Abstract

Abstract:

This paper discusses the question of whether a philosophical account of love can proceed independently of a judgment about the beloved’s value (qualities) or what promotes his or her well-being. I start by introducing a common philosophical problem of how one can love those who are not lovable. I use an example from Death on the Nile to show a different variety of love for an unlovable person. Christie’s narrative highlights nonjudgmental loyalty and equality between the lovers as its essential aspects. To show the distinctiveness of this loyalty-based notion of love, I pair it with accounts likely to be sympathetic to it.

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Additional Information

ISSN
1086-329X
Print ISSN
0190-0013
Pages
pp. 519-534
Launched on MUSE
2019-10-29
Open Access
No
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