things does not just consist in being what they are; they also need to use their reason and understand what they are ordained to do. Reason is that very faculty that allows them to order their desires properly.

(b) Furthermore, humans are created to “know and love God” whose “mirror and image” the human mind is (M 67ff.). We are asked to “imitate God” (M 68) and thus gain the “blessedness,” “happiness,” “salvation,” or “happy immortality” we were made for (CDH Pr, I 10.19, II 1.10; cf. DC 3,13). This thought guides Anselm throughout his philosophical endeavors and takes the form of a personal confession in *Proslogion* (= P) 1: “I was created so that I might see you but I have not yet done what I was created to do” since “the image of God created in me is eroded by vices” and God will have “to renew and refashion” it so that Anselm can use his proper powers again. Like Aristotle, Anselm stresses the role of reason, but there is yet another dimension in man’s orientation towards God which goes beyond a mere ethical fulfillment of the natural order and God’s will (although he believes that the kind of happiness it results in can only be obtained through morality).

2. According to Anselm, a first goal of the human being is to imitate God through a proper use of one's powers of reason and will. It is "in being free that we are made in the image of God" (AoF, 113, cf. M 68, CDH II 10). These powers are in fact so great that humans are capable of "self-initiated action" (Williams/Visser, 8), and the emphasis that voluntarist accounts of Anselm's moral philosophy place on this essential ingredient of true freedom²⁷ is echoed by Rogers' focus on *aseity*.

For Anselm, the value of free will consists in the ability to imitate God, and the way in which we "actualize the image of God in ourselves" is through "aseity," or the ability to choose "from ourselves" between alternatives (Rogers 2005, 251; cf. DLA 14, DCD 12 et al.). More importantly, this choice determines our character and thus constitutes some form of self-creation. *A se* choices in morally relevant situations are all about "freely and responsibly forming our characters" (AoF, 9). The human being does not have self-creating powers in the fullest, divine sense of the word, and the tools we use come from God. But according to Rogers, Anselm insists that "self-creation is the whole point of freedom" (AoF, 12). Free choice and freedom in the sense of virtuous self-perfection belong together if our choices do indeed "help in the construction of our own characters" (FaS, 37). This is Anselm's point in DCD 18: the condition of a rational creature (i.e. being endowed with *DB* and *DJ*) is such that "he would be able to give justice to himself." Rogers holds that it is Anselm's goal to "carve out a genuine domain for created choice in the universe of traditional, classical theism," and he arrives at some sort of "reflective primary cause" which mirrors the "primary agency of God" (AoF, 19). Rogers maintains that Anselm thus departs from Augustine's "theist compatibilism" (31ff.) and insists on a libertarian interpretation of the choice between competing desires, which serves as a "measure of independence" or aseity (11.106). Desires "may be explainable in terms of preceding causes" (in our case, God) but "the winning out of one desire over another" is not (60). The phrasing is problematic: it seems to refer again to a conflict between the two desires, and it also seems to denote a certain passivity, as if the agent were nothing but a bystander in this conflict. That, however, is not what Rogers has in mind.

She speaks of "parsimonious agent-causation," acknowledging that for created beings "the space for aseity is small" (FaS, 81ff.). "All that

27. Cf. Williams/Visser, 25: "there is no responsible agency unless there is an element of radical voluntarism somewhere."

is up to [man] is [to] hold onto God-given justice or throw it away” (AoF, 101). In DCD 2, Anselm refers to Jn 8:44 (“the devil did not hold on to the truth”) and coins the term *pervelle* to describe the modest autonomy of rational creatures. What the agent does “from himself” is nothing but “hold on” to justice or “will it through to completion” when there are options of seeking mere benefit instead. He preserves rectitude justly (i.e., for the sake of rectitude itself: *PSR*²⁸). But this is still true aseity, and it is only possible for the created nature if one is confronted with “genuinely open options” (FaS, 9). It is here that the torn condition or PAP has its decisive role. Anselm modifies his general definition of freedom for creatures and exemplifies it with Satan’s choice and the two desires of the will. Created freedom may only consist in letting justice prevail (or one’s *DJ* when it is not compatible with the desire for a certain benefit), but it is “willed through” a conflict situation, and it is done by free choice. The desire comes from God (it is a “god-given motivation”) but, under the conditions Anselm describes, the “winning out” becomes an instance of true “self-causation.” Thus, it is “up to the creature” in a libertarian sense and therefore grounds responsibility (AoF, 60.72.118.153). In order for this to be possible God endowed rational creatures with *both* desires. Moreover, this choice is not determined in the kind of intellectualist sense that would exclude any form of voluntarism, since even if a person judges something as (1) beneficial and (2) just, he still needs to will it through and doesn’t merely act on the rational insight *alone*.²⁹

28. Rogers’ interpretation (e.g. FaS, 92.96) has received criticism from, among others, Ekenberg (2016a, 2) who claims that *pervelle* is “not related to the mechanics of choice” and simply means “persevering in justice.” The latter is correct, but perseverance implies choices (cf. Rogers’ response in her paper published in this issue). Furthermore, Goebel 2017, 127 points out that Anselm’s *pervelle* describes perseverance “in one’s fully fledged will,” not merely “in some desire.” One sticks to one’s choice and doesn’t change one’s will/mind before the action is completed (cf. DCD 3; Goebel 2006, 97f.). This seems correct but also compatible with Rogers’ view if we state more precisely that the “perwilling of justice” (or similar phrases Rogers uses) is actually something the “entire will” does: it is perseverance in the proper ordering of one’s desires or in properly ordered desires.

29. The main concern here is not so much that someone following pre-established rules of morality cannot be free (freedom is no anarchy; Kant, in particular, emphasizes that freedom can only be developed under the law) but the internalist notion that the will necessarily follows the moral insight of reason and therefore is not free. This is particularly true for a Christian thinker and moral realist: a moral judgment recognizes something God, a preceding cause, has pre-decided: “what is good is decided by God” (Ekenberg 2016, 70). But the concern seems unfounded, as we shall see later (part 2).

It might, in any case, be more appropriate to speak of co-self-creation (rather than “self-creation”) since Anselm clearly sees God as the one who provides everything except that choice itself in which the human agent holds on to justice. The role of creatures is, after all, ontologically limited; but the purpose of Anselmian free choice, as Rogers sees it, is clear: we “participate in our own creation by making ourselves better on our own” and thus the “created agent enhances his moral stature” (FaS, 24.156).

3. If rational beings are made in the image of God and are therefore “god-like,” it would seem that final fulfillment of their being, or the highest degree of their powers, is achieved if and when they succeed in *being like God*. This would also provide them with supreme happiness, something that Anselm confirms in his discussion of *DB* in DCD 13 where he considers the (unsatisfying) hypothesis that the fallen angel could have received *DB* only and holds that “the higher he realizes happiness can be, the more he wills to be happy . . . therefore, he wills to be like God (*vult esse similis deo*).” But this cannot truly be the case. The angel must have had *DJ* as well to “curtail the excesses” of his desire for benefit/happiness (DCD 14), namely, to have what is not “fitting for him,” to wish for things improperly or for benefits not meant for him. Thus, it is not “fitting” for a creature to (desire to) be like God.³⁰ It seems, however, that this self-restriction, which results from the proper ordering of desires (cf. DC 3,13), is not just a matter of curtailing *DB*, as Anselm says; rather, there is *another kind* of happiness/benefit involved which, in the final analysis, the self-restriction and self-control of human beings *leads to*.

We have seen that Anselm does in fact insist on another purpose and meaning of human existence aside from being a rational being. This additional purpose is to “see” and “be with” God. This is clear from the emphasis Anselm places on the Christian notion of salvation (cf. CDH). He builds (e.g. in CDH II 1.4) on the Augustinian idea that humans have a “metaphysical nature” (cf. Fischer) which is both rational (they want to “know God” and understand last things) and affective (they “love God” and desire to be with him). This nature that is oriented towards God comes from God himself who “has made us and drawn us to himself,” so that we may strive to seek, love, and

30. It is also ontologically impossible. We may wonder how good a metaphysician Satan was if he didn’t see this impossibility (there is one exception: Jesus Christ; the desire to be like God is therefore not in itself evil: DCD 19).

understand him and, one day, dwell with him, since in his presence the restlessness that permeates the human condition (reason and will) will come to an end: “our heart is restless until it rests in you” (*Confessiones* I 1). It is this idea of man’s God-given orientation towards God which I call Anselm’s *theo-anthropology*, or, more precisely, his theo-teleological theo-anthropology.

Anselm’s moral landscape is not so much, as Rogers holds, influenced by Aristotelian *eudaimonism* but rather by what I call Augustinian *beatitudinism*. The latter implies the former, but the purpose and goal of the human existence does not only consist in “flourishing by fulfilling one’s natural purpose” of being rational and moral (FaS, 118). For Anselm, and any Christian thinker, the ontological and moral completion of the human nature (and, thus, of the natural order) in this life is not the final goal. Rather, it consists in being with God in the afterlife. Humans yearn for God’s presence, but it is only actualized in heaven.³¹ Both *eudaimonia* and *beatitudo* mean “happiness,” but the Latin term better captures this additional, transcendent, and theological dimension of Christian anthropology and ethics. Such happiness does not directly consist in doing what one is supposed to do, it is not simply the satisfaction one finds in self-knowledge and self-realization, or self-determination and self-perfection; rather, it is a happiness granted by God as a *reward* for doing “what God wills the will to do” (DLA 8).³²

For Anselm, a moral choice is never a moral choice alone. The final purpose of all human acting is everything Anselm says about the nature and scope of freedom but in a more complete way, and justice (moral goodness) is the precondition rational creatures have to meet in order to receive the kind of happiness we have just described (DCD 13). “Justice is the requisite for our achieving the goal for which God made us: eternal happiness in His presence. Why is justice necessary? Because only by choosing justice can the rational creature ‘polish’ the image of God in himself and become a genuine *imago dei*, meriting the happiness for which he was made” (AoF, 56). As has already been pointed out: for Anselm, the question of genuine moral responsibility, i.e. the attribution of praise and blame to a human agent and his choices, has eschatological

31. Although the heavenly existence with God has often been conceived as “beatific vision” (cf. 1 Cor 13:12), Anselm doesn’t use this particular term very often. It does, however, feature prominently in a passage that is essential to his theo-anthropology (M 70). For an account of Anselm’s concept of heaven, cf. Fortin 2008.

32. For a “purely Aristotelian” virtue ethicist, virtue is its own reward.

relevance; it is about sin and salvation, heaven or hell (cf. *De conceptu virginali* [DCV] 23, DLA 6.14, DC 3,9.12), so that “freedom is doing what one ought to do for the sake of salvation” (Luscombe 2006³³). The desire for this kind of happiness doesn’t find its highest form in what Anselm describes as perfecting the desire for benefit/happiness he considers in DCD 13 (i.e., to *be like God*). So, shouldn’t we rather conclude that good angels and humans who do what God wills them to do act from a desire that aims at *being with God*?

Anselm is certainly aware of this desire (e.g., M 70) as well as the fact that sin (“abandoning justice”) affects one’s happiness (Satan “took happiness away from himself”: DCD 18). But he doesn’t seem to consider it enough in his description of *DB*.³⁴ A hierarchical model of the will which is inspired by Anselm but aims at a complete account of moral choice—explaining, in particular, evil choices—will have to place sufficient emphasis on the longing for eternal happiness with God, and therefore I suggest modifying such models and introducing a third desire, the *desire for Happiness* (hereafter *DH*). The capital “H” distinguishes it from what I have so far called *DB* or, referring to Anselm’s use of *beatitudo*, the “desire for benefit/happiness” (lower-case h). It seems to me that *DH* cannot simply be identified with *DB* (i.e., the happiness that is subordinate to justice) precisely because its goal (or highest degree and final fulfillment) is distinct from that of the “lower” desire which “merely” aims at likeness with God.³⁵

33. Luscombe refers to Williams/Visser who acknowledge that Anselm is only interested in “morally significant freedom” but seem to see a difference between DV/DLA and other passages (e.g. DC 1,6) saying that Anselm here “explicitly restricts the scope of the discussion . . . to morally significant freedom, i.e., the freedom necessary for salvation” (2001, 9, n. 23).

34. According to Anselm, injustice also affects happiness in this life, e.g., Adam’s “unhappiness that consists in the powerlessness to recover the good things one has lost” (DCV 12, cf. DC 3,13). Rogers is aware of the peculiar nature of creaturely happiness but only refers to it in a footnote (FaS, 124).

35. Goebel (2006, 110) makes a related observation. Objecting to hierarchical interpretations, he refers to the distinction between two manifestations of good instead (DC 1,7): the pleasing and the just (this is in line with Aristotle’s pre-moral definition of the good in NE I 1). The evil person’s will can only desire one form of the good, namely what (seemingly) pleases or benefits him. This *affectio commodi*, Goebel says, simply follows a “logic of maximizing.” However, the desire to maximize is not the main issue here (one could also seek to maximize justice and proper Happiness), it is the difference in scope and purpose of the kind of benefit/happiness one seeks. —NB: My proposed distinction between two desires for happiness could employ Anselm’s words *commoditas* and *beatitudo*, were it not for the fact that he uses them interchangeably.

Although Anselm does not say this explicitly: evil springs in fact not only from disorder between *DB* and *DJ* but from confusion about the two forms of happiness.³⁶ Anselm does make it clear, though, that even the god-like aseity rational creatures have has a goal and context, namely, it fulfills the purpose of a rational being at a certain level (i.e., to imitate divine powers), but it still is a tool only for the sake of something else (i.e., to be with God). The final goal, and true freedom, is self-initiated action that leads to self-perfection through proper self-determination and thus merits the heavenly existence with God. We can therefore establish another hierarchical relationship between the two purposes and forms of happiness: aseity is a godlike ability; its goal, however, is not just to be like God but to be with God. It should be noted more clearly that *beatitudo*, not aseity, is the final perfection of the human being and reward for justice and freedom in Anselm's distinct sense of *PSR*². Taken out of context and deprived of its purpose, aseity can also lead *away* from God.

4. The introduction of a third *DH* into the hierarchical model of the will sheds new light on a puzzle that goes beyond an investigation into the nature and possibility of moral evil which Christian thinkers usually answer with some form of the free will defense. It is the question *why* humans (or angels) would ever have chosen evil in the first place. Anselm addresses both problems. But the supposed distinction between a desire for benefit/happiness and an additional *DH* calls for further reflection before we can turn to the problem of evil.

If justice leads to eternal happiness as a reward that is granted by God, one could argue that it ultimately serves another self-serving goal and brings about a personal benefit. But the goal is not selfish in the sense that both Anselm and Kant would deem immoral. It is nothing aimed at worldly advantage, nothing done at the expense of others. Choices that are just *cannot* come into conflict with *DH*, only with the *DB* Anselm discusses in *DCD*. The two are different precisely in that the latter needs to be aligned with *DJ*. If, however, a person does what he is meant to do, he perfects himself, is good to others, and merits God's favor in eternity. A good choice, in other words, manifests the harmony between anthropological, ethical, and theological determinations of the human existence.

36. Or, if one prefers to do without *DH* and hold on to a single desire for happiness/benefit instead, about two forms of fulfilling this desire: to be like God or to be with God.

On the one hand, the Happiness that results from justice and proper self-perfection is a transcendent quality. It therefore seems useful to see the corresponding desire in human beings as *higher* (belonging to a higher order) than *DJ*. On the other hand, *DJ* does not need to be aligned with this desire, insofar as it is not separate from justice and its theological context. One may thus be tempted to *identify* *DH* with *DJ* or see it, to use Aristotelian language, as a “consequent goal” of *DJ*. However, identifying the two desires wouldn’t take into account that *DH* underpins—and may actually *motivate*—*DJ*. Accordingly, this is the ultimate reason why we should desire justice and have received *DJ*. It is precisely the fact that the desire to be with God motivates *DJ* which, I believe, is reason enough to keep the two separate. The relationship between different orders of desires should not be conceived of as merely a process of aligning and curtailing in a very narrow sense of these words. Frankfurt’s emphasis on self-identification and the additional emphasis we have placed on higher-order desires and values as the appropriate instruments for the process of self-identification make this very clear. More precisely, *DH* motivates the agent to act on *DJ* and choose accordingly, and this is what the Frankfurtian model of the will describes as self-identification with a desire which then becomes effective and turns lower-order desires into volitions. *DH* is in this sense clearly a higher-order desire, higher, that is, than *DJ* and, thus, also higher than *DB*. So, a three-order structure of the will remains useful.

For similar reasons, it does not seem appropriate to subsume *DH* under *DB*. The latter, understood in the widest possible sense, could be conceived of as having two forms, with justice (or *DJ*) separating one from the other. I have pointed out that justice may be seen as the adverbial qualifier which allows human beings to seek benefit justly or to seek true benefit (i.e., Happiness). This means that the higher-order *DJ* has a qualifying *effect on* the lower-order *DB*, that is, by allowing a person to make a value judgment. But a two-order structure does not sufficiently explain the fact that we are, in turn, motivated by *DH* to act on *DJ* (the latter is “effected” by the former). *DH* does indeed “precede” (is *prius* to, cf. DCD 12) all other desires (including *DJ*), but it doesn’t seem to be *effective* in all human choices, which is what Anselm says of *DB*. This additional difference underscores the need to distinguish the two.

In fact, it turns out that the supposed universality of *DB*, if it only appears under the form of the desire for “mere benefit” without justice, can only be asserted in a very superficial way. It may even be seen as self-contradictory. For *DB* without justice does not lead to proper

benefit in the fullest meaning of the term (i.e., Happiness) but to its very opposite, meaning that those who perpetrate evil *a se* choices make themselves evil, abandon justice, and deprive themselves of the possibility to exercise *PSR*², the consequence of which is, according to Anselm, eternal *unhappiness*.

5. The distinction between two desires for happiness does not, however, solve the puzzle of evil choices, but it reconfirms something that should be commonplace in any theological ethics. Whatever the reason or direct motivation for an evil choice, one of its external yet necessary (albeit not sufficient) conditions is some kind of *cognitive deficiency*. This should not come as a surprise; for the created world is characterized by imperfection (Leibniz' "metaphysical" definition of evil is creaturely imperfection). Evil simply does not exist in the world of divine perfection. Some evil certainly results from irrational weakness of the will which leads a person to act against their best knowledge and give in to inappropriate desires.³⁷ Often, however, evil boils down to cognitive deficiency, the result being that the agent does not see his choice as evil. Anselm's insistence that rational creatures are not only endowed with *DB* but also with *DJ* aims at undermining this claim; the devil knows what God wants, his *DJ* gives him access to a natural moral law.

Rogers addresses some of these issues regarding the acting person's ignorance. Responsibility for character-determined choices can only be acknowledged if one is responsible for one's character ("tracing thesis"). Yet, what if a person does not understand that her choices determine her character? Rogers argues that the common principle of ethics that says that no one can be responsible for something done in ignorance does not apply here; for (1) humans *ought* to know that they build their characters by making choices, and (2) unawareness of the character-determining power of one's choices does not excuse evil choices (FaS, 217f.225).

Anselm addresses ignorance in DCD 23. He says that Satan could not have had full knowledge of all the *consequences* of his choice, namely, he couldn't have known for sure that he "would actually *be* punished," for otherwise he wouldn't have sinned. Satan does, however, know enough to be held responsible. "In Anselm's paradigm

37. See Goebel 2006 for a careful discussion of weakness of the will in Anselm. Goebel's focus, however, is not on weakness but on strength of the will (the two are not necessarily complementary antonyms) since that (i.e., the power to preserve justice) is what characterizes the good and free person according to Anselm.

instance of choice, Satan recognizes that he could conform to the divine will and that, in choosing what he chooses, he violates a divine command” and deserves punishment. Anselm’s example implies a distinction between “exculpatory and non-exculpatory ignorance” (FaS, 217.226). This analysis, however, only highlights the subordination of benefit to justice. More puzzling is the fact that the sinner (in the mere sense of evil-doer) seems to act against his own natural *DH*. The issue here is not so much that the sinner ignores *DJ* (evil clearly violates the principles of justice; this violation defines it as a moral term) or that his ignorance may have an effect on his responsibility. Anselm’s theo-anthropology sheds light on (or, rather, amplifies) the bigger puzzle of evil, namely, its motivation. Why exactly would anyone do evil if it ultimately leads to unhappiness, precisely, if he is fully aware that justly sought benefit would make him eternally happy?

Without the introduction of the third-order *DH*, this would be a flat contradiction of Anselm’s claim that creatures always seek happiness (*DB*) or, rather, a self-contradiction in the very desire that according to DCD 14 is motivating Satan even in his evil choice. Keeping *DB* and *DH* separate can help avoid this issue, but it doesn’t alleviate the cognitive dissonance at the heart of an evil choice.

Based on the separation between two desires for happiness, evil could simply be explained by saying that, while all humans are originally endowed with *DB* (which is always effective) and with *DJ* (which sinners “abandon”), some lack *DH*. But Anselm clearly thinks that all men were “made to enjoy God” (DC 3,13). If his theo-anthropology is correct, it has universal validity and all humans possess *DH*; they are all made to seek Happiness through justice, not “benefit simpliciter” (FaS, 82). It is important to note that *DH* cannot be mistaken for a merely moral imperative (like the demands of justice³⁸). It is a matter of self-fulfillment, not a (divine) commandment which could somehow be perceived as extrinsic and hegemonic, as somehow alien to myself. It is obvious, however, that *this* desire is *not* always effective in all human choices.

If their very nature commands humans to seek not only benefit but Happiness which results from justly sought benefit, evil choices are only possible in a state of ignorance which is, to be sure, not the root cause of evil but a *condicio sine qua non*. The person making an evil choice by abandoning justice, or valuing mere benefit higher than justice, may believe in some alleged advantage for himself (his *DB* remains effective)

38. This is true even if Anselm understands justice as an innate, natural desire as well.

but he doesn't understand the full consequences of his choice, namely that his per-willing "mere benefit" will make himself unhappy in the long run. Evil thus seems to be possible due to a false value-judgment which results from limited knowledge and reasoning.³⁹ Christian theology is adamant about the fact that the cause of sin cannot be evil itself (evil is seen as the consequence, not the cause of the inappropriate choice Adam made), but all human choices are made under the condition of imperfection.⁴⁰ The imperfection of the created world is not a consequence of sin but precedes it; the world is "from," not "of God" (Augustine, *De natura boni* 10). This imperfection here is precisely a cognitive issue: it is the acting person's unawareness of his proper purpose as a human being and as God's creature, or unawareness—i.e., lack of *direct* knowledge—of the final consequences of a sinful choice for one's true Happiness (he only knows that his choice is unjust). Anselm describes this ignorance which co-determines Satan's paradigmatic choice and without which he would never have done evil and thereby make himself "unhappy" (DCD 22f.).

It thus turns out that we may want to take issue with the very context of morality and eschatology which is so characteristic of Anselm's moral philosophy. Sinners are often ignorant of the fact that their moral choice is, *indirectly*, (1) a choice for or against God and (2) a choice for or against their own nature. At the same time, Anselm (like most of his readers) focusses on moral choice, although his initial definition of freedom transcends the realm of morality. This, it seems to me, is problematic not only for non-theist ethicists but for theologians as well.

PART 2: JUDGMENT DAY:

A DIFFERENT TEST CASE FOR ANSELM'S CONCEPT OF FREEDOM

2.1 *Morality and Eschatology: Evil as an Indirect Choice of God and Self*

1. Questioning Rogers' "Aristotelian" reading of Anselm, Visser emphasizes that he "is not an Aristotelian with respect to character formation" (Visser, 412); habituation doesn't seem to have a role in his

39. This is no determinist intellectualism since ignorance is not the cause but merely a—seemingly necessary—external condition of evil. Under different conditions, in a perfect world without cognitive deficiency, the distinction between voluntarism and intellectualism, determinism and indeterminism may not make much sense anymore (see below).

40. This is contrary to Anselm's claim that Adam was "without deficiency" (DC 3,13), although he is, of course, referring to Adam's happiness.

account of good and bad. Indeed, Anselm picks *Satan's fall* as his paradigmatic example when it comes to freely choosing between good and evil, which amounts to a once-and-forever “single primal” choice, and Rogers’ analysis of “character-formation” traces act-responsibility back to one decisive moment that determines a person’s character “forever” (FaS, 123.120 et al.).⁴¹ This is consistent with what Anselm says in DC 3,4: “having thrown away justice,” a person can never do anything good again (“unless God grants her the grace to do otherwise”). It is in this sense that she is *now determined* to be evil and “can only will badly and stupidly” (FaS, 119).

Evil choices are unfree because they don’t meet the *PSR*²-definition and result from a rational being’s loss of control over its own desires, but they are also determined because the evil person cannot be not evil since the loss of *DJ* is unrecoverable for the sinner and he therefore lacks the strength of will to persevere in times of temptation and steadfastly hold on to justice. Ekenberg (2016, 64) therefore cites Goebel who concludes that “Anselm is a voluntarist only with respect to good angels and human beings, whereas he is an intellectualist with respect to the morally bad.” More precisely, Goebel’s point is that Anselm’s “theory of acting is voluntarist and indeterminist in the case of the morally good person but intellectualist and determinist in the case of the morally bad person” (2006, 94). The evil person can, at most, be called free “in a very different sense” (105), for Anselm claims in DLA 3–4 that he *retains* the freedom described as *PSR*² but cannot *use* it anymore because he has abandoned justice and the motivation and strength to be just (cf. DC 3,13). It is indeed questionable whether it is even meaningful to call such a person free. It is, Goebel claims, nothing but the “appearance of responsibility” since the evil person doesn’t have any alternatives of acting properly speaking (118), and he points out that early readers of Anselm, like Hugo of Amiens, part ways with him on this point. Hugo “accepts Anselm’s

41. With the caveat that one must have reached moral maturity to make this choice. Note that the mere claim of indirect responsibility (tracing thesis) is in fact an Aristotelian idea. NE III 5 states that we are fully responsible for choices that may in themselves be involuntary but result from a previous, voluntary choice (e.g. committing evil in an intoxicated state). Aristotle’s point is twofold: (1) no one can exonerate himself from bad choices by blaming his character because it is a product of his choices. Rogers finds this view mirrored in Anselm (although there is indeed much less textual evidence for this claim than for the hierarchical model of the will). (2) Repeatedly doing bad things will form a bad character. This view differs from Anselm’s if all that counts is a single choice.

definition of freedom as the “ability to act in a morally good way” but teaches that the evil person doesn’t possess it anymore” (119).⁴² However, Goebel (2017, 126) also underlines “that Anselm consistently refuses to attribute a free will (*voluntas libera*) to the unjust.” Anselm’s understanding of the relationship between freedom and free choice (and free will) is even more intricate than is frequently seen. “All he does attribute to those who are not morally good is an (idle) capacity to keep justice . . . a capacity he calls the “freedom of decision” (*libertas arbitrii*)” (ibid).⁴³

This part of Goebel’s analysis seems nevertheless reconcilable with Rogers. He emphasizes that Anselm’s discussion of the power to preserve rectitude and resist temptation in DLA 5–7 only refers to *good* people (i.e., people with an upright will) (2006, 106⁴⁴). This may be true but doesn’t preclude that the exemplary account of evil choices Anselm offers in *DCD* (on which Rogers focusses) is still rooted in the logic of DLA’s definition of freedom as *PSR*² and its application to creaturely existence. Anselm himself points this out in his preface to the three dialogues when he says, “what I wrote about the bad angels was the heart of the question, whereas what I said about the good angels [in *DCD*] was a side issue.” More importantly, the choices of evil people are determined, but that is so *due to their own* self-determining primal choice. Libertarianism does not hold that nothing in the world is determined; it simply says that some things are determined due to choices that are in themselves indetermined. Rogers points out that Anselm assumes the same for sinners who have lost the ability to be non-evil by their own doing. Of true interest to us are not the individual—inevitably evil—choices evil people make, but how that first, free evil choice is possible (“first” in a temporal and

42. Goebel, therefore, “goes on to argue . . . that Anselm in the end fails to supply a theory of justice as a distinct source of motivation, and that his voluntarism about the good angels and men therefore risks collapsing into intellectualism all across the board” (Ekenberg 2016, 64).

43. Goebel takes issue with Rogers for translating both *voluntas libera* and *arbitrium liberum* as “free will” and sees similar equivocations in other English translations. But at least the difference between freedom (as *PSR*²) and free choice, or freedom of choice (e.g. *libertas arbitrii* [DC 3,13] which Goebel translates as “freedom of decision”), is, as we have seen, key in most accounts of Anselm’s moral philosophy. Kane moreover underlines Anselm’s distinction between two abilities: (1) to preserve rectitude and (2) to sin (cf. DLA 2). And the fact that those who have sinned don’t have a “free will” anymore should be obvious as well (see below).

44. Goebel here objects to the claim that Anselm “argues that no temptation forces *anyone* to sin unwillingly” (Williams/Visser, 9f.).

metaphysical sense). This is precisely the question Anselm and Rogers seek to address.⁴⁵

I emphasized, however, in the previous chapter, the role of a cognitive deficiency even in *that* choice. I contend that this condition in fact *limits* the freedom of choice. Ignorance is *not* a necessary condition of freedom (as Anselm and Rogers hold, referring, to be sure, to the moral freedom of creatures) and actually undermines Anselm's notion of "meritorious freedom" (Rogers 2002, 71); it is only a necessary condition of evil.⁴⁶ Ignorance and the randomness that comes with it are impediments for a truly free choice in the sense of *PSR*². Under the conditions of imperfection, it seems unreasonably and unfairly difficult for some to exercise this kind of freedom; it does not seem possible as a general human quality.

2. The issue of self-determination is even more pressing because of the *eschatological* relevance it has in Anselm: forming one's character through one choice also determines one's afterlife. Moral freedom is not just a matter of "co-self-creation" for rational agents but also of

45. Goebel *does* acknowledge this by distinguishing between a primary and secondary good and evil will (113f.). Only the primary evil will has absolute aseity and self-causality; i.e. the agent (Satan) has no other reason for his choice but his own will. It is only here, Goebel says, that creature's choice is totally independent from God (although he still gives existence to the agent and his will). But Goebel also acknowledges that Anselm recognizes a second, relative yet indetermined, form of aseity in good men and angels who preserve the justice they have received from God.

46. Ekenberg 2016 makes a similar observation. He frames the issue as a matter of voluntarism vs. intellectualism and argues that "construed as a theory of motivation, Anselm's account of the moral psychology of rational creatures is neither intellectualist nor voluntarist" (64). Ekenberg questions whether the role error and uncertainty play in Anselm's analysis of Satan's choice really qualify as the kind of contingency between knowing and acting voluntarism entails (71). He argues that Anselm is not an intellectualist either because ignorance is his requirement of virtuous choice and "knowing the right thing to do . . . does not suffice" (71). It seems to me, though, that Anselm's additional criterion of right choice—"willing in a certain way" (72) or for the right reason (cf. DV 12; this is again an Aristotelian qualification)—could be included in a revised version of intellectualism. Moreover, the dichotomy of voluntarism and intellectualism may be misguided anyways (see below). Anselm's voluntarism is, in any case, questionable if it is grounded in the mere belief that some choices, like Satan's fall, "cannot be explained by reference to what the agent knew or believed" (60f.) and if the reason for this consists in the conditions that make it impossible or difficult for the agent to have correct knowledge. In that case, a "reference to the agent's will" (61) is in fact *not* the only possible explanation of his choice.

co-self-redemption as opposed to co-self-damnation.⁴⁷ “Anselm . . . proposes that a single choice in the past might cast the die for all eternity” (AoF, 84). Humans earn the happiness that is beatitude through their moral performance.

This focus on a single moment in which man loses rectitude sounds like an account of original sin (Adam’s fall), and it certainly is at times (in DLA, DCD, DC, DCV). But it also serves as an account of *individual* responsibility for either sinning or holding on to justice. We don’t just live in a post-lapsarian world but also after the restoration⁴⁸ that has already happened in Christ. Christians, Anselm points out, participate in it through baptism (DCV 17, DC 3,8). Anselm doesn’t believe that they are all saved⁴⁹; he merely lays out the foundations for the ambivalent state of the human situation where good (through God’s original creation and Christ’s redeeming sacrifice) and evil (through Adam’s choice) are possible. Anselm addresses both the pre-lapsarian will and the issue of subsequent grace. DLA and DC, in particular, go beyond Adam and Satan’s fall and give an account of any *a se* choice one may and must make in order to prove one’s individual justice after the human nature has been restored in Christ. Rogers’ point is that it is still just *one choice* that counts.⁵⁰

47. This is different from Pelagianism where grace consists in the “natural endowments of freedom and reason” (AoF, 127). For a detailed discussion of freedom and grace, cf. Gibson 2014. He argues that Anselm’s approach remains unsatisfying and cannot reconcile human freedom “with God’s grace in making just creaturely agents.” For Gibson, retaining incompatibilism comes at the expense of “endorsing Pelagianism in some respects,” and the only alternative is to “endorse compatibilism and find another way to explain evil” (118f.).

48. The world as world has not been reconciled but the salvation of man has already happened through a restorative act of God (although the Bible may go even further: the world was created in Christ, Christ was before Adam, salvation thus seems to have been “before” the fall: Jn 1:1, Col 1:16).

49. Although there is a somewhat shaky logic to his argument that baptism alone may indeed be a sufficient condition of salvation but for infants only, and that mature adults also need to make a moral choice (DCV 23–24). In fact, much of DCV’s attempt to explain the logic of original sin and its hereditary nature seems problematic.

50. It seems, however, that Rogers allows—with DC 3,4 and 3,14—for subsequent restorative interventions of God’s grace which, although highly “miraculous” (cf. DLA 10), give agents, over and over again, a new chance to make the “one” character-forming and self-determining *a se* choice. But this would introduce an element of randomness and divine arbitrariness: is the single choice that counts simply the last one in a random series that ends with a person’s death? (Note, though, that Anselm even says that those who have rectitude only have it “separably” as long as they are alive: DLA 14).

But this one moral choice of self-determination or co-self-creation with eschatological relevance in an individual's life is preceded (1) by Adam's choice and (2) by God's gracious choice to send his son and thus restore humankind to its original dignity (cf. CDH, DCV 22). I suggest that (3) the individual's moral choice Anselm and Rogers focus on, if it is at all relevant, may be followed (or replaced) by another choice (4) which is independent of it or may correct and reverse it.⁵¹

The broader theological question is this: are we content with the idea that this world of cognitive and moral ambivalence is the arena in which the unconditionally loving father-God Jesus Christ proclaims submits each individual to a "test of freedom" so that we make that one character-determining choice (act from inordinate desires: DCD 4.7) in a state of unawareness regarding the consequences of our choice not just for *DB* and for the demands of justice but for our own purpose and *DH*? Are we satisfied with the idea that the lack of direct knowledge regarding the implications of our choice lets us abandon justice and lose the ability to exercise the "virtue" of freedom and self-perfection, and that God will then judge us accordingly and deny us that greater happiness of self-fulfillment for which he made us? I for one am not and in light of this will therefore suggest an alternative scenario.

3. Let it be understood that it is not Anselm's distinctive definition of freedom as *PSR*² that gives rise to theological problems. It is the other kind of freedom that is also present in Anselm's thought, namely, the free choice which in the case of creatures, he says, requires a PAP. This takes us back to the claim that *PSR*² combines the two notions of freedom and free choice into "one single definition" (Kane, 305). We have seen that Rogers' "unpacking" does indeed show that it is meant to cover the entire range of implications the idea of freedom has, at least in moral contexts.⁵² But I wonder how convincing the need for a PAP actually is if Anselm's distinctive definition really sets

51. It could also be argued that moral choice (3), as important as it is as such, doesn't belong in this schema which focusses on the God-man-relationship. I will highlight differences and similarities between moral choice and that other choice that may "follow" it (4), but my main point is that (4), not (3), fulfills Anselm's *PSR*²-definition. A chronology between (3) and (4) is therefore theologically valuable (as we shall see) but not essential to my argument.

52. Rogers' focus on the entailments of *PSR*² is mirrored by Gibson 2014 who clarifies "how freedom explains the possibility of injustice" and distinguishes between Anselm's "definition of freedom" and the "account of the conditions under which a subject is free" (93).

the standard for any discussion of freedom. As mentioned above, it was Frankfurt again who questioned the need of “alternate possibilities for moral responsibility,” and Rogers vehemently rejects this aspect of his account of freedom.

She points out that Frankfurt seems to confuse freedom of action with freedom of choice, external with internal freedom (AoF, 78ff.),⁵³ and focusses on the knowledge required for free choice. In CDH II 5, Anselm gives the example of a monk who “voluntarily keeps his vows” and stays in the monastery; for this choice to be praiseworthy it is irrelevant if external circumstances actually allow him to carry out the opposite action (leave the monastery). It doesn’t matter if he knows that he would be forced to stay should he actually try to leave. Rogers concludes that Anselm “explicitly rejects a PAP if the principle is about overt deeds . . . but when it comes to created choices, Anselm insists that there must be options” (FaS, 155).

My concern with the PAP is different from Frankfurt’s. Specifically, it stems from the underlying theological issue of Anselm’s insistence (which most of his readers and most theologians in general seem to agree with) that rational creatures have to prove their *PSR*² in the ambivalent state that characterizes the finite world after the fall, a world in which both good and evil are equally possible while at the same time the indirect, theological and theo-anthropological consequences of evil choices are clouded by ignorance. The moral-eschatological assessment of the human being which Anselm proposes reintroduces a certain imbalance between the two kinds of freedom in favor of the traditional view: freedom is, after all, to sin or not to sin, that is, the self-determined choice that makes the individual just or unjust. If we place much emphasis on the moment (and its irreversible consequences) in which justice is lost, our attention necessarily shifts from Anselm’s distinctive definition of freedom (*PSR*²) to the Augustinian understanding as choice between good and evil. At the heart of Anselm’s moral inquiry, at least on Rogers’ account, stands not freedom (*PSR*²) but the *freedom (free choice) to give up the ability to use one’s freedom by abandoning justice* and becoming a “slave to sin” (DLA 2.10ff.) and to one’s unrestricted *DB* (DC 3,11.13).

Should we not return to Anselm’s actual innovation, that is, the understanding of freedom as *PSR*²? Can we find a test case which allows creatures, too, to prove their *PSR*² without the need for a PAP? A

53. Rogers distinguishes between “overt acts” and choices, since “making a choice” can be considered as a (mental) act (FaS, 20).

change of perspective, away from the tracing problem that defines act-responsibility by looking into a person's past and towards a "future" choice may actually help avoid the problems raised so far. The test case I have in mind is what the Christian theological tradition calls "judgment day" and the choice or freedom that humans may have before God. I shall call this "judgment day freedom" (hereafter JDF, which, to be precise, in the following often refers to the *free choice* humans exercise on judgment day), and I suggest we identify it with *PSR*². It seems to me that the truly self-realizing choice Anselm has in mind—freedom as virtuous self-perfection—is only possible at that point.⁵⁴

4. It may sound peculiar that God's judgment should offer human agents a free choice. This notion, however, has become a commonplace in theology; it goes back to St. Paul's concept of a natural moral law which even the gentiles "know in their hearts" (Gal 5:11 and Rom 2:14–16⁵⁵). Luther, 53 maintains that people will actually be judged "by their own thoughts" and God will simply "assent to your own judgment about yourself and confirm it. . . . According to the *witness* of your *thoughts* and of your *conscience*, you therefore *deserve either heaven or hell*." Ratzinger (1978, 176) has expressed a similar thought: sinners are not "turned away by God" but "turn away from God."⁵⁶ Ratzinger sees this choice (which God will respect) as the ultimate fulfillment of human freedom, but I don't think it necessarily requires a PAP (i.e., the possibility of turning away from God).

It is against this conceptual backdrop that I shall place Anselm's definition of freedom in the context of the *doctrine of universal salva-*

54. It may be objected that this is highly speculative, but it is not more speculative than Anselm's focus on Satan's (or Adam's) fall. Recall that I don't intend to defend Anselm from modern misinterpretations. I rather think that his own "conflation" of theological and moral notions of freedom makes it difficult to preserve the greatness of his *PSR*² definition, and I propose to apply it in a different context.

55. "Indeed, when Gentiles, who do not have the law, do by nature things required by the law, they are a law for themselves, even though they do not have the law. They show that the requirements of the law are written on their hearts, their consciences also bearing witness, and their thoughts sometimes accusing them and at other times even defending them. This will take place on the day when God judges people's secrets through Jesus Christ, as my gospel declares." (Romans 2,14–16)

56. Cf. Augustine, *De libero arbitrio* II 20. C.S. Lewis has made a similar point in *The Great Divorce* (1945): people are in hell because they have chosen it (but they may be able to reconsider). I shall question the parameters of this choice (i.e., the supposed necessity to assume a "freedom to go to hell").

tion and reflect on JDF. This is where *PSR*² may have its proper place, not in the analysis of a moral choice which has indirect eschatological effects. If Anselm carries the idea of “choosing God” and one’s true self-fulfillment into his analysis of the will, and if “judgment” is all about a direct choice of God, both these ideas would require that such a choice not be made under the conditions of a clouded judgment but once the truth is fully “revealed” and the “veil of ignorance lifted” (cf. 2 Cor 3:14).

Furthermore, employing Anselm’s *PSR*² allows us to preserve the idea that the human person does in fact act freely on that “day” and makes a truly self-determined and self-determining choice. We can thus solve one of the biggest issues Christian theologians have with the doctrine of universal salvation: it seems to do away with free choice, for everyone is saved anyways, regardless of their moral choices and regardless even of that final choice for or against God. Indeed, universalism has gained a certain popularity among Catholic Church leaders as well.⁵⁷ The conflict between the concepts of universal reconciliation on one hand and freedom on the other hand only arises if freedom is understood in the traditional way as the ability to choose between good and evil. With Anselm’s *PSR*² there may be a chance to preserve human freedom against the backdrop of universalism.

2.2 Judgment Day and Anselm’s Notion of Freedom

1. Understanding freedom not primarily as a choice between good and evil, but as free choice *of* the good, as a free and liberating assent to the order of things according to the creator’s plan, allows us to gain a new understanding of the relationship between salvation and freedom, religion and morality.

Anselm emphasizes that the freedom for the good, whose use had been lost through sin, has become possible and desirable again because of the salvation Christ has brought. This is obvious in his moral works, as we have seen, though Anselm develops the theological background most prominently in CDH: through Christ, the human being has been “restored to its proper dignity” (CDH II 21). This is true for moral,

57. See, e.g., C. Murphy O’Connor, T. Bertone, and Pope Francis (e.g., in a reflection given during the General Audience on March 23, 2016). I am not discussing the doctrine of universalism and the controversies about it in this paper. I simply work on the assumption that it captures the theo-logic of unconditional love and use *PSR*² in the context of my theological own agenda (for a detailed discussion, cf. Göbel 2015).

character-determining choices, but it is even more true for the after-life-determining choice of JDF. Jesus himself is unequivocal about his role on judgment day: “And I, when I am lifted up from the earth, will draw all people to myself” (Jn 12:32). Recall that the divine judgment has little to do with the human notion of retributive justice (cf. Rm 3:21ff, Gal 3:6ff); it is rather the notion of “making just” (*justification*). The way in which this justification is brought about gives humans a role that may qualify as some sort of “parsimonious agent-causation.” It is not something God simply imposes on his creatures; on the contrary, they participate in it actively, through their freedom, without, however, falling into any form of Pelagianism. Paul’s and Luther’s understanding of God’s judgment is key in my proposal for using Anselm’s *PSR*² in the context of universal reconciliation. If it is true that humans should once be asked to judge themselves, I assume that, when they are “face to face” (1 Cor 13:12, cf. M 70) with the loving God whose love “trumps everything,” in the presence of Christ who *is* love, indeed everybody will “call on him,” as Paul says with that final act of salvation in mind (Rm 10:12), rather than choosing eternal separation from God.

2. I believe that my notion of JDF fulfills Anselm’s definition of freedom as *PSR*² and that it is largely compatible with everything he says about human and angelic choice in DCD and DC. There is, however, one passage that seems hard to reconcile with my proposal and casts doubt on the claim that JDF, as a “choice for God,” is actually *free*.⁵⁸

The passage, DCD 22–23 on Satan’s ignorance, has already been mentioned, but we need to look at it more closely now. Although Satan clearly knew that “he deserved (just) punishment if he sinned” because he knew what he ought to do (he still possesses the *DJ*), Anselm says that he cannot have foreknown for sure that he “would actually *be* punished.” The reasons Anselm considers include the fact that Satan may think he gets away with sinning, especially since there had been no precedence of divine punishment, or that God may first

58. Note that even for Anselm salvation is not a matter of *freedom* per se: sinners remain free, he says, but cannot be saved as long as they are in the state of having abandoned justice. Salvation is primarily a matter of *justice*, but Anselm believes that justice cannot be restored and man cannot be saved undeservedly. There are passages in which priorities seem to shift towards God’s forgiving power (salvation is not possible in the state of sin, but sin can be forgiven), but the “required justice” upon which salvation is contingent is usually merit-based (DCV 28, cf. DC 3,9.12).

want to punish him but may subsequently change his mind due to his merciful nature, not wanting “to damn his own creature.”⁵⁹ Anselm’s point is that, had Satan refrained from his sin because of this knowledge, he would have remained steadfast, and thus good, *but not free*. If he had had certain knowledge (seeing the final consequence of his choice), “as one who both willed and had happiness, he could not have spontaneously willed that which would make him wretched.” He would not have had a real choice: he “would not have been just for not willing for what he ought not, since he would not have been able to will it.” And refraining from sinning “out of fear of punishment” does not count as being just. Anselm therefore holds that Satan couldn’t have known for certain that God would punish him; he sins freely, thus abandons justice and so deserves his just punishment. This kind of ignorance is indeed a “necessary facet” in Anselm’s moral account “of angelic freedom” (AoF, 96).

My sketch of the choice a person makes on judgment day, in the presence of Christ, looks structurally similar to this hypothetical case of Satan having “before his eye” (cf. DLA 9) the real punishment that will inevitably follow as a consequence from his sinful choice. The question therefore is: can we be called free (and just) if we choose to be with God on judgment day because we see the reward in front of us? I think we can.

3. First, in the hypothetical case Anselm considers, Satan sees the consequences of a *sinful* choice. A bad choice, however, doesn’t complete one’s being and provide that other kind of happiness humans and angels were created for. There is an important difference between punishment for an evil choice and self-fulfillment through a good choice, namely, the choice to preserve rectitude for the sake of rectitude alone which, again, is not only the “per-willing” of justice over benefit through situations in which mere benefit seems attractive but also the per-willing of Happiness (the effective third-order *DH*) which fulfills the very nature of one’s being. There is an asymmetry between good

59. The passage shows that Anselm himself rejects universalism. He also shares Augustine’s idea of a perfect (limited) number of beings in heaven, with elect humans taking the places of fallen angels (DCD 5, DCV 17, DC 3,9, CDH I 16–18). Theoretically, however, this “perfect number” could include all humans.—NB: Universalism can easily be qualified by excluding Satan from final justification. The argument then emphasizes that humans will be saved precisely because they have already been saved in Christ, the God-man and new Adam (Anselm sees the same difference: fallen angels have not been restored by God).

and evil choices if the good end of a free choice is grounded in the nature of the being which makes the choice.

It seems in fact that Anselm sees a similar asymmetry between human choices and Satan's case. In DLA 9, he gives the example of a human agent who is aware of the indirect consequences his choice has in the long run (i.e., on the plane of eternity). Anselm discusses the case of someone who is threatened with torture and death if he "preserves the truth," and this person chooses to give us his uprightness in order to save his life (cf. DLA 5f.). Anselm's point is that he still makes a free choice. Although he didn't choose to be in that situation, he is not compelled to value his life higher (will it more) than the truth in that crucial moment of moral relevance. Anselm says: If the will "saw right before its eyes the eternal glory that it would immediately attain if it preserved the truth, and the torments of hell to which it would be given without delay if it lied, there is no question that it would quickly be found to have strength enough to preserve the truth" (DLA 9).

The moral assessment of the situation may sound rather harsh, almost cynical (although it is, again, quite Kantian in the radical view of what constitutes morality), and we may disagree with Anselm's account of the justice of the unconditionally loving father-God, but that is not the point here. Anselm seems to be implying that the person's choice would still have been "spontaneous" (*sponte*, i.e., free and *a se*, not compelled by an external force) even if he had possessed secure knowledge of God's ensuing judgment and if it had motivated him, through both *DJ* and *DH*, at the time he made his choice, thus siding with eternal glory over the preservation of his physical existence.

This brings us back to the cognitive issue of evil. Rogers acknowledges the exculpatory quality of "non-culpable ignorance" but insists that the "epistemic requirement" for moral responsibility is fulfilled in Satan's case because he "understands what he is doing and what the consequences might be" (FaS, 226). This is true, but it doesn't mean that seeing "the eternal glory before one's eyes" doesn't fulfill the epistemic requirement and fulfills it even more fully, thus enabling a person to make an even "freer" choice (cf. DLA 1.9). The consequences Satan is indeed aware of include the fact that his choice goes against the demands of justice, but the most important outcome of his choice is unclear to him (i.e., the indirect consequence of factual divine punishment and thus the fact that his choice will prevent him from achieving Happiness). Satan hopes to get away with his sin, but his reflection seems limited to the context of benefit and justice. He doesn't want to miss out on his Happiness; in fact, he doesn't even consider it. "No-one can will to plunge themselves into misery" (FaS,

227; cf. DCD 22–24). But it is most obviously an effective third-order *DH* that could prevent this from happening. Satan’s evil choice proves that he lacks sufficient knowledge to make a good choice.

This is not to say that his choice is unfree; we saw earlier that he knows enough to make a free choice. But I suggest to reverse Rogers’ argument (cf. FaS, 227): ignorance is the condition under which created natures normally make their (moral) choices, but it is not essential in making *a se* choices and required for freedom proper, which Anselm describes as *PSR*². If a created nature cannot see all the consequences of her choices, freedom as self-fulfillment is not possible, only a choice between good (justly sought benefit) and evil (mere benefit). Yet, freedom as self-fulfillment is, as we have seen, the ultimate meaning and goal of *PSR*² due to Anselm’s concept of *rectitudo* which is informed by his theo-anthropology.

Both ignorance and open options are conditions Anselm and Rogers regard as necessary ingredients of creaturely freedom, but that is because freedom (*PSR*²) is reduced to free choice again (PAP), a step which may seem warranted when taking into consideration the conditions of human reality where freedom (inner freedom) seems to exist in moral choices alone. It is a different issue, however, if we look at another moment and the kind of choice that transcends the finite beings’ existence on earth, at the transition from this world to the other world (JDF).⁶⁰

4. The fact that the ultimate reason of Satan’s choice (“but why?” asks the student in DCD 27) remains mysterious even at the end of the dialogue does not mean that there is *no reason* for his choice. Anselm insists that “in saying that he abandoned [justice] by willing what he ought not, I indicate clearly both why and how he abandoned it. He abandoned justice *because* he willed what he ought not to will, and he abandoned it *by* willing what he ought not to will.” This latter will, however, was not “preceded by any other cause except that he was able to will.” He willed it “simply because he willed it.” Rogers sees this answer as fitting with a libertarian account of choice. But the teacher’s answer only refers to “efficient causes” of creaturely acting, as Anselm

60. Note that, in moral contexts, unfree choices (in which someone harms himself by missing his own nature) are possible even if all consequences of one’s actions for *DH* are clear, but these choices may simply constitute pathological forms of human behavior (e.g., the weak will that gives in to an unsurmountable urge to do evil against my better knowledge that such a choice is neither in accordance with justice nor with *DH*; I could then “per-will to kill”: FaS, 230).

himself is quick to say. Satan's choice can still be explained in ways that seem sufficient to answer the student's question: Anselm refers to reasons already given, and that includes the Augustinian and Genesis account of original sin, namely desiring, in an "excessive," "inordinate" or "perverted" way "to be like God" (sin of pride: Gen 3:5; Augustine, *Confessiones* II and *De libero arbitrio* III 25.74–76; DCD 4). Satan feels the "desire to exalt himself in an inappropriate imitation of God" (AoF, 48); the actual good he desires can remain undefined.⁶¹ Anselm's reference to earlier parts of the dialogue recalls the disorder between *DB* and *DJ*. Putting benefit above justice (or letting himself be driven by desires that seek benefit without seeking justice), Satan disregards the purpose of aseity as a tool for justice and true Happiness, seeking in its place unlimited power. He wants to do everything and anything *a se*.

There is a difference between the motivational explanation of evil choice and the ontological explanation of the possibility of (moral) evil. On a libertarian account of freedom, only the choice itself can cause evil; there are no preceding factors. Anselm refuses to follow Augustine in "ascribing explanatory power to the nothingness" God created the world from⁶² and accepts the theologically problematic notion that "there are events in the world that are not caused by God but by a created being" which thus mirrors God's aseity (AoF, 12). This may seem to be a mystery, especially against the backdrop of the modern scientific paradigm which aims for a complete explanation of the world and all events in it with natural causes alone; but, as Rogers says, it is a "mystery [that] ought to be expected" (AoF, 105), for it is the mystery of creative power.⁶³

This account of evil does not, however, affect my hypothesis that, on judgment day, a final cause for one's acting—the "sight" and effect

61. Anselm says in DCD 6 he does not know what "advantageous thing" it was that Satan wanted ("unjustly desired") and the good angels "spurned" so that they "advanced." The specific object still falls under the unjust desire to be like God earlier identified as Satan's sin: "when he willed this thing . . . he willed inordinately to be like God" (DCD 4).

62. Augustine nevertheless uses a formula similar to Anselm's *PSR*² when he describes his motivation to *sin* ("choosing inequity for its own sake": *Confessiones* II 9), and Anselm agrees with Augustine that evil has no metaphysical status and is mere absence of good (DCD 11, DCV 5), so that moral evil is the non-realization of the order intended by God.

63. This idea doesn't do away with causality as such but introduces a form of agent causality which is not too different from Kant's goal (in his *Second Critique*) to prove the existence of a "causality from freedom," as distinct from natural causality.

of God and his love, or the “attracting” presence of Christ—does not prevent true freedom in the sense of *PSR*² as long as its efficient cause is the agent’s will and the proper order of its desires.

5. One may still *speak* of a last “judgment” in the traditional sense of an eschatological PAP, heaven or hell, understood as the hypothetical possibility of ultimate separation from God which results when humans turn away from him and reject his love and communion with him in heaven. But in the light of the unlimited, unconditional love of God, this possibility, we may hope, can barely become reality. Karl Rahner chose a similar approach in his attempt to come to terms with the notion of hell: he didn’t abandon the idea but said of hell that it was empty (Schumacher, 214). Or one could think of a combination of two theological models of judgment day: an open choice for some, who freely choose to be with God, while others may be compelled to choose God by his intervening grace if and when they fail to make this choice on their own. This hypothesis, which takes inspiration from Anselm’s own example of the unwilling monk (CDH II 5), does not diminish the freedom of those who choose God, although unbeknownst to them, actions resulting from a different choice (i.e., to turn away from God for all eternity) couldn’t become real.

Proponents of universalism could also give up the notion of any freedom on judgment day and refer to the irresistibility of grace. This doctrine and its various strands are controversial in the context of any reward model or “commercial theory” (L. Berkhof) of salvation precisely because it seems to diminish or abolish human freedom.⁶⁴ But theologians from Thomas Aquinas to Karl Barth are convinced that the eschatological moment makes it almost impossible to “escape God.” We are constrained to accept this revelation, “constrained not by the compulsion of force but by the compelling power of divine love exerted in our favor. We could evade force but we cannot evade love” (Barth, 387).

However, the effects of God’s restoring grace on judgment day can be understood in a slightly different and more intricate way which is in line with Anselm’s *PSR*² and allows us to hold on to human freedom in what I would call the most decisive moment in a person’s existence.

64. For a detailed discussion, cf. Göbel 2015, 68ff. and 172ff. Anselm does, of course, acknowledge the power of grace; his assertion that “the miraculous” does not do “any injury [to the natural and the voluntary] when it appears to supersede them, since they have nothing but what they have received from it” (DCV 11) could in fact be used to describe the universal grace of final justification.

6. Anselm is concerned about grace without merit, honor, order, and justice (DC 3,9 et al.). This is also why, in CDH I 12, he rejects the notion of atonement *sola misericordia*, a mere intervention of God's grace, and argues for God's mediating (re-conciliating) action which—through incarnation, Christ's obedience unto death, resurrection and victory over death, devil and sin—has restored the human condition (II 21). But it is precisely this idea that comes into effect when we use his concept of freedom to speculate about judgment day. Recall that Anselm distinguishes (in DLA 3–4, cf. DCD 12) between the mere *possession* of a capacity (*PSR*²) and its *use*. The possibility of the latter depends, among others, on external conditions; it is, therefore, a “mediated” reality, but it is nevertheless “self-determined” or “self-initiated action” (Kane, Williams).

On closer inspection, and considering Anselm's analogy with eyesight (I may not be able to see a mountain due to darkness or clouds or other impediments, but I still retain the power of vision), the act of justification on judgment day brings us back to the cognitive issue of “clouded judgment” in human choices: the all-outshining presence of Christ/divine love is like the light that dissolves the clouds or “lifts the veil” (2 Cor 3:14) and enables humans again to exercise the power of seeing, or that proper freedom for the good whose active capacity was lost through sin. The “light of faith” is, Pope Francis' encyclical *Lumen fidei* (no. 34) reminds us, “incarnate in Christ,” but it is not only present during our life; rather we may hope, with Paul, that its presence will shine and enlighten us even more on judgment day as well. Thus, what God does for man in his salvific grace is indeed a final “restoration of men to their original dignity” (CDH II 21), and moral goodness (justice) is not the *condition* for, but a possible *consequence* of salvation. The idea of universal reconciliation does not *deprive* humans of their last and greatest freedom but they are, on that “last day,” finally enabled to use their *PSR*² (again) and say yes to God.

This is not forced on them in a way that would preclude freedom by Anselm's standard of self-initiated action; it does not fall under the conditions that limit free will: “compelled by external force” or “bribed by some extraneous reward” (DV 12). It remains a human choice which is but motivated by the presence of Christ. “Irresistibility of grace” is, as I see it, a figurative way of speaking; judgment day grace doesn't *overpower* man but *empowers* him (again) to do what he ought (was meant) to do. Anselm may take issue with Augustine's compatibilist belief that, although “grace doesn't destroy the human will,” it still “changes . . . and . . . helps it” (*De gratia et libero arbitrio* 41; AoF, 34). But the only grace-effected “change” my account of

JDF implies regards the external conditions under which the creature is asked to make his choice: the veil of ignorance regarding the consequences of one's choices has been lifted through Christ's presence. The choice itself is still up to the individual. It is at this moment of final reconciliation that God's grace and the freedom humans were given by God work hand in hand.

Besides, there is, as it were, a "reward" involved for this choice (i.e., salvation) but it is not "extraneous;" rather, it is the fulfillment of man's innermost being, purpose, and dignity. This activation of one's "inherent freedom" (Saarinen, 45) translates into a voluntary act that chooses the good because the rational creature finally sees clearly again the natural order and telos of things, and acts from this understanding.⁶⁵

7. We may even be able to take this a step further and thus address the lingering issue whether, and in what sense, the judgment day choice can be called free. In human matters, necessity (unless it is consequent necessity⁶⁶) seems to prevent freedom, but God always acts with necessity and is still called free. The ontology behind this is: "God exists *a se*, and therefore all of his choices are self-caused . . . he is free without having options" (FaS, 266; cf. DLA 14, DCD 1, CDH II 10). Necessity, according to Anselm's theo-ontology, doesn't preclude freedom if it is the inner necessity that describes the natural explication of a being's essence, or essential (self-)perfection (CDH II 5.10.17, DV 8, DLA 8, DCD 12, DC 1,2-3, DCV 19, P 7 et al.). Anselm is of course speaking about God who is necessarily, yet freely, always all that he is. The same idea, however, also applies, to some extent at least, to man's JDF.⁶⁷

65. I am not arguing that, since grace and freedom happen simultaneously, the temporal order is suspended and thus a truly free choice is possible since the will is not effected by a preceding cause. Grace still effects the human choice. I am just arguing that the presence of Christ doesn't preclude but enables freedom. The inner condition of man is not altered, God only provides the external conditions under which man can be his actual self again. Christ's presence motivates the human choice; it is not Christ alone who acts; humans do indeed participate in their redemption by accepting and acting on grace rather than rejecting it. This *is* in line with more traditional church teachings on salvation, although it may differ from what Christ says in Jn 12:32.

66. Anselm discusses the various forms of necessity and the compatibility of freedom and God's omniscience in several works. For a detailed account, cf. AoF, 169ff.

67. It is here implied that the notion of essential freedom (freedom in the sense of self-perfection or simply perfection where, as in God's case, perfection is a state, not a process) is not self-contradictory and that it denotes a property of excel-

It is here that the conflict of desires, whether on the same order (as in Kantian readings of Anselm) or across orders (as in Frankfurtian readings), finds its final solution, for the goals of both desires Anselm describes in DCD coincide in the kind of happiness that the third-order desire I have suggested aims at, namely, Happiness attained through justice. So, Happiness is thus, after all, not merely a “consequent goal” or an additional goal that would supersede justice, but it is fulfillment of the rightness (*rectitudo*) of the natural order and, thus, of Anselm’s teleological theo-anthropology. All three desires of the will are now in harmonious order, and the created agent gains the complete happiness of “blessed immortality” (CDH Pr) through his choice. Man has not become god (he is still a creature); his freedom, however, at least in this one choice in which, directly and explicitly, he says yes to God, has been perfected in its proper essence which is divine or, as Anselm puts it, the “same for God and man” (DLA 1). *PSR*² is indeed, for creatures, a “potential perfection” (Goebel 2006, 117), but it can now become reality (cf. DLA 14). The kind of universalism which adopts Luther’s reading of Rm 2:14ff specifies that JDF allows *everyone* to exercise it, even “under conditions of creaturely existence” (cf. Goebel 2006, 116), although not (anymore) under the purported necessity of making a “moral choice for God.”

lence. Barnwell assumes (with T. Guleserian) that “contingent perfection of the will” through PAP is better than essential perfection because it is not as “easy.” But is the equation of excellence with effort or merit appropriate in a theological context? Isn’t it all-too-human, resulting from a conflation of moral and metaphysical categories? Anselm’s distinction between God and creatures *remains* meaningful. Simplicity is a key attribute of the divine in classical theology and it may come with a degree of easiness, but that is because God transcends the realm of moral normativity. The fact that perfection comes “easily” and “naturally” for God doesn’t show a lack of moral excellence but highest *metaphysical* excellence. Making good and free choices may be easier for a being that is good and free, but *being* essentially good and free is more difficult; it is a divine quality. Nevertheless, humans have some share in it. Still, Anselm makes a point that is somewhat similar to Barnwell’s. He seems to think that the happiness attained through one’s own efforts is more fulfilling and enjoyable (for creatures) than the happiness humans and angels were originally given (DC 3,13 et al.). He says the good angels had to merit the happiness they cannot lose anymore (DCD 25, cf. DLA 14), and he obviously assumes that Satan and Adam were willing to give up the paradisiac existence in God’s presence that should have given them complete happiness, still wanting to be “like the gods” (DCD 4, Gen 3:5; in DC 3,13, Anselm actually claims that Adam had complete happiness, although he also says that angelic happiness was greater]. Perhaps the only satisfying answer to these puzzles lies in giving up the idea that original sin describes a “historic” event or moment of choice and simply see it as an allegorical account of the human condition.

We saw earlier that Anselm holds there is only one definition of freedom and that he has theological reasons for rejecting Augustine's view of free choice. He thus arrives at his distinctive *PSR*²-definition of free will thinking of the divine being; it really is a theo-logical definition first, although it is then applied to created natures as well and "reduced" to moral choices (a moral PAP). The human choice, however, which I have described as JDF fulfills and perfects freedom in the sense of virtuous self-determination.

This also means that JDF may not require open options and thus fulfills the *PSR*²-definition without the need for an additional PAP. We have found a case which truly brings the two notions of freedom together: it is the "full-fledged freedom of choice [which] is the power of self-initiated action *for some good end*" (Williams/Visser, 8). It is, I think, this "full-fledged freedom" we are talking about when we reflect on judgment day following the theo-logic of unconditional love and universal salvation. Rogers no doubt succeeds in showing that Anselm sees a logical connection between *PSR*² and PAP; there is no inconsistency or undecidedness in his thinking, as if Anselm might "sometimes admit a freedom to choose between alternative possibilities but still comes back to the view that freedom is not being able to do other than as one does because freedom is doing what one ought to do for the sake of salvation (and loss of freedom lies in doing what one ought not to do)" (Luscombe 2006). It is nevertheless true that this latter view constitutes freedom at its fullest (and good people have it "inseparably after their death:" DLA 14), but Anselm continues also to identify it with the moral choice rational creatures are expected to make during their lifetime.

8. It should be abundantly clear by now: a possible objection that the above account of JDF does not fall under the category of moral choice strictly speaking is moot since that is exactly the point I am making here. Universalism reminds us that we should keep separate what Anselm (and others) merge together, often confusing the two: morality and eschatology. Created beings that have freedom participate in a divine quality; God is the epitome of freedom, but *his freedom is not* "morally significant freedom" (AoF, 14f.). *PSR*² is, as such, not a definition of morally significant freedom, and JDF is not a moral choice that has eschatological relevance. It does not demand an implicit, indirect choice of God and one's own happiness in a state of "obstructed sight," under the conditions of ambivalence, imperfection and cognitive deficiency. Rather, the matter at hand now is a direct choice of God, and its consequences are clear.

There is no torn condition anymore, no conflict of desires, no choice between selfish benefit and justly sought benefit. Or more precisely, a hypothetical PAP is, in fact, still conceivable but only on account of a radical voluntarism-turned-atheism which a pre-modern thinker would hardly have thought of: a “Nietzschean atheist,” who turns Anselm’s desire “to be like God” into the desire “to be God” and in his “will to power” cannot “bear not to be a god” if “there were any gods” (*Zarathustra* II 24), may consciously choose to turn away from God even when he sees God before his eyes and realizes that he will miss out on his higher fulfillment as a metaphysical being.⁶⁸ On principle, however, the choice to perfect and fulfill one’s very nature doesn’t require the polarized thinking of moral and metaphysical alternatives (i.e., an “either/or” between heaven and hell). JDF allows us to simply act on our *DH*.

The example of the Nietzschean atheist also shows that even though JDF may be motivated by *one* sole desire (although *DH*, not either *DB* or *DJ*), it is not a fully determined choice and unfree in the moral sense Anselm and Rogers discuss with created natures in mind (i.e., contrary to what Anselm says in DCD about the hypothetical case of someone endowed only with *DB* or *DJ*⁶⁹). For the agent acts “on one God-given motivation,” but he still has to give his rational assent and “will it through” to the end. The act of *pervelle* doesn’t require a torn condition per se. Even the non-moral, metaphysical self-choice of JDF may thus, in a way, fulfill the criteria of libertarian freedom and Anselmian aseity, that is, the “choice originates in the agent” and he “may have done otherwise” (AoF, 60). The question simply is what this choice consists in; can’t it just be a Stoic willing of something that would happen anyways, a conscious “let-it-happen” or “per-will it”?

68. This is different from the weak will considered above. We might call it “foolish” because one chooses to go against one’s very nature but it is more than the foolishness Anselm considers in P 2 where the fool (1) fails to understand (2) God’s nature and thus denies His existence. The example is also different from Anselm’s account of Satan’s case since it assumes full awareness of all consequences for one’s *DH*, including the actual punishment of eternal separation from God. The example finally calls into question Goebel’s claim that the “primary evil will” has true aseity due to the lack of any divine involvement. The choice of the Nietzschean atheist is an act of the primary evil will (even if it occurs at the end or after one’s earthly existence) which is still co-effected, although *ex oppositio*, by God.

69. This is, again, Anselm’s point in DCD: the fact that God endows rational creatures with *two* desires gives them the freedom to make *a se* choices. It leads factually to a PAP in human affairs, although a PAP is not directly included in the definition of freedom per se.

This calls into question a common form of dichotomy between (indeterminist) voluntarism and (determinist) intellectualism in two ways: (1) What is good may have been “decided by God” (Ekenberg 2016, 70), but the *acceptance* of Anselm’s value framework itself (i.e., the Christian theology-morality context discussed in part 1) can be seen as a truly free decision of the will. (2) The truth, once intellectually recognized (through reason and judgment), still requires some act of the will, a personal assent, to make it effective in one’s choices. This may take the form of “belief” which is “to think with assent.”⁷⁰ The idea seems unfounded that voluntarism needs to be anti-intellectualist if reason and will are oriented towards the truth; that, to be free and a “robust power and independent faculty,” the will needs to be able to go against “reason’s dictates” (ibid, 60⁷¹), especially if it is *DH* that motivates the choice. Reason here *serves* a desire; this *desire*, however, is not opposed to reason and its judgment that doing *x* is good and therefore ought to be done. Reason informed by *DH* recognizes choices that are not only just but also beneficial (having established the proper order between *DB* and *DJ*) and are therefore not opposed to choices that would bring mere benefit. I can only act in spite of this insight if I act “in spite of myself.”

The way in which Rogers uses *pervelle* in her account of Anselm’s moral philosophy can actually support the contrary argument I am making here: according to Rogers, Anselm’s view of moral choice is libertarian because the agent causes an *a se* choice, which is “absolutely up to him,” by “per-willing one God-given desire over another.” She takes it to mean “to will through to the point of intention” (FaS, 32). Is this not what Frankfurt sees as turning desire into volition, making it effective in determining one’s actions? Rogers explicitly rejects Frankfurt’s other claim that freedom simply consists in “harmony between first- and second-order desires” (90) because for her, libertarian freedom requires a PAP⁷²: “this per-willing occurs in a situation in

70. Augustine, *De praedestinatione sanctorum* 2,5; cf. Ratzinger 2005. John Paul II refers to this idea as the “personal dimension of the truth” (*Fides et ratio* 79). It applies to any form of truth, not only to moral and religious truths or personalized truths, e.g. Jesus Christ who for Christians is the “truth incarnate.”

71. Ekenberg also uses the word “autonomy” in this context, which seems acceptable if we add that the *nomoi* are set by someone else (God) and recognized by another faculty than the will (reason). Human “autonomy” is thus the act of taking ownership of those laws of being that transcend human powers; it is the translation of these principles into moral laws.

72. Rogers therefore objects to E. Stump who sees *Augustine* as a “qualified libertarian” and applies the hierarchical model to his view of free will: humans

which the agent is torn between genuinely open alternative possibilities” and desires two incompatible moral “objects” so that the per-willing of one entails overriding the desire for the other. Rogers’ main point, however, is that aseity requires no effective principle other than the acting person herself who “causes the non-determined choice . . . simply by per-willing (following through with), and that means without the introduction of any new sorts of causes” (32) and without any “additional causal power beyond the motivating factors preceding the choice” (96). Rogers’ critique of Frankfurt may be justified with moral choices in mind, but JDF, not being a moral choice, may not require a PAP. The freedom of rational creatures is mainly a matter of judgment regarding God’s natural order of things. Under the conditions of JDF, Anselm’s *PSR*² can fully coincide with Frankfurt’s non-binary self-identification. It is now possible simply as an act of rational assent to something that is recognized as self-fulfilling. It is a matter of self-identification with (and acting on) *DH*. No other “causal power” is required.

In short, the human being freely perfects the inner necessity that lies in his nature and seeks actualization. A choice that fulfills one’s purpose is, in some sense, both necessary and free if freedom consists in the power to “become what one is.” For humans this means that they let *DJ* determine and control *DB* and thus fulfill *DH*. This is *PSR*², and the conditions of JDF enable humans to practice it (again) and preserve justice, the rectitude of being, without the need for a moral PAP and indirect choice for or against God and self-fulfillment. According to Anselm, the main “point of freedom is to choose justice” (AoF, 61), and that is indeed, as I have tried to argue, starting from Paul’s and Luther’s view of divine judgment, what humans are asked to do and able to do on judgment day.

To be sure, created beings will never have absolute freedom; they are “thrown into being” (M. Heidegger) and have received, from God

choose inevitably because of a desire, but this desire is not determined by anything outside themselves. They choose, at a higher level, “to have the desires that leads” to the choice. But Rogers holds, if God is the source of desires (of any order), and if there is no provision for a torn condition, then the choice is determined after all (AoF, 40ff.). Rogers also objects to Stump’s “quiescence approach” to the problem of freedom and grace (which Tyvoll has applied to Anselm) because it assumes a “stasis” (the human will turns from evil on its own but cannot turn to the good, thus allowing grace to intervene) which “is not a positive benefit, but rather a not-willing.” But “then on Anselm’s understanding it cannot motivate.” And if it is something, “then the will of the created agent has chosen good on its own and initiated the process of salvation” (AoF, 137ff.).

or nature, all the tools they use in making their choices (i.e., the faculties of reason and will) (DCD 1 et al.). The libertarianism Anselm shares with Rogers is still different from any view that maintains human responsibility but sees God's grace at work not only in providing those tools but also in the act of choosing good over bad.⁷³ Anselm and Rogers hold that the *choice itself* offers some small space for creaturely freedom⁷⁴ and that this account applies to the various choices mentioned in this paper, namely, the choice that Adam makes for all humankind (which is reversed in Christ) and the individual's self-determination of his moral character. This is the realm of moral choice which is characterized by ambivalence and which also yields ambivalent results. Some make evil choices, others good ones.⁷⁵ I assumed the same kind of freedom for the "final choice" an individual has to make (JDF). Its additional, external condition (God's direct presence) does not change or limit human aseity. It is simply God's way of restoring, for the individual, the original capacity for goodness and Happiness that he had endowed humans with in the first place.

In order to further unpack the claim that this is true freedom, I qualify my above statement that self-choices are both necessary and free. The apparent contradiction may dissolve if we compare human and divine freedom again. The necessity of those choices is not a mere imperative that lacks logical necessity; it is not just a necessary condition *if* one wants to fulfill one's being. If the mind is, as Anselm says, a "mirror of God," we may apply what he says about creation to the sphere of human acting. God does not "have to" create but he nevertheless did so simply because his nature is love (cf. CDH I 18) and he always acts in accordance with his being. In a similar way, humans may not, strictly speaking, "have to" use their *a se* powers to choose, on judgment day, God and good (hypothetical PAP), but we may hope that they nevertheless will do; for they were "made to seek and love

73. This is, according to Rogers, Augustine's view (AoF, 30ff.108ff.). We may, in any case, want to remember that libertarian, compatibilist, and determinist theories all describe the same reality of a world in which humans are confronted with choices, and that all these theories, if they are developed in a theological context, seek to derive from their analyses hope for the other world.

74. Goebel 2006, 113 calls it "relative aseity."

75. This latter fact should not be overlooked; Anselm clearly thinks that there *are* examples of creaturely goodness, despite the fact that all humans are sinners, and he hopes that the monastic existence may be a path towards salvation. Anselm expresses this hope time and again in his letters, although he is often thrown back into doubt (cf. Southern, 215.447ff.).

God,” and are then able to see and live out their proper nature again (the hypothetical PAP is thus suspended).

2.3 Conclusion

I have stressed the importance of looking beyond the moral context Anselm himself focusses on in DLA and DCD and apply his distinctive *PSR*²-definition of freedom to the eschatological moment of eternal self-choice (JDF). Anselm helps us understand that it is not the potential choice to “turn away” from God that constitutes an integral part of the highest degree of human freedom; rather, it is the restored ability to turn towards God that fulfills the theo-teleology of the human nature and its freedom.

Note that my proposal does not touch on the more general questions of theodicy Anselm addresses: Why were humans not directly saved? Why is there all the hideous evil in the world? And I do not call into question the significance of human freedom in moral choices and its role in causing moral evil which may indeed be seen as the “price for the great good that is freedom” (AoF, 91).⁷⁶ The idea of universal salvation simply offers an alternative to the rather pessimistic thought that the evil humans cause in *this* world should continue in the *other* world and that the realm of divine eternity is equally divided into a dualism of good (heaven) and bad (hell). Universalism certainly has numerous practical—ethical and theological—consequences, and here is not the place to discuss them further. Suffice it to say that universalism may require Christians to be “over-human” and deal with something that seems outright “counterintuitive,”⁷⁷ namely, that we may have to separate morality from eschatology and dissolve the Anselmian nexus between eternal happiness and merit. Radical universalism does away with the idea of merit (be it moral performance or mere faith) as a relevant factor in God’s judgment (be it seen in the traditional way or with Paul and Luther). Yet, *everything* the all-loving God of the Christian Gospels does is “paradoxical” (G. Theissen) and may therefore seem “counterintuitive” but only, I must stress, by all-too-human

76. It is questionable whether any—compatibilist or libertarian—form of the free will defense offers a final solution to the problem of theodicy; a sufficiently satisfying answer may be found in a tradition that spans from Boethius to Leibniz and MacGregor (see Göbel 2015, 67.143.200).

77. Rogers 2002, 81 uses this word in her response to M. McCord Adams’ version of universalism.

standards, if, that is, human definitions of retributive justice, fairness and morality are used to do theology and describe the divine judgment. There is, in fact, a theo-logic to the paradoxical unity of love and omnipotence, of highest moral standards and absolute forgiveness, which characterizes God's being and his attitude towards mankind. The gospel of love is not illogical, and its logic is not only accessible to the human heart but also, by and large, to reason. It is to the credit of Anselm that he understood this well.⁷⁸

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78. This is an argument I have developed, in critical dialogue with Anselm's philosophical theology, in Göbel 2015.

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