The Fate of Human Action: The Agency of "Reason" in Modern Philosophy*

In this article, the author argues that the reason the problem of intentionality has persisted in contemporary analytic philosophy is because of an inadequate ontology of judgment and perception. This ontology stands in need of a corrective, so that we might render inferential practices continuous with other ways of relating to one's world. John McDowell has recognized this need, pointing out the almost incredible way in which, for instance, Robert Brandom claims that it is merely a contingent matter that discourse is bounded by perception and action, and that it could in principle exist without them. This isolative error common to contemporary analytic philosophy perpetuates the problem of intentionality and, therefore, agency. The article proceeds by showing how Alfred North Whitehead's aesthetic ontology can serve as a corrective. Whitehead's thought helps us to restore legitimacy to the idea of causal efficacy in perception—a crucial step toward a realist account of meaning and reference and, thereby, agency.